Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State of Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Oil and Gas Division (DNR), petitioned the Supreme Court for review of a superior court decision that under AS 38.05.035, the lack of continuing best interest findings (BIF) at each phase of an oil and gas project violated article VIII of the Alaska Constitution and that the DNR must issue a written best interest finding at each step of a phased project to satisfy the constitution. Because best interest findings after the lease sale phase are not required under the Alaska Constitution or AS 38.05.035, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's ruling. Furthermore, the Court held that the State was constitutionally required to consider the cumulative impacts of an oil and gas project at its later phases. View "Sullivan v. Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands" on Justia Law

In May 2011, the superior court modified an existing child support order, specifying that the modification was to be effective as of March 2007. But because the motion requesting modification was not filed until February 2008, the superior court’s order constituted a retroactive modification. Furthermore, the superior court modified the child support award based on its finding that the father’s income exceeded the maximum amount specified in Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3(c)(2). Because retroactive modification of child support is prohibited and because the superior court’s determination of the amount owed did not conform to the analysis specified in Rule 90.3(a), the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s modification of the child support order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Swaney v. Granger" on Justia Law

A hotel worker fell and injured her back while cleaning a room. Her employer initially paid benefits, but it filed a controversion of benefits after its doctor doubted the accident’s occurrence and said any work injury was not the substantial cause of the worker’s continuing need for medical care. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided that the fall was the substantial cause of the worker’s disability, finding the worker’s testimony about the injury credible and the employer’s doctor’s testimony not credible. Based on the testimony of the worker and her treating physician, as well as an MRI showing a herniated disc, the Board decided that the injury was compensable. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission reversed the Board’s decision because, in the its view, substantial evidence did not support the decision. Because the Commission incorrectly decided the substantial evidence question, the Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision. View "Sosa de Rosario v. Chenega Lodging" on Justia Law

In 2008 a city promoted a police officer to chief. The city’s hiring determination and the officer’s subsequent conduct led four police department employees to sue the police chief and the city. The employees asserted several claims including wrongful termination, sexual harassment, and negligent hiring. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of the police chief and the city on all claims. The employees appealed several of the superior court’s summary judgment rulings, its denial of sanctions for evidence spoliation, and an attorney’s fees award in the city’s favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact barring judgment, and affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of both the employees’ hostile work environment sexual harassment claims against the police chief and the employees’ negligent hiring claim against the city. And because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery sanctions, the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling too. But because genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment as to the employees’ claims against the city for wrongful termination and sexual harassment, the Court reversed those rulings, vacated the attorney’s fees award, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mills v. Hankla" on Justia Law

Appellant Sidney Hertz, a prisoner sentenced in 1984, applied for an early furlough release in 2009 but refused to agree to comply with any furlough release conditions, arguing that imposing conditions that were not part of his sentence violated his due process rights and constituted double jeopardy. The Department of Corrections (DOC) denied the early furlough release, but he was released on mandatory parole shortly thereafter. Appellant subsequently sued two DOC probation officers, alleging they lacked authority to impose furlough release conditions and that doing so violated his constitutional rights. The superior court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, appellant challenged the superior court’s dismissal and attempts to collaterally attack conditions of his mandatory parole. "Because DOC probation officers are mandated by statute and administrative regulation to impose appropriate conditions on furlough releases without regard to conditions set in an original sentence, and because these mandates alone do not violate a prisoner’s rights under the Alaska or United States Constitutions, [the Supreme Court] affirm[ed] the superior court’s dismissal of this case." View "Hertz v. Macomber" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a deed that was absolute on its face should have been reformed into a security agreement. Appellant Kelly Griffin owned property near Wasilla. Beginning in 2005, Appellee Michael Weber paid Griffin rent for use of a cabin on the property. One of Griffin's business creditors sued her for unpaid debts; Griffin also owed Weber for a series of small loans he made to her over the years. Griffin planned to refinance her property in order to pay off her debts, but when it became apparent she could not personally qualify for refinancing, she asked Weber to cosign the refinancing note. The refinancing bank conditioned its loan on the property being titled to both Griffin and Weber. Weber granted Griffin a power of attorney concerning the property thinking it might be useful expediting the refinancing. However, the bank opted not to refinance the property. The parties turned to a credit union who agreed to make the loan. Griffin subsequently signed a quitclaim deed of her property, granting it to both herself and Weber. Griffin used the proceeds of the loan to pay an existing loan on the property, her business debt and the debt she owed to Weber. In July 2010 Griffin sought to again refinance the property, this time with her fiancee, Ed Grube. The credit union approved, conditioned on Weber relinquishing his interest in the property. When Weber refused, Griffin signed a quitclaim deed conveying Weber’s interest to herself. The deed and an attachment to it indicated that Griffin was signing Weber’s name under the power of attorney granted in January 2009. The credit union refused to proceed with the new refinancing based on this deed. Weber filed a complaint against Griffin, claiming that Griffin’s act of signing the quitclaim deed under the January 2009 power of attorney was fraudulent, a breach of Griffin’s fiduciary duty and her duty of good faith and fair dealing, and a conversion. He sought compensatory and punitive damages, a declaration that the deed signed by Griffin was void, and partition of the property as a one-half owner. The superior court found that Griffin breached her fiduciary duty to Weber by using the power of attorney to sign the quitclaim deed of July 2010 for Weber and ruled that the deed was invalid. The court also found that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the parties intended the 2009 deed to be a security device rather than a conveyance under which they would equally share a one-half interest in the property. Griffin appealed, primarily arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to reform the deed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that reformation should have been granted because both parties to the transaction testified at trial that the deed was executed for security purposes. View "Griffin v. Weber" on Justia Law

