Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1961, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued a right-of-way grant to the Alaska Department of Public Works conveying a "road building material site" along the Denali Highway with no expiration date and no rental fee. After the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) was enacted in 1971, the United States conveyed the surface and subsurface estates encompassing the State's material site to Ahtna, Inc., an Alaska Regional Native Corporation. The conveyance was "subject to" the "[r]ights-of-way for Federal Aid material sites." ANCSA allowed the federal government to waive administration of the rights-of-way, which BLM did in 1984. The BLM waiver stated that the State was the grantee of the right-of-way at issue, and instead of providing an expiration date the waiver described the term of duration of the right-of-way as "[p]erpetual." The waiver entitled Ahtna to "any and all interests previously held by the United States as grantor," but the waiver explicitly stated there were no rental or other revenues associated with the right-of-way. The State removed material from the site until 1988, but the State did not use material from the site for the next 20 years. The State began using the site again in 2008. Ahtna demanded compensation for the removal of gravel from the material site and directed the State to cease and desist further entry onto Ahtna lands. The State responded that its right to remove the gravel pre-existed Ahtna's title interest. The State filed suit against Ahtna, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State, concluding that the State had a valid interest in the material site right-of-way under the Federal-Aid Highway Act, and that Ahtna could not cancel the right-of-way for nonuse or abandonment so long as the State operated and maintained the Denali Highway. Ahtna appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under the assumption that BLM's waiver transferred administrative authority to Ahtna, that authority did not include the right to cancel the State's interest in the material site for nonuse or abandonment without consent from the State. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the State. View "Ahtna, Inc. v. Alaska Dept. of Trans. & Public Facilities" on Justia Law

Thea G. challenged the superior court’s order terminating her parental rights to her two children, twelve-year old Zach, and six-year old Abbie. The superior court terminated Thea’s parental rights based on her unremedied substance abuse issues. Thea raised three issues on appeal: (1) the superior court’s finding that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the breakup of her family; (2) the finding that if her custody over Zach and Abbie were continued the children would likely suffer serious emotional or physical damage; and (3) the finding that termination of her parental rights is in Zach’s and Abbie’s best interests. Because each of these findings was supported by sufficient evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order terminating Thea’s parental rights to Zach and Abbie. View "Thea G. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The Alaska Supreme Court issued an order that remanded redistricting cases to the redistricting board to formulate a new plan in compliance with our case law. The Court agreed with the superior court that, in drafting its plan, the board failed to follow the process the Supreme Court mandated in order to ensure that the redistricting plan would be constitutional. Upon remand, the board was instructed to follow a process so that the Court could appropriately judge whether its violations of the Alaska Constitution were absolutely necessary for compliance with federal law. The board then submitted a modified plan to the superior court that changed only four out of forty house districts from the original plan; this amended plan was similarly rejected by the superior court because, among other reasons, the board failed to follow the process that the Supreme Court required in order to ensure compliance with the Alaska Constitution. The board petitioned for review of the superior court's decision. The Court concluded that because the board failed to follow the process that it ordered upon remand, the Court affirmed the superior court's decision and required the board to draft a new plan for the 2014 elections. View "In Re 2011 Redistricting Cases" on Justia Law

The primary issue in this appeal was whether boroughs have the implied or incidental authority to record a real property lien to secure payment of garbage-collection fees. In 2007 Virgilio and Rosemarie Sabado hired had a fire-damaged house on their property in Kodiak torn down. The contractor opened a commercial garbage account with the Kodiak Island Borough (Borough) and paid a deposit for placement of a construction dumpster near the property. Approximately $5,000 in garbage-service charges accrued. The Borough applied the deposit to this amount and began sending the contractor monthly bills for the balance. No payment was made and the account became delinquent. In October 2008 the Sabados sold the property to Cedric Cutler, who was unaware of the garbage account with the Borough. In December the Borough sent the contractor a letter advising him that a lien could be placed on the property if the account remained unpaid. No payment was made, and in January 2009 the Borough recorded a lien against the property. The Borough then sent lien-notice letters to the contractor and the Sabados, who were still listed as the property owners in the Borough’s tax files. In February 2010 the Borough petitioned to foreclose outstanding tax and garbage-service liens for years 2009 and prior. Cutler learned of the foreclosure proceeding and filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting the lien against his property was invalid and seeking damages for wrongful recording of a nonconsensual common law (NCCL) lien. Cutler appeals the superior court’s summary judgment ruling and default judgment entry with respect to the other garbage-service liens. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that boroughs did not have the authority to record liens to secure payment for garbage collection fees. View "Cutler v. Kodiak Island Borough" on Justia Law

