Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The parties to this appeal disputed the sequence for applying the provisions when calculating compensation for injured employees; another provision applied a cost-of-living ratio only to out-of-state recipients. Richard Roberge injured his shoulder in May 2014 while working for ASRC Construction Holding Company; he continued working with accommodations until the job ended in November. Roberge then returned to his Idaho residence. ASRC paid him $834.85 weekly in temporary total disability compensation through mid-August 2015, calculated by adjusting the maximum weekly compensation rate by the prevailing cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) percentage for his residence. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded We conclude the Act required first applying the cost-of-living ratio and then applying the maximum rate. View "Roberge v. ASRC Construction Holding Company, et al." on Justia Law

The State redesigned the dental insurance plan offered to public retirees in 2014, narrowing coverage but also decreasing premiums paid by retirees. The Retired Public Employees of Alaska challenged the redesign. After a bench trial the superior court concluded that the new plan unconstitutionally diminished retirees’ accrued benefits. The State appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by determining the dental plan was a constitutionally protected “accrued benefit” and by refusing to consider premium rates for retirees as relevant to the diminishment analysis. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the State on the second point only: "The Alaska Constitution does protect public retirees’ option to purchase dental insurance as an accrued benefit, but both coverage for retirees and price to retirees influence the value of this option." The Court therefore vacated and remanded for the superior court to reevaluate the plan changes and incorporate premium pricing into its analysis. View "Tshibaka v. Retired Public Employees of Alaska, Inc." on Justia Law

After Lauren Bridges’ daughter S.B. was born severely disabled, Bridges sued the many healthcare providers involved in S.B.’s birth. When Bridges’s attorneys failed to timely oppose the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the superior court granted summary judgment and then final judgment in favor of all defendants. Bridges then moved for relief from judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b). The superior court found that Bridges' attorneys’ neglect was inexcusable, precluding relief under Rule 60(b)(1), but nonetheless granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to avoid injustice. The Alaska Supreme Court found the superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding the neglect of Bridges’s counsel inexcusable and denying relief under Rule 60(b)(1). But the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). "An attorney’s neglect, whether excusable or inexcusable, cannot be grounds for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) unless the attorney abandons the client. Because that is not what the record shows, we reverse the superior court’s ruling and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants." View "Chena Obstetrics and Gynecology, et al. v. Bridges" on Justia Law

A mother no longer wished to serve as her adult daughter’s guardian due to fear of her daughter’s violence. The superior court held a hearing to determine whether to allow the mother to resign and appoint a public guardian from the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) to serve as the daughter’s guardian instead. After a brief exchange, the superior court allowed the daughter to waive her right to counsel and consent to appointment of a public guardian. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed because the superior court did not sufficiently establish that the waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. View "In the Matter of the Protective Proceeding of Amy D." on Justia Law

A patient sued a hospital after learning that a hospital employee intentionally disclosed the patient’s health information in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The patient alleged the disclosure breached the hospital’s contractual obligations to him. The superior court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the hospital if the jury found that the employee was not acting in the course and scope of employment when she disclosed the patient’s information. The jury so found, leading to judgment in the hospital’s favor. The Alaska Supreme Court found the jury instruction erroneously applied the rule of vicarious liability to excuse liability for breach of contract. "A party that breaches its contractual obligations is liable for breach regardless of whether the breach is caused by an employee acting outside the scope of employment, unless the terms of the contract excuse liability for that reason." The Court therefore reversed judgment and remanded for further proceedings, in particular to determine whether a contract existed between the patient and hospital and, if so, the contract’s terms governing patient health information. View "Guy v. Providence Health & Services Washington" on Justia Law

Gavora, Inc., a real estate company, acquired an existing long-term lease with a purchase option for a municipality-owned property. Dry-cleaning businesses operating on the property contaminated the groundwater both prior to and during the real estate company’s involvement. The municipality knew about, but did not disclose, groundwater contamination at nearby sites when the real estate company ultimately purchased the property. A state agency later notified Gavora and the municipality of their potential responsibility for environmental remediation. Gavora sued the municipality in federal district court; the federal court determined that the parties were jointly and severally liable for the contamination, and apportioned remediation costs. Gavora also sued the municipality in state court for indemnity and further monetary damages, alleging that the municipality had misrepresented the property’s environmental status during purchase negotiations. The superior court ruled in the municipality’s favor, finding the municipality did not actively deceive Gavora; Gavora had reason to know of the contamination; and all physical harm occurred before the sale. Gavora challenged all three findings. Finding no error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Gavora, Inc. v. City of Fairbanks" on Justia Law

