Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska), the agent for the owners of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), leases the TAPS right-of-way from the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (Department). Alyeska appealed the Department's 2002 appraisal of the TAPS lease price to Michael Menge, the Commissioner of the Department, and then to the superior court. Both affirmed the Department's appraisal. Alyeska appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) the Department misinterpreted AS 38.35.140(a); (2) the Department was required to adopt its interpretation of AS 38.35.140(a) as a regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); and (3) the appraisal improperly included submerged lands within the right-of-way when the Department failed to establish that the State holds title to those lands. Finding no misinterpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The Department of Natural Resources restricted the non-winter use of large vehicles on the Rex Trail. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether these restrictions were within the Department's authority. Because the Department has broad authority to manage public lands in general and specific authority to manage rights-of-way such as the Rex Trail, and the restrictions did not violate any statutory limitations on this authority, the Supreme Court concluded that they were authorized. View "Caywood v. Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Helen S. K. and Samuel M. K. were married in 1990. Helen filed for divorce in December 2010, requesting sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties' three minor children and equitable division of the marital assets. Samuel counterclaimed, requesting joint legal and shared physical custody of the children. The superior court awarded joint legal custody of all three children, shared physical custody of the parties' two younger children, but awarded Samuel primary physical custody of the parties' oldest child. The court imputed income to Helen and required that she pay Samuel child support. The court divided the parties' marital assets equally and made other decisions concerning the valuation and distribution of certain marital assets. Helen appealed this decision on several grounds, including the use of in camera interviews, the primary physical custody award to Samuel, the imputation of income, the equal property division, and the valuation and distribution of many of the assets. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with respect to the court's valuation of one asset, but affirmed all of its other decisions. View "Helen S. K. v. Samuel M. K." on Justia Law

Siegfried Pedersen was convicted of assault and weapons misconduct. He brought a civil suit against the victims of those crimes, Daniel Blythe and Bobbie Luxford, alleging defamation and trespass. The superior court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of collateral estoppel. Pedersen appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erred when, in deciding the motion to dismiss, it considered matters outside the pleadings without advising Pedersen of its intent to do so and giving him a reasonable opportunity to respond. The Court held that this error was harmless with regard to Pedersen's defamation claims. The Court also held that it was plain error for the superior court to dismiss Pedersen's trespass claims, claims to which collateral estoppel did not apply. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment on the defamation claims and reversed and remanded on the trespass claims. View "Pedersen v. Blythe" on Justia Law

The question raised before the Supreme Court in two consolidated appeals was whether this certain provisions of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) applied to a person convicted in a single proceeding of two (or more) sex offenses. James Ward was convicted of two sex offenses in a single criminal proceeding. In a separate and unrelated single proceeding, Michael Boles was also convicted of two sex offenses. They argued that the pertinent statute, AS 12.63.020(a)(1)(B), was ambiguous, because it could be read to require convictions in more than one proceeding. They therefore reasoned that the rule of lenity requires that the ambiguity be resolved in their favor and thus that the statute be read to require them to register for 15 years, not life. They asserted that the Department of Public Safety, in requiring them to register for life, misread the statute. The men filed separate administrative appeals, which were assigned to two different superior court judges. One judge, reasoning that the statute is unambiguous, affirmed the Department's ruling regarding Ward. The other judge, reasoning that the statute is ambiguous and must therefore be read favorably to offenders, reversed the Department's ruling regarding Boles. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Department did not err; the statute, in requiring persons "convicted of . . . two or more sex offenses" to register for life, is unambiguous and cannot reasonably be read to condition lifetime registration on two or more separate convictions for sex offenses, or on any sequential or chronological separation between convictions. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court order that affirmed the Department's decision regarding Ward and reversed the superior court order that reversed the Department's decision regarding Boles. View "Ward v. Alaska Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute between three daughters regarding the administration of their deceased mother’s estate. The dispute centered around three documents: (1) a will executed in 1987; (2) a revised will the decedent allegedly executed in 2007 or 2008, which contained a clause revoking all prior wills; and (3) an exhibit that was allegedly an accurate (but unsigned) draft of the revised will. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that: (1) the decedent executed a valid will in 1987; (2) the decedent subsequently executed a revised will, but that will was lost; and (3) the revised will had revoked the 1987 will. Because an executed version of the revised will was never located, the superior court concluded it had been destroyed by the decedent, leaving her estate to be administered under Alaska’s statutory scheme for intestate succession. On appeal, one daughter challenged the superior court’s conclusion that the 1987 will was properly revoked. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the superior court to determine whether its finding that the revised will was properly executed is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The Court also remanded for the superior court to determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to overcome the presumption that the decedent destroyed her will. View "Dan v. Dan" on Justia Law

