Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A man was arrested for misdemeanor crimes after an altercation arising from a business dispute. He brought civil claims against a police officer and the officer's municipal employer based on the arrest. The superior court granted a motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims against them. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision because: (1) the police officer had probable cause to make a felony arrest, and, therefore, any perceived deficiencies in the misdemeanor arrest process are irrelevant; and (2) no municipal policy deprived the arrestee of property, and, therefore, the municipality did not violate the arrestee's constitutional rights. View "Yi v. Yang" on Justia Law

A worker suffered an above-the-knee amputation of his right leg in a work-related accident in 2003. The accident happened when he used his foot to push a bale of mulch that he was feeding into a machine; his leg was caught in the machine and later had to be amputated. He received workers’ compensation benefits for the injury and later sued the manufacturer and the owner of the machine under various tort theories. After trial a jury found that the manufacturer was not negligent and the product was not defective. It also found that the company that owned the machine at the time of the accident was negligent, but that its negligence was not a legal cause of the accident. After finding that the worker and his employer were negligent and that their negligence was a cause of the accident, the jury apportioned fault for the injury between them. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erroneously admitted evidence of the worker's receipt of workers' compensation and social security benefits and his past drug use, the Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Jones v. Bowie Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

A limited partnership based in New York that invests in the claims of unsecured creditors sent a letter to an Alaska corporation offering to purchase one such claim for about one-third of its face value. The letter was addressed to the credit manager and was sent to the corporate offices. Upon receiving the envelope, the Alaska corporation forwarded it unopened to the manager of its accounts receivable department in Georgia. The manager executed the enclosed assignment agreement and returned it back to the limited partnership, which then sent a check in payment for the claim. The Alaska corporation eventually filed suit in superior court to have the agreement set aside. The superior court declined to do so. Because the Supreme Court concluded that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the manager of the accounts receivable department had apparent authority to execute the agreement as a matter of law, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Airline Support, Inc. v. ASM Capital II, L.P." on Justia Law

