Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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Alaska case law has treated the end of a domestic partnership as coextensive with both the end of a marriage-like relationship and the end of the partners’ cohabitation. But this appeal presented a novel factual circumstance of a couple who continued living together after their marriage-like relationship ended. The Alaska Supreme Court clarified several aspects of Alaska domestic partnership case law to decide this appeal, including when and how a domestic partnership terminates, when postpartnership payments must be reimbursed, and how the trial court should award attorney’s fees. Applying these clarified standards, the Court concluded most of the trial court’s property distribution was correct but that some minor aspects were in error. The Court therefore remanded for the trial court to revise its property division. View "Tomal v. Anderson" on Justia Law

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The Alaska Democratic Party amended its bylaws to allow registered independent voters to run as candidates in its primary elections without having to become Democratic Party members. But the Division of Elections refused to allow independent voter candidates on the Democratic Party primary election ballot, taking the position that Alaska election law, specifically the “party affiliation rule,” prevented anyone not registered as a Democrat from being a candidate in the Democratic Party’s primary elections. The Democratic Party sued for declaratory and injunctive relief preventing enforcement of the party affiliation rule, and the superior court ruled in its favor. The State appealed. Because the Alaska Constitution’s free association guarantee protects a political party’s choice to open its primary elections to independent voter candidates, and because in this specific context the State had no countervailing need to enforce the party affiliation rule, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Alaska v. Alaska Democratic Party" on Justia Law

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A self-represented couple sued their lawyer for legal malpractice. After lengthy and contentious discovery disputes, at the end of which the couple was sanctioned, the couple retained counsel to assist them in terminating the litigation. The parties agreed to dismiss the suit with prejudice, leaving open the couple’s former lawyer’s right to seek an award of attorney’s fees. At issue in this appeal was the superior court’s decisions regarding that lawyer’s motion for attorney’s fees. The superior court applied Alaska Civil Rule 82 for its award of partial reasonable attorney’s fees to the lawyer. But instead of employing Rule 82(b)(2)’s standard 20% calculation for an award without a money judgment, the court applied Rule 82(b)(3), which allowed courts to vary from the standard award. The court made findings and exercised its discretion to use 15% for calculating its fee award to the lawyer, and it left the discovery sanction against the couple in place. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the superior court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and that the court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err when it applied Rule 82(b)(3); furthermore, the Court also concluded the superior court did not abuse its discretion in levying and leaving in place the discovery sanction. View "Boiko v. Kapolchok" on Justia Law

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One night in February 2014 Carlile Transportation Systems, Inc. driver Bart Neal was driving a tractor-trailer southbound on the Dalton Highway. Neal could not steer properly at speeds above 35 miles per hour and decided to stop to put chains on his tires, partially blocking both traffic lanes, and, by his account, activated his flashers. Neal did not deploy reflective triangles. Eggor Enterprises, Inc. driver Joe Seurer was hauling a load of fuel northbound. By his account, Seurer saw lights in the distance but could not determine what they were. Seurer slowed his tractor-trailer from 50 to 35 miles per hour. About three-quarters of a mile from Neal, Seurer again saw lights and thought they might be from a pipeline maintenance truck stopped off the side of the road. He did not see reflective triangles or flashers. The road had an S-curve between Seurer and Neal. Until Seurer rounded the final curve, he did not realize Neal’s rig was blocking the road. Seurer applied his brakes about 300 feet from Neal, avoiding a serious collision but causing Seurer’s trailer to fall onto the side of the highway. The trailer’s fuel load spilled alongside the road. Eggor Enterprises’s insurer, HDI-Gerling American Insurance Company (HDI), paid over $3.5 million in cleanup costs to remediate the spill. HDI-Gerling, as subrogee of its trucking company client, sued Carlile for negligence. After a trial the jury determined that Carlile company’s driver was not negligent and returned a defense verdict. The insurance company appealed some of the superior court’s trial rulings. Seeing no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s entry of final judgment. View "HDI-Gerling America Insurance Company v. Carlile Transportation Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

