Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In late April 2006 Samuel Sengul leased a commercial storefront in downtown Juneau to Robert Manus, who was acting on behalf of CMS Franklin, Inc. The building was under construction when Sengul and CMS entered into the lease agreement, but the lease provided that Sengul would deliver the property to CMS in a specified improved condition by the time the lease commenced on June 1. The lease also included a rent abatement provision, which was at issue in this case. The building was not in improved condition until approximately June 8. Manus did not pay any rent, nor did he mention the rent abatement provision when he took possession of the building. Sengul finally demanded rent in late July, but Manus refused to pay, claiming abatement. In September, Manus had still not paid any rent, and Sengul put a lock on CMS's store door and placed signs demanding rent in the store windows. Manus had the lock cut off, but began to move the inventory out of the store, vacating it and returning the keys to Sengul two days after the lockout. Sengul then sued CMS and Manus for unpaid rent. The superior court determined that CMS had waived its right to rent abatement and owed Sengul unpaid rental amounts for the time that Manus had occupied the building. But the court also concluded that Sengul's lockout amounted to constructive eviction and awarded CMS damages as a refund for work performed on the premises that CMS was unable to benefit from after the constructive eviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that Sengul's actions constituted constructive eviction, but the Court disagreed that CMS waived its entitlement to have the rent abated. The case was remanded for the superior court to recalculate the damages owed to CMS. View "Sengul v. CMS Franklin, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael and Rebecca Sheffield of Unalaska divorced in 2009. Because Michael planned to move to Virginia in 2010, he sought school-year custody of the couple's two sons. The superior court ruled that the children's best interests supported school-year custody with Michael in Virginia. Rebecca appealed, arguing that the superior court placed too much emphasis on the older son's preference to live in Virginia with his father, especially in relation to the geographical stability that would result if the children remained in Unalaska. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court's consideration of the older child's preference was appropriate and that the superior court adequately considered the other statutory factors. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Sheffield v. Sheffield" on Justia Law

Appellant Jim Widmyer, a commercial fisher, applied for a permit to fish for sablefish. The State distributes these permits largely on the basis of past participation in the sablefish fishery, specifically participation between 1975 and 1984. Though Appellant had been unable to land many fish between 1975 and 1984, argued that he qualified for participation due to extraordinary circumstances. The Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission and the superior court both determined that Appellant did not qualify for participation due to extraordinary circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed those decisions after review of the Commission record. View "Widmyer v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Four children were removed from their parents' care based on domestic abuse in the parents' relationship. The parents later divorced and the mother was able to regain custody, but thereafter she entered into another abusive relationship. Two of her sons physically intervened in one violent confrontation between the mother and her new partner and notified the police of the abuse. The State took the boys and their two younger siblings into temporary custody. Their mother appealed the superior court's finding that all four children were children in need of aid. Because the Supreme Court concluded that continued exposure to domestic violence placed the children at substantial risk of injury, the Court affirmed the superior court’s finding that the mother's extensive history of abusive relationships was likely to result in harm to the children, and that the children were in need of aid under state law. View "Sarah G. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

"Philip J." is the father of seven children who were adjudicated to be children in need of aid. On appeal, he claimed that his right to due process was violated because he was unaware that the State would seek adjudication findings at the conclusion of a hearing that started as a contested probable cause (temporary custody) hearing. He also argued that he was denied due process because he was not allowed to present a closing argument. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Philip was not denied due process because he had notice that the State was seeking adjudication findings, because he had an opportunity to be heard on adjudication, and because he was not denied the opportunity to deliver a closing argument. The Court affirmed the superior court's order adjudicating all of the children as in need of aid. View "Philip J. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the Office of Public Advocacy's petition for review on the limited question whether the Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault qualified as a "public agency" within the meaning of "Flores v. Flores" (AS 44.21.410(a)(4)) such that the Office of Public Advocacy is required to provide representation to an indigent party in a child custody dispute in which the other party is represented by the Network. Because the Court maintained that from its holding in "Flores" that it would be fundamentally unfair in the specific context of child custody disputes to allow public funding to support one party but not that party’s indigent opponent, the Court found that the Network qualifies as a public agency for purposes of AS 44.21.410(a)(4). View "In the Matter of Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault" on Justia Law

