Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Several men were in a car that rear-ended the plaintiff Linda Sellers' vehicle. She sued the car’s owner, believing he had been driving. The car’s owner moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the basis of an affidavit from a second man, who claimed he was driving at the time of the accident. Plaintiff amended her complaint to name both men. The second man then moved to dismiss the claim against him, arguing that under Alaska Civil Rule 15(c) plaintiff’s amended complaint did not relate back to the date of her initial filing and the claim was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed and dismissed the claim. Plaintiff proceeded to trial against the car’s owner, who defended on grounds that he had not been driving. The jury found against plaintiff, who then appealed to the superior court, arguing that the district court erred when it dismissed her claim against the second man. The superior court affirmed the district court’s decision. After granting review of the matter, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded plaintiff’s amended complaint met the requirements for relation back under Rule 15(c), and therefore reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sellers v. Kurdilla" on Justia Law

A mother and father shared joint legal and physical custody of their daughter. The mother moved for sole legal and primary physical custody, alleging that a sustained lack of cooperation between the parents and other changes in their lives justified the modification of custody she requested. She moved in the alternative for a modification of the custody schedule. The superior court found there was no substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of custody and awarded partial attorney’s fees to the father. The father appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed these decisions. The case was remanded nevertheless for the superior court to consider whether the mother’s proposed modification of the new custody schedule would have been in the daughter’s best interests. View "Collier v. Harris" on Justia Law

Floyd Cornelison injured his back at work in 1996 while shoveling dirt. He had back surgery later that year, but it did little to improve his condition. The Board found he was permanently and totally disabled (PTD) in 2001 under the "odd-lot doctrine." TIG Insurance, the workers’ compensation insurer for Floyd’s employer, did not contest that he was PTD; it reclassified his workers’ compensation benefits as PTD in 2000. Floyd also received Social Security disability payments, and the employer received an offset for those payments. The employer and TIG challenged Cornelison's continuing eligibility for workers’ compensation, relying on surreptitious video surveillance and a doctor’s report issued after the doctor viewed an edited surveillance video. Cornelison and his wife sued TIG and a number of others involved in the attempt to terminate benefits; they alleged several causes of action, contending that the video had been purposely edited to provide a false picture of the employee’s physical abilities and that the defendants had participated to varying degrees in a scheme to defraud the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board. The trial court granted summary judgment or dismissal as to all of the defendants on all counts. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court concluded the Cornelisons provided enough evidence to show that a material factual dispute existed about the accuracy of the edited videos and the manner in which the videos were created. They also presented more than generalized claims of emotional distress. Because the superior court failed to address the issues in dispute in the IIED claim against certain persons involved with the making of the videos, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on this claim and remand to the superior court. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cornelison v. TIG Insurance" on Justia Law

The superior court issued a 30-day involuntary commitment order after finding that Mark V. was gravely disabled and “entirely unable to fend for himself independently in the community.” Mark argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove he could not live independently. Although Mark’s appeal was technically moot, his claim raised an important question that satisfied the public interest exception: Where does family and community support fit within the involuntary commitment process and which party bears the burden of proving or disproving that a respondent has that support? The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s inability to function with outside support, when relevant, was part of the petitioner’s burden of proving that there was no less restrictive alternative to commitment. But the Court found in this case that the State’s evidence satisfied this burden, and the Court therefore affirmed the 30-day commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V." on Justia Law

This appeal involved two petitions for long-term domestic violence protective orders. Olivia Lee-Magana prevailed both on a petition she brought against her ex-boyfriend Jacob Carpenter and on a petition he brought against her. She moved for attorney’s fees in both cases, but the trial court denied her motions at first and again on reconsideration. Lee-Magana appealed, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding her full attorney’s fees on both petitions : on hers because she was the prevailing petitioner in a domestic violence case for whom fees are allowed by statute, and on her ex-boyfriend’s because she was the prevailing party and his petition was vexatious. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s denial of attorney’s fees for Lee-Magana's successful defense against her ex-boyfriend’s petition. As for the court’s denial of attorney’s fees to Lee-Magana as the prevailing petitioner, the Court concluded there was no adequate reason for denying fees and therefore reversed and remanded for an award of fees in an appropriate amount. View "Lee-Magana v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission was created, an Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decision could be appealed to the superior court, and a party dissatisfied with the superior court’s final resolution of the case then could appeal to the Supreme Court. Construing the appellate rules, the Supreme Court decided in "Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau," "a decision of a superior court, acting as an intermediate appellate court, which reverses . . . the decision of an administrative agency and remands for further proceedings, is a non-final order of the superior court." Joseph Huit worked for Ashwater Burns, Inc. in 2010. Early in November he was working on a remodel project, and as part of the job he removed a water-damaged vanity from a bathroom. As he was carrying the vanity he scratched his abdomen on a protruding drywall screw; he showed the scratch to some people at the job site, including his brother Steven, but did not file a report of injury. According to Huit at some point later in November the scratch appeared to heal. In early December, Huit felt ill at work, so he went to the emergency room. He would later be diagnosed with “spontaneous endocarditis” with metastatic lesions growing on his spleen, kidneys, brain and heart. By January 2011 Huit had severe aortic regurgitation, and in February he underwent aortic valve replacement surgery. Huit first thought about the possibility that the infection was work related while he was hospitalized; he explained that after the doctors told him he had an infection, he remembered the scratch and notified his employer. Ashwater Burns filed a report of injury on December 21 and later controverted benefits, relying on a cardiologist’s opinion formed after reviewing Huit’s medical records. This appeal presented the Supreme Court's first opportunity to consider whether "Thibodeau," should apply to Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission decisions. After review, the Court concluded that it should. This appeal also presented a first opportunity to consider, at least in part, the legislature’s 2005 amendments to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act’s presumption analysis. The Court reversed the Commission’s application of that analysis in this case and modified its earlier precedent. View "Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc." on Justia Law

