Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A child with multiple disabilities was living with his adoptive parents and several adult siblings, including one sibling with severe mental health issues who engaged in violent behavior. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) became involved after incidents of domestic violence and reports that the parents were not sufficiently protecting the child. Despite OCS’s warnings and referrals to support organizations, the parents repeatedly allowed the violent sibling back into the home, exposing the child to further risk. Over several years, OCS provided rehabilitative services and created case plans requiring the mother to engage in parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, and measures to keep her adult children out if they were dangerous.The Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, initially placed the child in OCS custody and appointed a guardian ad litem. The Tribe intervened, and the mother stipulated at an adjudication hearing that the child was in need of aid. OCS continued to provide services and monitored compliance with the case plan, but the mother allowed the adult siblings, including the violent one, to return home. The mother partially engaged with required services but failed to demonstrate sustained protective capacity. OCS eventually filed a petition to terminate parental rights. At trial, testimony from caseworkers, experts, and law enforcement highlighted ongoing risks and the mother’s inability to remedy the unsafe conditions.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the termination order. It held that the Superior Court did not err in finding the child was in need of aid due to substantial risk of mental injury from exposure to domestic violence. The Supreme Court affirmed that OCS made active efforts to reunify the family, that the mother did not remedy the conduct placing the child at risk, and that returning the child to her custody would likely result in serious harm. The Court further held that termination was in the child’s best interests and affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling. View "Erin I. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

A married couple divorced after more than two decades together, having had four children during their marriage. At the time of their separation, two children were already adults, and the youngest two were still minors or in high school. The parties agreed to a bifurcated divorce, settling some issues but leaving child support and the division of marital assets unresolved. Key disputes included child support obligations for their adult daughter, who was intellectually disabled and living in an assisted facility, the classification of a $100,000 early inheritance received by the husband, and the equitable division of marital property, including responsibility for capital gains taxes after selling marital real estate.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, conducted a trial on these issues. The court found that the wife had primary physical custody of the adult daughter and ordered the husband to pay child support, both retroactively through the daughter’s graduation and ongoing support until she began receiving Social Security benefits. The court classified the $100,000 inheritance as marital property, in part because it was deposited into a shared account and used to pay marital debt. The court divided the marital estate unequally, awarding 55% to the wife, based mainly on her role as homemaker and the husband’s higher earning potential, and denied the husband’s request for reimbursement for post-separation expenditures on the property (Ramsey credit). The court also made the husband responsible for 55% of the capital gains tax liability.On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s rejection of the husband’s claims of judicial bias, its child support order, its classification of marital property, its denial of the Ramsey credit, and the overall division of the marital estate. However, it remanded for further findings on the allocation of capital gains tax liability, holding that the superior court must make additional findings explaining its unequal division of that debt. View "Cline v. Duckett" on Justia Law

A corporation operating sleep clinics in Alaska sought a favorable tax exemption available to certain small businesses under Alaska law, which incorporates standards from federal law. The clinic conducted diagnostic sleep studies for patients, often based on physician referrals, and maintained accreditation as an independent diagnostic testing facility. Its staff included certified polysomnographic technologists and a board-certified medical director who reviewed patient referrals and ensured tests were appropriate. The clinic marketed itself based on the expertise and training of its staff.After the clinic claimed the small business tax exemption for 2016-2018, the Alaska Department of Revenue denied the exemption in 2020, concluding the clinic performed services in the “field of health” and thus was ineligible. The clinic challenged this, first through an informal conference and then by appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The OAH upheld the denial, finding that the clinic’s operations—involving a highly trained medical director, certified staff, and significant interaction with patients—constituted services in the field of health. The OAH also determined the State’s denial was timely, interpreting the relevant statute to require assessment of exemption eligibility as of the first day of the tax year, not a decision by that date. The Superior Court affirmed, rejecting the clinic’s arguments and also finding that a later-issued IRS private letter ruling (PLR) did not alter the outcome, since it was based on different facts.On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The court held: (1) the State’s denial of the exemption was timely under the statutory framework; (2) substantial evidence supported the finding that the clinic performed services in the field of health, relying on the professional qualifications required, the medical director’s role, and the clinic’s patient interactions; and (3) the later IRS PLR did not bind the State or require a different result. The exemption denial was thus affirmed. View "Alyeska International, Inc. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