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Allstate Insurance Company denied underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage to Nathan Ball for an accident involving his own vehicle after determining he was not an insured person under his then-fiancée’s parents’ Allstate automobile insurance policy. Ball contended that his fiancée was a “policyholder” for purposes of her parents’ policy, a necessary predicate to his argument for UIM coverage under the policy. But the policy declarations page did not list “policyholders,” it listed only “named insureds” and “drivers.” The superior court granted summary judgment on grounds that the policy language was not ambiguous because “policyholder” referred only to the parents, the “named insureds,” that the fiancée as only a listed driver, had no objectively reasonable expectation that she was a policyholder, and, therefore, that Allstate did not have a duty to provide Ball UIM coverage. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed “policyholder” encompassed only the named insureds, not listed drivers, and therefore affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Ball v. Allstate Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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Daniel Shearer alleged Brooks Range Petroleum Corporation (BRPC) promised him a ten-year term of employment, then terminated his employment two and a half years later. Shearer sued in the Alaska Second Judicial District, where he alleged the parties had negotiated and formed their contract. BRPC filed a motion to dismiss the case or to change venue to the Third Judicial District, where the contract was executed and where Shearer had performed most of his job duties. The superior court denied the motion, thus retaining venue in the Second Judicial District. The Alaska Supreme Court accepted review of this case to settle where venue for this case was proper. The Court concluded neither Shearer’s tort claims, nor his contract-based claims arose in the Second Judicial District, and the chosen venue was therefore not proper. The Court reversed the superior court’s order denying a change of venue. View "Brooks Range Petroleum Corporation v. Shearer" on Justia Law

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A mother appealed the superior court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to her seven-year-old daughter. She moved to represent herself in the middle of trial; on appeal she contended the superior court abused its discretion when it denied her request on grounds that she lacked knowledge of the legal process, was unable to regulate her behavior in the courtroom, and could not view the case objectively. Finding that the record supported the trial court’s decision that the mother was unable to act with the courtroom decorum necessary for self-representation, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed denial of the mother’s request. View "Jensen D. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

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Vince B. appealed a long-term domestic violence protective order entered against him for stalking his ex-wife. The couple separated two and a half years prior to their divorce; the proceedings were prolonged and unfriendly. The parties struggled to communicate in the course of their shared custody, often hurling profanities at one another. Sarah’s new boyfriend was a particular source of conflict. In February 2016 Vince dropped the children off at Sarah’s boyfriend’s house while she was not present. Vince struck Sarah’s boyfriend in the face, prompting a call to the police. Several other hostile exchanges in 2016 led Sarah to file two domestic violence protective order petitions. The first was denied; the second was granted, in part based on testimony from the first petition, and was the subject of this appeal. Vince B. argued the superior court: (1) abused its discretion and violated his due process rights in its treatment of his ten-year-old son’s proposed testimony; (2) violated the doctrine of ripeness by warning that future conduct could justify a stalking finding; (3) violated the doctrine of res judicata by reconsidering a claim that it previously had adjudicated in an earlier domestic violence petition; and (4) failed to make requisite findings of fact meeting the elements of stalking. He asks us to vacate the order. Seeing no error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s protective order. View "Vince B. v. Sarah B." on Justia Law

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A commercial tenant breached its lease and owed unpaid rent. The landlord sued and obtained a writ of attachment against any funds owed the tenant from Alaska’s Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS). DHSS replied to the writ by stating it owed nothing to the tenant because a recent audit showed the tenant owed DHSS $1.4 million. Without responding to DHSS’s reply the landlord moved for a writ of execution against DHSS, which the superior court denied after finding there were no funds to attach. The court denied the landlord’s motion for reconsideration, as well as its request for a hearing to examine DHSS. The landlord appealed the denial of its motion for reconsideration and sought a remand for a hearing to examine DHSS. In affirming the superior court, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court was correct in denying reconsideration of its order regarding the writ of execution. View "Arcticorp v. C Care Services, LLC" on Justia Law

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In 2009 Calvin Miller purchased from June Fowler by warranty deed an eight-unit, three-story apartment building located in Anchorage. Miller filed suit to bar the seller’s attempt to foreclose on the property after he stopped making payments. Miller also alleged that the seller had misrepresented the condition of the building’s sewer lines at the time of sale. The superior court granted summary judgment in the seller’s favor on all of the misrepresentation claims on the basis that they were barred by the statute of limitations. During the trial, the superior court denied the purchaser leave to amend his complaint. After a bench trial on the remaining claims, the superior court concluded that the seller did not wrongfully foreclose on the building because the purchaser was in default. Miller appealed these three decisions. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment because the seller failed to establish an absence of material fact issues regarding when the purchaser’s causes of action accrued. The Court vacated the order denying the wrongful foreclosure claim because the superior court erred when it found the purchaser in default. The Court affirmed the denial of the purchaser’s motion to amend. View "Miller v. Fowler" on Justia Law