Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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A general contractor, Keluco General Contractors, Inc., secured a workers’ compensation and employers’ liability policy through Travelers Property Casualty Company of America. The policy was set to last one year, expiring on March 5, 2017. After the policy expired, a Keluco employee was injured at work. Keluco attempted to make a claim on its workers’ compensation policy and discovered it had expired. Travelers claimed to have sent a notice of nonrenewal to Keluco and its insurance agent, Gretchen Santerre, but Keluco claimed it never received the notice.Keluco sued Santerre and her employer, Country Mutual Insurance Company, for failing to inform it of the nonrenewal notice. Santerre filed a third-party complaint against Travelers. The Superior Court of Alaska granted partial summary judgment against Travelers, ruling that it failed to send the nonrenewal notice in the manner required by statute, specifically by not obtaining a certificate of mailing from the United States Postal Service (USPS). The court found that Travelers breached its contract with Keluco.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings on summary judgment, agreeing that Travelers violated AS 21.36.260 by not obtaining a certificate of mailing from USPS and thus breached its contract with Keluco. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Travelers’ contribution claim against Santerre, noting that Alaska law allows for the allocation of fault to a party who has settled out of a case.However, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s determination of when prejudgment interest began to accrue. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest should begin to accrue on September 20, 2017, the date the Keluco employee was injured and entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, rather than January 9, 2017. The case was remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest. View "Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Keluco General Contractors" on Justia Law

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Three Alaska residents challenged the Division of Elections' process for certifying a ballot initiative for the November 2024 election. They claimed the Division violated regulations and statutes by allowing corrections to circulators’ certifications of petition booklets used to gather signatures. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Division and the initiative’s sponsors on this issue. After a trial on other issues, the court ordered the Division to reject some signatures and booklets but found enough valid signatures remained to keep the initiative on the ballot. The challengers appealed the summary judgment decision.The superior court ruled that Alaska Statute 15.45.130 allows corrections to circulators’ certifications after the petition is filed, as long as the corrections are made before the Division completes its signature-counting process. The court found that the statute’s language, legislative history, and intent support this interpretation, aiming to facilitate the initiative process and avoid disenfranchising voters due to technical errors.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that AS 15.45.130 permits corrections to certifications during the Division’s 60-day review period, even after the one-year signature-gathering deadline and the start of the legislative session. The court found that the statute’s plain language, legislative history, and purpose support allowing corrections to ensure voters’ signatures are counted. The court also determined that the Division’s regulations do not prohibit post-filing corrections and that the Division’s interpretation of its regulations was reasonable. Thus, the initiative remained on the ballot. View "Crow v. Beecher" on Justia Law

Posted in: Election Law
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A contractor hired a subcontractor to work on a remote bridge construction project. The scope of the work changed, and neither party kept detailed records of the changes and associated costs. Years after the project was completed, the subcontractor sued for damages, claiming unpaid work. The superior court found that the subcontract did not govern the extra work, awarded some damages to the subcontractor, and precluded some claims due to discovery violations. The court also found the contractor to be the prevailing party and awarded attorney’s fees. Both parties appealed.The superior court denied summary judgment motions from both parties, finding factual disputes. It precluded the subcontractor from pursuing certain damages claims due to insufficient documentation but allowed evidence for contingent findings. After a bench trial, the court awarded the subcontractor $191,443.42, later reduced to $146,693.42 upon reconsideration. The court found the contractor to be the prevailing party under Rule 68 and awarded attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case. It concluded that the superior court abused its discretion by precluding the subcontractor’s claims for snowmachine use and labor without considering less severe sanctions. The court affirmed the superior court’s findings on other damages but reversed the awards for Morris Johnson’s labor and boat use, remanding for recalculation. The prevailing party determination and attorney’s fee award were vacated and remanded for reconsideration. The court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Johnson v. Albin Carlson & Co." on Justia Law

