Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Anchorage Police Department identified Joshua Richardson as a suspect in a shoplifting incident. When the police went to Richardson’s home to make an arrest, Richardson hid in a crawlspace and allegedly incurred injuries from a police canine. The misdemeanor theft charges against Richardson were dismissed shortly after his arrest. About two years after these events, Richardson filed two civil suits against the Anchorage Police Department, various police officers, the State of Alaska, Best Buy (the store in which he was alleged to have shoplifted), and the Best Buy employee who reported the theft. In separate proceedings, one before Judge Catherine Easter and one before Judge Mark Rindner, the superior court dismissed both complaints as untimely under the two-year statute of limitations. Richardson appealed these dismissals. In the suit before Judge Easter, Richardson argued that the statute of limitations should have been tolled due to his alleged mental incompetency and separation from his legal documents during unrelated incarceration. The Supreme Court concluded there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to these issues, and affirmed the Superior Court as to this issue. In the suit before Judge Rindner, however, there was credible evidence that Richardson filed his complaint before the statute of limitations ran. This created a genuine issue of material fact. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the dismissal in that case and remanded for further proceedings to determine when Richardson commenced his suit. View "Richardson v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

Petitioner-defendant Ryan Sanders was on trial for two murders. He sought to admit a recording of a phone call to the police, placed by a young woman who had since died. On the recording, the young woman told a police officer that one of the victims had told her that both victims were conspiring to attack and rob the defendant. In support of his motion to admit the recording, the defendant argued that the recording was critical to his defense, which centered on justified self-defense and heat of passion. Defendant invoked the hearsay exceptions for a declarant’s then existing state of mind, an unavailable declarant’s statement against penal interest, and the residual exception for unavailable declarants, as well as his constitutional right to present a defense. The superior court denied the motion. The jury, presented with no evidence of the alleged conspiracy to attack and rob the defendant, convicted him of first- and second-degree murder. He appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. The Alaska Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for hearing to decide whether the deceased witness’s statement should have been admitted at trial. The Court concluded that it should have been admitted, reversed defendant’s convictions, and remanded for a new trial. View "Sanders v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Six Alaska prisoners jointly filed a pro se putative class-action complaint against various Department of Corrections officials. Their complaint listed 18 causes of action, many of which addressed changes in Department policy regarding inmate purchase and possession of gaming systems and restrictions on mature-rated video games. One of the prisoners moved for class certification and for appointment of counsel. The superior court denied the class action motion on the grounds that pro se plaintiffs could not represent a class, and denied the appointment of counsel. The Department then moved for dismissal of the prisoners’ complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The superior court granted this motion on the ground that all of the claims were class action claims that could not be pursued. Two of the plaintiffs, Jack Earl, Jr. and James Barber, each filed an appeal (which were consolidated for the purposes of this opinion). They argued that the superior court erred in denying the motion for class certification, denying the motion for appointment of counsel, and dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Upon review of their arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in denying class certification and appointment of counsel, but reversed the dismissal of the action and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barber v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Appellant William Foondle appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his claims for legal malpractice against the public defenders who represented him in a criminal case. A grand jury indicted William Foondle for felony driving under the influence (DUI) in 2007. The DUI charge was a felony because Foondle had been convicted of DUI twice in the preceding ten years: once earlier in 2007 and once in North Dakota in 1999. Assistant public defenders Angela O’Brien and Daniel Lord were assigned to defend Foondle. In dismissing Foondle’s malpractice claims, the superior court relied on the public policy principle that precluded criminally convicted plaintiffs from civil recovery based on the alleged negligence of their former defense counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court’s legal analysis was correct, and affirmed the judgment on that basis. Furthermore, the Court rejected, as unsupported, Foondle’s argument that the dismissal violated his rights to due process and access to the courts. View "Foondle v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tracy Hutton was arrested on several weapons charges. After the first two counts were tried to a jury, he waived his right to a jury trial and the third count was tried to the court. He was convicted and appealed, arguing that he had not effectively waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that substantial evidence supported his waiver. The Alaska Supreme Court granted his petition for hearing to decide the appropriate standard of review for the waiver of the right to a jury trial. At oral argument, the State conceded petitioner was not advised of an essential element of the third count and that he was misadvised of the elements of his offense. Because petitioner was given incomplete and misleading information about the charge for which he was being asked to waive his right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court concluded that his waiver was constitutionally defective. The court of appeals’ decision was reversed, and the case was remanded to the superior court for a new trial. View "Hutton v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Michael Wagner shot and killed his landlord, Steven Key, in 2006. The superior court ruled that the prosecution could use Wagner's police interview to impeach him if he took the stand at his murder trial. Wagner argued on appeal that the police violated his right to remain silent, and that the court's ruling prevented him from testifying. