Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The husband in this case was ordered to pay spousal support for an indefinite time period. More than three years later after that order, before a different judge, the wife sought relief for the husband's failure to pay any spousal support. The husband moved motion to set aside the original spousal support award, arguing the judgment was void: (1) for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction at trial; and (2) because he had not received due process. The superior court granted the husband's motion. The wife appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: the Court found that the husband used Rule 60(b)(4) not to attack a void judgment, but as a substitute for a timely appeal. Furthermore, the Court found the husband had adequate notice of the issues to be litigated, was given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to give testimony. Therefore the Court concluded the trial court granted husband's motion in error. View "Blaufuss v. Ball" on Justia Law

Christopher C. and Therese C.'s parental rights were terminated as to the couple's four children. The trial court relied primarily on evidence that neither parent had acquired the basic skills necessary to parent their children despite more than a year of training by the Department of Health & Social Services' Office of Children's Services. The Supreme Court after its review concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore the Court affirmed the termination of the parties' parental rights. View "Christopher C. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Yauna Taylor and Calvin Grimmett were both University of Alaska employees terminated through notices of nonretention; Grimmett was alternatively terminated for cause. The Superior Court found that the University violated Taylor's due process rights by nonretaining her without a hearing rather than for cause; the court upheld the nonretention for Grimmett, but set aside his for-cause termination because the University violated the objective prong of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The University appealed Taylor's case; Grimmett appealed his and the University cross-appealed. Upon review of both cases, the Supreme Court concluded that the University indeed violated Taylor's due process rights by using a notice with no hearing. In Grimmett's case, the Court found the University violated his due process rights to terminate his employment without a hearing. The Court reversed the Superior Court's decision to uphold Grimmett's nonretention and reversed the for-cause termination. Both cases were remanded to their respective tribunals for further proceedings on backpay remedies. View "Grimmett v. University of Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Tommie Patterson was involved in a motor vehicle accident. His insurance company paid his medical providers to the policy limit. Two years later, Appellant sued the insurance company, arguing it had shown bad faith following the accident. The company moved for summary judgment, which was granted. A month after that decision, Appellant filed a second lawsuit, alleging the company falsely advertised its services, breached his insurance contract, embezzled money from him, falsified documents and threatened to make him at fault for the accident. The company moved for summary judgment again, which was granted. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Appellant's embezzlement claim in the second lawsuit alleged a different cause of action than in the first, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment with regards to that claim. All other claims were barred by res judicata. Therefore the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Patterson v. Infinity Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Office of Children's Services (OCS) placed a Native child in a non-Native foster home while working with the other towards reunification. Over two years later, the superior court terminated the parents' parental rights. The child's maternal grandmother and the tribe sought to enforce the Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) placement preferences. The foster parents petitioned for adoption. The superior court found good cause to deviate from the ICWA preference, and that the grandmother was not a suitable placement for the child. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the tribe argued the superior court erred by applying the wrong standard of proof for the good cause determination; that the court's findings were not supported by sufficient evidence; and that the findings were not sufficient to support the good cause determination. The Supreme Court found that the ICWA implicitly mandated that good cause to deviate from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences be proved by clear and convincing evidence. To the extent prior cases held otherwise, they were overruled. Therefore the superior court was vacated here and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A driver caused injury to the passenger of another car in a two-car accident. The passenger brought suit for damages, including her insurer's subrogated claim for medical expenses. The driver made an early offer of judgment, which the passenger did not accept. The driver's insurer then made a direct payment to the subrogated insurer, thereby removing that amount from the passenger's potential recovery. The driver then made a second offer of judgment, which the passenger did not accept. After trial both parties claimed prevailing party status; the driver sought attorney's fees. The superior court ruled that the first offer of judgment did not entitle the driver to fees, but the second offer did. Both parties appealed, arguing the superior court improperly considered the subrogation claim payment in its rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the subrogation claim payment had to be taken into account when evaluating the first offer of judgment and affirmed the decision that the driver was not the prevailing party based on the first offer of judgment. But because the nature of the payment on the subrogation claim was not clear, the Court vacated the decision that the second offer of judgment entitled the driver to attorney fees and remanded the case for further proceedings on this issue. View "Dearlove v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In May 2005, Petitioner Eugene Bottcher drove his vehicle off the road, hitting a boy and narrowly missing the boy's brother. Petitioner was intoxicated at the time; the boy who had been hit later died at the hospital from his injuries. After Petitioner hit the boy, he continued to drive, and when stopped by a passerby who had witnessed the accident, Petitioner tried to bribe him into not reporting the crime. Petitioner pled no contest to manslaughter, assault in the third degree, and failure to render assistance. The superior court sentenced him to a term of 23 years with 3 years suspended. The court also revoked Petitioner's driver's license for life. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's sentence and the lifetime revocation of his license. In his petition to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the lifetime revocation was excessive. Upon review, the Court held that the trial court was not clearly mistaken in finding that Petitioner's case was an extreme one in which a lifetime revocation of his driver's license was required to protect the public. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed the superior court's lifetime revocation of Petitioner's driver's license. View "Bottcher v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Clinton DesJarlais filed an application with the Office of the Lieutenant Governor seeking certification of an initiative that would generally prohibit abortion. The lieutenant governor, acting on the advice of the Department of Law, concluded that the initiative was unconstitutional and declined to certify it for circulation. Appellant filed suit against the State in superior court challenging the lieutenant governor's decision. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the State and appellant appealed. Because appellant's proposed initiative was clearly unconstitutional under controlling United States Supreme Court precedent, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment. View "DesJarlais v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellee Tamarack Air, Ltd. negligently damaged Appellant James Madonna's airplane while it was on Tamarack's airfield after it had been in Tamarack's shop for maintenance. Tamarack offered to fix the plane, but Madonna refused the offer. Instead, he elected to ship the plane to Wyoming and had the plane repaired at the original factory. Tamarack argued that Madonna had failed to mitigate his damages and refused to compensate Madonna for the full cost of these repairs. A jury awarded Madonna most, but not all, of the cost of having the plane repaired out of state. On appeal, Madonna argued that the trial court erred by refusing to let him present several other claims for damages related to the accident. But finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "Madonna v. Tamarack Air, Ltd." on Justia Law

A motorcyclist was involved in a single-vehicle accident resulting in a cut on his head and minor damage to his motorcycle. The accident involved no other drivers, vehicles, or property. Because the motorcycle was not insured at the time of the accident, the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended the driver's license. The motorcyclist appealed the suspension to the superior court, arguing that the suspension violated his equal protection and due process rights under the Alaska Constitution and was precluded by the de minimis nature of the accident. The superior court rejected the his arguments and awarded attorney's fees to DMV. The motorcyclist appealed to the Supreme Court, raising the same substantive arguments and challenging the award of attorney's fees. Upon review, the Court concluded that the motorcyclist's constitutional and common law arguments did not compel reversal of the administrative suspension. However, the Court vacated the entry of attorney's fees and remanded the case to the superior court to determine how the motorcyclist's constitutional challenges should have impacted the award. View "Titus v. Alaska Dept. of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law