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A man was injured while working on a man-made island in the Beaufort Sea, which served as an oil and gas drill site. In February, he drove a forklift down a ramp to unload cargo from a sled on the frozen sea. A colleague followed in a wheel loader, lost control, and collided with the sled and the forklift, crushing the man's leg. The man sued the companies owning and operating the island, alleging coverage under the Longshoreman and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) and maritime tort jurisdiction.The Superior Court of Alaska dismissed the man's LHWCA claims as unripe and ruled that the accident did not meet the two-prong test for maritime tort jurisdiction. The court found that the accident lacked the potential to disrupt maritime commerce and did not have a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activities. The court also concluded that the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Act (AWCA) barred the man from pursuing state law claims against the companies.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case. It held that the superior court properly dismissed the LHWCA-related claims, as eligibility for LHWCA benefits does not automatically establish maritime tort jurisdiction, and the LHWCA does not preempt the AWCA. However, the Supreme Court found that the superior court erred in its analysis of the maritime nexus prong. The accident had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce and bore a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activities, such as unloading cargo.The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the superior court’s dismissal of the maritime tort claims and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the accident met the locus prong of the maritime jurisdiction test. View "Beckwith v. ENI Petroleum US, LLC" on Justia Law

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Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, a debt purchaser, filed suits against three consumers, Jeannie Duvall, Allease Riddle, and Lorrena Terry, to collect past-due credit card debts. The consumers counterclaimed, alleging that Portfolio's debt-collection practices violated Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). The superior courts ruled in favor of the consumers on Portfolio's debt-collection claims, finding insufficient admissible evidence to prove Portfolio's ownership of the debts or the amounts owed. The courts also ruled in favor of the consumers on some of their UTPA counterclaims, awarding statutory damages and attorney's fees.In Duvall's case, the superior court granted summary judgment on her UTPA counterclaim that Portfolio sought unauthorized fees and charges, finding Portfolio failed to produce the original credit card agreement. The court excluded a late-disclosed witness and certain documents as inadmissible hearsay. Portfolio's contract claim failed due to lack of evidence. The court awarded Duvall partial attorney's fees under the UTPA and Rule 82.In Riddle's case, the superior court granted summary judgment on her UTPA counterclaim, finding Portfolio lacked standing to sue without proving ownership of the debt. The court awarded Riddle statutory damages and partial attorney's fees, reducing the award due to excessive litigation by both parties.In Terry's case, the superior court ruled in her favor on Portfolio's contract claim and her UTPA counterclaims after a bench trial. The court found Portfolio's conduct unfair and deceptive, awarding Terry statutory damages and full attorney's fees.The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior courts' rulings on the merits and statutory damages. It found no abuse of discretion in the evidentiary rulings or the exclusion of the late-disclosed witness. The court affirmed the attorney's fees award in Duvall, remanded the fees award in Riddle for reconsideration, and remanded the fees award in Terry for a minor correction. View "Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Duvall" on Justia Law

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A creditor and a debtor’s law firm both claimed settlement funds held by the superior court. The creditor had a charging order against the debtor’s distributions from a limited liability company (LLC), while the law firm had an attorney’s lien on the funds. In a previous appeal, the attorney’s lien was deemed valid, but the case was remanded to determine if the funds were LLC distributions subject to the charging order and the value of the attorney’s lien.The superior court ruled that the funds were LLC distributions and subject to the charging order. It also found that the debtor failed to prove any money was owed to the law firm for work performed, thus invalidating the attorney’s lien. The court mistakenly released the funds to the creditor, who returned them within two days, but was sanctioned with attorney’s fees for temporarily keeping the funds.The debtor appealed, and the creditor cross-appealed the attorney’s fee award. The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s rulings on the merits but reversed the attorney’s fee award. The court held that the funds were indeed LLC distributions subject to the charging order and that the debtor and law firm failed to prove the value of the attorney’s lien. The court also vacated the second final judgment and the attorney’s fee award against the creditor, finding no rule violation by the creditor. View "Baker v. Duffus" on Justia Law

