Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A father opposed the petition of his child's foster parent for guardianship. The child, a member of his mother's tribe, had been in the foster parent's care for about two years. The Office of Children's Services (OCS) took custody of the child in 2019 due to domestic violence and drug abuse in the mother's home. The father, living in Arizona at the time, was contacted by OCS after the child was taken into custody. OCS attempted to place the child with the father, but an Arizona home study recommended against it. The child was placed with the foster parent, a relative and tribal member.The superior court granted the foster parent's guardianship petition after an evidentiary hearing, finding it in the child's best interests and that returning the child to the father would likely result in serious emotional damage. The father appealed, arguing that the guardianship was a de facto termination of parental rights and required additional findings and procedural steps.The Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court to address whether OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). On remand, the superior court made additional findings on the existing record and reaffirmed the guardianship order.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion. The court held that the superior court made the necessary findings under ICWA, including that OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family and that guardianship was in the child's best interests. The court also clarified that guardianship proceedings do not require the termination of parental rights and can proceed independently of a Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceeding. The order appointing the guardian was affirmed. View "In re Protective Proceedings of Macon J." on Justia Law

Paul Grosz was injured while helping his friend Gregory Kisling hang a crucifix in Kisling’s home. Grosz fell from a homemade scaffolding when the wire holding the crucifix broke, resulting in significant injuries including broken ribs, a spinal fracture, and a traumatic brain injury. Grosz sued Kisling for negligence, and the jury awarded Grosz $1.2 million in noneconomic damages but found Kisling only 25% at fault, attributing 75% of the fault to Grosz.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, presided over by Judge Josie Garton, handled the case. After the jury's verdict, Grosz requested the court to determine if his injuries qualified for a higher statutory cap on noneconomic damages due to severe permanent physical impairment or severe disfigurement. The court denied this request, stating it was a jury issue that Grosz had not properly raised during the trial. The court then applied the comparative fault percentages, reducing the $1.2 million award to $300,000 (25% of $1.2 million). The court found this amount was below the $400,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages and did not reduce it further.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The main issue on appeal was whether the superior court should have first applied the statutory cap on noneconomic damages before apportioning fault. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the correct sequence is to first allocate fault and then apply the statutory cap if necessary. The court reasoned that this approach respects the jury’s role in determining the actual loss and aligns with legislative intent to cap a defendant’s exposure without further reducing an already capped amount. Thus, Grosz’s recovery of $300,000 was upheld, as it was below the statutory cap. View "Kisling v. Grosz" on Justia Law

A school principal used the school's printer after hours to create a coaster as a retirement gift for a friend. The coaster design contained the School District's official logo but altered the District's motto in a disrespectful manner. A custodian took pictures of the coaster, which were shared on social media, leading to public outrage. The principal left the community the next day. The District proposed to terminate him for incompetence and violating anti-harassment policies. After a brief pretermination hearing, the District terminated the principal. The principal appealed, and the Board upheld the termination following an additional hearing.The principal then appealed to the superior court, which also affirmed his termination. The court found that the District had grounds to terminate the principal due to substantial noncompliance with District rules and regulations and that the community's reaction to the coaster was reasonable. The court also rejected the principal's free speech arguments, stating that his speech was not protected under the First Amendment. The court acknowledged that the pretermination hearing process was flawed but deemed the error harmless due to the subsequent post-termination hearing.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that the Board had a reasonable basis to terminate the principal for incompetency under AS 14.20.170(a)(1) due to his inability to perform his duties effectively after the incident. The court also concluded that the principal's termination did not violate his free speech rights under AS 14.20.095 or the First Amendment. However, the court found that the pretermination hearing process did not provide sufficient due process, as the principal was not informed of his right to call witnesses. The court affirmed the termination but reversed the superior court's decision denying back pay, awarding back pay through the date of the Board's post-termination hearing decision. View "Stirling v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law

