Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The parties in this case divorced in 1992. The divorce decree did not divide their property. The husband received military retirement benefits; the wife filed a motion seeking a post decree equitable division of property. The husband opposed, arguing that the wife's claim was barred by: (1) the statute of limitations; (2) laches; and (3) estoppel. The superior court concluded that the wife could properly bring her motion, that her motion was not barred by the statute of limitations, and that laches barred only the retrospective division of the husband's retirement benefits. The husband appealed. Because the wife's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, and because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the wife was entitled to a prospective division of retirement benefits, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court with respect to these issues. However, because the court erred in setting the effective date of the property division, the case was remanded with instructions to correct the effective date. View "Schaub v. Schaub" on Justia Law

The Nancy Lake State Recreation Area (“Park”) issued special use permits to owners of private property abutting the remote boundary of the Park that grant them the right to use all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) along the Butterfly Lake Trail to access their private property. The ATVs have damaged the Trail and the surrounding wetlands. SOP, Inc. sued to enjoin the Park from issuing these ATV permits. SOP moved for summary judgment, and the Park filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Superior Court denied SOP’s motion and granted the Park’s motion. SOP appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the permits created easements because the Park could revoke the permits at will. Easements are disposals of property; the Alaska Constitution prohibits the Park from disposing of property that the legislature has set aside as a state park. The Court concluded the permits were illegal and reversed. View "SOP, Inc. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A taxi driver was cited for driving with a suspended license. She asserted that she was not driving the cab on the night in question. Because she had several other violations her license was revoked. The driver appealed the revocation of her license. An evidentiary hearing was held and the hearing officer recommended that the revocation be upheld. The transportation commission adopted the hearing officer’s proposed decision. The taxi driver appealed to the superior court, arguing that the revocation was in error and that her due process rights were violated. The superior court affirmed the Commission. The taxi driver appealed and used the same arguments on appeal to the Supreme Court. Because the taxi driver’s due process rights were not violated and there was sufficient evidence to revoke her license, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Patrick v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

The husband in this case was ordered to pay spousal support for an indefinite time period. More than three years later after that order, before a different judge, the wife sought relief for the husband's failure to pay any spousal support. The husband moved motion to set aside the original spousal support award, arguing the judgment was void: (1) for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction at trial; and (2) because he had not received due process. The superior court granted the husband's motion. The wife appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: the Court found that the husband used Rule 60(b)(4) not to attack a void judgment, but as a substitute for a timely appeal. Furthermore, the Court found the husband had adequate notice of the issues to be litigated, was given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to give testimony. Therefore the Court concluded the trial court granted husband's motion in error. View "Blaufuss v. Ball" on Justia Law

Christopher C. and Therese C.'s parental rights were terminated as to the couple's four children. The trial court relied primarily on evidence that neither parent had acquired the basic skills necessary to parent their children despite more than a year of training by the Department of Health & Social Services' Office of Children's Services. The Supreme Court after its review concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore the Court affirmed the termination of the parties' parental rights. View "Christopher C. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Yauna Taylor and Calvin Grimmett were both University of Alaska employees terminated through notices of nonretention; Grimmett was alternatively terminated for cause. The Superior Court found that the University violated Taylor's due process rights by nonretaining her without a hearing rather than for cause; the court upheld the nonretention for Grimmett, but set aside his for-cause termination because the University violated the objective prong of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The University appealed Taylor's case; Grimmett appealed his and the University cross-appealed. Upon review of both cases, the Supreme Court concluded that the University indeed violated Taylor's due process rights by using a notice with no hearing. In Grimmett's case, the Court found the University violated his due process rights to terminate his employment without a hearing. The Court reversed the Superior Court's decision to uphold Grimmett's nonretention and reversed the for-cause termination. Both cases were remanded to their respective tribunals for further proceedings on backpay remedies. View "Grimmett v. University of Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Tommie Patterson was involved in a motor vehicle accident. His insurance company paid his medical providers to the policy limit. Two years later, Appellant sued the insurance company, arguing it had shown bad faith following the accident. The company moved for summary judgment, which was granted. A month after that decision, Appellant filed a second lawsuit, alleging the company falsely advertised its services, breached his insurance contract, embezzled money from him, falsified documents and threatened to make him at fault for the accident. The company moved for summary judgment again, which was granted. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Appellant's embezzlement claim in the second lawsuit alleged a different cause of action than in the first, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment with regards to that claim. All other claims were barred by res judicata. Therefore the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Patterson v. Infinity Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Office of Children's Services (OCS) placed a Native child in a non-Native foster home while working with the other towards reunification. Over two years later, the superior court terminated the parents' parental rights. The child's maternal grandmother and the tribe sought to enforce the Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) placement preferences. The foster parents petitioned for adoption. The superior court found good cause to deviate from the ICWA preference, and that the grandmother was not a suitable placement for the child. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the tribe argued the superior court erred by applying the wrong standard of proof for the good cause determination; that the court's findings were not supported by sufficient evidence; and that the findings were not sufficient to support the good cause determination. The Supreme Court found that the ICWA implicitly mandated that good cause to deviate from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences be proved by clear and convincing evidence. To the extent prior cases held otherwise, they were overruled. Therefore the superior court was vacated here and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A driver caused injury to the passenger of another car in a two-car accident. The passenger brought suit for damages, including her insurer's subrogated claim for medical expenses. The driver made an early offer of judgment, which the passenger did not accept. The driver's insurer then made a direct payment to the subrogated insurer, thereby removing that amount from the passenger's potential recovery. The driver then made a second offer of judgment, which the passenger did not accept. After trial both parties claimed prevailing party status; the driver sought attorney's fees. The superior court ruled that the first offer of judgment did not entitle the driver to fees, but the second offer did. Both parties appealed, arguing the superior court improperly considered the subrogation claim payment in its rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the subrogation claim payment had to be taken into account when evaluating the first offer of judgment and affirmed the decision that the driver was not the prevailing party based on the first offer of judgment. But because the nature of the payment on the subrogation claim was not clear, the Court vacated the decision that the second offer of judgment entitled the driver to attorney fees and remanded the case for further proceedings on this issue. View "Dearlove v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In May 2005, Petitioner Eugene Bottcher drove his vehicle off the road, hitting a boy and narrowly missing the boy's brother. Petitioner was intoxicated at the time; the boy who had been hit later died at the hospital from his injuries. After Petitioner hit the boy, he continued to drive, and when stopped by a passerby who had witnessed the accident, Petitioner tried to bribe him into not reporting the crime. Petitioner pled no contest to manslaughter, assault in the third degree, and failure to render assistance. The superior court sentenced him to a term of 23 years with 3 years suspended. The court also revoked Petitioner's driver's license for life. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's sentence and the lifetime revocation of his license. In his petition to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the lifetime revocation was excessive. Upon review, the Court held that the trial court was not clearly mistaken in finding that Petitioner's case was an extreme one in which a lifetime revocation of his driver's license was required to protect the public. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed the superior court's lifetime revocation of Petitioner's driver's license. View "Bottcher v. Alaska" on Justia Law