Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The question raised before the Supreme Court in two consolidated appeals was whether this certain provisions of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) applied to a person convicted in a single proceeding of two (or more) sex offenses. James Ward was convicted of two sex offenses in a single criminal proceeding. In a separate and unrelated single proceeding, Michael Boles was also convicted of two sex offenses. They argued that the pertinent statute, AS 12.63.020(a)(1)(B), was ambiguous, because it could be read to require convictions in more than one proceeding. They therefore reasoned that the rule of lenity requires that the ambiguity be resolved in their favor and thus that the statute be read to require them to register for 15 years, not life. They asserted that the Department of Public Safety, in requiring them to register for life, misread the statute. The men filed separate administrative appeals, which were assigned to two different superior court judges. One judge, reasoning that the statute is unambiguous, affirmed the Department's ruling regarding Ward. The other judge, reasoning that the statute is ambiguous and must therefore be read favorably to offenders, reversed the Department's ruling regarding Boles. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Department did not err; the statute, in requiring persons "convicted of . . . two or more sex offenses" to register for life, is unambiguous and cannot reasonably be read to condition lifetime registration on two or more separate convictions for sex offenses, or on any sequential or chronological separation between convictions. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court order that affirmed the Department's decision regarding Ward and reversed the superior court order that reversed the Department's decision regarding Boles. View "Ward v. Alaska Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

A quasi-independent governmental agency manages a program designed to improve power generation in small Alaska villages that are located off the electrical grid. One such village believed that the agency did not respect the wishes of village leaders in securing a contract to improve that village's power-generation facility. The village, joined by a company that produces a key component used in improving power generation in village areas, sued the agency. The plaintiffs alleged that the agency erroneously awarded contracts for power generation and that agency employees improperly disclosed the company's trade secrets to its competitor. The superior court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims on motions for summary judgment. Because the Supreme Court agreed there were no disputed issues of material fact and the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court affirmed the decision of the superior court in all respects. View "Powercorp Alaska v. Alaska Energy Authority" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case were two narrow legal questions arising from the Alaska Records Management Act and the Alaska Public Records Act: (1) when state employees use private email accounts to send and receive email regarding state business, are the emails "public records" under the Public Records Act, and (2) is the use of a private email account to send and receive email regarding state business a per se violation of the Public Records Act's prohibition against obstruction of public access to "public records"? The Court answered the questions as follows: (1) private emails regarding state business are no different from any other records - those records preserved or appropriate for preservation under the Records Management Act are "public records" under the Public Records Act; and (2) the use of private email accounts to conduct state business, alone, is not per se obstruction of access to "public records" under the Public Records Act. View "McLeod v. Parnell" on Justia Law

Brian Ross had been absent from the State of Alaska since 1990, first as a student at the United States Naval Academy and later as a career Marine Corps officer. Despite his absence, Ross maintained Alaska residency and received a permanent fund dividend each year. In 1998 the Alaska Legislature amended the dividend qualifications to provide that anyone who was allowably absent for ten consecutive years would no longer be eligible for dividends. This ten-year rule, however, does not apply to members of the United States Congress, their staffs, or the families of either. In 2009 Ross and his children applied for dividends but were denied because Ross had then been absent for ten consecutive years from the enactment of the ten-year rule. They appealed the denial, but the denial was upheld at an informal agency appeal, a formal agency appeal, and by the superior court. Ross appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the ten-year rule violates his equal protection and substantive due process rights. Because the ten-year rule and congressional exception are fairly and substantially related to the legitimate state interests of limiting dividends to permanent Alaska residents and preventing fraud, and because the ten-year rule is rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of reducing administrative burdens, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court as to these claims. View "Ross v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

A man filed an application for both occupational and nonoccupational disability benefits from the Public Employees Retirement System, claiming disability from both physical and mental conditions. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied his claim, finding that he failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a physical or mental disability that presumably permanently prevented him from satisfactorily performing his job. The man appealed and the superior court affirmed the ALJ's determination. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the man challenged the ALJ's determination regarding his mental condition. Because the ALJ's written findings were sufficiently detailed to support the ALJ's conclusions, and because substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that the man’s mental condition did not amount to an occupational or nonoccupational disability, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the ALJ's order. View "McKitrick v. Alaska Pub. Employees Retirement Sys." on Justia Law