A father’s three children were taken into emergency custody by the Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) in 2019 while he was incarcerated in another state. After his release, OCS worked with him but ultimately petitioned to terminate his parental rights, primarily due to the length of his incarceration and concerns about his progress toward reunification. In January 2023, a superior court terminated the parental rights of both parents. The following July, one child, Serena, was adopted by her foster family, and the court closed her child in need of aid (CINA) case, releasing her into her adoptive parents’ custody.The father appealed the termination of his parental rights. In December 2023, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the termination order, finding OCS had not made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. On remand, the superior court reopened Serena’s CINA case but left her in the adoptive parents’ custody. The father was appointed counsel in the adoption case. However, more than one year after the adoption decree, the CINA case was declared moot at the request of the guardian ad litem, who cited Alaska’s statutory one-year limit on challenging adoption decrees. The father argued that the one-year bar did not apply because the adoptive parents had not “taken custody” of Serena and that his due process and right to effective counsel were violated.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the dismissal of the CINA case as moot. It held that the one-year statutory bar to challenging adoptions applied because Serena’s adoptive parents had taken custody. The court found no due process violation, as the father had notice, counsel, and opportunity to be heard, and rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding no constitutional deficiencies. View "Jonah B. v. State" on Justia Law

A father, originally from Iraq, moved with his children to Alaska after living in California. Following their eviction from an apartment, he and his son stayed at a campground. The Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) began investigating after reports of physical abuse. The son, then thirteen, described repeated abuse by his father, including beatings and injuries. A forensic exam confirmed evidence of physical harm. OCS took custody of the son and filed a petition alleging the child was in need of aid due to physical harm, risk of mental injury, and neglect.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, held hearings where an Arabic interpreter was provided for the father, although he mostly communicated in English. OCS developed a case plan that included domestic violence and mental health assessments, but the father did not engage with these services and eventually disappeared, later being found incarcerated in Florida. Despite efforts by OCS to maintain contact and locate both the father and the mother, who remained in Iraq, the father was largely unresponsive. At adjudication and termination hearings, the court found the child was in need of aid due to abandonment and parental incarceration. The court determined OCS had made reasonable efforts by offering services, attempting communication, and meeting the child’s needs.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the father’s appeal, which challenged the adequacy of OCS’s reunification efforts, specifically regarding mental health services and language accommodations. The court held that OCS’s efforts were reasonable, noting the father’s unwillingness to engage and absence, and found OCS made reasonable accommodations for language barriers. The court emphasized that OCS’s duty includes offering appropriate services and accommodations but does not extend to forcing an uncooperative parent to participate. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s termination of parental rights. View "Hamza B. v. State" on Justia Law

A newborn child was taken into state custody shortly after birth due to testing positive for addictive substances and requiring intensive medical care for withdrawal. The mother, who initially sought substance abuse treatment, was involuntarily discharged from her program for rule violations and aggression. After her discharge, she failed to participate in drug testing and further treatment, and disengaged from the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) for about a year. The child, considered an “Indian child” under federal law, was eventually placed in a foster home compliant with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The father was largely absent and uninvolved. After nearly the child’s entire life in state custody, the agency petitioned to terminate parental rights.The Superior Court for the Third Judicial District in Anchorage held a termination trial. The OCS presented testimony from a substance abuse expert and a cultural expert from the child’s tribe, as required by ICWA. The cultural expert, who was a tribal elder and had relevant experience, testified generally about substance abuse, the importance of child safety, and the parents’ noncooperation, but provided little detail about the tribe’s specific cultural standards as they related to the mother’s conduct. The superior court found clear and convincing evidence of risk of harm to the child, relied on the expert testimony, and terminated the mother’s parental rights.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska found that, although the expert was qualified, his testimony did not sufficiently contextualize the mother’s conduct within the tribe’s social and cultural standards, as required by ICWA. The court held that such testimony must be specifically grounded in the facts of the case and provide meaningful cultural context. Because this standard was not met, the Supreme Court reversed the termination of parental rights and remanded for further proceedings. View "Viva G. v. State" on Justia Law

Two parents, Ruby and Jaspar, challenged the termination of their parental rights to their two children, both of whom are considered Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) due to their mother’s tribal membership. Both parents had longstanding substance abuse issues, and the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) became involved after incidents of neglect, drug exposure, and unsanitary living conditions, including both children testing positive for opioids at birth and after the family’s eviction. The children were removed from the home and placed with relatives, while OCS provided the parents with case plans, referrals to treatment, visitation arrangements, and repeated efforts to maintain contact and assist with reunification.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, First Judicial District, Juneau, oversaw proceedings in which both parents stipulated to probable cause that their children were in need of aid. Over time, both parents disengaged from OCS and became largely unreachable, prompting OCS to increase its efforts to locate them through various means, including collaboration with tribal representatives, outreach at shelters, and the use of multiple databases. Despite intermittent contact and some attempts by the parents to reengage, the children remained in foster care for nearly three years while OCS continued providing services and support to the children and their caregivers.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, the parents argued that OCS failed to make “active efforts” to reunify the family as required by ICWA, and the mother further argued that the court erred in finding her continued custody likely to harm the children and that termination was in their best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination, holding that OCS made thorough and diligent efforts under ICWA, that the record supported the finding of likely harm if the children were returned to the parents, and that termination was in the children’s best interests. View "Ruby C. v. State" on Justia Law

