Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The father of three Indian children killed their mother. After the father’s arrest, the father’s relatives moved the children from Alaska to Texas and gained custody of the children through a Texas district court order. The mother’s sister filed a separate action against the father in Alaska superior court, seeking custody of the children and challenging the Texas order. Although Alaska had exclusive jurisdiction to make the initial custody determination, the Alaska court concluded that Texas was the more appropriate forum and ceded its jurisdiction to the Texas court, primarily because evidence about the children’s current status was in Texas. The Alaska Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s decision: it was an abuse of discretion to minimize the importance of protecting the children from the father’s alleged domestic violence and to minimize evidence required to resolve domestic violence and Indian Child Welfare Act issues in this case. View "Rice v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Aaron Steiner began a romantic relationship with Juanita Omadlao in May 2013, while Omadlao was still married to David Coulson. Coulson learned about the affair and filed for divorce. After the divorce proceedings ended, Coulson sued Steiner, claiming alienation of affections, fraud and civil conspiracy, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The superior court granted Steiner summary judgment on all three of Coulson’s claims. The court concluded that Alaska does not recognize a tort for alienation of affections and that Coulson’s remaining claims were derivative of Coulson’s alienation of affections claim and likewise barred by Alaska law. The Supreme Court agreed that Steiner was entitled to summary judgment on the alienation of affections claim based on our prior case law. But the Court concluded Steiner was not entitled to summary judgment on Coulson’s other claims because those claims were based, at least in part, on Steiner’s conduct during the divorce proceedings, not on his role in causing Coulson’s divorce. View "Coulson v. Steiner" on Justia Law

In July 2012 Erin Long was driving toward Sitka when Robert Arnold turned his truck onto the road, cutting her off and forcing her into a ditch. Long was traveling approximately ten miles per hour when she drove off the road, and her car slowed to a stop as it contacted roadside bushes. Long’s car did not come into contact with Arnold’s truck or any other stationary roadside object. Long claimed she began to feel sore while on a flight to California two days after the accident. She subsequently sought medical treatment for her pain. Long later sued Arnold, alleging that his negligent driving caused her injury, medical expenses, economic loss, loss of enjoyment of life, and physical and emotional pain and suffering. The main issue in this negligence case was whether it was error for the trial court to give a causation instruction to the jury, "[t]he negligence was important enough in causing the harm that a reasonable person would hold the negligent person responsible." Finding no error in issuing that instruction, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Long v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Two credit card holders defaulted on their accounts, and the issuing bank elected to litigate debt-collection actions. After courts entered default judgments against both card holders, the card holders filed new and separate suits alleging that the bank violated the Uniform Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA) during the earlier debt collection actions. The bank moved in each case to arbitrate the UTPA claims, and the superior court stayed the UTPA litigation and ordered arbitration. The issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the bank waived its right to demand arbitration of the subsequent UTPA claims by litigating the debt-collection claims. Because the Court concluded that the two claims were not sufficiently closely related, it held that the bank did not waive its right to demand arbitration of the separate UTPA claims. But The Court also concluded that it was error for the superior court to interpret the arbitration agreement on the question of the availability of statewide injunctive relief: the interpretation of an arbitration agreement is in the first instance a matter for the arbitrator. View "Hudson v. Citibank (South Dakota) NA" on Justia Law

A driver and his passengers sued another driver for injuries arising from an accident. After a trial, the jury returned an award of past pain and suffering damages for the driver, and past medical expenses and pain and suffering damages for one of the passengers. The driver and passengers appealed this award, arguing that it was impermissibly inconsistent and not supported by the weight of the evidence. Because the driver and passengers failed to challenge the jury verdicts before the trial court, all of their challenges were waived, and the Supreme Court affirmed the verdicts in full. View "Small v. Sayre" on Justia Law

A client personally financed the sale of his business corporation. His attorney drafted documents that secured the buyer’s debt with corporate stock and an interest in the buyer’s home. Over seven years later the government imposed tax liens on the corporation’s assets; according to the client, it was only then he learned for the first time that his attorney had not provided for a recorded security interest in the physical assets. The client sued the attorney for malpractice and violation of the Alaska Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). The superior court held that the statute of limitations barred the client’s claims and granted summary judgment to the attorney. But after review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that it was not until the tax liens were filed that the client suffered the actual damage necessary for his cause of action to be complete. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Westbrook" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the validity of an easement that Thomas Carnahan claimed extended over property owned by Keven and Marlene Windel. In addition, there were issues surrounding damage allegedly caused by improvements within that easement. Carnahan won at trial in "Windel I," but the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration of attorney fee issues. On remand, the superior court awarded Carnahan feed, finding that he was the prevailing party. The Windels appealed again, arguing the superior court erred in its analysis of Rule 68 when awarding Carnahan attorney fees. Finding no reversible error in the resolution of the fee dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Windel v. Carnahan" on Justia Law

The superior court granted sole legal and primary physical custody of a child to her grandparents, after a trial at which the court found by clear and convincing evidence that leaving the child in her mother’s custody would be clearly detrimental to the child’s welfare. Nine months later, the mother moved to modify custody, attesting by affidavit that she had improved her life in a number of ways and had accomplished goals the court had set for her. She also argued that the court’s grant of custody following trial had been only temporary, and she was thus entitled to a biological-parent preference and the court could modify custody without proof of a substantial change in circumstances. The court denied her motion without a hearing, holding both that its custody decree was intended to be final and that the mother failed to show the substantial change in circumstances necessary to entitle her to an evidentiary hearing. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s holdings, and therefore affirmed its denial of the mother’s modification motion without a hearing. View "Abby D. v. Sue Y." on Justia Law

The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (the Department or the State) terminated the employment of seafood inspector Ernest Thomas following a contentious airport inspection that resulted in complaints by a seafood processor and an airline. Thomas contended his termination was actually in retaliation for an ethics complaint he had filed over a year earlier against the agency’s director. The superior court decided most of the inspector’s claims against him on summary judgment but allowed one claim, alleging a violation of his free speech rights, to go to trial. The jury found that the ethics complaint was not a substantial or motivating factor in the inspector’s termination, and the superior court entered final judgment for the agency. On appeal, Thomas argued the superior court erred in granting summary judgment, in denying his motion for a new trial based on allegations of jury misconduct, and in awarding attorney’s fees to the agency. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thomas v. Dept. of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

Mid-afternoon on an icy early March day, plaintiff Michele Marshall was stopped at a stoplight preparing to turn left from the outside turn lane. Defendant Matthew Peter testified that he came to a complete stop about one-half car length behind her. After about 30 seconds, the light turned green, Marshall began to move forward, and Peter released his foot from the brake. But Marshall stopped sooner than Peter expected; Peter returned his foot to the brake, attempted to stop, and slid into Marshall’s vehicle. He testified that his car “just tapped the back of her car” at a speed that “couldn’t [have] be[en] more than three miles an hour.” He had yet to place his foot on the accelerator. Marshall contended that no reasonable juror could have found Peter not negligent and that the superior court therefore should have granted her motion for a directed verdict on liability. After review of this matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury reasonably found the driver behind not negligent, and therefore affirmed the denial of the motion. View "Marshall v. Peter" on Justia Law