Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2002 Plaintiff Kevin O'Connell was awarded damages against Defendants Anthony and Paulette Will for Defendants' failure to pay a promissory note. Under the attorney's fee provision in the note, Plaintiff was also awarded full attorney's fees and costs. After Plaintiff's attorney engaged in post-judgment collection efforts, Anthony Will paid the judgment. In 2009 Anthony Will filed a request for an order that the judgment in the case had been satisfied, and the superior court granted the motion. Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a further award of fees, arguing that he incurred additional fees in collecting the original judgment and that under the terms of the promissory note he is entitled to an additional award for those fees. The superior court denied his motion and Plaintiff appealed. He also argued that the superior court should not have considered Anthony Will's motion for entry of a satisfaction of judgment because Anthony failed to serve Paulette Will, Anthony's ex-wife, with the motion. Because the promissory note's terms did entitle Plaintiff to post-judgment fees, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's order denying Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees. The superior court did not err in considering Anthony Will's motion, but because Plaintiff was entitled to post-judgment attorney’s fees, the Court vacated the superior court’s entry of an order that the judgment was satisfied. View "O'Connell v. Will" on Justia Law

Renaissance Resources Alaska, LLC (Renaissance) partnered with Rutter & Wilbanks Corporation (Rutter) to develop an oil field. Renaissance and Rutter acquired a lease to the entire working interest and the majority of the net revenue interest of the field. They then formed a limited liability company, Renaissance Umiat, LLC (Umiat), to which they contributed most of the lease rights. But when they formed Umiat, Renaissance and Rutter did not contribute all of their acquired lease rights to the new company: they retained a 3.75% overriding royalty interest (ORRI). Rutter was eventually unable to meet the capital contributions required by Umiat's operating agreement and forfeited its interest under the terms of the agreement. Rutter filed suit against Renaissance seeking a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to half of the retained 3.75% ORRI. Renaissance argued why it deserved the entire 3.75%: (1) Renaissance held legal title to the 3.75% ORRI; and (2) Rutter could only obtain title through an equitable remedy to which Rutter is not entitled. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s conclusion that Renaissance's characterization was inaccurate and that Rutter was entitled to title to half of the 3.75% ORRI. Furthermore, Renaissance argued that the superior court should have found an implied term that Rutter would forfeit its share of the 3.75% ORRI if Rutter failed to contribute its share of expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s determination that there was not such an implied term in the agreement. View "Renaissance Alaska, LLC, v. Rutter & Wilbanks Corporation" on Justia Law

In 2004 and 2005, while allegedly bedridden and taking prescription pain medication, Plaintiff Gregory Erkins took out two successive loans on his house. The proceeds of the second, larger loan were used in part to pay off the first. In early 2007, Plaintiff ceased making regular payments and this loan fell into default. His house was listed for foreclosure sale. Also, at some point between February 2005 and November 2007, the loan was assigned from Ameriquest Mortgage Company to Appellee Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A. Acting pro se, Plaintiff filed suit in the superior court against Alaska Trustee, LLC, Bank of New York (the current holder of the loan), and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JP Morgan) (a party apparently unconnected to the proceedings except in that Bank of New York was listed as its successor). Plaintiff disputed the terms of the second loan, and argued fraud as well as lack of contractual capacity at the time of its origination. Several months after Plaintiff filed his complaint, as a trial date was about to be set, counsel for the defendants presented Plaintiff with a forbearance agreement. This agreement contemplated postponing the foreclosure sale in exchange for $2,000 monthly payments. Plaintiff executed this agreement. Allegedly unbeknownst to Plaintiff, the agreement also contained a waiver of claims broad enough to cover his claims against the defendants. Nine months later, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that this waiver of claims functioned as a settlement and released all of Plaintiff's claims in this suit. The superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no genuine issue of material fact barring judgment that they were not liable for any tort of Ameriquest, and that Plaintiff had released his claims in the forbearance agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the superior court’s decision finding that defendants could not be held liable for the alleged torts of Ameriquest. But the Court reversed that portion of the superior court’s order concluding that Plaintiff released his claims against the defendants by entering into a forbearance agreement because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the inclusion of the waiver of claims provision in the forbearance agreement constituted constructive fraud. View "Erkins v. Alaska Trust, LLC" on Justia Law

Two men bought an island. After a dispute, they agreed that one would keep the island, while the other would receive a one-time payment and an option to buy the island at a fixed price, adjusted for inflation, if the owner ever chose to sell it. Years passed, the value of the island rose, far outpacing inflation. But the owner never elected to sell. Instead, he eventually conveyed the island to his sister, as a gift. The option holder sued. The superior court held on summary judgment that the option remained viable, but that the gift was not improper. The option holder appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's interpretation of the option agreement, but because material facts were in dispute concerning contractual claims and allegations that the option holder's conveyance was fraudulent, the Court reversed and remanded the superior court's grant of summary judgment on those claims. View "Shaffer v. Bellows" on Justia Law