A husband and wife divorced after 19 years of marriage, with six children, including four adopted minors. The wife, a nurse practitioner, challenged the superior court's division of marital assets, particularly the valuation of the husband's law practice, which the court found lacked marketable goodwill. She also disputed the treatment of a $75,000 payout as a pre-distribution rather than interim support and the offsetting of adoption subsidies against the husband's child support obligation.The superior court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, held a four-day custody trial and a five-day property trial. The court awarded 50/50 shared physical custody and divided the marital estate 60/40 in favor of the wife. The court valued the husband's law firm based on its net assets, excluding goodwill, and found the Wasilla office building was not a marital asset. The court also calculated the husband's child support obligation but reduced it to account for the adoption subsidies received by the wife.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It affirmed the superior court's decision, holding that only marketable goodwill may be divided on divorce, and the evidence showed the law firm lacked such goodwill. The court found no error in the superior court's other decisions, including the pre-distribution in lieu of interim spousal support and the temporary adjustment of the child support obligation. The court also upheld the superior court's valuation of the law firm, the classification of the Wasilla office building, and the finding that the law firm had no excess cash. The Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award interim spousal support, in its treatment of post-separation earnings, or in its decision not to award long-term spousal support, above-guidelines child support, or additional attorney's fees. The property division, including the award of the marital home to the husband, was found to be equitable. View "May v. Petersen" on Justia Law

Seventeen-year-old Josiah Wheeler rented a cabin in Tok, Alaska, owned by Deborah Overly and Terry Summers. Wheeler was found dead in the cabin’s bathtub, and an autopsy revealed he died of acute carbon monoxide poisoning. A deputy fire marshal discovered that a propane water heater in the bathroom had an exhaust flue unconnected to any external venting, causing high levels of carbon monoxide to accumulate when the bathroom door was shut. The cabin was covered under a homeowners insurance policy issued by Garrison Property and Casualty Insurance Company, which included a pollution exclusion clause.Wheeler’s estate and his parents sought an out-of-court settlement with the homeowners, who notified Garrison of the claims. Garrison denied coverage, citing the pollution exclusion clause, and refused to defend the homeowners. The homeowners confessed liability and assigned their right to proceed against Garrison to Wheeler’s estate. The estate then filed suit against Garrison in federal district court, seeking damages and a declaratory ruling that the policy provided coverage. The district court granted summary judgment to Garrison, concluding that the pollution exclusion unambiguously barred coverage for carbon monoxide poisoning.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Alaska, asking whether the pollution exclusion in the homeowners insurance policy excluded coverage for claims arising from carbon monoxide exposure. The Supreme Court of Alaska concluded that an insured could reasonably expect coverage for injuries resulting from exposure to carbon monoxide from an improperly installed home appliance. The court noted that the policy’s broad definition of “pollutants” and the specific exclusions for lead paint and asbestos suggested a narrower interpretation of the pollution exclusion. Therefore, the court held that the pollution exclusion did not bar coverage for Wheeler’s death. View "The Estate Wheeler v. Garrison Property and Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A man on probation was subject to a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) requiring him to give a day's notice to security personnel before visiting the medical center where his former girlfriend worked. The woman alleged that the man violated this notice provision multiple times over three years, causing her severe emotional distress and job loss. The probation officer investigated the alleged violations but decided not to revoke the man's probation or penalize him.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, granted summary judgment for the State, finding no genuine issues of material fact, that the probation officer fulfilled her duty of reasonable care, and that her actions were shielded by discretionary function immunity. The woman appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment for the State regarding whether the probation officer fulfilled her operational duty to investigate the alleged violations. The court further concluded that the probation officer's subsequent decisions were shielded from suit by discretionary function immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment. View "Smith v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Robert Wills and Aniela Humphries, who share three children, divorced in January 2012. They initially shared physical custody on a 2/3-1/3 basis, switching to a 50-50 arrangement in January 2013. In November 2020, Wills refused to return their middle child to Humphries, prompting her to file a motion to enforce the custody agreement. The court found Wills had disobeyed the custody order and undermined the child's relationship with Humphries. It ordered a gradual transition back to 50-50 custody.Humphries sought attorney’s fees for enforcing the custody order, and the court awarded her $21,000, considering the parties' financial circumstances and the importance of the issues. Despite the court's order, Wills moved to South Carolina with the middle child and later sought to modify custody. The court granted him primary physical custody and modified child support, requiring Humphries to pay $1,070.89 monthly.Humphries requested an offset of the child support she owed against the attorney’s fees Wills owed her. The court granted the offset, finding that manifest injustice would result if Humphries had to pay child support while Wills owed her a substantial sum. The court determined that Wills still owed $15,641.09 in attorney’s fees and ordered Humphries to begin paying child support in March 2024.The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order, holding that the superior court has discretion to order an offset against child support if good cause exists and the offset is in the children’s best interests. The court found that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that manifest injustice would result without the offset and that the offset was in the children’s best interests. View "Wills v. Humphries" on Justia Law

