Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In May 2005, Petitioner Eugene Bottcher drove his vehicle off the road, hitting a boy and narrowly missing the boy's brother. Petitioner was intoxicated at the time; the boy who had been hit later died at the hospital from his injuries. After Petitioner hit the boy, he continued to drive, and when stopped by a passerby who had witnessed the accident, Petitioner tried to bribe him into not reporting the crime. Petitioner pled no contest to manslaughter, assault in the third degree, and failure to render assistance. The superior court sentenced him to a term of 23 years with 3 years suspended. The court also revoked Petitioner's driver's license for life. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's sentence and the lifetime revocation of his license. In his petition to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the lifetime revocation was excessive. Upon review, the Court held that the trial court was not clearly mistaken in finding that Petitioner's case was an extreme one in which a lifetime revocation of his driver's license was required to protect the public. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed the superior court's lifetime revocation of Petitioner's driver's license. View "Bottcher v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Clinton DesJarlais filed an application with the Office of the Lieutenant Governor seeking certification of an initiative that would generally prohibit abortion. The lieutenant governor, acting on the advice of the Department of Law, concluded that the initiative was unconstitutional and declined to certify it for circulation. Appellant filed suit against the State in superior court challenging the lieutenant governor's decision. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the State and appellant appealed. Because appellant's proposed initiative was clearly unconstitutional under controlling United States Supreme Court precedent, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment. View "DesJarlais v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellee Tamarack Air, Ltd. negligently damaged Appellant James Madonna's airplane while it was on Tamarack's airfield after it had been in Tamarack's shop for maintenance. Tamarack offered to fix the plane, but Madonna refused the offer. Instead, he elected to ship the plane to Wyoming and had the plane repaired at the original factory. Tamarack argued that Madonna had failed to mitigate his damages and refused to compensate Madonna for the full cost of these repairs. A jury awarded Madonna most, but not all, of the cost of having the plane repaired out of state. On appeal, Madonna argued that the trial court erred by refusing to let him present several other claims for damages related to the accident. But finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "Madonna v. Tamarack Air, Ltd." on Justia Law

A motorcyclist was involved in a single-vehicle accident resulting in a cut on his head and minor damage to his motorcycle. The accident involved no other drivers, vehicles, or property. Because the motorcycle was not insured at the time of the accident, the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended the driver's license. The motorcyclist appealed the suspension to the superior court, arguing that the suspension violated his equal protection and due process rights under the Alaska Constitution and was precluded by the de minimis nature of the accident. The superior court rejected the his arguments and awarded attorney's fees to DMV. The motorcyclist appealed to the Supreme Court, raising the same substantive arguments and challenging the award of attorney's fees. Upon review, the Court concluded that the motorcyclist's constitutional and common law arguments did not compel reversal of the administrative suspension. However, the Court vacated the entry of attorney's fees and remanded the case to the superior court to determine how the motorcyclist's constitutional challenges should have impacted the award. View "Titus v. Alaska Dept. of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

John Doe A and John Doe B were convicted of criminal offenses that required them to register and comply with Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA). After their convictions, the legislature amended ASORA, requiring certain offenders to comply with additional registration requirements. The John Does sued, claiming that retroactive application of ASORA’s amendments to them violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Alaska Constitution. The superior court agreed, and the State appealed. In 2008 the Supreme Court decided "Doe v. State" (Doe I), holding that ASORA’s amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and did not apply to persons who committed their crimes before the amendments became effective. Two years later the Court promulgated Alaska Appellate Rule 106, which provided that any issue decided by a two-to-one vote shall not have precedential effect. When the COurt promulgated Appellate Rule 106 it was silent on the question whether that rule might have retroactive effect. The Court held in this case that its two-to-one decision in Doe I was binding precedent that controlled the outcome of this case because Appellate Rule 106 did not have retroactive application. View "Alaska v. Doe" on Justia Law

This case involved a three-way transfer of boat tie-up spaces in a recreational subdivision. The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in requiring the joinder of one of the people involved in the transfer as an indispensable party. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err because appropriate relief could not be afforded in the absence of the person in question. The Supreme Court also concluded that the case was properly dismissed because the plaintiff refused to comply with the court's order requiring joinder. View "Weilbacher v. Ring" on Justia Law

Dixie Dixon was injured in an automobile accident when a car driven by Joshua Paul Blackwell ran a red light. She sued and received a verdict that was lower than Blackwell's Alaska Civil Rule 68 offer of judgment. On appeal she challenged the adequacy of the verdict and the efficacy of the offer of judgment. Because the jury's verdict was not inadequate, the offer Blackwell made was a valid Rule 68 offer, and the judgment finally rendered by the court was at least five percent less favorable to Dixon than the offer, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Dixon v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

An employee filed an affidavit of readiness for hearing in her workers' compensation case approximately four years after her employer filed a controversion of her written workers' compensation claim. The employer petitioned to dismiss her claim based on the statutory deadline for a hearing request. After a hearing, the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board dismissed her claim, and the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision. Because the employee did not file a timely request for a hearing and was not excused from doing so, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Pruitt v. Providence Extended Care" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Oil and Gas Division (DNR), petitioned the Supreme Court for review of a superior court decision that under AS 38.05.035, the lack of continuing best interest findings (BIF) at each phase of an oil and gas project violated article VIII of the Alaska Constitution and that the DNR must issue a written best interest finding at each step of a phased project to satisfy the constitution. Because best interest findings after the lease sale phase are not required under the Alaska Constitution or AS 38.05.035, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's ruling. Furthermore, the Court held that the State was constitutionally required to consider the cumulative impacts of an oil and gas project at its later phases. View "Sullivan v. Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands" on Justia Law

In May 2011, the superior court modified an existing child support order, specifying that the modification was to be effective as of March 2007. But because the motion requesting modification was not filed until February 2008, the superior court’s order constituted a retroactive modification. Furthermore, the superior court modified the child support award based on its finding that the father’s income exceeded the maximum amount specified in Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3(c)(2). Because retroactive modification of child support is prohibited and because the superior court’s determination of the amount owed did not conform to the analysis specified in Rule 90.3(a), the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s modification of the child support order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Swaney v. Granger" on Justia Law