Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A mining company contracted with a consultant to help the company obtain new capital investments. The company later brought suit against the consultant, seeking a declaratory judgment that the contract violated Alaska securities law. The company also sought equitable rescission of the contract and cancellation of shares of stock and royalty interests granted under the contract. The superior court granted summary judgment to the consultant on two grounds: (1) the company’s suit was barred as a matter of law by AS 45.55.930(g); and (2) the company’s suit was barred as a matter of law by res judicata in light of a prior suit instituted by the consultant against the company in which the company did not raise its present claims defensively. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment on both grounds, finding questions of fact still existed. View "Girdwood Mining Company v. Comsult LLC" on Justia Law

Nathawn Johnson was convicted of and sentenced for, among other crimes, two counts of sexual assault in the first degree relating to his rape of S.S. One count resulted from penetration of the victim's mouth without her consent; the other count resulted from penetration of the victim's vagina without her consent. Johnson never argued to the trial court that the two counts should have merged for double jeopardy grounds. After Johnson made the double-jeopardy argument for the first time on appeal, the appellate court held that Johnson had not preserved the issue and the trial court did not err by not merging the counts sua sponte. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Johnson argued the court of appeals erred by not reviewing his late-raised double jeopardy argument. The Supreme Court agreed with that, but finding that Johnson's separate convictions did not violate his rights against double jeopardy, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Johnson v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Stephen O.'s parents were concerned that he had suffered a possible psychotic break. They reported his behavior to a mental health clinician. The clinician obtained an ex parte order to take Stephen into custody and transport him to the hospital in Juneau for examination and treatment. The police took him into custody, but due to bad weather he remained in jail for six days before he was transported for evaluation. After a contested hearing, the superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that Stephen was gravely disabled under AS 47.30.915(7)(B) and issued an order for a 30-day involuntary commitment. Stephen appealed that order. Because the superior court’s conclusion that the man was gravely disabled was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, the Supreme Court reversed and vacated the superior court’s 30-day involuntary commitment order.View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Stephen O." on Justia Law

Daniel Brown was a City of Kenai employee who was accused of sexual harassment of female employees at the Kenai Recreation Center. But after a termination hearing, the Personnel Board of the City of Kenai stated that the basis for Brown’s termination was not sexual harassment but rather misconduct. Brown argued on appeal of that decision that the Board violated his right to due process by terminating him for misconduct without finding that he had committed the underlying acts of sexual harassment. He also argued that his termination violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court concluded that the Board had an adequate basis for its decision and that Brown’s termination did not violate the implied covenant of good faith or his right to due process. View "Brown v. City of Kenai, Personnel Board" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska and the Municipality of Anchorage exempt from municipal property taxation $150,000 of the assessed value of the residence of an owner who is a senior citizen or disabled veteran. But the full value of the exemption is potentially unavailable if a person who is not the owner’s spouse also occupies the residence. Contending that the exemption program violated their rights to equal protection and equal opportunities, three Anchorage same-sex couples in committed, long-term, intimate relationships sued the State and the Municipality. The superior court ruled for all three couples. The State and Municipality appealed. As to two of the couples, the Supreme Court affirmed: same-sex couples, who may not marry or have their marriages recognized in Alaska, cannot benefit or become eligible to benefit from the exemption program to the same extent as heterosexual couples, who are married or may marry. The exemption program therefore potentially treats same-sex couples less favorably than it treats opposite-sex couples even though the two classes are similarly situated. The identified governmental interests do not satisfy even minimum scrutiny. The exemption program therefore violates the two couples’ equal protection rights as guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution. As to the third couple, the Court reversed the ruling in their favor because it concluded that the program did not exempt a residence from taxation unless the senior citizen or veteran had some ownership interest in it. If the senior citizen or veteran has no actual ownership interest, the program treats a same-sex couple the same as a heterosexual couple by denying the exemption to both couples, rendering marital status and the ability to marry irrelevant. Because the senior citizen member of the third couple had no ownership interest in the residence, that couple had no viable equal protection claim. View "Alaska v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Byron Charles was convicted of a sex offense in the 1980s. In 1994 the Alaska Legislature enacted ASORA. The statute was expressly retroactive: ASORA accordingly required Charles to maintain sex offender registration. In 2006 Charles was charged with misdemeanor failure to register as a sex offender. At Charles’s failure-to-register trial, a Ketchikan police officer testified that he checked Charles’s 2005 registration and found that the listed address did not exist. Charles appealed, arguing only that the trial court’s finding of guilt was inconsistent with its finding Charles was credible, that the trial court erred in ruling on an evidentiary issue, and that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction. He did not argue that applying ASORA to him would be an ex post facto violation. The court of appeals affirmed Charles’s conviction in 2007. In 2008 the Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Doe I," holding that applying ASORA to Doe violated the Alaska Constitution’s ex post facto clause. The issue before the Court in this appeal was whether the 2008 holding in "Doe v. Alaska (Doe I)" applied to Charles. The Court concluded that it did. "In doing so, we adopt for cases on direct review the federal retroactivity standard announced in 'Griffith v. Kentucky.'" The Court also concluded that Charles’s prior failure to raise the ex post facto issue did not bar him from doing so later: manifest injustice would have resulted if he could not challenge on direct review his conviction for violating a criminal statute that, under the Alaska constitution, might not be applied to him. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals’s 2007 decision that affirmed Charles’s judgment and reversed his 2006 judgment of conviction. View "Charles v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A group of citizens sued two borough assembly members, alleging various violations of borough and state conflict of interest laws and the common law conflict of interest doctrine. After the borough took official action facilitating the assembly members’ defense, the citizens moved to enjoin the assembly members from using their official positions to defend the lawsuit or pursue personal financial gain. The superior court granted a preliminary injunction under the balance of hardships standard, concluding that the citizens faced the possibility of irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted and that the assembly members were adequately protected by the injunction. The assembly members filed a petition for review, which the Supreme Court granted. They argued that the superior court applied the wrong preliminary injunction standard and that the injunction violates their free speech rights. The Court agreed: the trial court should have applied the probable success on the merits standard because the injunction did not adequately protect the assembly members, and the injunction imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The Supreme Court vacated the injunction in full. View "Alsworth v. Seybert" on Justia Law

