Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A credit union recorded a judgment lien against an individual, Troy Lewis, in January 2017. Several months later, the Alaska Department of Revenue, Child Support Services Division (CSSD), recorded a child support lien against Lewis’s property. Subsequently, a law firm acting as trustee initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure on Lewis’s property to satisfy a deed of trust held by a bank. After paying the bank, the trustee was left with surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale. Both the credit union and CSSD claimed entitlement to these surplus funds, with the credit union asserting priority based on the earlier recording of its lien, and CSSD asserting priority under statutes specific to child support liens and withholding orders.The District Court of the State of Alaska, Anchorage, ruled in favor of CSSD, finding that the statutory provisions governing child support liens and withholding orders gave CSSD priority to the surplus funds, despite its lien being recorded after the credit union’s. The district court also found that CSSD’s withholding order applied to the surplus. The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, affirmed this decision, relying primarily on the child support withholding order statute as more specific and therefore controlling over the general lien priority statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that CSSD’s withholding order was ineffective in this scenario because, at the relevant time, the surplus funds were not “due, owing, or belonging” to Lewis, as required by the statute. However, the court ruled that the statutory prohibitions on transferring property subject to a CSSD child support lien (AS 25.27.230(d)) do apply to judgment lienholders in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. This effectively grants CSSD’s lien priority over other judgment liens, regardless of recording order. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Alaska USA Federal Credit Union v. The Sayer Law Group, P.C." on Justia Law

A man who was not a member of a grand jury petitioned the Superior Court in Anchorage, Alaska, seeking to present information to a grand jury about alleged deficiencies and patterns of conduct within the Office of Children’s Services. He did not request a criminal indictment, but instead asked that the grand jury investigate certain matters of public welfare and safety. The Superior Court held hearings to clarify what he sought, but before the process concluded, the Alaska Supreme Court amended Criminal Rule 6.1, establishing a procedure for private citizens to submit concerns to the grand jury through the Attorney General.Following this amendment, the Superior Court vacated further hearings and instructed the petitioner to submit his request to the Department of Law as required by Rule 6.1(c). The petitioner did so and also appealed the Superior Court’s dismissal, arguing that the Alaska Supreme Court lacked authority to enact Rule 6.1(c) and that it improperly limited the grand jury’s constitutional powers.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska considered the appeal. Using independent judgment for constitutional interpretation and reviewing the dismissal as a grant of summary judgment de novo, the Court held that the Alaska Constitution gives it broad rule-making authority over judicial procedure, including grand jury matters. The Court found that Rule 6.1(c) does not impermissibly suspend the grand jury’s investigatory power, nor does the Constitution guarantee individuals direct access to the grand jury. The Court also rejected claims that the rule violated statutory or common law rights and found no procedural defects in the rule’s promulgation. Accordingly, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of the man’s petition to follow a different process. View "Garber v. Superior Court, Third Judicial District" on Justia Law

A city in Alaska amended its zoning code through an ordinance designed to streamline permitting processes, reduce costs, and encourage development. The planning department reviewed the history of conditional use permits and identified certain uses that could be changed to permitted uses across multiple zoning districts. This proposed amendment underwent a series of public meetings and hearings before the city’s planning commission and city council. Notices about these meetings and the ordinance were published, and the ordinance was ultimately adopted by the city council after public participation and minor amendments.A resident challenged the ordinance in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Homer, claiming the city failed to comply with procedural requirements in its code, did not provide adequate public notice, and that the ordinance lacked a legitimate government purpose, violating substantive due process. He also argued the ordinance was unenforceable and objected to the award of attorney’s fees to the city. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, finding no genuine issues of material fact, and awarded attorney’s fees to the city, concluding that the city was the prevailing party and the plaintiff’s constitutional claims were frivolous.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It held that the city code required only substantial, not strict, compliance with procedural rules and that the city had substantially complied. The court found the city’s public notices adequate and determined that the ordinance served a legitimate public purpose, rejecting claims of arbitrariness or vagueness. The court also upheld the award of attorney’s fees, finding no abuse of discretion, and concluded the constitutional claims were frivolous, thus not barring a fee award. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s rulings on all issues. View "Griswold v. City of Homer" on Justia Law

