Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner-defendant Ryan Sanders was on trial for two murders. He sought to admit a recording of a phone call to the police, placed by a young woman who had since died. On the recording, the young woman told a police officer that one of the victims had told her that both victims were conspiring to attack and rob the defendant. In support of his motion to admit the recording, the defendant argued that the recording was critical to his defense, which centered on justified self-defense and heat of passion. Defendant invoked the hearsay exceptions for a declarant’s then existing state of mind, an unavailable declarant’s statement against penal interest, and the residual exception for unavailable declarants, as well as his constitutional right to present a defense. The superior court denied the motion. The jury, presented with no evidence of the alleged conspiracy to attack and rob the defendant, convicted him of first- and second-degree murder. He appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Alaska Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for hearing to decide whether the deceased witness’s statement should have been admitted at trial. The Court concluded that it should have been admitted, reversed defendant’s convictions, and remanded for a new trial. View "Sanders v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A father appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter. He claimed the trial court violated his due process rights when it allowed the termination trial to conclude in his absence without first asking him directly if he wished to testify. Kendra G. was born in 2012, and considered an Indian child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Both parents had a history of alcohol abuse, and father-appellant Remy M. had a history of domestic violence. The Office of Children's Services (OCS) initially became involved in this case after receiving reports alleging that mother Vera was abusing and neglecting her children. Although Remy has been able to maintain sobriety in a highly controlled environment, such as a correctional facility, he has repeatedly relapsed, including a few months before the termination trial. At the time of trial, Remy had not completed the recommended long-term substance abuse treatment or addressed the behavioral health issues that cause him to relapse. OCS presented numerous exhibits and the testimony of 16 witnesses to support its claim that termination of Remy's parental rights was necessary because of Remy's substance abuse, domestic violence, criminal behavior leading to incarceration, and parenting deficiencies. Remy attended most of the trial. On the third day of trial, Remy's attorney asked the court if Remy could be absent from trial on the following day to attend an integrated mental health and substance abuse assessment. The trial court responded that Remy did not have to be present because the case was civil, not criminal. The trial court ultimately found "beyond a reasonable doubt," that Kendra was in need of aid, and that even though Remy wanted to be a good father, he had been unable to follow through with any changes in his life to become an adequate parent for her in the near future. Remy did not appeal the substance of the trial court's decision. Instead he argued that the trial court violated his right to due process because it failed to advise him that he had a right to testify and because it permitted his attorney to waive that right in his absence. Remy argued in the alternative that even if he was not denied due process, "[the Supreme Court] should remand the case for development of the record in support of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Remy M. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs." on Justia Law

Petitioner Tracy Hutton was arrested on several weapons charges. After the first two counts were tried to a jury, he waived his right to a jury trial and the third count was tried to the court. He was convicted and appealed, arguing that he had not effectively waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that substantial evidence supported his waiver. The Alaska Supreme Court granted his petition for hearing to decide the appropriate standard of review for the waiver of the right to a jury trial. At oral argument, the State conceded petitioner was not advised of an essential element of the third count and that he was misadvised of the elements of his offense. Because petitioner was given incomplete and misleading information about the charge for which he was being asked to waive his right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court concluded that his waiver was constitutionally defective. The court of appeals’ decision was reversed, and the case was remanded to the superior court for a new trial. View "Hutton v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on unsuccessful constitutional claimants’ invocation of a statutory protection against adverse awards of attorney’s fees and the responsive assertion that they had sufficient economic incentive to bring their claim regardless of its constitutional nature. In a related decision, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision on the merits of the constitutional claim and remanded for entry of declaratory judgment in the claimants’ favor. The constitutional claimants therefore became the prevailing parties, and the Court assumed that on remand they would seek an award of attorney’s fees and costs under AS 09.60.010. Because such an award was conditioned on the absence of sufficient economic incentive to bring the claim regardless of its constitutional nature, the Court also assumed that on remand the superior court would enter the same discovery orders regarding the petitioners’ financial information and third-party funding of the litigation. After review, the Supreme Court saw "no purpose in dismissing the original applications for relief and petition for review as moot in light of the change in prevailing party status, only to have them re-filed as a result of further attorney’s fees proceedings in the superior court." Thee therefore addressed the meaning of “sufficient economic incentive.” The Court first concluded that earlier public interest litigation case law provided that the guiding parameters for the meaning of “sufficient economic incentive.” Further, the Court concluded that in this case the claimants did not have “sufficient economic incentive” to bring the claim regardless of its constitutional nature. The Court vacated the superior court’s discovery order and remanded this for further proceedings. View "Alaska Conservation Foundation v. Pebble Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

