Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Sidney Hertz, a prisoner sentenced in 1984, applied for an early furlough release in 2009 but refused to agree to comply with any furlough release conditions, arguing that imposing conditions that were not part of his sentence violated his due process rights and constituted double jeopardy. The Department of Corrections (DOC) denied the early furlough release, but he was released on mandatory parole shortly thereafter. Appellant subsequently sued two DOC probation officers, alleging they lacked authority to impose furlough release conditions and that doing so violated his constitutional rights. The superior court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, appellant challenged the superior court’s dismissal and attempts to collaterally attack conditions of his mandatory parole. "Because DOC probation officers are mandated by statute and administrative regulation to impose appropriate conditions on furlough releases without regard to conditions set in an original sentence, and because these mandates alone do not violate a prisoner’s rights under the Alaska or United States Constitutions, [the Supreme Court] affirm[ed] the superior court’s dismissal of this case." View "Hertz v. Macomber" on Justia Law

John Doe A and John Doe B were convicted of criminal offenses that required them to register and comply with Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA). Following their convictions, the legislature amended ASORA, requiring certain offenders, including both Does, to comply with additional registration requirements. The Does sued, claiming that retroactive application of ASORA’s amendments to them violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Alaska Constitution. The superior court agreed, and the State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the amended ASORA could not be applied retroactively: in 2008, in a two-to-one decision, the Court held that ASORA’s amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and did not apply to persons who committed their crimes before the amendments became effective. Two years later the Court promulgated Alaska Appellate Rule 106, which provided that any issue decided by a two-to-one vote would not have precedential effect. When the Court promulgated Appellate Rule 106 it was silent on the question whether that rule might have retroactive effect. By the Court's opinion in this case, that earlier two-to-one decision is now binding precedent that controlled the outcome of this case because Appellate Rule 106 does not have retroactive application. View "Alaska v. Doe" on Justia Law

The center of this appeal before the Supreme Court involved a three-way transfer of boat tie-up spaces in a recreational subdivision. Specifically, the issue was whether the court erred in requiring the joinder of one of the people involved in the transfer as an indispensable party. The Court concluded that the court did not err because appropriate relief could not be afforded in the absence of the person in question. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the case was properly dismissed because the plaintiff refused to comply with the court's order requiring joinder. View "Weilbacher v. Ring" on Justia Law

A medical service provider filed but failed to serve a complaint against a former patient and her insurer. The superior court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of service. Nearly a year later, the medical service provider filed a second complaint against the same parties. The superior court granted summary judgment dismissing that complaint, ruling that the medical service provider's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that Alaska's savings statute (AS 09.10.240) did not apply because of failure to provide timely notice of the initial complaint. The medical service provider appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that AS 09.10.240 does not require timely notice of the initial complaint. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's order granting summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "American Marine Corporation v. Sholin" on Justia Law

Jason Coday shot and killed Simone Kim with a rifle obtained from Ray Coxe’s gun store. Kim’s Estate brought a wrongful death action against Coxe, alleging that Coxe negligently or illegally provided Coday the rifle. Coxe defended in part by asserting immunity under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA). The Estate argued against applying the PLCAA and alternatively that it was unconstitutional. The superior court ruled that the PLCAA was constitutional and, interpreting and applying the PLCAA’s immunity provisions to the facts of this case, granted summary judgment dismissing the Estate’s claims against Coxe. The Estate appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s ruling that the PLCAA was constitutional and its interpretation of the PLCAA, but because it was unclear whether certain evidence before the superior court actually was or should have been considered when granting summary judgment dismissing the Estate’s claims, the Court vacated the summary judgment ruling and remanded the case for further consideration. View "Estate of Simone Young Kim v. Coxe" on Justia Law

Appellant Fredrick Williams appealed the superior court's decision affirming the Ketchikan Gateway Borough's ruling that a house was not exempt from Ketchikan Gateway Borough taxation. In 2002 Williams received a grant to rebuild his house from the Bureau of Indian Affairs Housing Improvement Program. Because Williams has owned the home for ten years, the repayment amount annually decreased by ten percent of the original amount, resulting in no repayment for a transfer occurring 20 years or more after Williams received the grant. Williams executed a deed of trust securing the federal government's right to repayment under the grant. Williams claimed that under the grant and the deed of trust, "[t]he federal government own[ed] . . . the $115,000 it took to build the home," and that Williams was therefore exempt from paying property taxes on it. On appeal, the superior court rejected this argument, upholding the Ketchikan Gateway Borough's view that the deed of trust securing the grant did not divest Williams of the ownership interest in his real property. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's conclusion and affirmed and adopted its decision. View "Williams v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law

