Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Neighbor and owner of property near the Palmer Municipal Airport brought an inverse condemnation claim against the City of Palmer, arguing that the airport operation diminished his property value. The superior court entered summary judgment for the City of Palmer because the property owner failed to submit any expert testimony regarding damages. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's decision because Alaska law permits property owners to testify about their opinion of the property's value before and after an alleged taking. View "Briggs v. City of Palmer" on Justia Law

Through a prisoner grievance process, William Osborne unsuccessfully challenged the Department of Correction's (DOC) calculation of his sentence. Afterward, he filed an administrative appeal in superior court. Osborne argued the DOC incorrectly computed his sentence following a parole revocation - failing to credit time he spent in custody pending the revocation proceedings. The superior court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Alaska Supreme Court has previously held that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to consider such an appeal: the superior court lacks statutory appellate jurisdiction to review DOC grievance decisions, and an exception allowing the superior court to review alleged constitutional violations did not apply because the prisoner grievance process is not sufficiently adjudicative and does not produce a record capable of review. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Osborne's appeal. View "Osborne v. Alaska, Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Gregg Conitz filed suit against his employer, Teck Alaska Incorporated, alleging discrimination in its internal promotional decisions. The Alaska State Commission for Human Rights dismissed Conitz's complaint, and the superior court dismissed Conitz's appeal as moot. The superior court fount that the same claims had already been decided by a federal court and that the doctrine of res judicata precluded further pursuit of the claims if they were remanded to the Commission. Conitz appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Conitz v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights" on Justia Law

In 2010, the superior court issued a final order requiring David and Jane Szabo to pay unpaid fines assessed by the Municipality of Anchorage or failing to remove junk stored on their property. The Szabos did not appeal the order. A year later, they filed an Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. The superior court denied the motion and also denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Szabos appealed, arguing that the fines assessed in this case were unconstitutionally excessive and the municipal code provision under which the Municipality proceeded is unconstitutional. Because the Supreme Court, after its review, concluded that the Szabos' claims did not assert a basis for relief under any section of Rule 60(b), the Court affirmed. View "Szabo v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

When Appellant Todd Christianson was sued by a former employee for severe personal injuries suffered while working for appellant's landscaping business, appellant tendered his defense to his general liability insurer. It did not accept his tender - instead, it sent him a letter that told him he should defend himself, noting an exclusion for claims of employees. Appellant then began to incur defense expenses. No insurer on the policies obtained by appellant's insurance broker, Conrad-Houston Insurance (CHI), ever defended him in the lawsuit. Nearly four years after receiving the insurer’s letter, appellant sued CHI for malpractice. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the superior court applied the discovery rule and dismissed the malpractice lawsuit because it was filed after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had run. The superior court ruled that because the insurer’s letter put appellant on notice he might have a claim against CHI, the statute of limitations had begun to run more than three years before appellant sued CHI. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court.View "Christianson v. Conrad-Houston Insurance" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Alaska Judicial Council recommended that the electorate not retain a sitting district court judge. Susan Kruse and a handful of other voters1 challenged the constitutionality of AS 22.15.195, which granted the Council power to make such recommendations. The superior court concluded that the statute was constitutional but enjoined the Council from releasing new information about the judge in the 60 days prior to an election. On appeal, the Supreme Court also found that AS 22.15.195 was constitutional and does not limit the Council's dissemination of new information. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's ruling in part but reversed and vacated the superior court's injunction prohibiting the Council's public dissemination of new information in the 60 days preceding an election. View "Alaska Judicial Council v. Kruse" on Justia Law

Appellant James Price appealed a superior court order affirming the Kenai Peninsula Borough Clerk's rejection of his ballot referendum application. The proposed referendum would have repealed Borough Ordinance 2008-28, which authorized the general law cities within the Borough to tax non-prepared food items on a year-round basis. The Borough Clerk and the superior court rejected the application on the ground that it violated AS 29.26.100's prohibition on local or special legislation. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the referendum did not violate the prohibition on local or special legislation and would be enforceable if passed. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Price v. Kenai Peninsula Borough" on Justia Law

Daniel G. appealed an ex parte order authorizing a 72-hour psychiatric evaluation issued after his emergency detention. The evaluation personnel determined that Daniel did not meet the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment, and he was released before the expiration of the 72-hour period. He argued the evaluation order violated his constitutional right to due process because it was issued on an ex parte basis, without notice and a hearing, while he was safely in protective custody. The superior court denied the motion to vacate the evaluation order as moot in light of Daniel’s release. After careful consideration of the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that although Daniel's appeal was moot, the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied. The Court therefore reached the merits of his due process claim: the 72-hour evaluation order and the statutory evaluation procedures did not violate due process, and the Court affirmed the evaluation order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Daniel G." on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denied a death benefit claim filed by the decedent's same-sex partner because the death benefit statute grants benefits only to a worker’s "widow or widower" as defined by statute. The Board construed these terms by applying the Marriage Amendment to the Alaska Constitution, which defined marriage as "only between one man and one woman," thus excluding a decedent's same-sex partner. Because this exclusion lacked a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of the statute, the Supreme Court concluded that this restriction on the statutory definition of "widow" violated the surviving partner's right to equal protection under the law. View "Harris v. Millennium Hotel" on Justia Law

The Minto Tribal Court terminated the parental rights of Edward Parks and Bessie Stearman to their daughter S.P. At the termination hearing, the attorney for Parks and Stearman was not permitted to present oral argument to the tribal court. Parks did not file an appeal with the Minto Court of Appeals and instead brought suit against S.P.'s foster parents, the Simmondses, in the state superior court in an attempt to regain custody of S.P. The Simmondses moved to dismiss Parks's state lawsuit on the basis that the tribal court judgment terminating parental rights was entitled to full faith and credit under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that full faith and credit should not be afforded because the tribal court had denied Parks minimum due process by prohibiting his attorney from presenting oral argument on his objections to tribal court jurisdiction based on his status as a non-tribal member. Although the superior court recognized that oral argument is not a per se requirement of minimum due process, the superior court concluded that the denial of oral argument in this case deprived Parks of a meaningful opportunity to be heard because Parks did not receive sufficient notice that his attorney would not be allowed to present oral argument to the tribal court. The Simmondses appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court for further findings. On remand, the superior court reiterated its prior conclusion of a violation of minimum due process and further concluded that the due process error was not harmless because Parks's objections to the Minto Tribal Court's jurisdiction might have had merit. The Simmondses appealed again to the Supreme Court. Because Parks failed to exhaust his remedies in the Minto Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that his state court suit should have been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded for dismissal of Parks's suit. View "Simmonds v. Parks" on Justia Law