Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal the issue before the Supreme Court was the superior court's valuation and distribution of marital property in the divorce of Carolyn Vieve Day and Charlie T. Williams. Day appealed on three grounds: (1) she contended that the superior court erred when it found her to be employable; (2) that the facts and equities of this case did not support a 50-50 property division; and (3) that the superior court should not have included in the marital estate funds that had already been spent by the date of trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded for additional findings on the superior court's 50-50 property division because the court did not make sufficient findings to explain why an equal distribution was justified in the presence of facts that appear to favor a greater distribution to Day. Furthermore, the Court concluded that it was error for the superior court to include in the marital estate funds that had already been spent by the time of trial. With regard to Williams, he cross-appealed on three grounds: (1) that the superior court erred when it revalued the parties' duplex after divorce; (2) that the court should not have applied the active appreciation theory when valuing the land on which the parties' paint business was situated; and (3) that the court should not have awarded attorney's fees to Day. The Supreme Court agreed with Williams that revaluing the duplex would have been improper, but because it was not clear whether the superior court actually revalued the duplex, the Court vacated the order to sell the duplex and remanded for reconsideration and clarification. Furthermore, the Court held that it was error for the superior court to award Day the duplex without considering whether she would be able to afford to keep or sell the property. As to Williams's remaining two claims, the Court affirmed the superior court's decisions. View "Day v. Williams" on Justia Law

A couple divorced in 2008, and the mother was granted sole legal custody and primary physical custody of their three children. At the time of the divorce, the superior court stated that if the father met certain conditions he could return to the court to seek modification of the child custody order. In 2009, he filed a motion to modify custody, seeking joint legal custody and increased visitation. The superior court, largely adopting a master's report and recommendations, left sole legal custody and primary physical custody with the mother, but expanded the father's visitation. The father appealed the superior court's 2010 custody modification order. Because the superior court neither committed clear error nor abused its discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the majority of the superior court's order. But because the superior court's order failed to explain why it did not order any changes to the father's visitation during the children's summer vacation, the case was remanded for further explanation regarding summer visitation. View "Jack C. v. Tally C." on Justia Law

A father and a mother share joint legal and equal physical custody over their daughter. The father sought to obtain a passport for the daughter, but federal law requires the consent of both parents if the child is under the age of 16. After the mother refused consent, the father brought a motion in the superior court requesting that the mother be ordered to execute a notarized statement of consent for the passport. The superior court denied this motion and the father appealed. Because the superior court abused its discretion in denying the father's motion, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Patrawke v. Liebes" on Justia Law

Loren J. Larson, Jr. was incarcerated at the Spring Creek Correctional Center in Seward. Acting pro se, he filed two separate complaints alleging violations of his constitutional rights. In his first complaint, he alleged that he suffers from paruresis, a condition that makes it impossible for him to urinate in the presence of others, and the correctional facility had violated state and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment by failing to accommodate his condition with alternative urinalysis testing procedures. His second complaint alleged that the correctional facility's revised visitor application form for minors violates his state constitutional right to rehabilitation because it is more restrictive than the administrative regulation governing visitation rights. Both complaints were dismissed for failure to state a claim under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals to address an issue common to both: the procedure for properly evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint of a pro se prisoner alleging constitutional violations. The Court took the opportunity to emphasize that a complaint must be liberally construed and a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is viewed with disfavor and should rarely be granted. Because both of Larson's complaints alleged facts which, if proven, were sufficient to entitle him to some form of relief, and because the Court found no merit in the arguments that Larson lacked standing or was otherwise barred from bringing a direct cause of action for these alleged constitutional violations, the Court reversed the dismissal of both of Larson's complaints. View "Larson v. State, Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Dennis Davison was convicted of sexually abusing his fourteen-year-old daughter, R.D. At trial, the doctor who performed a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) examination of R.D. testified to statements R.D. had made during the examination. Davison argued on appeal that the doctor’s testimony regarding R.D.’s statements was not admissible under Alaska Evidence Rule 803(4), because the examination was conducted primarily to gather evidence against him and not for purposes of medical treatment. Davison also argued that the trial court erroneously included in his presentence report statements R.D. had made during the sexual assault exam that pertained to offenses he was charged with but acquitted of at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the doctor’s hearsay testimony was not admissible under Rule 803(4), but held that this error was harmless with respect to Davison’s conviction. The Court remanded the sentencing issue to the court of appeals to consider whether the hearsay statements were sufficiently verified for inclusion in Davison’s presentence report. View "Davison v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. sued the City of Valdez for damages after Valdez applied for a grant from the State of Alaska for funding to convert Sea Hawk's seafood processing facility into a fish meal plant but then declined to accept the $600,000 grant that the State conditionally awarded to Valdez. On pre-trial motions, the superior court dismissed Sea Hawk's claims for breach of contract, breach of an agreement to negotiate, and breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith. Valdez and Sea Hawk filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Sea Hawk's remaining claim for promissory estoppel, which the court denied. Shortly before trial, the court dismissed Sea Hawk's promissory estoppel claim as a discovery sanction. Sea Hawk and Valdez both appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: Sea Hawk's claims were based on statements made and a letter sent by the Valdez City Manager to the owner of Sea Hawk. Because these communications, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Sea Hawk, were insufficient as a matter of law to support Sea Hawk's claims. The Court reversed the lower court's ruling denying Valdez summary judgment on Sea Hawk's promissory estoppel claim. View "Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. City of Valdez" on Justia Law

