Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Shabd-Sangeet Khalsa bought a home kit from Mandala Custom Homes in 2003. The house was assembled and Appellant moved in. Shortly thereafter, the house developed various problems. Appellant climbed a ladder to inspect a leak in the ceiling and fell, injuring herself. Appellant sued Mandala and other parties in 2006, alleging that the house was defective and that the defects in the home caused a host of other damages, including those related to her fall. The superior court set a discovery schedule. When discovery did not proceed smoothly, the court ordered Appellant to sign medical releases, present herself for deposition, and submit to medical testing, cautioning her that if she did not comply with discovery orders, the court would impose sanctions against her. When Appellant refused to sign the medical release forms, the court found her in contempt and dismissed her fall-related claims. Proceeding with Appellant's other claims, the court turned to Appellant's deposition which had been delayed multiple times. The superior court concluded that Appellant's conduct when she eventually did appear constituted a willful refusal to comply with its orders. The court then dismissed Appellant's entire case with prejudice. Appellant argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion. Finding no abuse, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal. View "Khalsa v. Chose" on Justia Law

In 2005 the Department of Revenue denied Permanent Fund Dividends (PDFs) to Appellants In and Peggy Harrod and their children. The Harrods appealed to the superior court where they argued that the Department lacked the authority to adopt residency requirements for the dividend program, that the denial of their applications violated the U.S. and State constitutions, and that their 2002 and 2003 dividend applications were wrongfully denied. The superior court affirmed the denial of the dividends. From 1997 to 2000, the Harrods resided outside of Alaska and did not apply for PDFs. In 2001 they unsuccessfully applied. Because they had been absent from Alaska for more than five years, a presumption arose that they did not intend to return and remain in state. The DOR applied the presumption and the Harrods did not rebut it. The presumption was applied in the Harrods' 2002 and 2003 applications, and the DOR found that despite returning in state on infrequent or short trips, the Harrods had not remained in-state for five years. Having reviewed the parties' arguments and the record on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Harrod v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Landowner Appellant Charles Miller contracted with Handle Construction Company, a manufacturer of pre-fabricated steel hangars, to erect a steel hangar on his land. After completing its work, the Company sued Appellant for unanticipated costs it incurred as a result of manufacturing defects in the hangar. Appellant made an offer of judgment which the Company accepted. When the Company received a separate payment from the hangar's manufacturer, Appellant refused to pay the full amount, arguing that an offset was warranted. The superior court rejected Appellant's argument and ordered him to pay the full amount of the offer. The case was submitted to the Supreme Court for review, but the Court determined that the basis for the superior court's decision was unclear. The Court reversed the decision and remanded the case for additional factual findings. View "Miller v. Handle Construction Company" on Justia Law

In 2007, after receiving 39 protective services reports involving allegations of abuse and neglect over the course of fifteen years, the Office of Children's Services (OCS) removed five children from parents "Ralph" and "Nell" based on evidence of physical abuse, mental inure, and chronic neglect. OCS put the children in foster care and provided the parents with case plans. Ralph and Nell had a sixth child. The superior court terminated parental rights to the newborn's older brother, but a separate trial was held with respect to her. Based on evidence of the parents' unremedied conduct and conditions that made the newborn a "child in need of aid," the superior court concluded that it was in the newborn's best interest to terminate Ralph and Nell's parental rights to her. Ralph appealed the termination order and the denial of his motion for continued visitation. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the superior court did not clearly err in finding Ralph had not timely remedied the conduct and conditions that placed the newborn at substantial risk of harm. The Court concluded that the superior court properly concluded that Ralph failed to show that ordering continued visitation after termination of parental rights was in the child's best interests. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's order. View "Ralph H. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Human Svcs." on Justia Law