A resident of Alaska filed a lawsuit challenging amendments to the State’s predator control program. The resident claimed that after the changes were implemented, she observed a noticeable decrease in the brown bear population at Katmai National Park, where she frequently visited to view bears. She argued that the Board of Game violated its constitutional and statutory duties by not providing adequate notice and opportunities for public input before adopting the changes, which expanded the program to target bears.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, dismissed the complaint, concluding that the resident lacked standing and was not entitled to a declaratory judgment on the validity of the regulatory change. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to the Board of Game and the Commissioner of the Department of Fish & Game.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and held that the resident had standing because she demonstrated an injury to her interest in viewing bears at Katmai National Park, which was sufficient to show standing. The court also concluded that she was entitled to a declaratory judgment on the validity of the regulation. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of her complaint, vacated the associated award of attorney’s fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bittner v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

A young adult with intellectual and developmental disabilities, referred to as G.J.F., moved to Alaska in 2021 and was referred by a homeless shelter to Volunteers of America Alaska (VOA), a nonprofit organization. VOA provided intensive case management support, including housing assistance and help with applying for government benefits. Despite initial resistance from G.J.F., a consistent therapeutic relationship was eventually established. VOA petitioned the superior court to appoint the Public Guardian as a full guardian for G.J.F., arguing that less restrictive alternatives were not feasible or adequate to meet G.J.F.'s needs.The superior court appointed a visitor and scheduled a hearing. The visitor's report and a neuropsychological evaluation indicated that G.J.F. had multiple mental health diagnoses and significant difficulties with decision-making and daily living tasks. The master recommended a full guardianship, but the Public Guardian objected, leading to an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, VOA staff testified about the extensive support they provided to G.J.F. and the limitations of their services. The court found that VOA's services were not sustainable and that G.J.F. needed decision-making support that only a full guardian could provide.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's order appointing the Public Guardian as a full guardian for G.J.F. The court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in determining that less restrictive alternatives were not feasible or adequate to meet G.J.F.'s needs. The court found that the record contained clear and convincing evidence supporting the need for a full guardianship, given G.J.F.'s significant vulnerabilities and the limitations of VOA's support. The court also noted that relying on the visitor's report, which was not admitted into evidence, was harmless error because the same information was provided through other evidence. View "In the Matter of the Protective Proceedings of G.J.F" on Justia Law

Dawn Maynor and Timothy Golden, who resided together in Alaska, moved to Oklahoma and then Louisiana due to Timothy's military transfers. They married in Oklahoma in 2017 and had a child in Louisiana in February 2018. The couple separated shortly after the child's birth, and in May 2018, they filed for dissolution of their marriage in Alaska, claiming Alaska residency despite living in Illinois and Louisiana. The superior court in Alaska granted the dissolution in August 2018, including a custody order giving Dawn primary physical custody and shared legal custody.Timothy later moved back to Alaska and, in September 2023, filed a motion to modify the custody arrangement, seeking joint physical custody. Dawn did not oppose this motion but instead filed a motion for relief from the 2018 custody order, arguing that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to decide child custody initially. The superior court denied Dawn's motion, concluding that Alaska was the child's home state due to the parents' claimed residency and the child's temporary absence from Alaska.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and determined that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make the initial child custody determination. The court found that the child had never lived in Alaska, and Louisiana was the child's home state within six months before the commencement of the dissolution proceedings. Since Louisiana had jurisdiction and did not decline it, the superior court in Alaska could not assert jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the superior court's denial of Dawn's motion for relief from judgment and vacated the original custody order due to the lack of jurisdiction. View "Maynor v. Golden" on Justia Law