The Alaska Board of Game promulgated regulations managing caribou hunting in Game Management Unit 13. A hunter challenged the regulations on constitutional and statutory grounds, arguing that they wrongfully interfered with his subsistence hunting rights, and also sought a judicially imposed public reprimand of an assistant attorney general representing the Board. The superior court dismissed the claim against the attorney, granted summary judgment upholding the regulations, and awarded partial attorney’s fees to the State and an intervenor defendant. The hunter appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal and summary judgment orders, but vacated the attorney’s fees awards and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manning v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Michael Wagner shot and killed his landlord, Steven Key, in 2006. The superior court ruled that the prosecution could use Wagner's police interview to impeach him if he took the stand at his murder trial. Wagner argued on appeal that the police violated his right to remain silent, and that the court's ruling prevented him from testifying. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that on the trial court record, it was impossible to tell whether the court's ruling affected Wagner's decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury. The Court, therefore, concluded that Wagner had not preserved his "Miranda" claim for appellate review. Wagner's conviction was affirmed. View "Wagner v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant exercised his constitutional right not to testify at trial. The prosecutor, in her rebuttal closing argument, commented that two people knew what had happened on the night in question, and only one of them, the victim, had testified. The defendant did not object to the comment, and the jury convicted him of attempted murder. The court of appeals, reviewing the defendant’s unpreserved claim of error, determined that the prosecutor’s remark violated the defendant’s right against self-incrimination. But the court of appeals concluded that there was no plain error because “at least some reasonable judges could have concluded that the problem was not egregious enough to warrant a mistrial, and that the problem could be handled through curative instructions.” After its review of the case, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but on different grounds: because the error, even though obvious, non-tactical, and affecting a substantial right, was harmless beyond a reasonable dou View "Goldsbury v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Defendants in two criminal cases failed to object to errors at trial: in "Moreno v. Alaska," the admission of improper testimony regarding Jorge Moreno's exercise of his right to be free from compelled self-incrimination; in "Hicks v. Alaska," the lack of a jury unanimity instruction when the prosecutor directed the jury that it could find Mary Hicks guilty of either of two episodes of allegedly driving under the influence of alcohol. Moreno and Hicks both appealed, and in each case, the appellate court held that the defendants failed to show that the error was not the result of counsel's strategic decision not to object. Moreno and Hicks filed petitions for hearing before the Supreme Court, arguing that the burden of proof should be on the State to show that their counsels' failures to object were the result of tactical decisions. They also contended that the court of appeals erroneously speculated on the purported tactical benefits they received due to their attorneys' lack of objections. Lastly, they each requested an evidentiary hearing to develop the record on this issue. The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether to apply an evidentiary presumption or to place a burden of proof on a party to establish that a defendant's lack of objection at trial was or was not the result of defense counsel's intelligent waiver or tactical decision not to object. The Court concluded, however, that Alaska case law compels neither result: defense counsel's tactical reason for failing to object, or counsel's intelligent waiver of an objection, should be plainly obvious from the record before foreclosing the reviewing court's consideration of the remaining plain error elements. The Court reversed the court of appeals' decisions on this issue. But it concluded that Moreno suffered no prejudice despite the error in his case, and affirmed the court of appeals' decision upholding Moreno's conviction on this alternate ground. Hicks's case was remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "Moreno v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellants Richard Hughes, the Alaska Miners Association, and the Council of Alaska Producers challenged Lieutenant Governor Mead Treadwell's certification of a ballot initiative that would require final legislative approval for any large-scale metallic sulfide mining operation located within the Bristol Bay watershed. Appellants argued that the initiative violated the constitutional prohibitions on appropriation and enacting local or special legislation by initiative. Following oral argument, the Alaska Supreme Court issued an order affirming the superior court's summary judgment order in favor of the State and the initiative sponsors, and allowing preparation of ballots to proceed. View "Hughes v. Treadwell" on Justia Law

Robert Gillam and two of his business ventures filed suit, alleging that the Alaska Public Offices Commission should not have been allowed to investigate and decide whether Gillam and his businesses had committed certain campaign finance violations. Gillam alleged that both the Executive Director and the Chair of the Commission were biased and that further consideration by the Commission would violate his right to due process protected by the Alaska and federal constitutions and his Alaska constitutional right to a fair investigation. The superior court concluded that Gillam’s claims were not ripe and that Gillam has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Upon review, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed that there was an administrative recusal procedure for Gillam’s state law claims and that Gillam needed to exhaust that remedy before bringing his state law claims to court. The Court also agreed that Gillam’s federal due process claim was not ripe because the recusal procedure might resolve that claim. View "RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Kirk" on Justia Law