Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A father requested court-appointed counsel in a child custody modification proceeding after learning that the mother had hired a private attorney. The court denied the request. The father (supported in part by several amici curiae) claimed that the denial violated his due process and equal protection rights under theAlaska Constitution. The Supreme Court disagreed, declining to expand its prior decisions by mandating court-appointed counsel for every indigent parent in a child custody proceeding when the opposing parent was represented by private counsel. The Court concluded that on the facts of this case the father’s constitutional rights were not violated by the denial of court-appointed counsel. View "Dennis O. v. Stephanie O." on Justia Law

Alex H., a prisoner, challenged the superior court’s denial of his request for transport to attend in person his parental rights termination trial, and, therefore, the ultimate termination of his parental rights. He argued that when denying his transport request the superior court: (1) abused its discretion by concluding in its statutory analysis that transport was not required; (2) abused its discretion or erred by failing to consider all required factors for the statutory analysis; and (3) separately violated his due process rights by denying him in-person attendance at the parental rights termination trial. Because the superior court considered all relevant factors the parties presented to it, because it was not obvious that considering additional factors would have changed the court’s statutory analysis, and because the prisoner’s due process rights were not violated, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s transport decision and ultimate termination of the prisoner’s parental rights. View "Alex H. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Providence Alaska Medical Center terminated Dr. Michael Brandner’s hospital privileges without notice and an opportunity to be heard after determining he had violated hospital policy by failing to report an Alaska State Medical Board order requiring him to undergo an evaluation of his fitness to practice medicine. Brandner unsuccessfully challenged this action through Providence’s internal post-termination hearing and appeal procedures. Brandner then sued in superior court, seeking reinstatement and damages for, in relevant part, alleged due process violations both in the procedures used and in the substantive standard applied in his termination. The superior court ruled that Brandner’s due process rights were not violated, that he was not entitled to reinstatement, and that under federal law Providence was entitled to immunity from his damages claims. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision concerning the substantive standard applied to terminate Brander; he therefore was not entitled to reinstatement or post-termination-hearing damages. But Brandner’s due process rights were violated by the procedures Providence employed because was not given required notice and a hearing prior to the termination of his hospital privileges; the Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision on the pre-termination notice and hearing claim and its decision that Providence had damages immunity from this claim. View "Brandner v. Providence Health & Services - Washington" on Justia Law

The respondent in involuntary commitment and medication proceedings, Jacob S., appealed a few issues related to findings that he was mentally ill and posed a risk of harm to others. The superior court ordered both 30-and 90-day commitments, the latter following a jury trial. The court also entered medication orders after finding the respondent unable to make mental health treatment decisions. The primary argument respondent made on appeal of the commitment order, was: (1) when a respondent requests a jury trial on a 90-day commitment petition, who decides the factual underpinning for and the ultimate question of least restrictive alternative to commitment (the jury or the court); and (2) can a respondent be found incompetent under AS 47.0.837(d)(1) if only part of the requirements of that statute is not met? The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the court decides the question of least restrictive alternative; and (2) yes, a respondent can be found incompetent if one part is not met. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court’s commitment and medication orders. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Jacob S." on Justia Law

In a prison discipline proceeding, prisoner William Johnson was found guilty of possessing contraband. He appealed his punishment to a discipline committee, which affirmed the decision. Represented by counsel, Johnson appealed to the superior court, alleging that the Department of Corrections had deprived him of due process. The court granted the State’s unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the prisoner’s statement of points on appeal was deficient. When Johnson moved for reconsideration but made no attempt to remedy the deficiency, the superior court denied his motion and awarded the State attorney’s fees. Johnson appealed the dismissal and the award of attorney’s fees. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