Before 2009, the Alaska Board of Game employed a controversial scoring system in order to distribute permits to subsistence hunters in a popular caribou and moose hunting area between Anchorage and Fairbanks. In 2009, the Board amended its regulations to abolish the scoring system and replace it with two separate subsistence hunts: a community harvest hunt for groups and a separate hunt for individuals. A local tribe was subsequently granted a community harvest permit pursuant to the new rules. An individual resident brought suit challenging the new system, alleging violations of the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act, his due process rights, the Board’s governing statutes, and several provisions of the Alaska Constitution. The tribe intervened on the side of the State and a private organization intervened on the side of the individual. In July 2010, the superior court granted summary judgment and enjoined the community harvest hunt as unconstitutional. The superior court later awarded attorney’s fees to the individual and private organization. The tribe appealed both decisions to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court concluded that the underlying appeal was moot because the challenged regulation had been substantively changed since 2009. Accordingly, the case was dismissed. View "Nene v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

After a van driven by Ralph Kermit Winterrowd II was damaged in a collision with a moose, the Alaska Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) proposed suspending Winterrowd’s driver’s license because he did not provide proof of liability insurance. Winterrowd opposed suspension and then filed suit to enjoin DMV’s suspension action. Treating Winterrowd’s opposition as a request for hearing, DMV scheduled an administrative licensing hearing. On motion by DMV, the superior court dismissed Winterrowd’s complaint. DMV suspended Winterrowd’s license after he failed to attend the licensing hearing. Winterrowd appealed the dismissal of his superior court complaint. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, because Winterrowd had not exhausted his administrative remedies at the time when the court dismissed his complaint. View "Winterrowd v. Alaska Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Diana Albrecht brought a class-action lawsuit against Alaska Trustee, LLC, on behalf of a group of Alaska homeowners who had faced foreclosure on their homes. Alaska Trustee, acting as foreclosure trustee, had provided Albrecht and the other homeowners reinstatement quotes that included the costs of foreclosure. Albrecht maintained that the inclusion of foreclosure costs in her reinstatement quote violated her right to cure under a former version of AS 34.20.070(b), the non-judicial foreclosure statute, which provided that a homeowner’s "default may be cured by payment of the sum in default other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or court costs actually incurred by the trustee due to the default." According to Albrecht, Alaska Trustee's inclusion of foreclosure costs in addition to "attorney's fees or court costs" constituted a violation of not only the non-judicial foreclosure statute but also Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). The superior court concluded that Albrecht lacked standing to sue and denied her motion for class certification. The superior court further ruled that Alaska Trustee's practice of including various fees and charges as foreclosure costs was permitted under the statute. The superior court awarded attorney's fees to Alaska Trustee as the prevailing party, enhancing those fees under AS 45.50.537(b) on the ground that Albrecht's claims were frivolous. Because the inclusion of foreclosure costs in a reinstatement quote did not violate AS 34.20.070, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in most respects. But because the Court concluded that Albrecht’s claims were not frivolous and attorney's fees could not be awarded under Rule 82 for time spent litigating the structure of a class action, the Court remanded for recalculation of fees awarded. View "Albrecht v. Alaska Trustee, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the division of property between a couple who had been in a relationship for 12 years but never married. The couple and their children resided in a home titled in the man's name. After they separated, pursuant to a domestic violence protective order, the man paid the mortgage while the woman lived in the home with the children. The man filed for custody of the children and the woman counterclaimed for custody and asserted that the parties' property should be divided by the court. The superior court found that the parties were in a domestic partnership and intended to acquire property as though married. It then proceeded to equally divide the property, but considered the post-separation mortgage payments a part of the domestic violence protective order and the equivalent of spousal support. Therefore it did not take them into account when dividing the property. The man appealed, arguing that the superior court erroneously concluded that the parties intended to be in a domestic partnership and that the superior court improperly failed to credit him for mortgage payments made after the separation. Because the superior court properly found that the parties intended to be in a domestic partnership and that the post-separation mortgage payments were made pursuant to a domestic violence protective order, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Reed v. Parrish" on Justia Law