Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The superior court awarded Kelly Matson sole legal custody and primary physical custody of hers and Kevin Co's two minor children. Co challenged the legal and physical custody awards and the visitation schedule. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court engaged in a comprehensive review of the statutory best-interests factors, made clear and thoughtful findings of fact, and did not abuse its discretion, it affirmed the superior court's decision in all respects. View "Co v. Matson" on Justia Law

Michele Beach sued a clinic and its executive director, alleging that they had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by conducting an unfair investigation and unlawfully retaliating against Beach for her suggestions about improvements in security systems. Beach had worked for the clinic when the clinic's executive director concluded that prescription drug records had been systematically falsified and that Beach was responsible. The superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Beach appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Beach v. Handforth-Kome" on Justia Law

Conrad Brown and Tammy Wanner-Brown married in 1992, and divorced in 2011. A major issue of the divorce involved Conrad’s State of Alaska retirement medical benefits. Before the marriage, Conrad had briefly worked for the State at a time when all employees in his position were classified as Tier 1. After he married Tammy, he became re-employed with the State and completely re-earned his retirement benefits. Conrad was still classified by the State as Tier 1 because of his prior employment with the State. The superior court decided Conrad was a Tier 2 employee for purposes of valuing and distributing marital assets because "[t]he Tier 1 eligibility was earned prior to the marriage" and "[t]he marital assets . . . spent to allow the plaintiff to vest with the State of Alaska were no different for a Tier 1 than for a Tier 2." The court awarded Tammy the couple’s two rental properties and all of the marital debt, and ordered her to pay Conrad an equalization payment within a year. The court also ordered Tammy to refinance the two rental properties within one year to remove Conrad’s name from the titles and debt. Tammy appealed, arguing that: (1) Conrad’s retirement classification should have been Tier 1, not Tier 2; (2) the court miscalculated the value of the medical benefits even if they were Tier 2; (3) the court erred by not taking into consideration the cost of selling one of the properties even though the property division had the practical effect of requiring her to sell it; and (4) the court gave her an impossibly short time to refinance the loans on the rental properties. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the superior court erred by valuing Conrad’s retirement medical benefits as Tier 2 instead of Tier 1 and remanded the case back to the trial court to recalculate these benefits and reconsider its property division. The Court declined to reach Tammy’s other points on appeal. View "Wanner-Brown v. Brown" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Rollins purchased a beverage dispensary license (liquor license) in late 1990. She attempted to open a bar on a property she owned but was unsuccessful. Rollins appealed the superior court’s decision upholding the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board’s determination to deny her application for a waiver of the annual operating requirement for her liquor license. On appeal, Rollins argued that: (1) the Board’s decision was not supported by the evidence; (2) she was improperly assigned the burden of proof; (3) the hearing before the administrative law judge violated her right to due process; and (4) the Board’s selective enforcement of its statutes violated her right to equal protection. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rollins properly bore the burden of proof on the issue of whether she was entitled to a waiver, that the record supported the Board’s decision, and that the Board proceedings did not violate her constitutional rights. View "Rollins v. Alaska Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Irma E. asked the State Office of Children’s Services to place her granddaughters with her, but OCS denied her request. Irma repeatedly asked the superior court to hold a hearing to review OCS's decision, but the superior court denied Irma’s requests for a hearing. Based on AS 47.14.100(m), the Supreme Court concluded that a family member who has been denied placement of a child in OCS’s custody is entitled to a review hearing to contest the OCS placement decision. View "Irma E. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Cynthia and David Fernandez married in 1979 and had two children. In 1986 the parties divorced but continued to live together until 1997, when David left the home. David returned ifrom 2001 to 2007, when the parties separated a second and final time. In August 2010 David received a letter from the Child Support Services Division (CSSD) advising him that he was required to pay child support in the amount of $450 per month, based on a support order dating from November 1986, when the parties dissolved their marriage. David filed a motion in the superior court requesting relief from the child support order. Cynthia opposed the motion. The parties reached an agreement for Cynthia to pay David $33,000, based on the amount of equity David had contributed to Cynthia’s home when they lived together; Cynthia would attempt to get a second mortgage to fund the settlement, and if she was unable to secure financing, the parties would negotiate a payment plan. Cynthia was not able to obtain a second mortgage and immediately sought to return to "square one." After negotiations with David proved unsuccessful, the court set terms for the settlement, requiring Cynthia to pay David $250 per month, plus her Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) each year, until the amount of $33,000 was paid in full. Cynthia appealed that decision, arguing that the purported settlement agreement became a mere "agreement to negotiate" after she was unable to obtain a second mortgage and that the court lacked authority to set terms and enter a judgment of $33,000 against her. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the lower court's order. View "Fernandez v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

