Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A minor convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) argued that the statute that excluded misdemeanor traffic violations from juvenile court jurisdiction violated her right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution. She argued that the mandatory jail sentence for first DUI offenders was unfairly different than the dispositions for other misdemeanors in the juvenile code. And she argued that it was unfair for felony DUI offenses to be charged in juvenile court when misdemeanor offenses were not. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that because driving was an adult activity, the legislature could reasonably decide to treat misdemeanor traffic violations consistently to promote public safety while also reasonably choosing to protect juvenile offenders from the harsh collateral consequences of a felony conviction. The Court, therefore, concluded the statute was constitutional and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Watson v. Alaska" on Justia Law

In 2019, an attorney representing Vern H. in an unrelated matter petitioned the superior court for an order authorizing Vern’s hospitalization for a mental health evaluation. The attorney indicated that Vern said he needed to go to a behavioral health unit and threatened to hang himself. The attorney believed Vern was mentally ill and likely to cause harm to himself. After three days in jail, Vern contended he no longer met the criteria for involuntary detention, or should have been re-evaluated to determine whether continued detention was warranted, or if a less restrictive environment could have met his needs. This appeal raised two questions about involuntarily detaining an individual in jail pending transport to a hospital for a civil commitment mental health evaluation: (1) when transport is not immediately available and the individual requests a review hearing, what standard of proof applies to the individual’s continued detention; and (2) is the State required to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that jail is the least restrictive alternative available for the detention? The Alaska Supreme Court held that the probable cause standard applied to review hearings regarding an individual’s continued detention, and that the State must prove detention in jail is the least restrictive alternative available while an individual awaits transport to a hospital for evaluation. View "In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of Vern H." on Justia Law

Members of the plaintiff class were former Alaska State employees. When they enrolled in the State employee retirement system, a statute provided that if they left eligible employment, withdrew their contributions to the system, and later returned to eligible employment, they could repay their withdrawn contributions, be reinstated to their original benefits level, and have their credited service time restored. The statute was later repealed. The superior court ruled on summary judgment that this repeal did not diminish or impair the former employees’ accrued benefits and was therefore constitutional. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the statutory reinstatement right was an accrued benefit of the retirement system protected against diminishment or impairment by article XII, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution. The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Metcalfe v. Alaska" on Justia Law

In 1997, Kelley Maves was convicted of two sexual assaults in Colorado. He moved to Alaska in 2015, where the Department of Public Safety required him to register for life as a sex offender under the Alaska Sex Offenders Registration Act (ASORA). Maves appealed the Department’s decision to the superior court, arguing that one of the two convictions could not be used as the basis for a lifetime registration requirement because it had been set aside; with one conviction he would be required to register for only 15 years. His argument on appeal included a challenge to a 1995 departmental regulation that defined “conviction” as including those that had been set aside. The superior court affirmed the Department’s decision requiring the Maves to register for life. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the 1994 version of ASORA was not plainly intended to apply to offenders whose convictions have been set aside, and that the 1995 regulation extending the Act’s reach to those convictions was not necessary to carry out the Act’s purposes. The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision upholding the requirement that Maves register under ASORA for life. View "Maves v. Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Alaska Department of Corrections investigated its employee David Wilson for potentially criminal misconduct. It ordered him to answer questions from investigators but assured him that his answers and any evidence derived from those answers could not be used against him criminally. Wilson was terminated for refusing to answer and claimed the State violated his constitutional privilege against self­ incrimination by failing to tell his lawyer that his answers to the investigator could not be used against him in a criminal proceeding. After review of his appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that by terminating Wilson for refusing to answer those questions, the State of Alaska did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination, under either the U.S. Constitution or the Alaska Constitution. The State did notify Wilson that his answers could not be used against him criminally, and Wilson not only confirmed at the time that he understood this notification, but also in the subsequent court proceedings introduced no evidence to the contrary. View "Wilson v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The Alaska Division of Banking and Securities civilly fined Sitnasuak Native Corporation shareholder Austin Ahmasuk for submitting a newspaper opinion letter about Sitnasuak’s shareholder proxy voting procedures without filing that letter with the Division as a shareholder proxy solicitation. Ahmasuk filed an agency appeal, arguing that the Division wrongly interpreted its proxy solicitation regulation to cover his letter and violated his constitutional due process and free speech rights. An administrative law judge upheld the Division’s sanction in an order that became the final agency decision, and the superior court upheld that decision in a subsequent appeal. Ahmasuk raised his same arguments on appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Ahmasuk’s opinion letter was not a proxy solicitation under the Division’s controlling regulations, therefore reversing the superior court’s decision upholding the Division’s civil sanction against Ahmasuk without reaching the constitutional arguments. View "Ahmasuk v. Division of Banking and Securities" on Justia Law

