Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Sven Rofkar grew a substantial quantity of marijuana in a house he rented. After state troopers searched the house, Petitioner was charged with four felonies, all brought under separate subsections of AS 11.71.040, designated as "misconduct involving a controlled substance in the fourth degree." A jury found Rofkar guilty on all charges. The superior court merged two possession charges into the manufacturing charge, but refused to merge the "maintaining" charge. Petitioner therefore stood convicted of two felonies. The double jeopardy clause of the Alaska Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense." The underlying question in this case was whether two convictions have been imposed on Petitioner for the "same offense" within the meaning of this clause or whether he committed two crimes. Petitioner raised this issue on appeal to the court of appeals. But the court of appeals declined to consider it. Instead, the court held that its opinion in "Davis v. State" was controlling authority. Petitioner did not argue that "Davis" should be overruled in his opening brief, although he did so in his reply brief, the court gave the double jeopardy issue no further consideration. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this case should be reviewed by the court of appeals on the merits for two reasons: first, the double jeopardy issue was raised and not waived; second, it was not clear that "Davis v. State" was decided in accordance with the applicable test for deciding double jeopardy claims set out in the Court's opinion in "Whitton v. State." View "Rofkar v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Rudy R. moved to modify the agreement through which he and Heather W. shared 50-50 custody of their daughter. He argued that recent legal troubles and instability in Heather's life amounted to changed circumstances that required modifying the custody agreement in the child's best interests. The superior court agreed. Heather appealed, arguing that the evidence did not show that any of her changed circumstances affected her child. The superior court also found that it was in the child's best interests for Rudy to have primary physical custody. Heather argued this was an abuse of discretion because the trial court considered impermissible character evidence, gave disproportionate weight to some factors while ignoring others, and refused to consider evidence of past domestic violence between the parties. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding changed circumstances and did not assign disproportionate weight to certain statutory best interest factors. But because the issue of domestic violence was never adjudicated, the Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Rudy has a history of domestic violence, and, if so, whether he rebutted the statutory presumption against an award of custody. View "Heather W. v. Rudy R." on Justia Law

This case concerned the ownership of James "Jim" and Terrie Gottstein’s former marital home. Jim paid for the property, but Terrie’s name alone was on the deed. The Gottsteins lived in the home for 15 years before moving out; they later separated. Terrie entered into a deal to sell the property to another couple, the Krafts, for significantly less than its appraised value, and Jim objected. One month before closing, Jim recorded a notice of interest under AS 34.15.010, which forbid a spouse from selling "the family home or homestead" without the consent of the other spouse. Neither the Krafts nor Terrie knew about the notice of interest, and the sale went ahead as planned. Following the sale, Jim filed suit against the Krafts, requesting that the superior court recognize his ownership interest in the property. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Krafts. The superior court concluded that it was not "the family home or homestead," rendering Jim’s notice of interest under AS 34.15.010 ineffectual. Jim appealed, arguing: (1) that the statute protected his interest in the property; (2) that the Krafts had constructive notice of his interest and therefore were not bona fide purchasers; and (3) that Jim has an equitable interest in the property and the superior court was mistaken in not granting his request for an equitable remedy. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the phrase "family home or homestead" in AS 34.15.010 refers to a family’s residence. Because the disputed property was vacant, and the couple had moved to another home at the time of sale, it did not fall under the spousal consent requirement of AS 34.15.010(b). Jim thus did not put the Krafts on notice of any legally valid claim to the property. View "Gottstein v. Kraft" on Justia Law

Bobbie Ann Hunter and Shaun Conwell had two sons before separating. Conwell filed a complaint for custody in 2006 but Hunter did not respond. The superior court granted Conwell sole legal and primary physical custody of the boys in a 2006 default judgment. Nearly two years later Hunter, acting pro se, sought modification of custody. The superior court denied Hunter’s motion without a hearing because it concluded that Hunter’s allegations were insufficient to constitute a substantial change in circumstances. Hunter appealed, and in a 2009 opinion the Supreme Court rejected as time-barred her arguments regarding the initial custody determination, but reversed the superior court’s denial of her motion for modification. The Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Hunter’s allegations of: (1) potential verbal abuse of the boys; (2) a change in Conwell’s employment requiring significant time away from the boys; (3) signs that the boys were developing mental health problems; and (4) Conwell’s interference with court-ordered telephonic visitation. An evidentiary hearing on remand was held and the superior court found that Hunter had not demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of custody. The court noted, however, that Conwell’s continued interference with telephonic visitation would alone amount to a substantial change if not remedied going forward. Hunter moved for reconsideration; her motion was deemed denied after 30 days. Hunter then appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s finding of no substantial change in circumstances. View "Hunter v. Conwell" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Nelson applied for post-conviction relief, alleging 35 claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At a deposition, trial counsel asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination regarding his representation of Petitioner. The superior court ultimately dismissed all but one post-conviction relief claim for failure to establish a prima facie case, and the court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner petitioned for the Supreme Court's review to determine whether the ordinary presumption of defense counsel's competence applied when counsel invokes the Fifth Amendment regarding the representation. The Court determined that it does, but noted that an adverse inference may be drawn in the petitioner's favor on specific disputed factual issues if warranted in an appropriate case. With this clarification, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision because this was not an appropriate case warranting such an inference. View "Nelson v. Alaska" on Justia Law

