Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tierice Coleman is the biological father of two minor sons, T.C. and J.C. T.C. was born in January 2000 to Elka McCullough, a woman with whom Coleman had a brief relationship. J.C. was born in March 2000 to Laura Bianchi, a woman with whom Coleman had a long-term relationship at the time of J.C.'s birth and with whom he was cohabitating at the time of trial. McCullough petitioned for child support with respect to T.C. Coleman did not contest that he owed support, but he argued that he should be allowed a deduction under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3(a)(1)(D) because he was currently living with J.C., the child of his relationship with Bianchi, and his relationship with Bianchi commenced prior to his relationship with McCulluogh. McCullough argued that because J.C. was born after T.C., Coleman should not be allowed the deduction. The superior court concluded that Coleman was not entitled to a deduction. Coleman appealed the superior court's ruling to the Supreme Court who affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Coleman v. McCullough" on Justia Law

A bar served a man alcohol while he was visibly intoxicated, and the man murdered a woman later that evening. The lawyer representing the bar in the subsequent dram shop action did not attempt to add the murderer as a party for apportionment of fault. Following entry of a large judgment against the bar, the bar brought a legal malpractice suit against its attorney. The attorney moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, arguing that where case law is unsettled, as a matter of law an attorney cannot be held liable for an error in judgment. The superior court granted the motion and the bar appealed. "Because the existence of unsettled law does not excuse an attorney from fulfilling a duty of care," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "L.D.G., Inc. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the court concerned whether monetary damages are available to a prisoner for violations of the terms of a judicial decree approving the "Cleary Final Settlement Agreement." In 2004 appellee Corrections Corporation of America contracted with the State to house Alaska inmates at Corrections Corporation's Red Rock Correctional Center in Arizona. Byran Perotti was an Alaska inmate at Red Rock. He filed a complaint against Corrections Corporation alleging that Corrections Corporation violated provisions of its contract with the State, as well as various State Department of Corrections policies. He asserted standing as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the State and Corrections Corporation. He based his argument on his status as a Cleary class member and the provisions of the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement, which settled the class action involving various inmate claims against the State of Alaska, Department of Corrections (DOC). Perotti's complaint sought liquidated damages under the DOC-Corrections Corporation contract, as well as compensatory damages, nominal damages, and punitive damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement did not contemplate the award of monetary damages to enforce its provisions. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court's decision granting Corrections Corporation's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Perotti's claims. View "Perotti v. Corrections Corporation of America" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her young son. The mother had a long history of substance abuse and relinquished parental rights to her older daughter in 2008 because she was unable to care for her. During the 18 months following the child’s removal, the mother continued to abuse drugs until she was incarcerated. At that point, she entered an intensive residential substance abuse program at the prison, which she successfully completed two weeks prior to the termination trial. In appealing the superior court’s order terminating her parental rights, the mother argued to the Supreme Court that the court erroneously: (1) denied her motion to continue the termination proceedings; (2) determined that termination was in the best interests of the child; and (3) failed to consider legal guardianship as an alternative to termination. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Hannah B. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Judith R. challenged the superior court's order terminating her parental rights to her son, "Dexter." The court terminated her rights based on her longstanding, unremedied mental illness. In its ruling on the record, the court sua sponte, directed the parties to consult with Dexter's therapist about the advisability of allowing continued contact between Judith and Dexter following termination of Judith's parental rights, but the court's written order made no mention of post-termination contact. On appeal, Judith challenged the superior court's finding that termination of her parental rights was in Dexter's best interests and the court's failure to issue a "detailed order regarding post-termination visitation." Because the court's best interests finding was supported by substantial evidence and because the court was not required to address post-termination contact in its termination order, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Judith R. v. Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

In 1999, the Alaska Board of Fisheries (the Board) made a use finding in the Chitina subdistrict for the first time, changing it from a "personal use" to a "subsistence" fishery. The Board reversed this decision in 2003, returning Chitina to a personal use fishery. The Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund (AFWCF) and the Chitina Dipnetters Association, Inc., after asking the Board to reconsider its 2003 finding in both 2005 and 2008, brought this suit to challenge the Board's negative customary and traditional use finding for Chitina. They claimed that the regulation used by the Board to make such a finding was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The superior court held that the regulation was valid and constitutional, but remanded for the Board to fully articulate the standard being used in its application of the regulation. It also instructed the Board not to consider "the per capita consumption of wild food in the home community of various users" upon remand. On remand, the Board codified a definition of "subsistence way of life," allowed the parties to submit evidence, and upheld its previous classification. Because 5 AAC 99.010(b) was consistent with its authorizing statutes, was reasonable and not arbitrary, did not violate the Alaska Constitution's equal access provisions, and was constitutionally applied when the Board made its customary and traditional use finding for the Chitina fishery in 2003, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the superior court's rulings. Because there was no indication that the Board actually relied on the per capita consumption of wild foods in the users' home communities when applying 5 AAC 99.010(b) and because that information could have been relevant to the subsistence inquiry, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the superior court's ruling. View "Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Five disabled Alaskans sued their former representative payee. At the conclusion of trial, the superior court awarded both compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiffs; it also entered injunctive relief against the representative payee as to both parties and non-parties. But it declined to enter other injunctive relief as to non-parties. Three of the plaintiffs appealed. They argued that the superior court failed to understand that non-party injunctive relief was available under Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act. Because the superior court actually entered non-party injunctive relief, the Supreme Court after its review of the case disagreed with the plaintiffs' characterization of the superior court proceedings and affirmed the superior court in all respects. View "Osbakken v. Whittington" on Justia Law

A worker at a fish processing plant was injured while on the job. His employer asserted that it did not maintain workers' compensation and that it was immune from suit, so the worker filed a negligence action in state court seeking reimbursement for medical expenses, compensation for lost wages, and attorney's fees. The superior court granted the employer's motion to dismiss on immunity grounds. Because the employer, an international organization, enjoys absolute immunity from suit and it did not waived this immunity, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Price v. Unisea, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Michael Cooper was involved in a car accident that injured Samuel Thompson. Thompson sued Cooper and Cooper's employer for damages. The jury returned a verdict for Thompson for compensatory damages but not punitive. The parties appealed the trial court's rulings on certain evidentiary issues, jury instructions and denied motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed most of the trial court's rulings but reversed: (1) exclusion of Thompson's treating physicians' opinion testimony on causation; and (2) denial of a jury instruction on additional harm. View "Thompson v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Victoria ("Vicky") Cox and John Floreske were married in July 1981. They separated in September 2007 and divorced in June 2009. During their marriage, Vicky and John amassed a highly illiquid marital estate including three businesses and two subdivisions. After a bench trial each party was awarded a mutual right of first refusal on all properties awarded to the other party. This right was personal to the parties and would not survive them. Vicky appealed the superior court’s denial of her motion for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)(4) and (5) arguing that: (1) the mutual right of first refusal is void under Civil Rule 60(b)(4); and (2) the superior court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to vacate the mutual right of first refusal under Civil Rule 60(b)(5). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to vacate the mutual right of first refusal under Civil Rule 60(b)(5). View "Cox v. Floreske" on Justia Law