Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Joe Garibay was at the Sam's Club in Fairbanks when he collided with a woman’s shopping cart, waking her baby. She demanded an apology, but Garibay swore at her instead. Assuming he was drunk because of the beer in his cart and his threatening manner, the woman called the police, then followed Garibay out to the parking lot to get his license plate number. When a police officer arrived a few minutes later, the woman told him that Garibay was “maybe . . . a drunk,” that he had threatened her in front of her children, and that she wanted him charged with assault. Informed that an assault charge was unlikely, the woman asked that the police at least “find that guy to make sure he’s not drunk.” The officer assured her that they would try to find Garibay and “make sure he’s not, you know, drunk driving, something like that.” Police subsequently stopped him, then arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol. The Department of Motor Vehicles revoked Garibay’s driver’s license for 90 days, and the superior court affirmed the revocation. Garibay appealed, arguing that the police stop constituted an unconstitutional search and seizure requiring that evidence of his drinking be excluded from the license revocation proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that the exclusionary rule applied in license revocation proceedings only in exceptional circumstances not present here. View "Garibay v. Alaska, Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Major forest fires swept through areas south of Fairbanks in the summer of 2009 and approached properties owned by appellants (the landowners). Firefighters working under the direction of the State Department of Forestry intentionally set fire to the landowners’ vegetation. The burnouts deprived the advancing wildfires of fuel and saved the structures. But the landowners sued the State, bringing a takings claim under the eminent domain provision of the Alaska Constitution, article I, section 18, and tort claims for negligence and intentional misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the tort claims because of governmental immunity; it reversed its dismissal of the constitutional claim, remanding it to the superior court for further consideration of whether the specific exercise of the State’s police powers at issue here was justified by the doctrine of necessity. View "Brewer v. Alaska" on Justia Law

J.W. was the son of Jeanette Myre, a member of the Asa’carsarmiut Tribe, and John Wheeler, a non-member. In 2007 Myre petitioned the Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Court to assume jurisdiction over the custody of J.W. After a hearing in which both parents participated. The tribal court awarded Myre primary physical custody and granted Wheeler limited visitation rights. In 2011 Wheeler kept J.W. at the end of a visitation period, then initiated custody proceedings in Alaska superior court. Myre moved to enforce the 2007 tribal court custody order; the superior court found it to be a lawful custody order and returned J.W. to Myre’s custody. In 2012 Myre was arrested for child endangerment, and the State of Alaska assumed protective custody of J.W. Wheeler moved for modification of the custody order in the superior court. The Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Council intervened in the superior court proceeding to argue that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to modify the tribal court custody order. The superior court concluded it had modification jurisdiction and determined there had been substantially changed circumstances such that modification was in J.W.’s best interests. The superior court awarded Wheeler primary physical custody. Neither Wheeler nor Myre appealed the superior court’s decision, but the tribal council appealed, arguing that the superior court lacked modification jurisdiction. The narrow question before the Alaska Supreme Court was whether the tribal council has standing to appeal the superior court’s modification decision in light of the parents’ election not to appeal that decision. Concluding that under this circumstance, the tribal council did not have standing, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Asa'carsarmiut Tribal Council v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