Petitioner Izaz Khan was indicted on one count of perjury based on four allegedly false statements made in a financial affidavit. At trial, the court instructed the jury, without objection from Petitioner, that they did not need to be unanimous regarding which statements were false. The jury convicted Petitioner. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that even assuming the instruction was erroneous, the error would not rise to the level of plain error. The court of appeals reasoned that any error was not prejudicial because Petitioner had presented a single defense that applied to all four statements. Petitioner filed a petition for hearing, which the Supreme Court granted on the following questions: "(1) whether a unanimous jury verdict is a right under the Alaska Constitution, and (2) if so, the appropriate plain error analysis for reviewing the effect of a contrary jury instruction given without any objection by the defendant." The parties disagreed about the proper plain error analysis for constitutional errors. Last year, in a case decided after the Court granted this petition, it clarified its constitutional plain error analysis in "Adams v. Alaska." Petitioner argued that the Court should depart from "Adam"s to adopt the analysis of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i in "Nichols v. Hawai'i" in analyzing erroneous jury instructions. The State argued that the Court should have departed from "Adams" and adopt the federal plain error standard from the United States Supreme Court's decision in "United States v. Olano." The Alaska Supreme Court declined both parties' invitations to reconsider "Adams," and reaffirmed its decision in that case. Because the court of appeals did not apply the correct standard for constitutional plain error, the Court remanded this case for a determination whether, if the challenged jury instruction was erroneous, reversal was required under the proper plain error analysis. View "Khan v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A father appealed various procedural actions taken by the superior court in his divorce and custody proceeding. Appearing pro se, he alleged that the court’s expedited procedures violated his due process rights and reflected judicial bias. He also argued that the court abused its discretion in its award of attorney’s fees. Because the court’s procedures did not violate the father’s due process rights and the father has not shown that the court was biased against him, the Supreme Court affirmed the procedural decisions of the superior court. But because the superior court did not follow the established process for the award of attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s attorney’s fees order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Berry v. Berry" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sven Rofkar grew a substantial quantity of marijuana in a house he rented. After state troopers searched the house, Petitioner was charged with four felonies, all brought under separate subsections of AS 11.71.040, designated as "misconduct involving a controlled substance in the fourth degree." A jury found Rofkar guilty on all charges. The superior court merged two possession charges into the manufacturing charge, but refused to merge the "maintaining" charge. Petitioner therefore stood convicted of two felonies. The double jeopardy clause of the Alaska Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense." The underlying question in this case was whether two convictions have been imposed on Petitioner for the "same offense" within the meaning of this clause or whether he committed two crimes. Petitioner raised this issue on appeal to the court of appeals. But the court of appeals declined to consider it. Instead, the court held that its opinion in "Davis v. State" was controlling authority. Petitioner did not argue that "Davis" should be overruled in his opening brief, although he did so in his reply brief, the court gave the double jeopardy issue no further consideration. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this case should be reviewed by the court of appeals on the merits for two reasons: first, the double jeopardy issue was raised and not waived; second, it was not clear that "Davis v. State" was decided in accordance with the applicable test for deciding double jeopardy claims set out in the Court's opinion in "Whitton v. State." View "Rofkar v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Bobbie Ann Hunter and Shaun Conwell had two sons before separating. Conwell filed a complaint for custody in 2006 but Hunter did not respond. The superior court granted Conwell sole legal and primary physical custody of the boys in a 2006 default judgment. Nearly two years later Hunter, acting pro se, sought modification of custody. The superior court denied Hunter’s motion without a hearing because it concluded that Hunter’s allegations were insufficient to constitute a substantial change in circumstances. Hunter appealed, and in a 2009 opinion the Supreme Court rejected as time-barred her arguments regarding the initial custody determination, but reversed the superior court’s denial of her motion for modification. The Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Hunter’s allegations of: (1) potential verbal abuse of the boys; (2) a change in Conwell’s employment requiring significant time away from the boys; (3) signs that the boys were developing mental health problems; and (4) Conwell’s interference with court-ordered telephonic visitation. An evidentiary hearing on remand was held and the superior court found that Hunter had not demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of custody. The court noted, however, that Conwell’s continued interference with telephonic visitation would alone amount to a substantial change if not remedied going forward. Hunter moved for reconsideration; her motion was deemed denied after 30 days. Hunter then appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s finding of no substantial change in circumstances. View "Hunter v. Conwell" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Nelson applied for post-conviction relief, alleging 35 claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At a deposition, trial counsel asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination regarding his representation of Petitioner. The superior court ultimately dismissed all but one post-conviction relief claim for failure to establish a prima facie case, and the court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner petitioned for the Supreme Court's review to determine whether the ordinary presumption of defense counsel's competence applied when counsel invokes the Fifth Amendment regarding the representation. The Court determined that it does, but noted that an adverse inference may be drawn in the petitioner's favor on specific disputed factual issues if warranted in an appropriate case. With this clarification, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision because this was not an appropriate case warranting such an inference. View "Nelson v. Alaska" on Justia Law

An adult woman diagnosed with a mental illness appealed her already completed 30-day involuntary commitment to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API), arguing the evidence did not support the superior court’s findings that: (1) she was likely to cause harm to herself or others due to her mental illness; and (2) API was the least restrictive alternative placement for her. Because Alaska's existing case law provides that an evidentiary-based "weight of the evidence" challenge to a completed involuntary commitment is moot absent accompanying legal issues appropriate for decision under the mootness doctrine's public interest exception, the Supreme Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on mootness. As a result, the Court addressed a question not directly raised in earlier cases: should the Court's application of the mootness doctrine in this context accommodate the importance of collateral consequences arising from an involuntary commitment? The Court answered that question "yes" and therefore reached the merits of this appeal. On the merits, the Court affirmed the superior court's involuntary commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Joan K." on Justia Law

In an October 2007 election, Kenai Peninsula Borough voters approved local initiatives establishing term limits for members of the Borough Assembly and the school board. But voters also reelected five incumbents who, by the terms of the initiatives, would be ineligible to serve an additional term. The Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers (ACT) filed a lawsuit against the Borough requesting a court declaration that the initiatives applied to candidates chosen in the October 2007 election and that the seats held by the five incumbents were vacant. The Borough argued that the initiatives were invalid. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to ACT and partial summary judgment to the Borough and, therefore, did not designate either as the prevailing party. ACT appealed the superior court's decision not to name a prevailing party and argued that ACT should have been named the prevailing party. After its review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that ACT and the Borough both prevailed on distinct issues central to the case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision not to name a prevailing party or award attorney's fees and costs to either party. View "Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kenai Peninsula Borough" on Justia Law