Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kaleb Basey was the subject of a joint criminal investigation conducted by the Alaska State Troopers (AST) and the Fort Wainwright Criminal Investigation Division. He was a party to two federal cases stemming from that investigation. First, Basey was indicted by a federal grand jury in December 2014 and was the defendant in a federal criminal case. Second, Basey brought a federal civil rights lawsuit in January 2016 against more than a dozen named individuals, including AST officers, based on their alleged actions during the investigation and his arrest. Basey filed two public records requests with AST seeking records related to his specific investigation, records related to AST’s use of military search authorizations, and disciplinary and training certification records for two AST investigators who were defendants in the civil case. About a week later AST denied Basey’s requests on the basis that all of the information he requested pertained to pending litigation. Basey appealed to the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety; the Commissioner denied the appeal. The denial letter stated that the requested records “pertain to a matter that is currently the subject of civil and/or criminal litigation to which [Basey is] a party” and that pursuant to AS 40.25.122 the records “continue to be unavailable through [a public records request] and must be obtained in accordance with court rules.” Basey subsequently filed a complaint to compel AST to produce the records. The State filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that two statutory exceptions justified the denial of Basey’s requests. On appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court, Basey argued AST had to comply with his requests for the records he requested. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the State could not establish disclosure of these records “could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings” or that either of these pending actions “involv[es] a public agency” as required by the statutory exceptions the State cited. View "Basey v. Alaska Dept. of Public Safety, Division of Alaska State Troopers" on Justia Law

Michael Rae was a prisoner in the custody of Alaska’s Department of Corrections (DOC). In January 2015, he filed a complaint (labeled a “petition”) alleging that DOC lacked the constitutional authority to hold him. In an attached motion for expedited consideration he asserted that he had been “subjected to numerous forms of cruel and unusual punishments” including solitary confinement and impediments to his ability to conduct legal research. In June 2015, the superior court sua sponte dismissed the complaint with prejudice because Rae failed to “advance any cognizable or discernable claim.” Rae filed both a motion for reconsideration and a notice of his intent to seek a default, following up with a 75-page application for a default judgment. The superior court denied reconsideration, concluding that “Rae’s main point of contention is that [DOC] has no legal authority to hold him or exist at all” and that the “argument is without merit and the relief sought is not available to Rae.” The Alaska Supreme Court agreed the complaint failed to state a cognizable claim, and affirmed the dismissal. View "Rae v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

In May 2014, the Alaska Department of Corrections found inmate Sababu Hodari guilty of a disciplinary infraction. Hodari appealed the Department’s decision to the superior court, arguing that the Department violated his right to due process by failing to follow prescribed procedure in the disciplinary hearing. While the appeal was pending the Department reversed its decision and removed the disciplinary records from Hodari’s file. The superior court then found that Hodari had effectively prevailed on his appeal, and it allowed him to recover costs and fees from the Department. Hodari moved for an award of $4,800 in attorney’s and paralegal fees. The court awarded Hodari fees and costs but did not specify the amount of the award in its order, so the Department moved for clarification of the fee-award order. In its clarification order the court stated that because Hodari had not shown that the paralegal fees were for legal work “ordinarily performed by an attorney,” he was only entitled to $1,800 in attorney’s fees. Hodari appealed, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion in refusing to award him paralegal fees. The Alaska Supreme Court disagreed, and therefore affirmed the superior court’s fee award. View "Hodari v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

In November 1999, Alaska filed a felony information charging Sean Wright with sexually abusing two young girls. Wright was not arrested or indicted on these charges until almost five years later. He moved to dismiss the charges, claiming, among other reasons, that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The superior court denied this motion. On appeal, the court of appeals ordered a reassessment of Wright’s claim. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded speedy trial time begins to run from the filing of an information, and that that the superior court did not err in attributing primary responsibility for the delay to Wright. View "Alaska v. Wright" on Justia Law