This case involved a contract dispute between 3-D & Co. and Tew’s Excavating, Inc. The dispute was over the terms of a construction contract for two roads in the Scenic View Subdivision of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough. 3-D & Co. raised twelve issues on appeal, which in sum, contended that the superior court applied the wrong legal standards and arrived at the wrong factual conclusions regarding the terms of the contract. The Supreme Court took each of 3-D's issues in turn and affirmed the superior court's decisions in all respects. View "3-D & Co. v. Tew's Excavating, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case were coverage limits associated with underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance and whether coverage provided under disputed insurance policies complies with the requirements of Alaska insurance statutes. The Respondent families hold UIM policies. They alleged they suffered emotional distress and loss of consortium as a result of a collision that killed one family’s child and severely injured the other family’s child. The insurer accepted that the policyholders incurred damages. However, it contended that the families exhausted the coverage limits available to them under the UIM policies because the family members seeking damages were not “in” the fatal collision. The superior court concluded that the families had not exhausted their UIM coverage under Alaska insurance statutes and reformed the insurance policies to allow the emotional distress claims to proceed to arbitration. The superior court dismissed the families’ loss of consortium claims as outside the coverage of the policies. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the families exhausted the coverage limits available under their policies and that these policies were consistent with statutory requirements, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision to reform the policies. Because coverage limits are exhausted, the Court declined to consider whether loss of consortium was covered under the policies. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Houle" on Justia Law

Appellant Zebuleon Whitney collided with a bicyclist in his pick-up truck, seriously injuring the bicyclist. The bicyclist sought a settlement agreement in excess of the maximum coverage of the driver’s insurance policy. Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) responded with an offer to tender policy limits, which the bicyclist refused. After a series of court proceedings in both state and federal court, Appellant sued his insurance company, complaining in part that his insurance company had breached its duty to settle. State Farm moved for partial summary judgment on a portion of the duty to settle claims. The superior court granted the motion. The parties then entered a stipulation by which Appellant dismissed all remaining claims, preserving his right to appeal, and final judgment was entered in the insurance company’s favor. Because State Farm’s rejection of the bicyclist’s settlement demand and its responsive tender of a policy limits offer was not a breach of the duty to settle, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to that extent. But because the superior court’s order exceeded the scope of the insurance company’s motion for partial summary judgment, The Court reversed the superior court’s order to the extent it exceeded the narrow issue upon which summary judgment was appropriate. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings concerning the surviving duty to settle claims. View "Whitney v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Landowner Appellant Charles Miller contracted with Handle Construction Company, a manufacturer of pre-fabricated steel hangars, to erect a steel hangar on his land. After completing its work, the Company sued Appellant for unanticipated costs it incurred as a result of manufacturing defects in the hangar. Appellant made an offer of judgment which the Company accepted. When the Company received a separate payment from the hangar's manufacturer, Appellant refused to pay the full amount, arguing that an offset was warranted. The superior court rejected Appellant's argument and ordered him to pay the full amount of the offer. The case was submitted to the Supreme Court for review, but the Court determined that the basis for the superior court's decision was unclear. The Court reversed the decision and remanded the case for additional factual findings. View "Miller v. Handle Construction Company" on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant Yvan Safar contracted with developer Per Bjorn-Roli to construct a 12-unit condominium project. Appellee Wells Fargo agreed to finance the project. By early 2007, the developer paid Appellant the entire amount of his contract, and Wells Fargo disbursed the entire loan, but the units were not complete. Appellant allegedly used his own funds to meet his payroll needs on the project. The project overran its budget, and Wells Fargo had to foreclose. Appellant contended that the bank promised to reimburse him for monies he spent in contemplating the completion of the project. After trial, the superior court found that Wells Fargo made no enforceable promise to Appellant to reimburse him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the bank did not make any promise or commitment to Appellant sufficient to meet the "actual promise" element of promissory estoppel. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Appellant's case. View "Safar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Terminated employee Karen Crowley appealed a superior court's dismissal of her contract claims against her former employer, the Alaska Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services (OCS). Ms. Crowley was hired in 2000 as a non-permanent social worker. She was granted permanent status after a six-month probation. Toward the end of her probationary period, Ms. Crowley's supervisor began receiving complaints about Ms. Crowley's job performance. An investigation was initiated. The report of the investigation found seven specific allegations against her. In 2002, the director of OCS terminated Ms. Crowley's employment. Subsequently Ms. Crowley filed suit in 2004, alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful retaliation and discrimination based on age and race. In 2006, the superior court granted summary judgment to OCS on all counts. Ms. Crowley appealed to the Supreme Court in 2007, which then reversed and remanded the superior court's judgment with respect to the good faith and fair dealing and retaliation claims. The remaining issues were retried, and judgment reentered in favor of OCS. Upon re-review of Ms. Crowley's claims, the Supreme Court found that she showed neither an objective nor a subjective breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment dismissing her case. View "Crowley v. Alaska" on Justia Law