An adult woman diagnosed with a mental illness appealed her already completed 30-day involuntary commitment to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API), arguing the evidence did not support the superior court’s findings that: (1) she was likely to cause harm to herself or others due to her mental illness; and (2) API was the least restrictive alternative placement for her. Because Alaska's existing case law provides that an evidentiary-based "weight of the evidence" challenge to a completed involuntary commitment is moot absent accompanying legal issues appropriate for decision under the mootness doctrine's public interest exception, the Supreme Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on mootness. As a result, the Court addressed a question not directly raised in earlier cases: should the Court's application of the mootness doctrine in this context accommodate the importance of collateral consequences arising from an involuntary commitment? The Court answered that question "yes" and therefore reached the merits of this appeal. On the merits, the Court affirmed the superior court's involuntary commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Joan K." on Justia Law

In an October 2007 election, Kenai Peninsula Borough voters approved local initiatives establishing term limits for members of the Borough Assembly and the school board. But voters also reelected five incumbents who, by the terms of the initiatives, would be ineligible to serve an additional term. The Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers (ACT) filed a lawsuit against the Borough requesting a court declaration that the initiatives applied to candidates chosen in the October 2007 election and that the seats held by the five incumbents were vacant. The Borough argued that the initiatives were invalid. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to ACT and partial summary judgment to the Borough and, therefore, did not designate either as the prevailing party. ACT appealed the superior court's decision not to name a prevailing party and argued that ACT should have been named the prevailing party. After its review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that ACT and the Borough both prevailed on distinct issues central to the case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision not to name a prevailing party or award attorney's fees and costs to either party. View "Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kenai Peninsula Borough" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the validity of two 2005 Kenai Peninsula Borough (Borough) ordinances: one enacted by the Borough Assembly and the second enacted by voter initiative. The Borough Assembly enacted an ordinance in June 2005 that increased the sales tax rate from two percent to three percent. In an October 2005 election, Borough voters passed an initiative that required prior voter approval for all Borough capital projects with a total cost of more than one million dollars. The Alliance for Concerned Taxpayers (ACT) challenged the sales tax increase and sought to enforce the capital projects voter approval requirement. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Borough on both matters: on the sales tax issue, reasoning that a 1964 voter action allowed the increase and the 2006 referendum defeat ratified it; and on the capital projects voter approval issue, reasoning that Proposition 4 was an unconstitutional use of the initiative power to appropriate a public asset. ACT appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment on the sales tax issue and the capital project voter approval issue, concluding the 1964 voter authorization of a three-percent sales tax preserved the Borough's right to raise the rate to three percent, and that the 2006 defeat of the referendum to repeal the rate increase constituted a ratification of the increase. On the voter approval issue, the Court concluded that allowing voters to veto any capital improvement projects of over $1 million had the effect of diluting the Borough Assembly's exclusive control over the budget and was therefore an impermissible appropriation. View "Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kenai Peninsula Borough" on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was whether under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act a misrepresentation by a seller of a used motor home is subject to a defense that the misrepresentation was made in good faith. Plaintiff Robert Borgen bought a used Travelaire motor home from A&M Motors, Inc. in 2004. The motor home had previously been owned by Thom and Linda Janidlo; the Janidlos traded in the vehicle to A&M Motors about two weeks before Borgen bought it. When the Janidlos traded in the motor home, they indicated that it was a 2002 model. At some point, someone changed the model year to 2003 on the documents at A&M Motors. The title from the State of Alaska showed that the motor home was a 2003 model, but the vehicle identification number (VIN) indicated that the motor home was a 2002 model. Both trial experts testified that the tenth digit of a VIN of a chassis indicates the model year of the chassis, but their testimony as to whether the same holds true for the VIN of a coach was unclear. The VIN on the chassis is the VIN on the vehicle’s title, but a motor home’s model year is determined by the model year of the coach. A&M Motors sold the Travelaire to Borgen as a 2003 model. In August 2005 Borgen discovered documents in the motor home indicating the motor home was actually a 2002 model. He contacted A&M Motors to complain; the only compensation they offered him was a $1,000 service contract. Borgen sued A&M Motors, pleading three causes of action: (1) misrepresentation, (2) violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA), and (3) breach of contract. Borgen moved for summary judgment on his UTPA claim in February 2008. The trial court denied that motion, and a jury ultimately decided that A&M Motors had not engaged in an unfair or deceptive act in its dealings with Borgen. Finding that the trial court did not err by finding the UTPA implied an unknowing affirmative misrepresentation of material fact would not give rise to liability, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment with respect to Borgen's UTPA claims, but remanded for further proceedings on treble damages. View "Borgen v. A&M Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

A wife left her husband in Ohio and moved with their son to Alaska, where she filed for divorce. The husband filed for divorce in Ohio. The parties agreed Ohio had child custody and property division jurisdiction. The superior court dismissed the wife’s divorce action and the wife appealed, arguing that not granting a divorce was error regardless of the pending Ohio litigation. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant the divorce, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wilson v. Wilson" on Justia Law