Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A construction company chartered a barge and obtained insurance through a broker. Upon returning the barge, the owner discovered damage and sued the construction company in federal court. The construction company requested its insurer to defend it, but the insurer refused, citing lack of coverage. After the federal court awarded damages to the barge owner, the construction company sued the insurer and broker in state court, alleging breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and negligence.The Superior Court of Alaska denied the construction company's motion for summary judgment against the broker and insurer. The court granted summary judgment to the broker and insurer, finding that the construction company's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the construction company had not relied on any reassurances from the broker that would have delayed the filing of the lawsuit.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the construction company's claims against the broker were time-barred, as the statute of limitations began to run when the insurer first denied coverage. The court also held that the construction company's claims against the insurer were time-barred, as the statute of limitations began to run when the insurer refused to defend the construction company in the federal lawsuit. The court concluded that the construction company's claims were untimely and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the broker and insurer. View "Swalling Construction Company, Inc. v. Alaska USA Insurance Brokers, LLC" on Justia Law

A man was unable to purchase a firearm because a background check revealed he was subject to a long-term domestic violence protective order (DVPO). He sued the State, claiming he was no longer subject to a protective order as defined by federal statute and sought a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment to have the Department of Public Safety (DPS) notify a national database that he was no longer subject to a protective order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). He filed a motion for summary judgment, which the State opposed, filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. The superior court granted the State’s cross-motion, and the man appealed.The superior court found that the DVPO had not expired and remained a qualifying order under Section 922(g)(8). It also concluded that the man’s constitutional claims were not ripe because he had not initiated modification or dissolution of the order. The court entered a final judgment in favor of the State.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the DVPO remained in effect and was a qualifying order under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The court found that the legislative history supported the interpretation that DVPOs issued under AS 18.66.100(c)(1) are effective until further order of the court. The court also concluded that the man’s remaining claims were not ripe for adjudication because he had not attempted to dissolve or modify the DVPO. View "Eng v. State" on Justia Law

A plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the State, arguing that the statutory definition of "sustained yield" under AS 16.05.255(k) violates the Alaska Constitution’s sustained yield provision. The plaintiff contended that the legislature lacked the authority to define sustained yield and that the statutory definition contradicted the constitutional provision. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting the court to declare the statute unconstitutional and to enjoin the State from enforcing it.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, reviewed the case. The court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, which was based on res judicata and collateral estoppel, determining that the issues raised were not precluded by prior litigation. The court then granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the statutory definition of sustained yield in AS 16.05.255(k) complies with the Alaska Constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case on appeal. The court analyzed the plain meaning of the constitutional and statutory provisions, the intent of the framers of the Alaska Constitution, and relevant precedent. The court found that the legislature had the authority to define sustained yield in statute and that the statutory definition was consistent with the broad principle of sustained yield as intended by the framers. The court emphasized that the Constitution allows for legislative discretion in establishing management priorities for natural resources.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s judgment, holding that AS 16.05.255(k)’s definition of sustained yield does not violate the Alaska Constitution and that the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep. View "West v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

Carter K. was scheduled to be released from jail in October 2022 when a mental health professional filed a petition for his hospitalization for evaluation. The superior court granted the petition, and Carter was transported to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API). API staff then filed petitions to commit Carter for 30 days of treatment and to administer medication. Carter waived his presence at the hearings, and his attorney appeared on his behalf. The State presented two witnesses: Carter’s primary provider at API, a nurse practitioner, and a court visitor.The nurse practitioner testified that Carter was diagnosed with schizophrenia and exhibited severe psychotic symptoms, including delusions and disorganized communication. He opined that Carter could not meet his basic needs if discharged. The court visitor corroborated this, noting Carter’s inability to make informed decisions about his treatment. The superior court master recommended Carter’s commitment for 30 days, finding him gravely disabled and unable to function independently. The master also recommended the administration of three medications: olanzapine, lorazepam, and diphenhydramine.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. Carter argued that the superior court erred in finding him gravely disabled and in approving the involuntary administration of medication. The Supreme Court held that the superior court did not plainly err in finding Carter gravely disabled, as the nurse practitioner’s uncontested testimony supported this conclusion. The court also found no less restrictive alternative to commitment was available, as outpatient treatment would not meet Carter’s needs.However, the Supreme Court found plain error in the order for the involuntary administration of lorazepam, as the superior court did not adequately consider the required factors to determine if it was in Carter’s best interests and if no less intrusive treatment was available. The commitment order and the medication order for olanzapine were affirmed, but the order for lorazepam was vacated. View "In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of: Carter K." on Justia Law

