Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Six weeks after the Regulatory Commission of Alaska approved the 2007 Access Charge Rates long distance telephone companies pay to local telephone companies, an association of local telephone companies realized that five of the rates the Regulatory Commission approved were based upon an erroneous spreadsheet the association included in its rate filings. The association requested that the Regulatory Commission correct the rates. The Regulatory Commission corrected the rates prospectively, but concluded retrospective application was barred by the Supreme Court's case law on retroactive ratemaking. The superior court agreed that retrospective application of the adjusted rates was impermissible, and the association appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in "Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Chugach Electric Association, Inc." (prohibiting retroactive ratemaking in "second look" cases), but held that the Regulatory Commission has the authority to implement corrections of some procedural mistakes starting when notice of a mistake is given. The Court remanded to the Regulatory Commission to determine the type of error that occurred in this case and whether the error should be corrected retrospectively. View "Alaska Exchange Carriers Assn., Inc. v. Regulatory Comm'n of Alaska" on Justia Law

Two men bought an island. After a dispute, they agreed that one would keep the island, while the other would receive a one-time payment and an option to buy the island at a fixed price, adjusted for inflation, if the owner ever chose to sell it. Years passed, the value of the island rose, far outpacing inflation. But the owner never elected to sell. Instead, he eventually conveyed the island to his sister, as a gift. The option holder sued. The superior court held on summary judgment that the option remained viable, but that the gift was not improper. The option holder appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's interpretation of the option agreement, but because material facts were in dispute concerning contractual claims and allegations that the option holder's conveyance was fraudulent, the Court reversed and remanded the superior court's grant of summary judgment on those claims. View "Shaffer v. Bellows" on Justia Law

An elderly woman requiring long-term medical care gave $120,000 to her son in February 2007. The mother believed that the gift would not prevent her from receiving Medicaid coverage if she lived long enough to exhaust her remaining assets. She relied on a provision in Alaska's Medicaid eligibility manual that suggested prospective Medicaid beneficiaries could give away a portion of their assets while retaining sufficient assets to pay for their medical care during the period of ineligibility that Medicaid imposes as a penalty for such gifts. But by the time the mother applied for Medicaid in September 2008, the Alaska legislature had enacted legislation with the retroactive effect of preventing the kind of estate planning the mother had attempted through her gift. The State temporarily denied the mother's application. The son appealed pro se on behalf of his mother, who died in 2009. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Alaska legislature's retroactive change to the Medicaid eligibility rules was valid. The Court thus affirmed the State's temporary denial of the mother's application. View "Pfeifer v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Serv." on Justia Law

