Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In May 2005, Petitioner Eugene Bottcher drove his vehicle off the road, hitting a boy and narrowly missing the boy's brother. Petitioner was intoxicated at the time; the boy who had been hit later died at the hospital from his injuries. After Petitioner hit the boy, he continued to drive, and when stopped by a passerby who had witnessed the accident, Petitioner tried to bribe him into not reporting the crime. Petitioner pled no contest to manslaughter, assault in the third degree, and failure to render assistance. The superior court sentenced him to a term of 23 years with 3 years suspended. The court also revoked Petitioner's driver's license for life. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's sentence and the lifetime revocation of his license. In his petition to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the lifetime revocation was excessive. Upon review, the Court held that the trial court was not clearly mistaken in finding that Petitioner's case was an extreme one in which a lifetime revocation of his driver's license was required to protect the public. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed the superior court's lifetime revocation of Petitioner's driver's license. View "Bottcher v. Alaska" on Justia Law

John Doe A and John Doe B were convicted of criminal offenses that required them to register and comply with Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA). After their convictions, the legislature amended ASORA, requiring certain offenders to comply with additional registration requirements. The John Does sued, claiming that retroactive application of ASORA’s amendments to them violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Alaska Constitution. The superior court agreed, and the State appealed. In 2008 the Supreme Court decided "Doe v. State" (Doe I), holding that ASORA’s amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and did not apply to persons who committed their crimes before the amendments became effective. Two years later the Court promulgated Alaska Appellate Rule 106, which provided that any issue decided by a two-to-one vote shall not have precedential effect. When the COurt promulgated Appellate Rule 106 it was silent on the question whether that rule might have retroactive effect. The Court held in this case that its two-to-one decision in Doe I was binding precedent that controlled the outcome of this case because Appellate Rule 106 did not have retroactive application. View "Alaska v. Doe" on Justia Law

Appellant Sidney Hertz, a prisoner sentenced in 1984, applied for an early furlough release in 2009 but refused to agree to comply with any furlough release conditions, arguing that imposing conditions that were not part of his sentence violated his due process rights and constituted double jeopardy. The Department of Corrections (DOC) denied the early furlough release, but he was released on mandatory parole shortly thereafter. Appellant subsequently sued two DOC probation officers, alleging they lacked authority to impose furlough release conditions and that doing so violated his constitutional rights. The superior court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, appellant challenged the superior court’s dismissal and attempts to collaterally attack conditions of his mandatory parole. "Because DOC probation officers are mandated by statute and administrative regulation to impose appropriate conditions on furlough releases without regard to conditions set in an original sentence, and because these mandates alone do not violate a prisoner’s rights under the Alaska or United States Constitutions, [the Supreme Court] affirm[ed] the superior court’s dismissal of this case." View "Hertz v. Macomber" on Justia Law

John Doe A and John Doe B were convicted of criminal offenses that required them to register and comply with Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA). Following their convictions, the legislature amended ASORA, requiring certain offenders, including both Does, to comply with additional registration requirements. The Does sued, claiming that retroactive application of ASORA’s amendments to them violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Alaska Constitution. The superior court agreed, and the State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the amended ASORA could not be applied retroactively: in 2008, in a two-to-one decision, the Court held that ASORA’s amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and did not apply to persons who committed their crimes before the amendments became effective. Two years later the Court promulgated Alaska Appellate Rule 106, which provided that any issue decided by a two-to-one vote would not have precedential effect. When the Court promulgated Appellate Rule 106 it was silent on the question whether that rule might have retroactive effect. By the Court's opinion in this case, that earlier two-to-one decision is now binding precedent that controlled the outcome of this case because Appellate Rule 106 does not have retroactive application. View "Alaska v. Doe" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the court concerned whether monetary damages are available to a prisoner for violations of the terms of a judicial decree approving the "Cleary Final Settlement Agreement." In 2004 appellee Corrections Corporation of America contracted with the State to house Alaska inmates at Corrections Corporation's Red Rock Correctional Center in Arizona. Byran Perotti was an Alaska inmate at Red Rock. He filed a complaint against Corrections Corporation alleging that Corrections Corporation violated provisions of its contract with the State, as well as various State Department of Corrections policies. He asserted standing as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the State and Corrections Corporation. He based his argument on his status as a Cleary class member and the provisions of the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement, which settled the class action involving various inmate claims against the State of Alaska, Department of Corrections (DOC). Perotti's complaint sought liquidated damages under the DOC-Corrections Corporation contract, as well as compensatory damages, nominal damages, and punitive damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement did not contemplate the award of monetary damages to enforce its provisions. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court's decision granting Corrections Corporation's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Perotti's claims. View "Perotti v. Corrections Corporation of America" on Justia Law

