Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant Byron Kalmakoff of raping and murdering his cousin when he was fifteen years old. Troopers sent to investigate the murder conducted four interviews with Defendant. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress statements he made in those interviews based on "Miranda" violations. The trial court suppressed a portion of the first interview and all of the second, but admitted the third and fourth interviews. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions, concluding that any error in admitting portions of the first interview was harmless and that the third and fourth interviews were "sufficiently insulated" from any Miranda violations that occurred during the first two interviews. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for additional fact findings and concluded that the Miranda violations from the first two interviews violated Defendant's right to remain silent. As such, the third and fourth interviews were tainted by violations in the first two interviews. The Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Kalmakoff v. Alaska" on Justia Law

In 2003, Officer Lee Virg-In used a taser twice on J.N., an 11-year-old girl. She had been driving an ATV in the streets of Kotzebue with another younger passenger. J.N. ran several stop signs and was otherwise driving dangerously. The Officer used his overhead lights and siren to signal J.N. to stop, but she refused, first trying to escape on the ATV and later on foot. According to J.N., she was never aggressive or threatening when the Officer eventually caught up with her. Sandra Russell, J.N.'s mother, filed a complaint against Officer Virg-In, alleging that his use of the taser constituted excessive force. Ms. Russell also sued the City of Kotzebue. The Officer defended the reasonableness of his actions and argued he was immune from suit. The superior court dismissed J.N.'s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it was error to grant the Officer qualified immunity "because if a police officer used a taser multiple times on an 11-year-old girl who was suspected of traffic violations, was compliant and was not posing a threat to the officer or others, that conduct would be so egregious that any reasonable officer would have known the conduct was an excessive use of force." The Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Russell v. Virg-In" on Justia Law

The City of Juneau has an ordinance that prohibits smoking in certain places. In 2008, the City Assembly amended the ordinance to prohibit smoking in "private clubs" that offer food or alcoholic beverages for sale. The Fraternal Order of Eagles, Juneau-Douglas Aerie 4200 and three of its members challenged the ban on smoking on both its face and as applied to their Aerie facility. The Eagles argued that the prohibition violates both their First Amendment rights under the federal and state constitutions. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the ban on smoking in private clubs did not violate the Eagles' right to privacy under the federal or state constitutions, nor did it implicate the freedom of association under the federal First Amendment. The Court affirmed a lower court's order that granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Juneau. View "Fraternal Order of Eagles, Juneau-Douglas Aerie 4200 v. City & Borough of Juneau" on Justia Law

At issue for the Supreme Court was whether under the Federal Constitution a criminal defendant's court-appointed counsel must, upon the defendant's demand after lawful sentencing pursuant to a plea agreement, file a petition for discretionary sentence review by the Court when state law precludes an appeal of right. Defendant David Stone was charged with manslaughter, assault, and driving under the influence. Soon after judgment was entered, an attorney from the public defender agency asked Defendant if he wished to appeal his sentence. The attorney reviewed his file, and spoke with Defendant's trial counsel. After review, the attorney concluded that Defendant could not appeal his sentence. Defendant pro se petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing that the attorney's failure to object or appeal his sentence as excessive constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court denied Defendant's application, holding that it was "unwilling to find that an attorney is ineffective on the sole basis that the attorney did not advance a meritless argument." On argument to the Court of Appeals, the State contended that because Defendant did not question the legality of his sentence, it could not have been ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to appeal his sentence. Defendant countered by arguing that he was entitled to appellate review regardless of the terminology he used. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court. Upon its consideration of the legal authority and briefs submitted by both parties, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate courts, holding that Defendant was entitled to require his court-appointed counsel to file a petition for the Court's discretionary review of his sentence. View "Stone v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Leta Trask painted a religious message on her roof. Appellee Ketchikan Gateway Borough filed a complaint to enjoin Ms. Trask from displaying the message. The Borough argued that the message was in violation of a borough ordinance prohibiting roof signs. Ms. Trask counterclaimed for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the Borough's enforcement of the ordinance violated her free speech rights. The superior court held that the message was not a "sign" contemplated by the ordinance and that she did not have to remove it. The court dismissed Ms. Trask's 1983 claim for lack of standing. Ms. Trask appealed the dismissal of her 1983 claim to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that it was error to dismiss Ms. Trask's 1983 claim. The Court reversed the lower court's dismissal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trask v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law

Appellant Loren Larson, Jr. sued Alaska, alleging that the Alaska Court of Appeals violated its "duties to establish rules of law and declare what legal rights a citizen has." The court dismissed Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief from an earlier conviction for two murders and one burglary. The superior court ruled that Appellant’s suit was barred by both judicial immunity and res judicata. Appellant petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s case. The Court found that Appellant identified the source of the appellate court’s duties from the preamble of the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct but did not make any specific allegations in relation to the law or to his case. With nothing more, the Court concluded that Appellant failed to state a claim for relief and dismissed his case. View "Larson v. Alaska" on Justia Law