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that on the trial court record, it was impossible to tell whether the court's ruling affected Wagner's decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury. The Court, therefore, concluded that Wagner had not preserved his "Miranda" claim for appellate review. Wagner's conviction was affirmed. View "Wagner v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant exercised his constitutional right not to testify at trial. The prosecutor, in her rebuttal closing argument, commented that two people knew what had happened on the night in question, and only one of them, the victim, had testified. The defendant did not object to the comment, and the jury convicted him of attempted murder. The court of appeals, reviewing the defendant’s unpreserved claim of error, determined that the prosecutor’s remark violated the defendant’s right against self-incrimination. But the court of appeals concluded that there was no plain error because “at least some reasonable judges could have concluded that the problem was not egregious enough to warrant a mistrial, and that the problem could be handled through curative instructions.” After its review of the case, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but on different grounds: because the error, even though obvious, non-tactical, and affecting a substantial right, was harmless beyond a reasonable dou View "Goldsbury v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Defendants in two criminal cases failed to object to errors at trial: in "Moreno v. Alaska," the admission of improper testimony regarding Jorge Moreno's exercise of his right to be free from compelled self-incrimination; in "Hicks v. Alaska," the lack of a jury unanimity instruction when the prosecutor directed the jury that it could find Mary Hicks guilty of either of two episodes of allegedly driving under the influence of alcohol. Moreno and Hicks both appealed, and in each case, the appellate court held that the defendants failed to show that the error was not the result of counsel's strategic decision not to object. Moreno and Hicks filed petitions for hearing before the Supreme Court, arguing that the burden of proof should be on the State to show that their counsels' failures to object were the result of tactical decisions. They also contended that the court of appeals erroneously speculated on the purported tactical benefits they received due to their attorneys' lack of objections. Lastly, they each requested an evidentiary hearing to develop the record on this issue. The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether to apply an evidentiary presumption or to place a burden of proof on a party to establish that a defendant's lack of objection at trial was or was not the result of defense counsel's intelligent waiver or tactical decision not to object. The Court concluded, however, that Alaska case law compels neither result: defense counsel's tactical reason for failing to object, or counsel's intelligent waiver of an objection, should be plainly obvious from the record before foreclosing the reviewing court's consideration of the remaining plain error elements. The Court reversed the court of appeals' decisions on this issue. But it concluded that Moreno suffered no prejudice despite the error in his case, and affirmed the court of appeals' decision upholding Moreno's conviction on this alternate ground. Hicks's case was remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "Moreno v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Joe Garibay was at the Sam's Club in Fairbanks when he collided with a woman’s shopping cart, waking her baby. She demanded an apology, but Garibay swore at her instead. Assuming he was drunk because of the beer in his cart and his threatening manner, the woman called the police, then followed Garibay out to the parking lot to get his license plate number. When a police officer arrived a few minutes later, the woman told him that Garibay was “maybe . . . a drunk,” that he had threatened her in front of her children, and that she wanted him charged with assault. Informed that an assault charge was unlikely, the woman asked that the police at least “find that guy to make sure he’s not drunk.” The officer assured her that they would try to find Garibay and “make sure he’s not, you know, drunk driving, something like that.” Police subsequently stopped him, then arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol. The Department of Motor Vehicles revoked Garibay’s driver’s license for 90 days, and the superior court affirmed the revocation. Garibay appealed, arguing that the police stop constituted an unconstitutional search and seizure requiring that evidence of his drinking be excluded from the license revocation proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that the exclusionary rule applied in license revocation proceedings only in exceptional circumstances not present here. View "Garibay v. Alaska, Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Thomas Kyte and Deidre Stallings are the parents of a daughter, born in 2002. Child Support Services Division (CSSD) entered an administrative order in 2005 requiring Kyte to pay child support of $576 per month, based on his estimated annual income. Stallings later moved that child support be made retroactive to 2002, and Kyte moved for a prospective modification; the superior court denied both motions in a 2007 order that maintained the monthly amount set by the earlier administrative order. In January 2008 Kyte filed a form request for review and modification of the 2007 order. A few months later, he received a response, captioned in bold letters: “Notice of Denial of Modification Review.” The notice was signed by a CSSD child support manager. Nothing in the record indicated either party responded to this notice. Over three years later, in 2011, Kyte filed a motion in superior court, seeking to modify his child support obligation because of a serious hip injury and consequent reduction in his income. He asked for modification both prospectively and retroactively to March 2008. Recognizing that retroactive child support modifications are generally not allowed, Kyte asserted in his motion that his January 2008 request for modification still remained open; he contended that CSSD’s notice of denial did not constitute a valid final order under Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2). CSSD intervened in the court proceeding in order to address the issue of retroactive modification; Stallings did not participate. The superior court denied Kyte’s request for retroactive modification, finding that CSSD’s May 2008 denial notice was a final order from which Kyte could have appealed. Kyte then appealed the superior court’s order. The Supreme Court concluded that CSSD’s decision of the father’s 2008 request was an appealable final order satisfying Appellate Rule 602, and therefore affirmed the superior court’s conclusion that the father was not entitled to a retroactive modification of child support. View "Kyte v. Stallings" on Justia Law