Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Jacob Ennen was seriously injured while he was a passenger in Gordon Shanigan's car. Shanigan's insurer, Integon Indemnity Corporation (Integon), paid $50,000 to cover Shanigan's possible liability to Appellant. Under Alaska insurance statutes, Appellant would also likely have been entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under Shanigan's policy. However, Integon's policy was inconsistent with these statutes, and Integon told Ennen that he was not entitled to any additional money. Six years later, some time after Integon learned that its underinsured motorist provision violated Alaska insurance statutes, Integon paid Appellant underinsured motorist benefits plus interest and fees. Appellant sued Integon for bad faith. Integon filed a third-party complaint against Appellant's attorney, Craig Allen. Before trial, the superior court dismissed Integon’s claims against Allen on the ground that allowing Integon to implead Appellant's attorney would violate public policy. The superior court held that because Appellant did not own the insurance policy, Integon did not owe him a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the superior court concluded that Appellant had no cause of action for bad faith. But, in the event this ruling were to be reversed on appeal, the superior court made an alternate finding that while Integon had committed the tort of bad faith, Appellant had suffered no damages as a result. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed on both counts. "The superior court was justifiably cautious about extending the bad faith cause of action to a new class of plaintiffs, but we conclude that Ennen, as an insured, is eligible under our existing case law to bring a cause of action for bad faith." The Court concluded that Appellant established facts that would entitle him to damages. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Integon's third-party claim against Allen on the alternative ground that Allen was not a proximate cause of Appellant's harm. View "Ennen v. Integon Indemnity Corp." on Justia Law

Michael McCrary sued Ivanof Bay Village (Ivanof Bay) and its president, Edgar Shangin, under two contracts, alleging breaches of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court dismissed the suit based on sovereign immunity. McCrary appealed the sovereign immunity ruling, arguing that even though the United States Department of Interior lists Ivanof Bay as a federally recognized Indian tribe, Ivanof Bay has not been formally designated as a federally recognized tribe. The Supreme Court previously concluded Alaska Native tribes recognized by Congress or the Executive Branch are sovereign under federal law, and McCrary did not demonstrate that conclusion should be overturned. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's dismissal of McCrary's suit. View "McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Village" on Justia Law

In late April 2006 Samuel Sengul leased a commercial storefront in downtown Juneau to Robert Manus, who was acting on behalf of CMS Franklin, Inc. The building was under construction when Sengul and CMS entered into the lease agreement, but the lease provided that Sengul would deliver the property to CMS in a specified improved condition by the time the lease commenced on June 1. The lease also included a rent abatement provision, which was at issue in this case. The building was not in improved condition until approximately June 8. Manus did not pay any rent, nor did he mention the rent abatement provision when he took possession of the building. Sengul finally demanded rent in late July, but Manus refused to pay, claiming abatement. In September, Manus had still not paid any rent, and Sengul put a lock on CMS's store door and placed signs demanding rent in the store windows. Manus had the lock cut off, but began to move the inventory out of the store, vacating it and returning the keys to Sengul two days after the lockout. Sengul then sued CMS and Manus for unpaid rent. The superior court determined that CMS had waived its right to rent abatement and owed Sengul unpaid rental amounts for the time that Manus had occupied the building. But the court also concluded that Sengul's lockout amounted to constructive eviction and awarded CMS damages as a refund for work performed on the premises that CMS was unable to benefit from after the constructive eviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that Sengul's actions constituted constructive eviction, but the Court disagreed that CMS waived its entitlement to have the rent abated. The case was remanded for the superior court to recalculate the damages owed to CMS. View "Sengul v. CMS Franklin, Inc." on Justia Law

A construction company solicited a bid from a subcontractor to perform concrete work. The construction company provided a plan and bid schedule. The subcontractor responded with a proposal, which the construction company accepted. The subcontractor carried out the subcontract as it understood the terms. After the work was completed, the subcontractor discovered it had inadvertently underbid on the project. In the ensuing lawsuit, the superior court granted partial summary judgment to the construction company with respect to all damages claimed in relation to the bidding error. The subcontractor appealed the partial summary judgment order, claiming breach of an implied warranty that the plans and specifications would be sufficient, and arguing that the superior court erred by applying the theory of unilateral mistake to the case. Because the construction company did not breach the implied warranty and the subcontractor committed a unilateral mistake for which it bore the risk, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Handle Construction Co., Inc. v. Norcon, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2002 Plaintiff Kevin O'Connell was awarded damages against Defendants Anthony and Paulette Will for Defendants' failure to pay a promissory note. Under the attorney's fee provision in the note, Plaintiff was also awarded full attorney's fees and costs. After Plaintiff's attorney engaged in post-judgment collection efforts, Anthony Will paid the judgment. In 2009 Anthony Will filed a request for an order that the judgment in the case had been satisfied, and the superior court granted the motion. Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a further award of fees, arguing that he incurred additional fees in collecting the original judgment and that under the terms of the promissory note he is entitled to an additional award for those fees. The superior court denied his motion and Plaintiff appealed. He also argued that the superior court should not have considered Anthony Will's motion for entry of a satisfaction of judgment because Anthony failed to serve Paulette Will, Anthony's ex-wife, with the motion. Because the promissory note's terms did entitle Plaintiff to post-judgment fees, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's order denying Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees. The superior court did not err in considering Anthony Will's motion, but because Plaintiff was entitled to post-judgment attorney’s fees, the Court vacated the superior court’s entry of an order that the judgment was satisfied. View "O'Connell v. Will" on Justia Law