Appellant had four children who tested positive for cocaine at birth. After her fourth child was born, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took custody of the child and placed him with his maternal grandmother. Based on the mother’s history of untreated substance abuse, OCS filed a petition for termination of the appellant's parental rights three months after the child was born. After trial, the superior court concluded that: (1) the mother’s substance abuse placed her child in need of aid; (2) the mother failed to remedy the conditions that placed her child in need of aid within a reasonable time; (3) OCS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; and (4) termination was in the best interests of the child. Appellant argued on appeal that she was not given a reasonable time to remedy her substance abuse issues, that OCS did not exercise reasonable efforts over the short period prior to termination, and that termination eight months after birth was not in her child’s best interests. After its review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court because it properly considered the mother’s history with OCS, her conduct after the child’s birth, and the best interests of the child. View "Amy M. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Kimberly Mendez (formerly Harris), sought an order granting her primary physical custody of her daughter, for a planned move from Alaska to Florida. The superior court awarded primary physical custody instead to the girl’s father, John Governale, who remained in Alaska. Kimberly appealed, contending that the superior court erred by overlooking or minimizing John’s issues with domestic violence and substance abuse, his inability to meet their child’s emotional needs and foster her relationship with Kimberly, and the relative instability in his domestic life. Kimberly argued in the alternative that even if the superior court was correct to award primary physical custody to John, it erred in its allocation of visitation time and expenses. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed on most issues. The Court remanded for reconsideration of the best interests analysis in light of one incident of domestic violence that the superior court erred in analyzing, and for reconsideration of the allocation of visitation expenses. View "Harris v. Governale" on Justia Law

A couple filed for divorce after two years of marriage. The wife requested that the parties be returned "as much as possible into their re-marital financial status." The husband requested that the superior court "equitably divide all marital property." The superior court granted the divorce and divided the marital property based on a determination that the parties asked the court to apply a modified version of "Rose v. Rose." The court then divided the property based partly on "Rose" and part on equitable division. The husband moved for reconsideration, arguing the court ignored his request, and that the resulting distribution was inequitable. The superior court denied the motion without explanation. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court’s decision was (1) based on the faulty premise that both parties agreed to a Rose property division and (2) not otherwise supported by necessary factual findings. The case was reversed and remanded for a new property division. View "Pfeil v. Lock" on Justia Law

Tesoro Corporation challenged its income taxes assessed for 1994 through 1998. The state Department of Revenue (DOR) calculated Tesoro’s Alaska income by applying a three-factor apportionment formula to Tesoro’s worldwide income, including that of its non-Alaskan subsidiaries. An administrative law judge ruled Tesoro was a unitary business that could be subject to formula apportionment, and that DOR could permissibly assess penalties against Tesoro. Tesoro appealed to the superior court, which affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Tesoro argued that only the income of its Alaska-based subsidiaries should have been subject to taxation in Alaska because Alaska’s tax scheme violates the Due Process and Interstate Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. Because Tesoro’s business was unitary, the Supreme Court rejected Tesoro’s challenge to the constitutionality of taxing all of its income under formula apportionment. Because Tesoro lacked standing to challenge the formula’s constitutionality, the Court did not reach the internal consistency issue Tesoro raised. Furthermore, the Court concluded that DOR permissibly imposed penalties on Tesoro. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court decision that affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision and order. View "Tesoro Corporation v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law