A former inmate brought sued the Department of Corrections alleging that the Department negligently failed to protect him after he reported being threatened and that he was subsequently assaulted and seriously injured while in prison. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the inmate had not shown that a genuine issue of material fact existed on the question whether the Department breached its duty to protect him from reasonably foreseeable harm. Specifically, the superior court concluded that the communication of the threat was too general to put the Department on notice that the inmate was at risk for the attack he suffered. The inmate appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the inmate presented evidence that raised a genuine issue of fact as to the foreseeability of the attack he suffered. View "Mattox v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) became involved with Emma D. and her newborn son, Joey, following reports from Covenant House expressing concern about Emma’s homelessness, inability to care for an infant, and feelings of depression and aggression toward Joey. Emma D. has a history of mental health issues, particularly bipolar disorder, dating back to her early childhood. OCS took the then-six-month-old Joey into emergency custody during Joey’s hospitalization for respiratory syncytial virus and dehydration, during which he was also diagnosed with supraventricular tachycardia, a heart disorder that required regular attention and treatment. OCS staff subsequently made attempts to assist Emma in obtaining regular mental health treatment in order to reunite her with Joey. OCS staff had difficulty communicating and meeting with Emma; she failed to engage in regular treatment, maintain consistent visitation with Joey, or attend her appointments with case workers and service providers. The superior court terminated Emma’s parental rights 14 months after OCS assumed emergency custody. Emma argued on appeal that OCS failed to consider adequately her mental health issues and therefore its efforts were not reasonable. She also appealed the superior court’s finding that she had failed to remedy her conduct in a reasonable time. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no reversible error in the superior court’s decision terminating Emma’s parental rights. View "Emma D. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Members of Healy Lake Village Tribe who claimed to constitute the newly elected tribal council brought suit in superior court against Mt. McKinley Bank after the Bank refused to change the signatory authority on the Tribe’s accounts to reflect the alleged leadership change. A second group of tribal members, who also claimed to represent the Tribe based on a competing election, was granted intervention in order to contest the superior court’s jurisdiction. The superior court determined that the fundamental issue in the case was the determination of the legitimate governing body of the Tribe, which was an internal self-governance matter within the Tribe’s retained inherent sovereignty. The superior court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the group that brought the initial action appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. Because determining the real party in interest would have required the superior court to decide matters solely within the Tribe’s retained inherent sovereignty, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Healy Lake Village v. Mt. McKinley Bank" on Justia Law