In 2008 Robert Rude, then a sitting Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI) director, and three other candidates ran as an independent “New Alliance” slate for positions on the CIRI board of directors. Shortly before the election, CIRI filed suit, claiming that the New Alliance proxy materials contained materially misleading statements. Rude and his co-defendants counterclaimed, alleging that CIRI’s election procedures were unfairly tilted toward the interests of the current board and that the directors had improperly refused to disclose shareholder and corporate information to Rude and the other New Alliance candidates. The superior court granted summary judgment on all claims and counterclaims in favor of CIRI. As a result, the New Alliance proxies were voided, and Rude was not re-elected to the board. Rude appealed the rulings both on CIRI’s claims and his counterclaims. Although Rude’s claims were technically moot, the Supreme Court addressed them insofar as they potentially affected prevailing party status. Because no issue of material fact existed as to the claims at issue and because CIRI is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. In a separate appeal, Rude challenged four other rulings of the superior court: (1) the award of attorney’s fees to CIRI; (2) denial of his Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment; (3) the superior court’s exclusion of exhibits filed with that motion; and (4) dismissal of New Alliance as a party to this suit. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in any of these rulings, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in all respects. View "Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc." on Justia Law

A father challenged a superior court’s decision to terminate his parental rights, arguing that the court’s conclusions were not supported by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was not in the best interests of the child, and that the court improperly considered certain facts. Because the record supported the superior court’s decision to terminate the father’s parental rights, and because the superior court properly considered the record as a whole, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sherman B. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her young son. The mother had a long history of substance abuse and relinquished parental rights to her older daughter in 2008 because she was unable to care for her. During the 18 months following the child’s removal, the mother continued to abuse drugs until she was incarcerated. At that point, she entered an intensive residential substance abuse program at the prison, which she successfully completed two weeks prior to the termination trial. In appealing the superior court’s order terminating her parental rights, the mother argued to the Supreme Court that the court erroneously: (1) denied her motion to continue the termination proceedings; (2) determined that termination was in the best interests of the child; and (3) failed to consider legal guardianship as an alternative to termination. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Hannah B. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

In 1999, the Alaska Board of Fisheries (the Board) made a use finding in the Chitina subdistrict for the first time, changing it from a "personal use" to a "subsistence" fishery. The Board reversed this decision in 2003, returning Chitina to a personal use fishery. The Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund (AFWCF) and the Chitina Dipnetters Association, Inc., after asking the Board to reconsider its 2003 finding in both 2005 and 2008, brought this suit to challenge the Board's negative customary and traditional use finding for Chitina. They claimed that the regulation used by the Board to make such a finding was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The superior court held that the regulation was valid and constitutional, but remanded for the Board to fully articulate the standard being used in its application of the regulation. It also instructed the Board not to consider "the per capita consumption of wild food in the home community of various users" upon remand. On remand, the Board codified a definition of "subsistence way of life," allowed the parties to submit evidence, and upheld its previous classification. Because 5 AAC 99.010(b) was consistent with its authorizing statutes, was reasonable and not arbitrary, did not violate the Alaska Constitution's equal access provisions, and was constitutionally applied when the Board made its customary and traditional use finding for the Chitina fishery in 2003, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the superior court's rulings. Because there was no indication that the Board actually relied on the per capita consumption of wild foods in the users' home communities when applying 5 AAC 99.010(b) and because that information could have been relevant to the subsistence inquiry, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the superior court's ruling. View "Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

In 2008, Michael Cooper was involved in a car accident that injured Samuel Thompson. Thompson sued Cooper and Cooper's employer for damages. The jury returned a verdict for Thompson for compensatory damages but not punitive. The parties appealed the trial court's rulings on certain evidentiary issues, jury instructions and denied motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed most of the trial court's rulings but reversed: (1) exclusion of Thompson's treating physicians' opinion testimony on causation; and (2) denial of a jury instruction on additional harm. View "Thompson v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Siegfried Pedersen was convicted of assault and weapons misconduct. He brought a civil suit against the victims of those crimes, Daniel Blythe and Bobbie Luxford, alleging defamation and trespass. The superior court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of collateral estoppel. Pedersen appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erred when, in deciding the motion to dismiss, it considered matters outside the pleadings without advising Pedersen of its intent to do so and giving him a reasonable opportunity to respond. The Court held that this error was harmless with regard to Pedersen's defamation claims. The Court also held that it was plain error for the superior court to dismiss Pedersen's trespass claims, claims to which collateral estoppel did not apply. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment on the defamation claims and reversed and remanded on the trespass claims. View "Pedersen v. Blythe" on Justia Law