Offshore Systems – Kenai (Offshore) operates a commercial dock facility on Cook Inlet in the Kenai Peninsula Borough (Borough). Nikishka Beach Road traverses Offshore's property. The public has used this road to access the beach since the 1950s. In 2007 Offshore installed a gate blocking the road. The State and the Borough sought an injunction against Offshore, alleging a public right-of-way or prescriptive easement exists over Nikishka Beach Road. Offshore counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment quieting title to its property. The parties disputed the length and history of Nikishka Beach Road. The superior court concluded that Nikishka Beach Road provided public access to the beach on several alternative grounds. Offshore appealed the superior court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that a 1980 patent reserved a valid easement for public access to the shoreline of Cook Inlet. The Court held that the superior court had the authority to locate an easement over Nikishka Beach Road. The Court reversed the award of attorney's fees to the Borough. View "Offshore Systems - Kenai v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska dismissed an employee for allegedly submitting a falsified timesheet and claiming full pay for a week when she was not working. The employee argued her dismissal violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because a biased supervisor was involved with the termination decision, because the State's investigation was conducted unfairly, and because she was treated differently from similarly situated employees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision that there was insufficient evidence to show a breach of the implied covenant on any of these grounds. The Court also affirmed the superior court's ruling that the employee's unfair labor practice claim was untimely and therefore waived. View "Lentine v. Alaska" on Justia Law

"Jeffrey E." appealed his 30-day involuntary commitment order, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the superior court's conclusion that he was gravely disabled. In June 2011 Jeffrey was 20 years old, had recently lost his job due to behavioral difficulties, was in the process of divorcing, and was staying with family members. Jeffrey's family members became concerned about his behavior and brought him to a hospital. Jeffrey's family reported Jeffrey had not been eating, drinking, sleeping, or performing any self-care for several days- " he had more or less remained seated in a catatonic state," to the point of urinating on himself. Jeffrey's family also reported Jeffrey had made comments about others being able to read his mind, had responded aggressively to challenges, and had a family history of mental illness. Because Jeffrey was uncommunicative, hospital staff could not determine if he was actively psychotic. Although unable to articulate how he would behave differently, Jeffrey wanted to go home and "denied thoughts or plans of self harm or harm to others." Hospital staff concluded Jeffrey "may be experiencing symptoms of psychosis but it is difficult to assess" and that "[h]e could benefit from further assessment and stabilization . . . as it is possible he is experiencing psychosis." The superior court granted an ex parte order requiring Jeffrey's transport to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) for examination. A few days later API staff filed a petition for an involuntary 30-day commitment, and the court held a hearing on this petition. Because the superior court did not err in concluding that the respondent was gravely disabled under the required clear and convincing evidence standard, the Supreme Court affirmed the 30-day commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Jeffrey E." on Justia Law

Jeffrey Gorton and Stephanie Mann are the parents of a young son. When they divorced, the superior court awarded them a shared physical custody schedule and to calculated child support. This appeal arose from that calculation and from the amount the superior court allowed Jeffrey to deduct from his income for child support payments he was already making for his two children from a prior marriage. The superior court allowed Jeffrey to deduct from his adjusted gross income the actual amount of child support he paid to the mother of his two older children from the prior marriage. But Jeffrey claimed that he should receive a deduction for a hypothetical 27% of his income that caring for the older children would cost him if they lived with him full time and he did not have shared custody of those children. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision that Jeffrey was only entitled to deduct from his adjusted income the amount of child support actually paid for the children from his prior marriage under Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(a)(1)(C). View "Gorton v. Mann" on Justia Law