Petitioner Frank Olson was arrested in Anchorage for driving while intoxicated. At the police station he refused to submit to a breath test. An officer advised him of the consequences for refusing to take the test using an implied consent form, but the form contained information that was out of date; it stated that refusal was a felony if the arrestee had been convicted of DWI or refusal twice within the previous five years. In fact, refusal was a felony if the arrestee had been twice convicted within the previous ten years. Petitioner had several prior DWI convictions, one of which was approximately three weeks outside the five-year window, but well within the ten-year window. Petitioner persisted in his refusal and was convicted of the class C felony, refusal to submit to chemical test. He appealed, claiming the erroneous warning violated his due process rights. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted his petition for hearing. Because the Court held that Petitioner bore the burden of proving prejudice from the erroneous information, the Court remanded his case to give him an opportunity to make that showing. View "Olson v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Leroy Adams of sexual assault in the second degree for having sexual intercourse with K.S. when he knew that K.S. was unaware that a sexual act was being committed. Both Defendant and K.S. were intoxicated at the time, and Defendant testified at trial that the sex was consensual. During his cross-examination of Defendant, the prosecutor questioned him about his refusal to speak to the police prior to trial. The prosecutor also argued to the jury in closing that Defendant's refusal to talk to the police made his testimony at trial less credible. Defendant claimed on appeal that the prosecutor’s questions and argument were improper comments on Defendant's right to silence under article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution. Because Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s questions or argument at trial, the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for review and concluded that the prosecutor improperly commented on Defendant's invocation of his right to silence and violated his constitutional rights. The Court reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Adams v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Parents requested that the Anchorage School District evaluate their child for eligibility for special education services. While awaiting the results of the eligibility assessment, the parents arranged for private tutoring. The school district did not assess the child’s eligibility within the statutorily-required time, and the parents requested a due process hearing. They also arranged for their child to be privately evaluated to determine whether he was eligible for special education services. The school district subsequently completed its evaluation and determined the child to be ineligible for services. At the due process hearing, the parents alleged that the school district committed procedural violations under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), including impermissibly delaying the evaluation. They sought reimbursement for the cost of their child’s private evaluation and tutoring. An independent hearing officer presided over the due process hearing and ultimately agreed with the district that the child was ineligible for services. The hearing officer ordered the school district to pay the cost of the private eligibility assessment and to partially pay the cost of the tutoring. The superior court upheld the award of the private eligibility assessment, but reversed the award of the private tutoring cost. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the school district argued that the parents should not be reimbursed for the evaluation or the tutoring; the parents argued they are entitled to full reimbursement for both expenses. The central question the Court addressed was: where a child is ultimately determined to be ineligible for special education services, does the IDEA provide relief for procedural violations that occur during the process of evaluating the child’s eligibility for services? The Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, upholding the independent hearing officer’s award of the private assessment cost, but reversing the hearing officer’s award of the private tutoring expenses. View "J.P. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Branwen Collier and William Harris are the parents of a daughter, Zada. The parties agreed to shared physical custody of their daughter, and the superior court decided that joint legal custody was in the child’s best interest. The mother later filed a motion for modification of joint legal and shared physical custody, asserting that her work schedule had changed since the parties agreed on a physical custody schedule, that the father had violated court orders, and that he was not communicating effectively. The mother sought sole legal and primary physical custody. The superior court denied the motion without a hearing and awarded attorney’s fees to the father. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision that the mother was not entitled to a hearing on her motion to modify custody under the circumstances of this case, but vacated the award of attorney’s fees. View "Collier v. Harris" on Justia Law

After a disciplinary hearing, a hearing officer found Alaska prison inmate Joseph James guilty of the “low-moderate” infraction of “threatening another person with future bodily harm” at Red Rocks Correctional Center in Arizona. The determination was based entirely on an incident report written by a prison staff member who had not witnessed the incident. Instead, the report’s author provided a hearsay account of a conversation between James and another staff member. After exhausting his administrative remedies, James filed an appeal to the superior court. James argued that basing the finding of guilt solely on the hearsay written account constituted a violation of his due process rights. James also maintained that the failure to audio-record the disciplinary hearing violated due process. The superior court affirmed the disciplinary determination. Because the Supreme Court concluded that James’s due process right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses was violated during the disciplinary proceedings and that he was prejudiced by the failure to audio-record the disciplinary hearing, the Court vacated the disciplinary determination and remanded the case for a new hearing. View "James v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

This case involved a contract dispute between 3-D & Co. and Tew’s Excavating, Inc. The dispute was over the terms of a construction contract for two roads in the Scenic View Subdivision of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough. 3-D & Co. raised twelve issues on appeal, which in sum, contended that the superior court applied the wrong legal standards and arrived at the wrong factual conclusions regarding the terms of the contract. The Supreme Court took each of 3-D's issues in turn and affirmed the superior court's decisions in all respects. View "3-D & Co. v. Tew's Excavating, Inc." on Justia Law

Robert J. Henrichs, Derenty Tabios, and Robert E. Burk were shareholders and former directors of Chugach Alaska Corporation who ran for election to the Chugach board in 2005. These former directors sued Chugach because their names were excluded from the board’s corporate proxy materials and because Chugach did not provide them with shareholder information for their own proxy campaigns within the time frame they demanded. The superior court granted Chugach summary judgment on all claims and the former directors appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed because Chugach was not required to deliver the information the former directors demanded and because Chugach’s conduct did not otherwise violate their rights as board candidates. View "Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corporation" on Justia Law