Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant Leroy Adams of sexual assault in the second degree for having sexual intercourse with K.S. when he knew that K.S. was unaware that a sexual act was being committed. Both Defendant and K.S. were intoxicated at the time, and Defendant testified at trial that the sex was consensual. During his cross-examination of Defendant, the prosecutor questioned him about his refusal to speak to the police prior to trial. The prosecutor also argued to the jury in closing that Defendant's refusal to talk to the police made his testimony at trial less credible. Defendant claimed on appeal that the prosecutor’s questions and argument were improper comments on Defendant's right to silence under article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution. Because Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s questions or argument at trial, the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for review and concluded that the prosecutor improperly commented on Defendant's invocation of his right to silence and violated his constitutional rights. The Court reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Adams v. Alaska" on Justia Law

After a disciplinary hearing, a hearing officer found Alaska prison inmate Joseph James guilty of the “low-moderate” infraction of “threatening another person with future bodily harm” at Red Rocks Correctional Center in Arizona. The determination was based entirely on an incident report written by a prison staff member who had not witnessed the incident. Instead, the report’s author provided a hearsay account of a conversation between James and another staff member. After exhausting his administrative remedies, James filed an appeal to the superior court. James argued that basing the finding of guilt solely on the hearsay written account constituted a violation of his due process rights. James also maintained that the failure to audio-record the disciplinary hearing violated due process. The superior court affirmed the disciplinary determination. Because the Supreme Court concluded that James’s due process right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses was violated during the disciplinary proceedings and that he was prejudiced by the failure to audio-record the disciplinary hearing, the Court vacated the disciplinary determination and remanded the case for a new hearing. View "James v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Byron Kalmakoff of raping and murdering his cousin when he was fifteen years old. Troopers sent to investigate the murder conducted four interviews with Defendant. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress statements he made in those interviews based on "Miranda" violations. The trial court suppressed a portion of the first interview and all of the second, but admitted the third and fourth interviews. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions, concluding that any error in admitting portions of the first interview was harmless and that the third and fourth interviews were "sufficiently insulated" from any Miranda violations that occurred during the first two interviews. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for additional fact findings and concluded that the Miranda violations from the first two interviews violated Defendant's right to remain silent. As such, the third and fourth interviews were tainted by violations in the first two interviews. The Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Kalmakoff v. Alaska" on Justia Law

In 2003, Officer Lee Virg-In used a taser twice on J.N., an 11-year-old girl. She had been driving an ATV in the streets of Kotzebue with another younger passenger. J.N. ran several stop signs and was otherwise driving dangerously. The Officer used his overhead lights and siren to signal J.N. to stop, but she refused, first trying to escape on the ATV and later on foot. According to J.N., she was never aggressive or threatening when the Officer eventually caught up with her. Sandra Russell, J.N.'s mother, filed a complaint against Officer Virg-In, alleging that his use of the taser constituted excessive force. Ms. Russell also sued the City of Kotzebue. The Officer defended the reasonableness of his actions and argued he was immune from suit. The superior court dismissed J.N.'s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it was error to grant the Officer qualified immunity "because if a police officer used a taser multiple times on an 11-year-old girl who was suspected of traffic violations, was compliant and was not posing a threat to the officer or others, that conduct would be so egregious that any reasonable officer would have known the conduct was an excessive use of force." The Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Russell v. Virg-In" on Justia Law

At issue for the Supreme Court was whether under the Federal Constitution a criminal defendant's court-appointed counsel must, upon the defendant's demand after lawful sentencing pursuant to a plea agreement, file a petition for discretionary sentence review by the Court when state law precludes an appeal of right. Defendant David Stone was charged with manslaughter, assault, and driving under the influence. Soon after judgment was entered, an attorney from the public defender agency asked Defendant if he wished to appeal his sentence. The attorney reviewed his file, and spoke with Defendant's trial counsel. After review, the attorney concluded that Defendant could not appeal his sentence. Defendant pro se petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing that the attorney's failure to object or appeal his sentence as excessive constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court denied Defendant's application, holding that it was "unwilling to find that an attorney is ineffective on the sole basis that the attorney did not advance a meritless argument." On argument to the Court of Appeals, the State contended that because Defendant did not question the legality of his sentence, it could not have been ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to appeal his sentence. Defendant countered by arguing that he was entitled to appellate review regardless of the terminology he used. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court. Upon its consideration of the legal authority and briefs submitted by both parties, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate courts, holding that Defendant was entitled to require his court-appointed counsel to file a petition for the Court's discretionary review of his sentence. View "Stone v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Loren Larson, Jr. sued Alaska, alleging that the Alaska Court of Appeals violated its "duties to establish rules of law and declare what legal rights a citizen has." The court dismissed Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief from an earlier conviction for two murders and one burglary. The superior court ruled that Appellant’s suit was barred by both judicial immunity and res judicata. Appellant petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s case. The Court found that Appellant identified the source of the appellate court’s duties from the preamble of the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct but did not make any specific allegations in relation to the law or to his case. With nothing more, the Court concluded that Appellant failed to state a claim for relief and dismissed his case. View "Larson v. Alaska" on Justia Law