Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
by
Robert Rude and Harold Rudolph were shareholders and former directors of Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI). They distributed a joint proxy solicitation in an attempt to be elected to the CIRI board of directors at CIRI’s 2010 annual meeting. Rude and Rudolph accumulated over one quarter of the total outstanding votes, but CIRI’s Inspector of Election refused to allow them to cumulate their votes. Thus, votes were split evenly between the two of them and neither was seated. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the language of the proxy form required the shareholders’ votes to be equally distributed between Rude and Rudolph unless a shareholder indicated otherwise. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of CIRI on this issue. View "Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Elizabeth Rollins purchased a beverage dispensary license (liquor license) in late 1990. She attempted to open a bar on a property she owned but was unsuccessful. Rollins appealed the superior court’s decision upholding the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board’s determination to deny her application for a waiver of the annual operating requirement for her liquor license. On appeal, Rollins argued that: (1) the Board’s decision was not supported by the evidence; (2) she was improperly assigned the burden of proof; (3) the hearing before the administrative law judge violated her right to due process; and (4) the Board’s selective enforcement of its statutes violated her right to equal protection. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rollins properly bore the burden of proof on the issue of whether she was entitled to a waiver, that the record supported the Board’s decision, and that the Board proceedings did not violate her constitutional rights. View "Rollins v. Alaska Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

by
Tesoro Corporation challenged its income taxes assessed for 1994 through 1998. The state Department of Revenue (DOR) calculated Tesoro’s Alaska income by applying a three-factor apportionment formula to Tesoro’s worldwide income, including that of its non-Alaskan subsidiaries. An administrative law judge ruled Tesoro was a unitary business that could be subject to formula apportionment, and that DOR could permissibly assess penalties against Tesoro. Tesoro appealed to the superior court, which affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Tesoro argued that only the income of its Alaska-based subsidiaries should have been subject to taxation in Alaska because Alaska’s tax scheme violates the Due Process and Interstate Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. Because Tesoro’s business was unitary, the Supreme Court rejected Tesoro’s challenge to the constitutionality of taxing all of its income under formula apportionment. Because Tesoro lacked standing to challenge the formula’s constitutionality, the Court did not reach the internal consistency issue Tesoro raised. Furthermore, the Court concluded that DOR permissibly imposed penalties on Tesoro. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court decision that affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision and order. View "Tesoro Corporation v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

by
A tour company claimed fraud and misconduct on the part of a borough in the course of a fraudulent conveyance trial concerning liability for property taxes. Specifically, the company argued that a police officer falsely testified at trial concerning a conversation he allegedly had with the company president regarding the company's obligation to pay borough taxes. The superior court denied relief under Rule 60(b)(3), finding that the company had failed to establish clear and convincing evidence of fraud. The company appealed, arguing that the superior court applied the incorrect legal standard and that the company presented clear and convincing evidence of fraud. The company also appealed various orders relating to discovery and the award of attorney's fees. Because the superior court applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was not clear and convincing evidence of fraud, the Supreme Court affirmed its denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the lower court's refusal to reopen discovery or awarding attorney's fees. View "Alaskan Adventure Tours, Inc. v. The City and Borough of Yakutat" on Justia Law

by
An unpaid employee of a closely-held corporation sued the corporation and its president for back wages. The day after the employee filed suit, the corporation filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court discharged the corporation's debts, and the superior court dismissed the corporation, but the superior court allowed trial to proceed against the president on a veil-piercing theory. A jury found that the corporation was a mere instrumentality of the president, and that the president owed the former employee wages under a bonus agreement. The president appealed the superior court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not err in holding the president liable, and affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Brown v. Knowles" on Justia Law

by
Jack Morrell was a patron of appellee Jason, Inc.'s Chilkoot Charlie's bar where he had been drinking. He had a confrontation with Eric Kalenka shortly after he left. Morrell brandished a knife and used it to fatally stab Kalenka. Kalenka's estate sued Chilkoot Charlie's alleging the bar had continued to serve Morrell as a "drunken person" in violation of Alaska law, and therefore was liable in part for Kalenka's death. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether the Kalenka estate raised a genuine issue of fact of whether Morrell was a "drunken person" within the meaning of the statute. The Court concluded that the estate presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment. Therefore, the Court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment to Chilkoot Charlie's, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Shareholders of a closely held corporation brought a derivative suit against a shareholder-director and the corporation's former attorneys for fiduciary fraud, fraudulent conveyance, legal malpractice, and civil conspiracy. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court ruled all the claims were time-barred. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of most claims, but reversed its dismissal of two and remanded those claims for further proceedings. View "Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP" on Justia Law

