Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOTPF) fired Appellee Paul Smith for misconduct. Smith, an equipment operator, shot and field-dressed a moose while on duty in 2005 and received a thirty-day suspension. In 2006, he took a fuel tank stand from his workstation, later claiming that he thought he received permission to do so. At about the same time, 100 gallons of fuel disappeared from the same station. DOTPF concluded that Appellee had stolen the fuel and terminated him. After unsuccessfully filing union grievances and complaints with the state Human Rights Commission and federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Appellee filed suit, alleging breach of contract, civil rights and tort law violations. The superior court granted summary judgment to the state on all counts. Appellee appealed the superior court's ruling on his civil rights and contract claims. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record and the arguments Appellee made on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decisions as to both of Appellee's claims. View "Smith v. Alaska" on Justia Law

At issue for the Supreme Court was whether under the Federal Constitution a criminal defendant's court-appointed counsel must, upon the defendant's demand after lawful sentencing pursuant to a plea agreement, file a petition for discretionary sentence review by the Court when state law precludes an appeal of right. Defendant David Stone was charged with manslaughter, assault, and driving under the influence. Soon after judgment was entered, an attorney from the public defender agency asked Defendant if he wished to appeal his sentence. The attorney reviewed his file, and spoke with Defendant's trial counsel. After review, the attorney concluded that Defendant could not appeal his sentence. Defendant pro se petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing that the attorney's failure to object or appeal his sentence as excessive constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court denied Defendant's application, holding that it was "unwilling to find that an attorney is ineffective on the sole basis that the attorney did not advance a meritless argument." On argument to the Court of Appeals, the State contended that because Defendant did not question the legality of his sentence, it could not have been ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to appeal his sentence. Defendant countered by arguing that he was entitled to appellate review regardless of the terminology he used. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court. Upon its consideration of the legal authority and briefs submitted by both parties, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate courts, holding that Defendant was entitled to require his court-appointed counsel to file a petition for the Court's discretionary review of his sentence. View "Stone v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The State provided prisoner Dewell Pearce extensive medical care during his incarceration. Around the time of his release from custody, Mr. Pearce won a medical malpractice judgment against the State. The State paid part of the judgment, but relying on a reimbursement statute, withheld the medical care costs associated with conditions unrelated to the malpractice claim. The State then sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to reimbursement from Mr. Pearce for treatment of the unrelated conditions. The superior court ruled that the statute in question did not authorize the State to seek reimbursement from former prisoners no longer in custody. The State appealed. Upon review of the superior court record and the applicable statute, the Supreme Court found that the superior court misinterpreted the law. The Court reversed the superior court's ruling and vacated the judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Alaska Dep't of Corrections v. Hendricks-Pearce" on Justia Law

In 1999, Appellant-Employee Kenneth Monzulla hurt his back at work. In 2001, he and his employer entered a partial compromise and release agreement to settle all issues stemming from the injury except for future medical care for his lumbar and thoracic spine. More recent disputes involved the extent of Appellant's medical care. A recurring issue between the parties pertained to venue for the proceedings. In 2008, Appellee Voorhees Concrete Cutting asked the Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission to review and stay a non-final order that denied its change of venue from Fairbanks. The Commission first issued a partial stay, which permitted the case to go forward in any venue other than Fairbanks. It later reviewed the merits of the Workers' Compensation Board's decision to deny the change of venue and reversed it. On appeal, Mr. Monzulla contended that the Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction over "motions for extraordinary review." He claimed that legislature only granted the Commission jurisdiction to hear appeals of final Board orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that jurisdiction to hear appeals is "necessarily incident to the Commission's express power" to hear appeals from final Board decisions. The Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Monzulla v. Voorhees Concrete Cutting" on Justia Law