In November 2010, Stevie Lander was driving on an icy road. Her vehicle slid into a Bonnie Luther's car. Although Luther reported no injuries at the scene of the accident, that evening she went to the emergency room for head and neck pain, and within weeks she began to suffer from lower back pain that prevented her from returning to her job as a flight attendant. Luther attributed her pain to the accident and sued Lander for negligence two years later. Lander admitted negligence and made an offer of judgment, which Luther did not accept. The case proceeded to trial in 2014, and the jury awarded Luther a total of $3,259 for past medical expenses, past wage and benefit loss, and past non-economic losses. The superior court granted attorney’s fees to Lander under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68(b) and denied Luther’s motion for a new trial. Luther appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by denying her a new trial based on inadequate damages and by excluding evidence of the amount of payments for medical treatment made by Luther’s insurer. She also challenged the superior court’s decision to grant attorney’s fees based on billing records that were filed under seal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of payments made for Luther’s medical treatment by her insurer. But because that error was harmless, the Court affirmed the final judgment entered by the superior court. View "Luther v. Lander" on Justia Law

Timothy G. alleged he was abused by his stepfather repeatedly between 1997 and 2006. In 2006, Timothy reported the abuse to his mother. She took Timothy and his four siblings to a shelter, sought a protective order against the stepfather, and instituted divorce proceedings. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) then substantiated the report of harm, removed the children from their mother’s care, and placed them in foster care. In 2012, Timothy filed a complaint naming OCS and his stepfather as defendants. He sought compensatory damages from OCS, claiming that “[a]s a direct and proximate consequence of [OCS’s] breach of [its] dut[y] of care, [he] suffered physical injury, psychological and emotional injury and distress, psychological torment, torture and sexual abuse, pain and suffering, and resultant loss of earning capacity.” Timothy alleged that OCS had investigated at least ten reports of harm involving him and his siblings, but had taken no action. In response to OCS' motion to dismiss, Timothy G. asserted that the statute of limitations had been tolled on his claim because he was mentally incompetent following those years of abuse. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on this issue and concluded that Timothy had failed to prove that he was incompetent. On appeal, Timothy argued that the superior court should have ruled in his favor if he produced more than a scintilla of evidence to support his assertion. But the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court applied the proper burden of proof and the proper test for competency, and that the court did not clearly err in finding that Timothy did not prove his incompetence. View "Timothy G. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

The State Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) filed a petition for an ex parte protective order on behalf of an elderly woman against her adult daughter and caregiver, after receiving allegations of financial abuse made by the elderly woman’s other family members. The superior court found those allegations to be unfounded and denied the protective order. The elderly woman’s estate and the caregiver daughter sought attorney’s fees against the State in connection with both the protective order and conservatorship proceedings. The superior court awarded full reasonable fees arising from the denial of the protective order, finding that OPA’s protective order petition was brought without “just cause,” under the fee-shifting provision of AS 13.26.131(d). The superior court declined to award attorney’s fees arising from the proceeding to establish a conservatorship because the State had not “initiated” the conservatorship proceeding as required for fees under AS 13.26.131(d). The State appealed the first award, and the caregiver daughter and the estate of the woman cross-appealed the denial of the second award. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that AS 13.26.131 did not apply to elder fraud protective order proceedings; nor did Alaska Civil Rule 82. Instead, AS 44.21.415 contained a cost-recovery mechanism that allowed private parties to recover attorney’s fees against the State in such proceedings. So the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s fee award in the elder fraud protective order proceeding. And because the State did not initiate the conservatorship proceeding here, no attorney’s fees are available against the State in that proceeding. View "Alaska Office of Public Advocacy v. Estate of Jean R." on Justia Law

A federally recognized Alaska Native tribe adopted a process for adjudicating the child support obligations of parents whose children are members of the tribe or are eligible for membership, and it operated a federally funded child support enforcement agency. The Tribe sued the State and won a declaratory judgment that its tribal court system had subject matter jurisdiction over child support matters and an injunction requiring the State’s child support enforcement agency to recognize the tribal courts’ child support orders in the same way it recognized such orders from other states. Because the Supreme Court agreed that tribal courts had inherent subject matter jurisdiction to decide the child support obligations owed to children who are tribal members or were eligible for membership, and that state law thus required the State’s child support enforcement agency to recognize and enforce a tribal court’s child support orders, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alaska v. Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska" on Justia Law