Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Officer Lee Virg-In used a taser twice on J.N., an 11-year-old girl. She had been driving an ATV in the streets of Kotzebue with another younger passenger. J.N. ran several stop signs and was otherwise driving dangerously. The Officer used his overhead lights and siren to signal J.N. to stop, but she refused, first trying to escape on the ATV and later on foot. According to J.N., she was never aggressive or threatening when the Officer eventually caught up with her. Sandra Russell, J.N.'s mother, filed a complaint against Officer Virg-In, alleging that his use of the taser constituted excessive force. Ms. Russell also sued the City of Kotzebue. The Officer defended the reasonableness of his actions and argued he was immune from suit. The superior court dismissed J.N.'s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it was error to grant the Officer qualified immunity "because if a police officer used a taser multiple times on an 11-year-old girl who was suspected of traffic violations, was compliant and was not posing a threat to the officer or others, that conduct would be so egregious that any reasonable officer would have known the conduct was an excessive use of force." The Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Russell v. Virg-In" on Justia Law

At issue for the Supreme Court was whether under the Federal Constitution a criminal defendant's court-appointed counsel must, upon the defendant's demand after lawful sentencing pursuant to a plea agreement, file a petition for discretionary sentence review by the Court when state law precludes an appeal of right. Defendant David Stone was charged with manslaughter, assault, and driving under the influence. Soon after judgment was entered, an attorney from the public defender agency asked Defendant if he wished to appeal his sentence. The attorney reviewed his file, and spoke with Defendant's trial counsel. After review, the attorney concluded that Defendant could not appeal his sentence. Defendant pro se petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing that the attorney's failure to object or appeal his sentence as excessive constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court denied Defendant's application, holding that it was "unwilling to find that an attorney is ineffective on the sole basis that the attorney did not advance a meritless argument." On argument to the Court of Appeals, the State contended that because Defendant did not question the legality of his sentence, it could not have been ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to appeal his sentence. Defendant countered by arguing that he was entitled to appellate review regardless of the terminology he used. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court. Upon its consideration of the legal authority and briefs submitted by both parties, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate courts, holding that Defendant was entitled to require his court-appointed counsel to file a petition for the Court's discretionary review of his sentence. View "Stone v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Loren Larson, Jr. sued Alaska, alleging that the Alaska Court of Appeals violated its "duties to establish rules of law and declare what legal rights a citizen has." The court dismissed Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief from an earlier conviction for two murders and one burglary. The superior court ruled that Appellant’s suit was barred by both judicial immunity and res judicata. Appellant petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s case. The Court found that Appellant identified the source of the appellate court’s duties from the preamble of the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct but did not make any specific allegations in relation to the law or to his case. With nothing more, the Court concluded that Appellant failed to state a claim for relief and dismissed his case. View "Larson v. Alaska" on Justia Law