A jury found Ronald Brooks liable to his former brother-in-law, Timothy Hollaar, for the full amount of loans that had been memorialized by four promissory notes. On appeal, Ronald argued: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing Timothy to recover more than nominal damages, since Timothy was not the real source of the money and intended to pay any recovery to the family members who supplied it; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to make special findings of fact on Timothy’s promissory estoppel claim; and (3) that the trial court erred in naming Timothy the prevailing party. Because Timothy could lawfully sue to recover the loans, the promissory estoppel claim was properly submitted to the jury, and Timothy was the prevailing party, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Brooks v. Hollaar" on Justia Law

John Doe A and John Doe B were convicted of criminal offenses that required them to register and comply with Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA). Following their convictions, the legislature amended ASORA, requiring certain offenders, including both Does, to comply with additional registration requirements. The Does sued, claiming that retroactive application of ASORA’s amendments to them violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Alaska Constitution. The superior court agreed, and the State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the amended ASORA could not be applied retroactively: in 2008, in a two-to-one decision, the Court held that ASORA’s amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and did not apply to persons who committed their crimes before the amendments became effective. Two years later the Court promulgated Alaska Appellate Rule 106, which provided that any issue decided by a two-to-one vote would not have precedential effect. When the Court promulgated Appellate Rule 106 it was silent on the question whether that rule might have retroactive effect. By the Court's opinion in this case, that earlier two-to-one decision is now binding precedent that controlled the outcome of this case because Appellate Rule 106 does not have retroactive application. View "Alaska v. Doe" on Justia Law

Daniel and Luisa Burke owned a home in Anchorage. Nesavou Maka, Fungani Maka, and Alberta Maka were their next-door neighbors. A common driveway approximately 20 feet wide straddled the neighbors' properties. The Burkes wanted to build a fence down the middle of this driveway. However, a preexisting covenant to provide access granted the two lots’ owners reciprocal access to the common driveway. The Burkes filed suit to quiet title, seeking a declaratory judgment that the covenant was invalid and gave the Makas no legal right to use the Burkes’ portion of the driveway. The Makas asserted several affirmative defenses, including laches. Following a bench trial, the superior court found the Burkes used the driveway as shared; the Burkes were aware the Makas believed the driveway to be shared; and the Burkes caused the Makas prejudice by failing to object to the Makas’ visible use between 2004 and 2009. Based on those findings, the superior court ruled that laches barred the Burkes from challenging the covenant’s validity and dismissed the Burkes’ claims with prejudice. The Burkes appealed, arguing that the superior court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Because the superior court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and those facts supported the application of laches, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Burke v. Maka" on Justia Law

The center of this appeal before the Supreme Court involved a three-way transfer of boat tie-up spaces in a recreational subdivision. Specifically, the issue was whether the court erred in requiring the joinder of one of the people involved in the transfer as an indispensable party. The Court concluded that the court did not err because appropriate relief could not be afforded in the absence of the person in question. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the case was properly dismissed because the plaintiff refused to comply with the court's order requiring joinder. View "Weilbacher v. Ring" on Justia Law