A homeowner sought a declaratory judgment that foreclosure fees were not properly included in the reinstatement amount necessary to halt foreclosure proceedings under Alaska law. The superior court concluded that the foreclosure fees were properly included in the reinstatement amount. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court and therefore affirmed. View "Kuretich v. Alaska Trustee, LLC" on Justia Law

Loren J. Larson, Jr. was incarcerated at the Spring Creek Correctional Center in Seward. Acting pro se, he filed two separate complaints alleging violations of his constitutional rights. In his first complaint, he alleged that he suffers from paruresis, a condition that makes it impossible for him to urinate in the presence of others, and the correctional facility had violated state and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment by failing to accommodate his condition with alternative urinalysis testing procedures. His second complaint alleged that the correctional facility's revised visitor application form for minors violates his state constitutional right to rehabilitation because it is more restrictive than the administrative regulation governing visitation rights. Both complaints were dismissed for failure to state a claim under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals to address an issue common to both: the procedure for properly evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint of a pro se prisoner alleging constitutional violations. The Court took the opportunity to emphasize that a complaint must be liberally construed and a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is viewed with disfavor and should rarely be granted. Because both of Larson's complaints alleged facts which, if proven, were sufficient to entitle him to some form of relief, and because the Court found no merit in the arguments that Larson lacked standing or was otherwise barred from bringing a direct cause of action for these alleged constitutional violations, the Court reversed the dismissal of both of Larson's complaints. View "Larson v. State, Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Dennis Davison was convicted of sexually abusing his fourteen-year-old daughter, R.D. At trial, the doctor who performed a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) examination of R.D. testified to statements R.D. had made during the examination. Davison argued on appeal that the doctor’s testimony regarding R.D.’s statements was not admissible under Alaska Evidence Rule 803(4), because the examination was conducted primarily to gather evidence against him and not for purposes of medical treatment. Davison also argued that the trial court erroneously included in his presentence report statements R.D. had made during the sexual assault exam that pertained to offenses he was charged with but acquitted of at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the doctor’s hearsay testimony was not admissible under Rule 803(4), but held that this error was harmless with respect to Davison’s conviction. The Court remanded the sentencing issue to the court of appeals to consider whether the hearsay statements were sufficiently verified for inclusion in Davison’s presentence report. View "Davison v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska dismissed an employee for allegedly submitting a falsified timesheet and claiming full pay for a week when she was not working. The employee argued her dismissal violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because a biased supervisor was involved with the termination decision, because the State's investigation was conducted unfairly, and because she was treated differently from similarly situated employees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision that there was insufficient evidence to show a breach of the implied covenant on any of these grounds. The Court also affirmed the superior court's ruling that the employee's unfair labor practice claim was untimely and therefore waived. View "Lentine v. Alaska" on Justia Law

"Jeffrey E." appealed his 30-day involuntary commitment order, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the superior court's conclusion that he was gravely disabled. In June 2011 Jeffrey was 20 years old, had recently lost his job due to behavioral difficulties, was in the process of divorcing, and was staying with family members. Jeffrey's family members became concerned about his behavior and brought him to a hospital. Jeffrey's family reported Jeffrey had not been eating, drinking, sleeping, or performing any self-care for several days- " he had more or less remained seated in a catatonic state," to the point of urinating on himself. Jeffrey's family also reported Jeffrey had made comments about others being able to read his mind, had responded aggressively to challenges, and had a family history of mental illness. Because Jeffrey was uncommunicative, hospital staff could not determine if he was actively psychotic. Although unable to articulate how he would behave differently, Jeffrey wanted to go home and "denied thoughts or plans of self harm or harm to others." Hospital staff concluded Jeffrey "may be experiencing symptoms of psychosis but it is difficult to assess" and that "[h]e could benefit from further assessment and stabilization . . . as it is possible he is experiencing psychosis." The superior court granted an ex parte order requiring Jeffrey's transport to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) for examination. A few days later API staff filed a petition for an involuntary 30-day commitment, and the court held a hearing on this petition. Because the superior court did not err in concluding that the respondent was gravely disabled under the required clear and convincing evidence standard, the Supreme Court affirmed the 30-day commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Jeffrey E." on Justia Law