This matter arose from four Child in Need of Aid (CINA) cases. In each, the superior court appointed a guardian ad litem for the child through the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA), and in each case Brenda Finley, working under contract with OPA, appeared as the GAL. Pursuant to CINA Rule 11(e), Finley disclosed to the parties that she was a foster parent in another CINA case. She stated that she did not believe that her role as a foster parent “will affect her ability to be [impartial] in this specific case, or in other cases.” A parent in each case moved for an evidentiary hearing “regarding whether Ms. Finley should be disqualified as a guardian ad litem.” Arguing that Finley’s role as a foster parent might create a conflict of interest due to her relationship with the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) as both a foster parent and a GAL, the parents sought additional details to determine whether a conflict existed, suggesting a hearing would allow them to elicit information regarding Finley’s past, present, and possible future tenure as a foster parent, the status of the cases in which she served as a foster parent, her financial arrangements with OCS, and her relationship with OCS workers. Both OCS and OPA filed qualified oppositions to the parents’ request for a hearing, arguing: that categorical disqualification of foster parents from serving as GALs was overbroad; the court should provide clarity on what framework should govern the potential conflict; and that a low bar for disqualification would fail to recognize “the difficulty of keeping positions in child welfare staffed by qualified individuals, ideally with ties to the community . . . .” The Alaska Supreme Court held that the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct applied to determine whether the GAL has a disqualifying conflict of interest and that the superior court must permit limited discovery to ascertain the underlying facts for determining whether a disqualifying conflict exists. View "C.L. v. Office of Public Advocacy" on Justia Law

A group of defrauded investors brought a lawsuit in Washington State seeking to recover assets they alleged had been fraudulently conveyed to perpetrators of the fraud. The investors discovered that the alleged perpetrators owned land in Alaska in the name of a mining company. They filed an action in Alaska superior court for fraudulent conveyance and to quiet title to the property. The Washington case was later dismissed; the Alaska superior court then granted summary judgment against the investors, concluding that as a result of the dismissal of the Washington case they lacked the creditor status necessary to give them standing to pursue their Alaska claims. The court awarded attorney’s fees to the mining company as the prevailing party. The investors had only one apparent asset: a potential legal malpractice claim against their Alaska attorneys for having filed a fatally defective claim. The investors disavowed any intention of pursuing such a claim, but the mining company moved for a writ of execution, seeking the involuntary assignment of the potential claim to itself. The superior court denied the mining company’s motion, concluding that Alaska law, for public policy reasons, did not allow the involuntary assignment of legal malpractice claims. The mining company appeals. Because the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s conclusion that legal malpractice claims could not be involuntarily assigned, it affirmed the order denying the writ of execution. View "PADRM Gold Mine, LLC v. Perkumpulan Investor Crisis Center Dressel - WBG" on Justia Law

After a woman died and left a will disposing of several parcels of real property and two trailers, her ex-husband — with whom she had maintained a romantic relationship following divorce — filed claims against the woman’s estate for those properties. He contended the decedent had transferred title to three of those parcels to him. He also claimed that they made an agreement about two parcels and the trailer that sat on them: he and the decedent would live there until their deaths, after which the properties would be sold and the proceeds given solely to their great-grandchild. The estate rejected these claims, invoking the statute of frauds. The superior court ruled in favor of the estate, finding that the ex-husband failed to prove the existence of contracts satisfying the statute of frauds and rejecting his alternative claims for restitution. On appeal, the ex-husband argued the proceedings were marred by procedural flaws, and challenged the superior court’s decision on the merits. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court largely affirmed the superior court’s decision, but remanded for further proceedings on the restitution claim involving one parcel. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Alexina Rodman" on Justia Law

After a narrow loss in the general election for Alaska House District 27, Lance Pruitt contested the result. The superior court dismissed Pruitt’s multi-count complaint for failure to state a valid claim. But in order to expedite the case’s eventual review, the court heard evidence on a single count: Pruitt’s claim that the Division of Elections committed malconduct that influenced the election by moving a polling place without notifying the public in all the ways required by law. After considering the evidence, the superior court ruled that Pruitt did not show either that the lack of notice amounted to malconduct or that it was sufficient to change the results of the election. Pruitt appealed only the count on which the court heard evidence. In order to resolve this election contest before the start of the legislative session, the Alaska Supreme Court issued a brief order stating that Pruitt had not met his burden to sustain an election contest. This opinion explained the Court’s reasoning. Although the count alleging inadequate notice should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim, the Court held it did not succeed on the merits. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Pruitt v. Alaska" on Justia Law