by
In 2001, Union Oil Company of California entered into a contract to sell its oil to Tesoro Alaska Company. Under the contract the Tesoro took title at the North Slope, but agreed to use a pipeline company associated with Union to transport oil through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. The price per barrel was calculated as the West Coast market price less marine transport and pipeline tariff. The contract made no mention of whether the pipeline tariff was tied to the ultimate destination of the oil. At the time, the interstate and intrastate pipeline tariffs were the same. Tesoro shipped the oil to an in-state refinery and paid the tariff to the pipeline company. Union subtracted the tariff amount from the market price of the oil less marine transport and sent invoices to the buyer. Meanwhile, Tesoro successfully challenged the intrastate tariff as unjust and unreasonable and the pipeline company issued a refund, including 10.5% interest. Union claimed that it was entitled to the tariff refund under the contract. The superior court, on motions for summary judgment, awarded the principal amount of the refund to Union and the interest to Tesoro. Both parties appealed. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court held that the contract's pricing term was a netback price to the Los Angeles market referencing the interstate tariff. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to Union and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Tesoro. View "Tesoro Alaska Company v. Union Oil Company of California" on Justia Law

by
In 2007, a shareholder of Calais Company, Inc., Deborah Kyzer Ivy, filed a complaint against Calais seeking involuntary corporate dissolution. In May 2009, Ivy and Calais reached a settlement agreement in which Calais agreed to purchase Ivy's shares at "fair value" as determined by a three-member panel of appraisers. The appraisers disagreed over the fair value of the company. Calais sought to enforce the Agreement in superior court, arguing the two majority appraisers had failed to comply with the appraisal procedure mandated by the Agreement and the Agreement's definition of "fair value." The superior court ultimately declined to rule on the issue, concluding that interpreting the term "fair value" was beyond its scope of authority under the terms of the Agreement. Consequently, the court ordered Calais to purchase Ivy's shares based on the majority appraisers' valuation. Calais appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's final order and remanded for the court to remand to the appraisers with explicit instructions to calculate the "fair value" as defined by AS 10.06.630(a), as required by the Agreement. View "Calais Company, Inc. v. Kyzer Ivy" on Justia Law

by
The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case involved a dispute over the disposition of a deceased Alaska attorney's interest in attorney's fees from his participation, through a joint venture, in the Exxon Valdez oil spill litigation. The attorney's sister, individually and on behalf of their mother's trust, asserted claims to the attorney's fees, and the attorney's estate opposed those claims. The parties settled the dispute by agreeing that the right to attorney's fees was an estate asset, and the settlement was approved by the Alaska superior court in the deceased attorney's probate proceedings. The attorney's fees were ultimately paid to the joint venture. Both the estate and the sister then sought the deceased attorney's interest in the joint venture's attorney's fees. The estate requested that the superior court enjoin the sister's claims as violations of the settlement agreement. Around this time, the joint venture deposited what it calculated as the deceased attorney's share of the joint venture's attorney's fees in a federal interpleader action in California. The superior court ruled that under the settlement agreement, as between the estate, the sister, and the mother's trust, the estate had the right to the deceased attorney's share of the attorney's fees held by the joint venture. The superior court therefore enjoined the sister from pursuing claims to the deceased attorney's share of the joint venture's attorney's fees. The superior court later modified the injunction to allow the sister's participation in the federal interpleader action. The sister appeals, arguing that the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction, issued its judgment without proper procedures, improperly interpreted the settlement agreement, prohibited her from pursuing contract claims against third parties, and entered a vague and ambiguous judgment. She also argues that the superior court's ruling was improperly expanded to allow her participation in the federal interpleader action. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court acted within its jurisdiction, followed adequate procedures, did not prevent the sister from pursuing her individual contract claims against the joint venture, was not vague and ambiguous in its ruling, and did not expand the ruling's substance when modifying it, the Court affirmed the superior court's orders and judgment. View "Dimeff v. Estate of Robert Merle Cowan" on Justia Law