In 2009, Richard Mattox sued the Department of Corrections (DOC) for injuries arising from an assault by another prisoner. Mattox alleged that DOC was negligent in failing to accommodate his requests for transfer to a different housing module prior to the assault and that DOC was negligent in permitting the correctional officer on duty to leave the module during the time the assault occurred. The superior court granted DOC’s motion for partial summary judgment regarding classification and housing assignments and then granted DOC’s motion for summary judgment on all other causes of action. The Alaska Supreme Court remanded because there was a material question of fact regarding the foreseeability of the assault. Mattox moved for a new trial on the grounds that the jury erroneously applied the doctrine of discretionary function immunity in reaching its verdict when that question should have been decided by the court before trial. The court denied that motion and Mattox appealed. The Supreme Court concluded Mattox waived any challenge to the jury’s application of the doctrine, and the superior court committed no reversible error by allowing the jury to apply the doctrine rather than applying the doctrine itself sua sponte. View "Mattox v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

In 2013, a number of pro se prisoners moved the superior court to enforce the terms of a 1990 Final Settlement Agreement and Order in "Cleary v. Smith," a class action by inmates regarding prison conditions. In 2014 Superior Court Judge John Suddock dismissed the prisoners’ motions, concluding that the Final Settlement Agreement was unenforceable because it had been terminated in 2001 when Superior Court Judge Elaine Andrews found that the requirements for termination had been met. But Judge Andrews did not terminate the Final Settlement Agreement because she determined that the Alaska Prison Litigation Reform Act was only constitutional if it did not terminate the Final Settlement Agreement. Judge Andrews’s 2001 Order became the law of the case when it was issued. Because Judge Suddock failed to make required findings when reversing the law of the case, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed Judge Suddock’s Order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barber v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Sean Wright, a former inmate of the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC) who was incarcerated at an out-of-state correctional facility under contract with DOC, filed a medical malpractice and 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights action against officials employed by the out-of-state correctional facility and by DOC. The civil rights claims alleged that the corrections officials were deliberately indifferent to Wright's medical needs. The superior court granted summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice action as barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Subsequently the court granted summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claims against the inmate. In the course of the proceedings, Wright unsuccessfully sought to have the superior court judge removed for alleged bias. Wright appealed these decisions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wright v. Anding" on Justia Law

The father of three Indian children killed their mother. After the father’s arrest, the father’s relatives moved the children from Alaska to Texas and gained custody of the children through a Texas district court order. The mother’s sister filed a separate action against the father in Alaska superior court, seeking custody of the children and challenging the Texas order. Although Alaska had exclusive jurisdiction to make the initial custody determination, the Alaska court concluded that Texas was the more appropriate forum and ceded its jurisdiction to the Texas court, primarily because evidence about the children’s current status was in Texas. The Alaska Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s decision: it was an abuse of discretion to minimize the importance of protecting the children from the father’s alleged domestic violence and to minimize evidence required to resolve domestic violence and Indian Child Welfare Act issues in this case. View "Rice v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Alex H., a prisoner, challenged the superior court’s denial of his request for transport to attend in person his parental rights termination trial, and, therefore, the ultimate termination of his parental rights. He argued that when denying his transport request the superior court: (1) abused its discretion by concluding in its statutory analysis that transport was not required; (2) abused its discretion or erred by failing to consider all required factors for the statutory analysis; and (3) separately violated his due process rights by denying him in-person attendance at the parental rights termination trial. Because the superior court considered all relevant factors the parties presented to it, because it was not obvious that considering additional factors would have changed the court’s statutory analysis, and because the prisoner’s due process rights were not violated, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s transport decision and ultimate termination of the prisoner’s parental rights. View "Alex H. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

The respondent in involuntary commitment and medication proceedings, Jacob S., appealed a few issues related to findings that he was mentally ill and posed a risk of harm to others. The superior court ordered both 30-and 90-day commitments, the latter following a jury trial. The court also entered medication orders after finding the respondent unable to make mental health treatment decisions. The primary argument respondent made on appeal of the commitment order, was: (1) when a respondent requests a jury trial on a 90-day commitment petition, who decides the factual underpinning for and the ultimate question of least restrictive alternative to commitment (the jury or the court); and (2) can a respondent be found incompetent under AS 47.0.837(d)(1) if only part of the requirements of that statute is not met? The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the court decides the question of least restrictive alternative; and (2) yes, a respondent can be found incompetent if one part is not met. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court’s commitment and medication orders. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Jacob S." on Justia Law