A landowner and his neighbors disputed the location of a retaining wall built along their shared property line. The landowner, representing himself, claimed the wall encroached onto his lot and sought its removal and compensation. The neighbors, one of whom is an attorney, denied any encroachment and alternatively asserted that if any part of the wall did extend onto the landowner’s property, they had acquired that portion by adverse possession. The landowner relied on a survey and email evidence to support his claims, while the neighbors cited a prior survey and their continuous use of the area.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, oversaw the proceedings. The landowner filed several motions, including for admission of evidence, recusal of the judge, and a jury trial, but each was denied for procedural reasons such as untimeliness or failure to comply with court rules. The neighbors filed counterclaims, including one for adverse possession and another to quiet title. Discovery disputes arose, and the court compelled the landowner to comply and permitted the neighbors to enter his property for further survey work. At trial, the landowner repeatedly interrupted proceedings and disregarded the court’s instructions, leading to his participation being restricted to remote access and, after continued disruptions, his removal from the trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in removing the landowner from trial due to his disruptive conduct and that the award of attorney’s fees to the neighbors was proper. The court also determined that most of the landowner’s claims on appeal were waived due to inadequate briefing. The order of the superior court was affirmed. View "Humphrey v. Reges" on Justia Law

A mother gave birth to a child who was eligible for enrollment in an Indian tribe as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The mother admitted to using methamphetamine during pregnancy, which led to an initial report to state authorities, though the child remained in her care as he did not test positive for drugs. Several months later, the child was found unattended in a hotel room under the care of an adult suspected of being under the influence, prompting the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to take emergency custody. The father, who was incarcerated at the time, was identified and participated in early proceedings by telephone. Following his release, he attempted to engage in the case plan and visited his son, but over the next two and a half years, OCS assigned five different caseworkers to the family. The father experienced periods of incarceration, lapses in contact, and personal challenges, but he also took parenting classes, sought substance abuse assessment, and maintained some visitation.The Superior Court for the Third Judicial District, Anchorage, adjudicated the child as being in need of aid and later terminated the father’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment and substance abuse. At trial, the court found that OCS had made active efforts to reunify the family, relying on the preparation of a case plan, some referrals for substance abuse testing, and attempts to contact the father, even though it recognized that OCS’s efforts were not perfect, especially during periods of the father’s incarceration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether OCS’s actions satisfied ICWA’s requirement that “active efforts” be made to prevent the breakup of an Indian family. The court held that OCS’s efforts were passive rather than active because it failed to make necessary referrals, provide adequate support services, and consistently engage with the father. The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the termination of parental rights and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jace B. v. State" on Justia Law

After a brief marriage, the parties separated, and one spouse filed for a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) in early 2024. The superior court first granted a short-term protective order, and after several postponements and a hearing where both parties testified, granted a long-term DVPO in October 2024. Following this, the petitioner sought to recover attorney’s fees and costs totaling $29,448 incurred during the DVPO proceedings.The respondent objected to the motion for attorney’s fees, arguing that the petitioner failed to provide any itemized billing or evidence supporting the claimed amount. The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kodiak, denied the motion for attorney’s fees and costs, specifically noting the lack of documentation showing hours worked or costs incurred. The petitioner then moved for reconsideration, which the court denied without comment. The petitioner appealed the denial of attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the matter. It held that, although Alaska Statute 18.66.100(c)(14) permits awarding attorney’s fees and costs to a successful DVPO petitioner, the party seeking fees must provide itemization of claimed fees and costs if the opposing party requests it. The court reasoned that such documentation is necessary to confirm that the fees were actually incurred in the DVPO action and were reasonable. Since the respondent’s objection was a sufficiently specific and cognizable request for itemization, and the petitioner failed to provide any itemized billing or supporting documentation, the superior court did not err in denying the motion for attorney’s fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order. View "Emery v. Stone" on Justia Law