In 1992, Robert Farmer and his wife, Kathy, bought Wolverine Lodge in Glennallen from Peggy Jo Watson. The purchase price of $365,000 was secured by a deed of trust on the property. Farmer defaulted on the mortgage for the first time in 1996, but he cured before the foreclosure sale occurred. In 2012 Farmer defaulted again. Farmer was almost five months late on the payments, had not paid the real estate taxes or room taxes, and had no insurance on the property. Watson paid all of these expenses herself in order to keep the property up-to-date and insured. She testified that "Farmer promised many times that he would bring the loan current and obtain insurance,” but “[h]e never did." In March 2012 Watson commenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Watson’s attorney recorded a notice of default and a notice of sale, and distributed them to Farmer by mail and personal service. Notice of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was published in the Alaska Journal of Commerce and posted at various locations in Anchorage. The nonjudicial foreclosure sale was postponed six times. It was initially set for July 25, but Watson postponed it until August 29. On August 28 Farmer filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and Watson again postponed the sale, this time at Farmer’s request, until September 26. Because of the ensuing automatic bankruptcy stay, the sale was postponed until October 31, then until November 28, then again until December 19, and finally until December 27, when the sale actually took place. Watson’s attorney was the only attendee at each of the scheduled sales. Each of these postponements was announced publicly on the sale date, and the trustee signed the notice of postponement every time. Farmer was not otherwise notified of any of the postponements, and, at the time of the actual sale, he alleged that neither "[he], [his] wife, nor [his] bankruptcy attorney knew . . . that a deed of trust foreclosure sale was scheduled for December 27, 2012." Farmer argued that equity required re-notice after each postponement and that the lack of re-notice violated his due process rights. The superior court granted summary judgment to Watson. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: equity does not require re-notice after postponement of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and notice of a postponement by public announcement satisfies due process. View "Farmer v. Alaska USA Title Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Thomas Kyte and Deidre Stallings are the parents of a daughter, born in 2002. Child Support Services Division (CSSD) entered an administrative order in 2005 requiring Kyte to pay child support of $576 per month, based on his estimated annual income. Stallings later moved that child support be made retroactive to 2002, and Kyte moved for a prospective modification; the superior court denied both motions in a 2007 order that maintained the monthly amount set by the earlier administrative order. In January 2008 Kyte filed a form request for review and modification of the 2007 order. A few months later, he received a response, captioned in bold letters: “Notice of Denial of Modification Review.” The notice was signed by a CSSD child support manager. Nothing in the record indicated either party responded to this notice. Over three years later, in 2011, Kyte filed a motion in superior court, seeking to modify his child support obligation because of a serious hip injury and consequent reduction in his income. He asked for modification both prospectively and retroactively to March 2008. Recognizing that retroactive child support modifications are generally not allowed, Kyte asserted in his motion that his January 2008 request for modification still remained open; he contended that CSSD’s notice of denial did not constitute a valid final order under Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2). CSSD intervened in the court proceeding in order to address the issue of retroactive modification; Stallings did not participate. The superior court denied Kyte’s request for retroactive modification, finding that CSSD’s May 2008 denial notice was a final order from which Kyte could have appealed. Kyte then appealed the superior court’s order. The Supreme Court concluded that CSSD’s decision of the father’s 2008 request was an appealable final order satisfying Appellate Rule 602, and therefore affirmed the superior court’s conclusion that the father was not entitled to a retroactive modification of child support. View "Kyte v. Stallings" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the issuance of a permit by the State Department of Environmental Conservation, Division of Environmental Health to the Alaska Railroad Corporation for the use of herbicides to control vegetation along a railroad right-of-way. Two public interest organizations, Alaska Community Action on Toxics (ACAT) and Alaska Survival, contended that the Department’s issuance of the permit violated due process and the public notice requirement of AS 46.03.320; that the Department abused its discretion in accepting the permit application as complete and in denying standing and intervenor status to a third organization, Cook Inletkeeper; and that ACAT and Alaska Survival should not have been ordered to pay the costs of preparing the administrative record on appeal. The Department and the Railroad cross-appealed on the issue of attorney’s fees, contesting the superior court’s conclusion that ACAT and Alaska Survival were exempt from fees under AS 09.60.010(c) as constitutional litigants. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the challenges to the permit were moot due to its expiration and changes in the governing regulatory scheme. The Court affirmed the agency’s decisions regarding costs; the cross-appeals on attorney’s fees were withdrawn by agreement.View "Alaska Community Action on Toxics v. Hartig" on Justia Law

In May 2011, plaintiffs, six Alaskan children acting through their guardians, filed suit against the State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources, seeking declaratory and equitable relief. The plaintiffs contended that the State breached "its public trust obligations [under] [a]rticle VIII of the Alaska Constitution" by failing "to protect the atmosphere from the effects of climate change and secure a future for Plaintiffs and Alaska's children." The minors argued that the superior court erred when it dismissed their complaint on grounds that their claims were not justiciable, specifically, that the claims involved political questions best answered by other branches of state government. The Supreme Court concluded the claims for declaratory relief did not present political questions, and affirmed their dismissal, because in the absence of justiciable claims for specific relief, a declaratory judgment could not settle the parties' controversy or otherwise provide them with clear guidance about the consequences of their future conduct. View "Kanuk v. Alaska, Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Neighbor and owner of property near the Palmer Municipal Airport brought an inverse condemnation claim against the City of Palmer, arguing that the airport operation diminished his property value. The superior court entered summary judgment for the City of Palmer because the property owner failed to submit any expert testimony regarding damages. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's decision because Alaska law permits property owners to testify about their opinion of the property's value before and after an alleged taking. View "Briggs v. City of Palmer" on Justia Law

Through a prisoner grievance process, William Osborne unsuccessfully challenged the Department of Correction's (DOC) calculation of his sentence. Afterward, he filed an administrative appeal in superior court. Osborne argued the DOC incorrectly computed his sentence following a parole revocation - failing to credit time he spent in custody pending the revocation proceedings. The superior court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Alaska Supreme Court has previously held that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to consider such an appeal: the superior court lacks statutory appellate jurisdiction to review DOC grievance decisions, and an exception allowing the superior court to review alleged constitutional violations did not apply because the prisoner grievance process is not sufficiently adjudicative and does not produce a record capable of review. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Osborne's appeal. View "Osborne v. Alaska, Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Gregg Conitz filed suit against his employer, Teck Alaska Incorporated, alleging discrimination in its internal promotional decisions. The Alaska State Commission for Human Rights dismissed Conitz's complaint, and the superior court dismissed Conitz's appeal as moot. The superior court fount that the same claims had already been decided by a federal court and that the doctrine of res judicata precluded further pursuit of the claims if they were remanded to the Commission. Conitz appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Conitz v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights" on Justia Law