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Erna Rousey transferred five real properties and nearly $225,000 in cash assets to her son, James “Jimmy” Rousey, Jr., in the last few years of her life. After her death, her estate sought recission of these transfers, alleging undue influence. The estate argued that Erna lacked the mental capacity to make the transfers and that they were the product of fraud, undue influence, or coercion. Jimmy contended that the transfers were valid gifts and that Erna had sufficient mental capacity.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, found that Jimmy maintained a confidential relationship with Erna and that the property transfers were the result of undue influence. The court concluded that the estate was entitled to recission of the property transfers and awarded attorney’s fees to the estate. Jimmy, representing himself, appealed the recission and attorney’s fee award, arguing that the transfers were valid gifts and that the court erred in its findings.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the recission of the property transfers. The court held that the estate provided clear and convincing evidence that Jimmy exerted undue influence over Erna, who was susceptible due to her diminished mental capacity, isolation, and reliance on Jimmy. The court found that Jimmy failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence and that the transfers were not gifts. However, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the enhanced attorney’s fee award for reconsideration, noting that the superior court may have improperly relied on Jimmy’s actions before the litigation started and did not sufficiently explain why Jimmy’s opposition to the petition was in bad faith. The Supreme Court instructed the lower court to reconsider the attorney’s fee award based on appropriate factors. View "In re Estate of Rousey" on Justia Law

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The case involves a former principal of a charter school, Emily Roseberry, who alleged that the school district superintendent, Pauline Harvey, overstepped her authority in violation of Alaska statutes and the governing charter school contract and bylaws. Roseberry was fired after making complaints about Harvey’s conduct to the superintendent, the board of education, and an independent commission. Roseberry initially filed suit in federal court, raising federal civil rights claims and a state whistleblower claim. The federal court dismissed her federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state whistleblower claim.Roseberry then filed suit in state court, bringing the whistleblower claim and three additional state-law claims: intentional interference with contractual relations, negligent supervision, and defamation. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by issue and claim preclusion. The superior court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Roseberry appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that Roseberry’s state claims were not barred by issue and claim preclusion. The court held that the federal court’s dismissal of Roseberry’s First Amendment claim did not preclude her whistleblower claim because the definitions of “matter of public concern” under the First Amendment and the Alaska Whistleblower Act are different. The court also held that Roseberry’s additional state-law claims were not barred by claim preclusion because the federal court would likely have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, given that it had already declined to exercise jurisdiction over the whistleblower claim.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the superior court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Roseberry v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law

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The case involves the appellant, Gregory Smith, challenging the Municipality of Anchorage's decision to abate unauthorized campsites in Davis Park. The Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) outlines procedures for campsite abatement, including posting a notice and allowing for an appeal to the superior court. In June 2022, the Municipality posted a notice in Davis Park, advising that the area was not legal for storage or shelter and that any personal property would be removed and disposed of as waste after ten days. Smith and five others appealed the abatement, arguing it violated due process and the Eighth Amendment.The superior court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Municipality that its jurisdiction was limited to reviewing the legal sufficiency of the posted notice, not the abatement decision itself. The court noted that the appellants did not challenge the notice's compliance with the Code, thus leaving no issues for the court to decide. The court also observed that the appellants' claims were not without merit and suggested that a civil suit could address their concerns.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court's jurisdiction was not limited to the notice's legal sufficiency. The court held that the superior court has jurisdiction to review the substantive decision to abate the campsite, including constitutional challenges. The court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration of the constitutional issues raised by Smith. The court also directed the superior court to determine if the administrative record was sufficient for meaningful appellate review and to take necessary steps to ensure it has an adequate record. View "Smith v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

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Yako Collins was convicted of first-degree sexual assault in 2009 and sentenced to 25 years with five years suspended. Collins requested referral to a three-judge sentencing panel, arguing that his lack of significant criminal history and good character warranted a sentence outside the presumptive range. The superior court denied his request, and Collins appealed.The Alaska Court of Appeals in Collins I identified two non-statutory mitigating factors that could justify referral to the three-judge panel: the defendant's lack of a history of unprosecuted offenses and normal prospects for rehabilitation. The court remanded the case to the superior court for reconsideration. While the case was pending, the Alaska Legislature amended the relevant statutes in 2013, explicitly rejecting these mitigating factors as standalone bases for referral. The superior court, applying the amended statutes, affirmed Collins's original sentence, and Collins appealed again.In Collins II, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 2013 legislative amendments merely clarified existing law and did not violate the ex post facto clause. The court held that Collins could not seek referral to the three-judge panel based solely on the factors identified in Collins I but could argue for referral based on the totality of circumstances.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the 2013 amendments could not be applied retroactively to Collins, as they were substantive changes to the law. The court emphasized the separation of powers and the prohibition on ex post facto laws, concluding that the legislature could not retroactively overrule a binding judicial interpretation. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the 2013 amendments were procedural or substantive. View "Collins v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law