Siegfried Pedersen was convicted of assault and weapons misconduct. He brought a civil suit against the victims of those crimes, Daniel Blythe and Bobbie Luxford, alleging defamation and trespass. The superior court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of collateral estoppel. Pedersen appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erred when, in deciding the motion to dismiss, it considered matters outside the pleadings without advising Pedersen of its intent to do so and giving him a reasonable opportunity to respond. The Court held that this error was harmless with regard to Pedersen's defamation claims. The Court also held that it was plain error for the superior court to dismiss Pedersen's trespass claims, claims to which collateral estoppel did not apply. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment on the defamation claims and reversed and remanded on the trespass claims. View "Pedersen v. Blythe" on Justia Law

The question raised before the Supreme Court in two consolidated appeals was whether this certain provisions of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) applied to a person convicted in a single proceeding of two (or more) sex offenses. James Ward was convicted of two sex offenses in a single criminal proceeding. In a separate and unrelated single proceeding, Michael Boles was also convicted of two sex offenses. They argued that the pertinent statute, AS 12.63.020(a)(1)(B), was ambiguous, because it could be read to require convictions in more than one proceeding. They therefore reasoned that the rule of lenity requires that the ambiguity be resolved in their favor and thus that the statute be read to require them to register for 15 years, not life. They asserted that the Department of Public Safety, in requiring them to register for life, misread the statute. The men filed separate administrative appeals, which were assigned to two different superior court judges. One judge, reasoning that the statute is unambiguous, affirmed the Department's ruling regarding Ward. The other judge, reasoning that the statute is ambiguous and must therefore be read favorably to offenders, reversed the Department's ruling regarding Boles. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Department did not err; the statute, in requiring persons "convicted of . . . two or more sex offenses" to register for life, is unambiguous and cannot reasonably be read to condition lifetime registration on two or more separate convictions for sex offenses, or on any sequential or chronological separation between convictions. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court order that affirmed the Department's decision regarding Ward and reversed the superior court order that reversed the Department's decision regarding Boles. View "Ward v. Alaska Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Loren J. Larson, Jr. was incarcerated at the Spring Creek Correctional Center in Seward. Acting pro se, he filed two separate complaints alleging violations of his constitutional rights. In his first complaint, he alleged that he suffers from paruresis, a condition that makes it impossible for him to urinate in the presence of others, and the correctional facility had violated state and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment by failing to accommodate his condition with alternative urinalysis testing procedures. His second complaint alleged that the correctional facility's revised visitor application form for minors violates his state constitutional right to rehabilitation because it is more restrictive than the administrative regulation governing visitation rights. Both complaints were dismissed for failure to state a claim under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals to address an issue common to both: the procedure for properly evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint of a pro se prisoner alleging constitutional violations. The Court took the opportunity to emphasize that a complaint must be liberally construed and a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is viewed with disfavor and should rarely be granted. Because both of Larson's complaints alleged facts which, if proven, were sufficient to entitle him to some form of relief, and because the Court found no merit in the arguments that Larson lacked standing or was otherwise barred from bringing a direct cause of action for these alleged constitutional violations, the Court reversed the dismissal of both of Larson's complaints. View "Larson v. State, Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Dennis Davison was convicted of sexually abusing his fourteen-year-old daughter, R.D. At trial, the doctor who performed a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) examination of R.D. testified to statements R.D. had made during the examination. Davison argued on appeal that the doctor’s testimony regarding R.D.’s statements was not admissible under Alaska Evidence Rule 803(4), because the examination was conducted primarily to gather evidence against him and not for purposes of medical treatment. Davison also argued that the trial court erroneously included in his presentence report statements R.D. had made during the sexual assault exam that pertained to offenses he was charged with but acquitted of at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the doctor’s hearsay testimony was not admissible under Rule 803(4), but held that this error was harmless with respect to Davison’s conviction. The Court remanded the sentencing issue to the court of appeals to consider whether the hearsay statements were sufficiently verified for inclusion in Davison’s presentence report. View "Davison v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A man was arrested for misdemeanor crimes after an altercation arising from a business dispute. He brought civil claims against a police officer and the officer's municipal employer based on the arrest. The superior court granted a motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims against them. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision because: (1) the police officer had probable cause to make a felony arrest, and, therefore, any perceived deficiencies in the misdemeanor arrest process are irrelevant; and (2) no municipal policy deprived the arrestee of property, and, therefore, the municipality did not violate the arrestee's constitutional rights. View "Yi v. Yang" on Justia Law