Leon Burts filed for divorce in 2009. The superior court valued Leon’s post-retirement military health insurance benefit as a marital asset and allocated it to Leon. Leon appealed, arguing that the benefit was too speculative to be valued and that state courts are preempted from treating this type of federal benefit as a marital asset. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s characterization of this benefit as marital property, but concluded the court’s valuation was erroneous. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the value of the benefit. View "Burts v. Burts" on Justia Law

Native nonprofit corporation Dena Nena Henash (d/b/a Tanana Chiefs Conference) applied to the Fairbanks North Star borough assessor for charitable-purpose tax exemptions on several of its properties. The assessor denied exemptions for five of the parcels, concluding that they did not meet the exemption’s requirements. The superior court affirmed the denial as to four of the properties and remanded the case for consideration of one property back to the assessor, who granted the exemption. The Nonprofit appealed the denial of exemptions for three of the remaining properties plus a portion of the fourth, and appealed the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees to the Borough. Because the properties in question were used exclusively for charitable purposes, the Supreme Court reversed the assessor’s determination on the four appealed properties, vacated the attorney’s fees award, and remanded for an award of fees. View "Dená Nená Henash v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law

This case arose from an award by Golden Valley Electric Association (GVEA) of two competitively bid construction contracts on its Northern Intertie Project. In November 2001 GVEA awarded Global Power & Communications, LLC (Global) a $39.4 million contract (Contract NI-8) for construction of the Northern Intertie’s Tanana River flats section. Later GVEA awarded Global an approximately $5.3 million contract (Contract NI-9) for construction of the Northern Intertie’s Tanana River crossing and Fairbanks sections. Subsequently, after Global had been awarded NI-9 and before it had completed work on NI-8, Global presented GVEA with requests for additional compensation (RFIs) totaling approximately $2.4 million in connection with NI-8. GVEA responded that it found "no legitimate basis" to justify Global’s RFIs and rejected Global’s request for additional payment. Global also notified GVEA that Global would submit more RFIs, arising out of both NI-8 and NI-9. In all, Global sought additional compensation totaling $5.7 million under the two contracts. GVEA responded to Global denying most of the RFIs but indicated that it would approve a few and consider partial payment for a few others. Global sued, and a trial court ultimately held in GVEA's favor, awarding it costs under both the contract and the applicable state law. Global appealed, arguing among other things, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling in favor of GVEA. Upon review of the lengthy record from the trial court, the applicable legal authority and legislative history, and the two contracts in question, the Supreme Court partly affirmed and partly vacated the trial court's decision. The case was remanded for: (1) a fee determination regarding GVEA’s "UTPA" claim against Global and (2) a new trial on causation and damages relating to GVEA’s breach of NI-9. View "ASRC Energy Services Power v. Golden Valley Electric" on Justia Law

A construction company solicited a bid from a subcontractor to perform concrete work. The construction company provided a plan and bid schedule. The subcontractor responded with a proposal, which the construction company accepted. The subcontractor carried out the subcontract as it understood the terms. After the work was completed, the subcontractor discovered it had inadvertently underbid on the project. In the ensuing lawsuit, the superior court granted partial summary judgment to the construction company with respect to all damages claimed in relation to the bidding error. The subcontractor appealed the partial summary judgment order, claiming breach of an implied warranty that the plans and specifications would be sufficient, and arguing that the superior court erred by applying the theory of unilateral mistake to the case. Because the construction company did not breach the implied warranty and the subcontractor committed a unilateral mistake for which it bore the risk, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Handle Construction Co., Inc. v. Norcon, Inc." on Justia Law