A mining company sought to develop an open pit gold mine in the Kuskokwim River watershed, on lands owned by Alaska Native Corporations. To operate the mine, the company needed state permits for a natural gas pipeline right-of-way across state lands and for water appropriations to dewater the mining pit and support operations. Local tribes objected, arguing that the mine and its associated infrastructure would have significant impacts on the watershed, which is culturally and economically important to them. The Department of Natural Resources approved the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits after considering the impacts of the permitted activities themselves, but not the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project.The tribes appealed the Department’s decisions to the Commissioner, arguing that both the Water Use Act and the Alaska Constitution required consideration of the cumulative impacts of the whole mining project. The Commissioner denied the appeals, finding that the Department was only required to consider the effects of the permitted activities themselves. The tribes then appealed to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage. The superior court affirmed the Department’s decisions, ruling that the agency was not required to conduct a cumulative impacts analysis of the entire mine project under either statute or the constitution.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether the Department was required to consider the cumulative impacts of the entire mining project when granting the pipeline right-of-way and water use permits. The court held that neither the Water Use Act nor the Right-of-Way Leasing Act required consideration of downstream effects of mining activity enabled by the permits. The court also held that Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution did not require the Department to consider the costs and benefits of developing private resources on private lands when deciding whether to grant permits for the use of state resources. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgments. View "Orutsararmiut Native Council v. Boyle" on Justia Law

A state agency, the Department of Family and Community Services (DFCS), leased office space from JBG Memorial (JBG) in Anchorage under a fifteen-year agreement set to expire in February 2023, with options to renew. As the lease neared expiration, DFCS applied for and received a waiver from the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOT&PF) commissioner to procure new office space through a single source process, bypassing the usual competitive bidding. DFCS informed JBG that it would not renew the lease and would vacate, but did not provide details about the new lease. JBG requested public records but did not receive them before the lease expired. DFCS remained in the property on a month-to-month basis until it entered a new lease at Anchorage Business Park. JBG received the requested records only after the new lease was signed.JBG filed suit in the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, seeking to enjoin the termination of its lease, void the new lease, and require proper bid procedures. JBG also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent DFCS from vacating. The State moved to dismiss, arguing JBG had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. JBG admitted it had not done so but claimed exhaustion was excused due to lack of meaningful access, bias, futility, and irreparable harm. The superior court dismissed the complaint, finding JBG had not pled facts sufficient to excuse exhaustion, and awarded attorney’s fees to the State as the prevailing party.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The court held that JBG was required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review and failed to establish any valid excuse for not doing so. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the State. View "JBG Memorial, LLC v. State of Alaska, Department of Transportation and Public Services" on Justia Law

An individual was admitted to a hospital after a medical emergency and, following treatment, was held for mental health concerns. Hospital staff petitioned for his transport to a designated evaluation facility, citing symptoms of serious mental illness and inability to make rational decisions. Although the court ordered immediate transport for evaluation, the individual remained at the hospital for two weeks due to lack of capacity at evaluation facilities. After a hearing, the court found this prolonged detention violated his substantive due process rights and ordered his release. However, the individual remained at the hospital for three more days, after which the hospital filed a second petition based on new information. The court granted this petition, and the individual was detained for an additional nine days before being transported for evaluation.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, first dismissed the initial petition and ordered the individual's release, finding the extended detention unconstitutional. Upon the hospital’s second petition, the court approved another period of detention, reasoning that new information justified the renewed hold and that delays were due to facility refusals and capacity issues. After the individual was finally transported and evaluated, the evaluation facility petitioned for a 30-day commitment, which the superior court granted following a hearing.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It held that the second period of detention, especially when considered alongside the prior extended detention, violated the individual’s substantive due process rights because the nature and duration of the detention were not reasonably related to the limited purpose of facilitating immediate transportation for evaluation. The court also found that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that commitment was the least restrictive alternative. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated both the superior court’s order upholding the second detention and the 30-day commitment order. View "In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of: Tavis J." on Justia Law

A longtime Alaska resident with extensive experience in personal-use and commercial fishing brought suit against the State of Alaska, alleging that the State’s management of chinook and chum salmon populations in the Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers violated the sustained yield principle mandated by the Alaska Constitution. The plaintiff claimed that the significant decline in these salmon populations since statehood was evidence of unconstitutional management. He did not challenge any specific policy, regulation, or action, but instead sought a declaration that the State’s management had been unconstitutional for decades and requested injunctive relief to compel the State to fulfill its sustained yield obligations.The Superior Court for the Fourth Judicial District, Bethel, granted the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court found that the claims presented nonjusticiable political questions reserved for the legislative branch, that the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury or identify specific State actions causing harm, and that deference to agency expertise was warranted in the absence of a challenge to a particular policy or action.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the claims for injunctive relief were nonjusticiable because they would require the judiciary to make initial fisheries policy determinations, a function constitutionally committed to the legislative and executive branches. The Court further held that the claim for declaratory relief was not justiciable because it would not clarify or settle the legal relations between the parties, as it did not identify specific actions or policies to be addressed. The Court concluded that, absent a challenge to a particular State action or policy, the claims did not present an actual controversy suitable for judicial resolution. View "Forrer v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