A company that leased space to a government agency lost its bid to renew that lease to another landowner in a different zoning district. The new lessor requested the municipal planning department to approve the government agency’s proposed use of its space, which the planning department determined was appropriate for the property’s zoning designation. The former lessor challenged this determination by appealing to the municipal zoning board, which affirmed the planning department’s decision.The former lessor then appealed the zoning board’s decision to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The superior court, on its own initiative, questioned the former lessor’s standing to appeal. After briefing, the court determined that the former lessor was a “party aggrieved” and therefore had standing. On the merits, the court found the zoning board’s findings insufficient and remanded the case for reconsideration. The new lessor petitioned for review, which was granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that the former lessor’s interest as a business competitor was insufficient to show that it was a “person aggrieved” with standing to appeal a zoning decision to the superior court. The court held that a general interest in upholding the zoning plan is not sufficient for aggrievement and that the former lessor’s competitive interest did not meet the statutory requirement of being a “person aggrieved.” Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the former lessor’s appeal for lack of standing. View "Winco Anchorage Investors I, LP v. Huffman Building P, LLC" on Justia Law

A mother and son co-owned a property in Kodiak and hired an excavation company to build a retaining wall. The son made a $15,000 payment to the contractor by credit card. Disputes arose over the contract terms, leading both parties to sue each other for breach of contract. The superior court found that the contractor breached the contract and awarded damages to the mother and son, assuming the $15,000 payment would be reversed by the credit card company.The superior court's final judgment was issued on July 13, 2021. The contractor appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed several aspects of the superior court’s decision unrelated to the $15,000 payment. More than a year after the final judgment, the mother and son moved for relief from the judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b), arguing that the court mistakenly assumed the $15,000 charge would be reversed. The superior court granted relief under Rule 60(b)(1), finding it had made a mistake about the credit card payment and adjusted its damages award accordingly.The contractor appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion in granting relief under Rule 60(b)(1) because the motion was filed more than a year after the final judgment, making the delay unreasonable. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed, noting that Rule 60(b)(1) motions must be made within one year of the judgment and that this period cannot be tolled or extended. The court found that the superior court erred in tolling the one-year limitation period and that the Bishops' motion was untimely.The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order granting the Rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from judgment and remanded for disbursement of the supersedeas bond consistent with its decision. View "Red Hook Construction, LLC v. Bishop" on Justia Law

The City of Soldotna sought to expand its boundaries by annexing adjacent land and submitted an annexation petition to the Local Boundary Commission (Commission) for legislative review. The Commission, however, decided to convert the petition to a local vote, exercising its authority under a regulation that had not been previously used. Soldotna appealed the Commission’s decision, arguing that the Commission exceeded its authority, the regulation was invalid due to lack of standards and required rulemaking, there was insufficient basis for the decision, and the decision was internally inconsistent.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, upheld the Commission’s decision. The court found that the regulation under which the Commission acted was authorized by the Alaska Constitution and that the Commission’s decision to convert the petition was reasonable. The court held that the Commission acted within its statutory grant of authority and had a reasonable basis for converting the petition.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the Commission had the authority under the Alaska Constitution and relevant statutes to adopt the regulation allowing it to convert a legislative review petition to a local action petition. The court found that the regulation provided a standard by requiring the Commission to balance the best interests of the locality and the state. The court also determined that the Commission’s decision had a reasonable basis in the record, considering the public opposition to the annexation and the support for local action from the Kenai Peninsula Borough. The court concluded that the Commission acted within its discretion and expertise in deciding to proceed by local action. View "City of Soldotna v. State" on Justia Law