Renaissance Resources Alaska, LLC (Renaissance) partnered with Rutter & Wilbanks Corporation (Rutter) to develop an oil field. Renaissance and Rutter acquired a lease to the entire working interest and the majority of the net revenue interest of the field. They then formed a limited liability company, Renaissance Umiat, LLC (Umiat), to which they contributed most of the lease rights. But when they formed Umiat, Renaissance and Rutter did not contribute all of their acquired lease rights to the new company: they retained a 3.75% overriding royalty interest (ORRI). Rutter was eventually unable to meet the capital contributions required by Umiat's operating agreement and forfeited its interest under the terms of the agreement. Rutter filed suit against Renaissance seeking a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to half of the retained 3.75% ORRI. Renaissance argued why it deserved the entire 3.75%: (1) Renaissance held legal title to the 3.75% ORRI; and (2) Rutter could only obtain title through an equitable remedy to which Rutter is not entitled. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s conclusion that Renaissance's characterization was inaccurate and that Rutter was entitled to title to half of the 3.75% ORRI. Furthermore, Renaissance argued that the superior court should have found an implied term that Rutter would forfeit its share of the 3.75% ORRI if Rutter failed to contribute its share of expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s determination that there was not such an implied term in the agreement. View "Renaissance Alaska, LLC, v. Rutter & Wilbanks Corporation" on Justia Law

In 2004 and 2005, while allegedly bedridden and taking prescription pain medication, Plaintiff Gregory Erkins took out two successive loans on his house. The proceeds of the second, larger loan were used in part to pay off the first. In early 2007, Plaintiff ceased making regular payments and this loan fell into default. His house was listed for foreclosure sale. Also, at some point between February 2005 and November 2007, the loan was assigned from Ameriquest Mortgage Company to Appellee Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A. Acting pro se, Plaintiff filed suit in the superior court against Alaska Trustee, LLC, Bank of New York (the current holder of the loan), and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JP Morgan) (a party apparently unconnected to the proceedings except in that Bank of New York was listed as its successor). Plaintiff disputed the terms of the second loan, and argued fraud as well as lack of contractual capacity at the time of its origination. Several months after Plaintiff filed his complaint, as a trial date was about to be set, counsel for the defendants presented Plaintiff with a forbearance agreement. This agreement contemplated postponing the foreclosure sale in exchange for $2,000 monthly payments. Plaintiff executed this agreement. Allegedly unbeknownst to Plaintiff, the agreement also contained a waiver of claims broad enough to cover his claims against the defendants. Nine months later, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that this waiver of claims functioned as a settlement and released all of Plaintiff's claims in this suit. The superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no genuine issue of material fact barring judgment that they were not liable for any tort of Ameriquest, and that Plaintiff had released his claims in the forbearance agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the superior court’s decision finding that defendants could not be held liable for the alleged torts of Ameriquest. But the Court reversed that portion of the superior court’s order concluding that Plaintiff released his claims against the defendants by entering into a forbearance agreement because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the inclusion of the waiver of claims provision in the forbearance agreement constituted constructive fraud. View "Erkins v. Alaska Trust, LLC" on Justia Law

Two men bought an island. After a dispute, they agreed that one would keep the island, while the other would receive a one-time payment and an option to buy the island at a fixed price, adjusted for inflation, if the owner ever chose to sell it. Years passed, the value of the island rose, far outpacing inflation. But the owner never elected to sell. Instead, he eventually conveyed the island to his sister, as a gift. The option holder sued. The superior court held on summary judgment that the option remained viable, but that the gift was not improper. The option holder appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's interpretation of the option agreement, but because material facts were in dispute concerning contractual claims and allegations that the option holder's conveyance was fraudulent, the Court reversed and remanded the superior court's grant of summary judgment on those claims. View "Shaffer v. Bellows" on Justia Law

This case involved a contract dispute between 3-D & Co. and Tew’s Excavating, Inc. The dispute was over the terms of a construction contract for two roads in the Scenic View Subdivision of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough. 3-D & Co. raised twelve issues on appeal, which in sum, contended that the superior court applied the wrong legal standards and arrived at the wrong factual conclusions regarding the terms of the contract. The Supreme Court took each of 3-D's issues in turn and affirmed the superior court's decisions in all respects. View "3-D & Co. v. Tew's Excavating, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case were coverage limits associated with underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance and whether coverage provided under disputed insurance policies complies with the requirements of Alaska insurance statutes. The Respondent families hold UIM policies. They alleged they suffered emotional distress and loss of consortium as a result of a collision that killed one family’s child and severely injured the other family’s child. The insurer accepted that the policyholders incurred damages. However, it contended that the families exhausted the coverage limits available to them under the UIM policies because the family members seeking damages were not “in” the fatal collision. The superior court concluded that the families had not exhausted their UIM coverage under Alaska insurance statutes and reformed the insurance policies to allow the emotional distress claims to proceed to arbitration. The superior court dismissed the families’ loss of consortium claims as outside the coverage of the policies. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the families exhausted the coverage limits available under their policies and that these policies were consistent with statutory requirements, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision to reform the policies. Because coverage limits are exhausted, the Court declined to consider whether loss of consortium was covered under the policies. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Houle" on Justia Law