Several months before an election, complaints were filed with the Alaska Public Offices Commission alleging that two political groups, A Stronger Alaska and the Republican Governors Association, had violated Alaska’s campaign finance laws by coordinating with a gubernatorial campaign and failing to comply with disclosure requirements. The Commission initiated expedited proceedings, held hearings where officials from the groups testified, and then chose not to make a final determination on the alleged violations. Instead, the Commission remanded the matters to its staff for further investigation on a regular, non-expedited basis. The Commission’s staff subsequently issued administrative subpoenas seeking documents and communications from the groups, but the groups refused to comply.The Commission sought judicial enforcement of its subpoenas in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The groups opposed enforcement, arguing that the subpoenas were unnecessary because the Commission already had relevant testimony, that further investigation was barred by res judicata, and that the process violated their due process rights. They also challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme authorizing the expedited process. The superior court rejected all of these arguments, granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission, and ordered enforcement of the subpoenas.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the subpoenas were not unreasonable or oppressive simply because prior testimony had been given, as documentary evidence could still be relevant. The court also held that res judicata did not apply because the Commission had not issued a final decision on the merits, and that the process did not violate substantive due process or result in an absurd or unconstitutional statutory scheme. The court affirmed the order granting summary judgment to the Commission. View "Republican Governors Association v. Hebdon" on Justia Law

A fuel distribution company sought to acquire a competitor in Western Alaska, prompting the State to sue for anticompetitive conduct under Alaska’s consumer protection laws. To resolve the dispute, the State and the company negotiated a consent decree requiring the company to divest a portion of its fuel storage capacity in Bethel to another distributor, Delta Western, before completing the acquisition. The consent decree specified that it would expire in 30 years or could be dissolved by court order for good cause. Delta Western was not a party to the consent decree, but entered into a separate fuel storage contract with the acquiring company as required by the decree. The contract’s term extended beyond the initial five years at Delta Western’s option.Years later, the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Second Judicial District, Nome, dissolved the consent decree at the acquiring company’s request. The company then notified Delta Western that it considered the fuel storage contract terminated as a result. Delta Western filed a breach of contract action in Anchorage Superior Court, seeking to enforce the contract and arguing that its terms were independent of the consent decree. The contract case was transferred to Nome Superior Court, which issued a preliminary ruling that the contract remained valid despite the dissolution of the consent decree. The court also vacated its initial order dissolving the consent decree to allow Delta Western to intervene and present its position.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether dissolution of the consent decree automatically terminated the fuel storage contract and whether the superior court abused its discretion by permitting Delta Western to intervene. The court held that dissolution of the consent decree did not automatically void the contract between the parties, and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Delta Western to intervene. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decisions and lifted the stay on the contract case. View "Crowley Marine Services, Inc. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

The case concerns the repeal of a regulation that had banned the use of personal watercraft, commonly known as jet skis, in two designated Critical Habitat Areas (CHAs) in Alaska: Kachemak Bay and Fox River Flats. The Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) Commissioner originally enacted the ban in 2001, citing concerns about the potential impact of jet skis on fish, wildlife, and their habitats. In 2021, after a review process that included public comment and consideration of scientific literature, the Commissioner repealed the ban, reasoning that technological improvements had reduced the environmental impact of jet skis and that existing studies did not conclusively demonstrate significant harm in these specific northern marine environments.Conservation groups challenged the repeal in the Superior Court for the Third Judicial District, Anchorage, arguing that the Commissioner lacked statutory authority to repeal the regulation and that the repeal was inconsistent with the statutory purpose of protecting critical habitat. The superior court granted summary judgment to the conservation groups, finding that the Commissioner did not have the authority to repeal the ban and that the repeal conflicted with the purpose of the CHA statutes. The court reinstated the ban and awarded attorney’s fees to the conservation groups.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the superior court’s decision de novo. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner had both implied statutory authority and delegated authority from the Boards of Fisheries and Game to enact and repeal regulations governing uses within CHAs. The Court further found that the repeal was consistent with the statutory purpose of the CHA statutes, was reasonable, and was not arbitrary or in conflict with other laws. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision, directed entry of summary judgment in favor of the State, and remanded for further proceedings regarding prevailing party status and attorney’s fees. View "Department of Fish & Game v. Cook Inletkeeper" on Justia Law