A mother sought to regain custody of her children, who had been living with their uncle and aunt in Canada for two years. The uncle and aunt opposed the return, arguing it was in the children's best interests to stay with them. Concurrent custody proceedings took place in Alaska and Canada, with Alaska ultimately asserting jurisdiction. After a custody trial, the uncle and aunt were awarded physical and legal custody of the children. The mother appealed, claiming the court made several legal and factual errors.The Alaska Superior Court found that it had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and consolidated the cases. During the trial, the court heard testimony from multiple witnesses, including the mother, the uncle, the aunt, and experts. The court found that the children were thriving in Canada and that returning them to their mother would be detrimental due to her erratic behavior and substance use. The court also conducted in camera interviews with the children, who expressed a preference to stay with their uncle and aunt.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to the uncle and aunt, finding that the children's welfare required it. The court also found that the Superior Court correctly applied the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requirements, determining that the placement constituted a "foster care placement" and that active efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. The court concluded that the expert witnesses were properly qualified and that the evidence supported the finding that returning the children to their mother would likely cause serious emotional damage. The custody and visitation orders were upheld as not being an abuse of discretion. View "O'Brien v. Delaplain" on Justia Law

Baxter Senior Living, LLC, an assisted living facility in Anchorage, Alaska, obtained an insurance policy from Zurich American Insurance Company covering various types of losses, including those caused by microorganisms. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Baxter implemented several operational restrictions and incurred additional costs. Despite these measures, the facility experienced COVID-19 cases among staff and residents. Baxter filed a claim with Zurich for loss of business income due to the pandemic, which Zurich denied.Baxter then filed a complaint in February 2022, alleging breach of contract and other claims, arguing that the presence of COVID-19 and related governmental orders caused a loss of use of its property, constituting "direct physical loss of or damage to" the property under the insurance policy. Zurich moved to dismiss the case, arguing that neither the presence of the virus nor the governmental orders constituted "direct physical loss of or damage to" property. The U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska certified two questions to the Alaska Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of this phrase in the context of the pandemic.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the certified questions and concluded that neither the presence of the COVID-19 virus at an insured property nor the operational restrictions imposed by pandemic-related governmental orders constitute "direct physical loss of or damage to" the property under a commercial insurance policy. The court emphasized that "direct physical loss" requires some physical alteration or deprivation of possession of the property, and "direct physical damage" requires a tangible alteration of the property. The court noted that the presence of the virus does not physically alter the property but merely attaches to it, and the operational restrictions do not cause a physical alteration or deprivation of possession. Therefore, the court answered both certified questions in the negative. View "Baxter Senior Living, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A man domiciled in Washington passed away, leaving a will that specified it should be administered according to Alaska law. He had married his surviving spouse after executing the will. The will devised property to the surviving spouse, his brother, and the National Kidney Foundation (NKF). The surviving spouse claimed statutory allowances and an elective share under Alaska law, arguing she was entitled to the entire estate as an after-married spouse.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, initially ruled that Washington law governed the surviving spouse's rights because the decedent was domiciled in Washington at the time of his death. The court held that Washington law, not Alaska law, determined the surviving spouse's entitlement as an after-married spouse. The court also awarded the surviving spouse a statutory spousal allowance under Washington law but denied her claim to inherit as an after-married spouse. The court granted attorney's fees to NKF and denied the surviving spouse's motion for fees.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that Alaska law should govern the interpretation and effect of the will, including the rights of an after-married spouse, because the testator had explicitly chosen Alaska law to administer his will. The court found that Alaska's after-married spouse statute pertains to the interpretation and effect of a will when the testator subsequently marries, and thus, Alaska law should apply. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision to apply Washington law and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court also vacated the Superior Court's attorney's fee award. View "In the Matter of the Estate of: Bentley" on Justia Law