Sponsors of an initiative that would revise taxation for a defined set of oil producers filed a superior court complaint seeking declaratory judgment that the lieutenant governor’s initiative ballot summary was not true and impartial. The superior court held that one ballot summary sentence included “partisan suasion” by weighing in on a disputed initiative provision’s meaning, and the court ordered that sentence deleted. The lieutenant governor appealed, arguing that the disputed sentence was fair and impartial, but requesting that, if the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, the Supreme Court allow the lieutenant governor to insert a proposed replacement sentence. After expedited briefing and oral arguments, the Supreme Court issued a brief order affirming the court’s ruling and judgment but allowing, at the lieutenant governor’s discretion, the portion of the proposed replacement sentence to which the sponsors had no objection. The Supreme Court stated that “[a]n opinion explaining the reasoning for this order will follow at a later date.” This opinion set forth the reasons for the earlier order. View "Alaska Office of Lieutenant Governor, Division of Elections v. Vote Yes for Alaska's Fair Share" on Justia Law

Loren Larson, Jr. was convicted in 1998 of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of first-degree burglary, and he was sentenced to two consecutive 99-year terms for the murder counts and a 10-year concurrent term for the burglary count; the court of appeals affirmed Larson’s conviction in 2000. In 2003, the court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s subsequent dismissal of Larson’s post-conviction relief claim. Larson maintained his innocence and has unsuccessfully challenged the convictions in numerous other proceedings. Larson claimed he wanted to apply for clemency from the Alaska Governor on grounds he was innocent and wrongly convicted, But he did not want to execute two required information release forms that were part of the clemency application. Larson was advised by the Board of Parole that under the current administrative framework an incomplete application would be returned to him and not forwarded to the governor. Larson then sued the Board, arguing that its refusal to forward his application without the release forms violated his due process right to submit a clemency application. He further argued that enforcing the information release requirement would violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which in some contexts barred the government from conditioning a benefit on the waiver of a constitutional right. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Board, rejecting the applicant’s constitutional arguments. Because the Board did not violate the applicant’s constitutional rights, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. View "Larson Jr. v. Alaska, Department of Corrections, Board of Parole" on Justia Law

Petitioners were sex offenders who received prison sentences with some time suspended and probation imposed pursuant to a statute that mandated suspended imprisonment and probation as part of their initial sentences. The statute provided that the probationary term could not be suspended or reduced. After being released from prison, repeatedly violating the conditions of probation, and having all of their formerly suspended time reinstated, petitioners moved for discharge from probation. Their motions were denied because the statute mandating probation required the petitioners to serve the entire probationary term, even if they no longer had suspended time remaining as an incentive to comply with probation. While their cases were pending before the court of appeals, the statute was repealed. The court of appeals held the statute’s repeal was not retroactive, and it affirmed the denial of their motions. The Alaska Supreme Court granted review of this matter, and concluded that based on the statute’s text and legislative history, courts had no discretion to reduce a sex offender’s probation below statutory minimums, therefore affirming the court of appeals' judgment. View "Chinuhuk et al. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Anticipating a shortfall of revenue from previously enacted tax incentives, the 30th Alaska State Legislature attempted to offset future fiscal unpredictability by authorizing a discounted buyback of tax credits financed by bonds without pledging the “full faith and credit” of the State. Without a vote of the people, the legislature created a public corporation capable of borrowing up to $1 billion through the issuance of subject-to-appropriation bonds to purchase outstanding oil and gas exploration tax credits, with bondholders to be reimbursed solely at the discretion of future legislatures through appropriations to the new public corporation. A taxpayer filed suit, alleging, inter alia, that the legislature violated the Alaska Constitution’s state debt limitation. The superior court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the legislation did not create “debt” for purposes of the constitutional limitation. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, finding that this financing scheme, even if unforeseeable in the mid-twentieth century, was the kind of constitutional “debt” that the framers sought to prohibit under article IX, section 8 of the Alaska Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's decision granting the State's motion to dismiss, and affirmed the superior court’s decision rejecting the State’s arguments under section 11. View "Forrer v. Alaska" on Justia Law