Appellant Simone Greenway sued Appellee Larry Heathcott alleging among other things, identity theft and breach of domestic partnership and fiduciary duties. After a bench trial at which both parties were pro se, the superior court denied Appellant's claims. She argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in denying her a continuance so a particular lawyer could represent her when he became available, so she could compose her case, and so she could obtain testimony from a witness whose subpoena was quashed. She also argued that the court failed to help her sufficiently and failed to explain she could call the witnesses telephonically after it rejected her witness affidavits. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion as to these issues. She also asserted that the trial judge was biased, or appeared to be biased, against her. The audio recording of the trial refuted those assertions and demonstrated that the trial judge was impartial, patient, and courteous in dealing with Greenway and in trying to obtain understandable evidence from her. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Greenway v. Heathcott" on Justia Law

Leisnoi, Inc. retained the law firm of Merdes & Merdes to represent it in litigation against Omar Stratman over its certification of and title to certain lands Leisnoi claimed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Leisnoi and Merdes entered a contingency fee agreement under which, if Leisnoi was successful, Merdes would receive an interest in the lands Leisnoi obtained or retained. The case was resolved in 1992 in favor of Leisnoi, although Stratman appealed and the related litigation continued for another decade. In October 2008, the Stratman litigation finally concluded in Leisnoi's favor. The following year, Merdes moved the superior court to issue a writ of execution. Leisnoi opposed the motion, arguing among other things that the judgment was void under 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s restrictions on contingency fee contracts involving Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act lands. In January 2010, the Superior Court issued an order denying Leisnoi's motion and granting Merdes's motion to execute. Six months later, Leisnoi paid Merdes the remaining balance. Leisnoi then appealed the superior court's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned questions of waiver and whether the superior court's judgment was void or voidable. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded: (1) Leisnoi did not waive its right to appeal by paying Merdes the balance due on the judgment; (2) an Arbitration Panel's fee award and the superior court's 1995 entry of judgment violated 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s prohibition against attorney contingency fee contracts based on the value of Native lands that were subject to the Act; (3) the superior court's 2010 order granting Merdes's motion to execute on the 1995 judgment separately violated the Act's prohibition against executing on judgments arising from prohibited attorney contingency fee contracts; (4) notwithstanding the illegality of the Arbitration Panel fee award and the 1995 judgment, Leisnoi was not entitled to relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b) (the 1995 order was voidable rather than void for purposes of Civil Rule 60(b), and therefore not subject to attack under Civil Rule 60(b)(4)); and (5) Leisnoi was not entitled to relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6). Accordingly, Merdes was ordered to return Leisnoi's payment of the balance on the judgment, but Leisnoi was not entitled to recover payments made prior to the issuance of the writ of execution. View "Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C." on Justia Law

The underlying tort action in this appeal resulted from a car accident in which the insured, while driving a rental truck, hit a person who was lying in the middle of the road. Both the driver and the person struck were intoxicated, in addition to a passenger in the truck. The person who was struck died from his injuries. The victim's estate sued. The insurance company offered to settle the case against both the driver and the passenger (who may have faced liability for his actions after the accident) for policy limits. These offers were rejected. The estate offered to settle for the release of the named insured only, but the insurer rejected that offer. The occupants of the vehicle later settled with the estate. Unable to reach settlement, the insurer filed a declaratory action to clarify its duties under the policy and resolve issues of who was driving the vehicle, the number of occurrences, and possible breaches of the insurance contract by the insureds. The insureds assigned their claims against the insurer to the estate, which answered and counterclaimed for breach of contract and bad faith. The insurer prevailed on nearly all issues. The personal representative of the estate, for herself and as assignee of the insureds, appealed that result. After review, the Supreme Court found that the insurer did not breach its duties to the insured, and accordingly the Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Williams v. GEICO" on Justia Law

In 2009 the Department of Natural Resources issued two decisions, one removing the classification of certain lands as wildlife habitat and the other allowing for the conveyance of these lands to the Denali Borough for further development. A wildlife biologist and others submitted comments challenging the Department's actions; the biologist's comments and requests for reconsideration were denied and he filed an appeal in the superior court. While the appeal was pending, the wildlife biologist died in a plane crash and his sister, the personal representative of his estate, filed a motion to substitute an individual and an organization as appellants in this case. The court allowed for substitution of the personal representative, but prohibited the substitution of third parties; after the personal representative declined to personally continue the appeal, the superior court dismissed the case. The personal representative appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court correctly articulated the proper test for substitution on appeal, but because it did not acknowledge the comments that the proposed appellant submitted during agency proceedings, the Court remanded the case for the court to consider whether these comments indicated the proposed appellant was entitled to prosecute in the review proceeding below, thereby making her a proper party for substitution. The Court affirmed the superior court's conclusion that the personal representative could not transfer or assign her right to appeal. View "Licht v. Irwin" on Justia Law