In a 2007 ruling, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that the State had "compelling interests" in aiding parents to help their minor children make informed and mature pregnancy-related decisions, and at that time, the Court indicated that a parental notification law might be implemented without unduly interfering with minors’ fundamental privacy rights. The 2010 voter-enacted Parental Notification Law revived an exception in the existing medical emancipation statute, creating considerable tension between a minor’s fundamental privacy right to reproductive choice and how the State could advance its compelling interests. By this 2016 opinion, the Alaska Court concluded that the Notification Law violated the Alaska Constitution’s equal protection guarantee and could not be enforced. "But the decision we reach today is narrow in light of the limited State interests offered to justify the Notification Law. The State expressly disclaims any interest in how a minor exercises her fundamental privacy right of reproductive choice, and it does not suggest that it has an interest in limiting abortions generally or with respect to minors specifically. And as a court we are not concerned with whether abortion is right, wrong, moral, or immoral, or with whether abortions should be available to minors without restriction. We are concerned only with whether, given its stated underlying justifications, the current Notification Law complies with the Alaska Constitution’s equal protection guarantee — and it does not." View "Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Defendant Aaron Young was accused of involvement in a shooting and convicted at trial, in part on the strength of three eyewitness identifications. He challenged the admissibility of two of the identifications on due process grounds, but the superior court ruled them admissible. Defendant also requested an eyewitness-specific jury instruction, which the superior court refused. Furthermore, defendant argued that he was entitled to a mistrial because of an alleged discovery violation by the State that he learned of mid-trial. The superior court denied his motion, finding that the State had not violated the disclosure rules and alternatively that the defendant had not suffered any prejudice. The defendant was convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. On petition to the Alaska Supreme Court, defendant argued not only that his conviction should have been reversed based on the current law on the admissibility of eyewitness identifications, but also that Alaska’s due process clause required the adoption of a new test. He also argued that the superior court erred in failing to give his requested jury instruction and in failing to grant him a mistrial. The Supreme Court held that the superior court erred under the law as it currently existed when it held one of the eyewitness identifications sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial, but that it did not err in admitting the other. The Court also held that the superior court erred in refusing to give an eyewitness-specific jury instruction but did not err in denying a mistrial. Because the errors were harmless, the Court affirmed defendant’s conviction. In light of the issues raised by this appeal, the Court concluded that the current test for the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence does not adequately protect the right to due process under the Alaska Constitution. The Court therefore identified factors that courts should consider in future cases when deciding whether to admit eyewitness identification evidence. View "Young v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Linden Fyfe was stopped by police while driving on a stretch of highway designated as a "traffic safety corridor." He was charged and convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. At sentencing the trial court imposed double the statutory minimum fine, relying on AS 28.90.030(a), that doubled “the fine, or maximum fine,” for any violation of a provision of Title 28 in a traffic safety corridor. The court of appeals reversed. It concluded that despite the statute’s plain language, the legislature intended fines to be doubled only for noncriminal traffic offenses. The Supreme Court disagreed with that rationale, not the appellate court's mandate. The Court concluded that the statute applied to both criminal and non-criminal traffic offenses under Title 28. But the court also held that the plain language of the statute precluded its application to minimum fines such as the one at issue here. On that ground the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision to vacate Fyfe’s fine and remanded for imposition of the statutory minimum fine. View "Alaska v. Fyfe" on Justia Law

After a two-day hearing, the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) dismissed Qwynten Richards from her Ph.D. program for failing to respond to feedback from her professors. An Appeals Committee affirmed Richards’s dismissal from the program because it concluded that there were sufficient negative reviews from her professors to support dismissal, and that she had failed to satisfactorily complete a “remediation” assignment given to her after the faculty found she plagiarized parts of a paper. Richards appealed to the superior court. The superior court affirmed, holding that UAF was reasonable in characterizing her dismissal as academic, that it substantially complied with its procedures, and that Richards received due process. It also awarded UAF 10% of its claimed attorney’s fees. Richards appealed to the Supreme Court. But finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Richards v. University of Alaska" on Justia Law

In 2014, a petition was filed on behalf of the Seacliff Condominium Association for an order requiring Heather R., the owner of a condominium in Seacliff, to undergo an involuntary 72-hour psychiatric evaluation. The petition alleged that Heather was a threat to “herself . . . and her neighbors” based on “[y]ears of confrontation, threats, aberrant and widely swinging behavior suggesting drug use,” including “taking pictures inside people’s houses, inability to have normal social interactions, [and] lying [in] wait to confront neighbors.” After conducting a statutorily required ex parte screening investigation, which did not include an interview with Heather, the superior court master determined that there was probable cause to believe that she was mentally ill and presented a likelihood of serious harm to others. Heather appealed the evaluation order, claiming that the ex parte investigation violated due process and that the master failed to properly conduct the statutorily required screening investigation. Although this appeal was technically moot, the Supreme Court reached the merits of these claims under the public interest exception. The Court vacated the evaluation order because the superior court master failed to conduct the interview as part of the screening investigation required by statute; the Court did not reach the due process question. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Heather R." on Justia Law