Appellant Leta Trask painted a religious message on her roof. Appellee Ketchikan Gateway Borough filed a complaint to enjoin Ms. Trask from displaying the message. The Borough argued that the message was in violation of a borough ordinance prohibiting roof signs. Ms. Trask counterclaimed for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the Borough's enforcement of the ordinance violated her free speech rights. The superior court held that the message was not a "sign" contemplated by the ordinance and that she did not have to remove it. The court dismissed Ms. Trask's 1983 claim for lack of standing. Ms. Trask appealed the dismissal of her 1983 claim to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that it was error to dismiss Ms. Trask's 1983 claim. The Court reversed the lower court's dismissal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trask v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law

Gas producers that lease land from Alaska must pay royalties calculated on the value of the gas produced from the leased area. The royalty may be calculated in one of two methods: the “higher of” pricing or contract pricing. “Higher of” pricing is the default method of calculating royalties and is calculated using market data and the prices of other producers. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) usually does not calculate the royalty payments under “higher of” pricing until years after production. Under contract pricing, the lessee’s price at which it sells gas is used to determine the royalty payment. Appellant Marathon Oil requested contract pricing from 2008 onward and sought retroactive application of contract pricing for 2003-2008. The DNR approved contract pricing from 2008 onward but denied the retroactive application. The superior court affirmed the DNR’s decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Marathon argued that the statute that governs contract pricing permitted retroactive application of contract pricing. Upon review of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that though the statute was ambiguous, it would defer to the DNR’s interpretation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the DNR’s order. View "Marathon Oil Co. v. Dep't. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Chilkoot Lumber Company, a commercial landlord (Chilkoot) and its tenant, Rainbow Glacier Seafood (Rainbow) resolved their lease dispute by settlement and entered the terms of the settlement on the record at trial. Rainbow did not follow through with its duties under the settlement agreement. After the time for performance by Rainbow had expired, Chilkoot moved the court to enforce the agreement. The superior court denied the motion to enforce. On reconsideration, the parties tentatively agreed to reinstate the settlement agreement with new deadlines for performance. When they could not agree on new deadlines, the superior court entered an order that enforced the settlement agreement as modified by Rainbow’s proposed deadlines. Chilkoot subsequently violated the order, and the superior court ordered it to pay $1,000 per day it violated the agreement. Chilkoot appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the superior court erred by imposing its own deadlines and sanctioning Chilkoot $1,000 per day. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order. The Court held it was an error for the lower court to conclude that the parties had not reached a settlement agreement and to deny Chilkoot’s motion to enforce the agreement. Furthermore, the Court found that the court’s sanctions against Chilkoot were "coercive and remedial, rather than punitive." The Court reversed the superior court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chilkoot Lumber Co. v. Rainbow Glacier Seafoods, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Frank Griswold appealed the Homer Advisory Planning Commission’s grant of a conditional-use permit to a mariculture association. The city clerk rejected his appeal for lack of standing because Appellant did not show that the permitted action would have an adverse effect on the use, enjoyment or value of his property. Appellant appealed that rejection to the superior court. The court affirmed the Planning Commission’s decision. Upon review of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. The Court found that the Homer City Code restricted standing in land use appeals and that the city clerk correctly rejected Appellant’s appeal. View "Griswold v. City of Homer" on Justia Law

Appellant Loren Larson, Jr. sued Alaska, alleging that the Alaska Court of Appeals violated its "duties to establish rules of law and declare what legal rights a citizen has." The court dismissed Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief from an earlier conviction for two murders and one burglary. The superior court ruled that Appellant’s suit was barred by both judicial immunity and res judicata. Appellant petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s case. The Court found that Appellant identified the source of the appellate court’s duties from the preamble of the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct but did not make any specific allegations in relation to the law or to his case. With nothing more, the Court concluded that Appellant failed to state a claim for relief and dismissed his case. View "Larson v. Alaska" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the 2008 valuation of a parcel of real property owned by Appellant Martha Dunnagan. Larry Varilek, the personal representative of Ms. Dunnagan’s estate, argued that the Board of Equalization overvalued the property and appealed the Board’s decision. The superior court held that Mr. Varilek failed to prove that the property was overvalued. Mr. Varilek appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s assessment. The Court found that Mr. Varilek failed to meet his burden by showing that the Board’s valuation was improper. View "Varilek v. Burke" on Justia Law