In 2003, Officer Lee Virg-In used a taser twice on J.N., an 11-year-old girl. She had been driving an ATV in the streets of Kotzebue with another younger passenger. J.N. ran several stop signs and was otherwise driving dangerously. The Officer used his overhead lights and siren to signal J.N. to stop, but she refused, first trying to escape on the ATV and later on foot. According to J.N., she was never aggressive or threatening when the Officer eventually caught up with her. Sandra Russell, J.N.'s mother, filed a complaint against Officer Virg-In, alleging that his use of the taser constituted excessive force. Ms. Russell also sued the City of Kotzebue. The Officer defended the reasonableness of his actions and argued he was immune from suit. The superior court dismissed J.N.'s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it was error to grant the Officer qualified immunity "because if a police officer used a taser multiple times on an 11-year-old girl who was suspected of traffic violations, was compliant and was not posing a threat to the officer or others, that conduct would be so egregious that any reasonable officer would have known the conduct was an excessive use of force." The Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Russell v. Virg-In" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Price, Jr. posted "no trespassing" signs on his property in 1998 in an attempt to quell what he believed were an excessive number of snow machiners using a trail that crossed his land, damaging it, traveling at high speeds, and causing a great deal of noise. In 2003, the Supreme Court held that a group of snow machiners had established a public prescriptive easement over the trail but twice remanded the case to the superior court to define the scope of the easement. The superior court held additional hearings, and in 2007 issued a memorandum that defined the easement. Appellant appealed the court's definition. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant did not meet his burden of proving that the volume of snow machine traffic exceeded the scope of the easement. However, the Court reversed the superior court's decision that found the easement includes non-snow machine users. The Court remanded the case again for further clarification on the permissible scope of the snow machine easement, including seasonal limits, width and speed limit. View "Price v. Eastham" on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant Yvan Safar contracted with developer Per Bjorn-Roli to construct a 12-unit condominium project. Appellee Wells Fargo agreed to finance the project. By early 2007, the developer paid Appellant the entire amount of his contract, and Wells Fargo disbursed the entire loan, but the units were not complete. Appellant allegedly used his own funds to meet his payroll needs on the project. The project overran its budget, and Wells Fargo had to foreclose. Appellant contended that the bank promised to reimburse him for monies he spent in contemplating the completion of the project. After trial, the superior court found that Wells Fargo made no enforceable promise to Appellant to reimburse him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the bank did not make any promise or commitment to Appellant sufficient to meet the "actual promise" element of promissory estoppel. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Appellant's case. View "Safar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Christina J. appealed the termination of her parental rights to her son Gideon. She developed substance abuse problems as a young teenager and because involved in an abusive relationship with Gideon's father shortly after leaving custody of the Office of Children's Services (OCS). Gideon was born when Christina was 19 and removed from her custody when he was four months old after OCS received reports of violence, substance abuse and neglect from both parents. Christina participated in substance abuse, domestic violence and mental health assessments, but nine months after OCS took custody of Gideon, it petitioned to terminate her parental rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Christina failed to remedy the conduct that placed Gideon at a substantial risk of harm. Accordingly, the Court held that the lower court did not err by finding termination of Christina's parental rights was in Gideon's best interest. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Christina J. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Terminated employee Karen Crowley appealed a superior court's dismissal of her contract claims against her former employer, the Alaska Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services (OCS). Ms. Crowley was hired in 2000 as a non-permanent social worker. She was granted permanent status after a six-month probation. Toward the end of her probationary period, Ms. Crowley's supervisor began receiving complaints about Ms. Crowley's job performance. An investigation was initiated. The report of the investigation found seven specific allegations against her. In 2002, the director of OCS terminated Ms. Crowley's employment. Subsequently Ms. Crowley filed suit in 2004, alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful retaliation and discrimination based on age and race. In 2006, the superior court granted summary judgment to OCS on all counts. Ms. Crowley appealed to the Supreme Court in 2007, which then reversed and remanded the superior court's judgment with respect to the good faith and fair dealing and retaliation claims. The remaining issues were retried, and judgment reentered in favor of OCS. Upon re-review of Ms. Crowley's claims, the Supreme Court found that she showed neither an objective nor a subjective breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment dismissing her case. View "Crowley v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The City of Juneau has an ordinance that prohibits smoking in certain places. In 2008, the City Assembly amended the ordinance to prohibit smoking in "private clubs" that offer food or alcoholic beverages for sale. The Fraternal Order of Eagles, Juneau-Douglas Aerie 4200 and three of its members challenged the ban on smoking on both its face and as applied to their Aerie facility. The Eagles argued that the prohibition violates both their First Amendment rights under the federal and state constitutions. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the ban on smoking in private clubs did not violate the Eagles' right to privacy under the federal or state constitutions, nor did it implicate the freedom of association under the federal First Amendment. The Court affirmed a lower court's order that granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Juneau. View "Fraternal Order of Eagles, Juneau-Douglas Aerie 4200 v. City & Borough of Juneau" on Justia Law