Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Daniel G. appealed an ex parte order authorizing a 72-hour psychiatric evaluation issued after his emergency detention. The evaluation personnel determined that Daniel did not meet the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment, and he was released before the expiration of the 72-hour period. He argued the evaluation order violated his constitutional right to due process because it was issued on an ex parte basis, without notice and a hearing, while he was safely in protective custody. The superior court denied the motion to vacate the evaluation order as moot in light of Daniel’s release. After careful consideration of the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that although Daniel's appeal was moot, the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied. The Court therefore reached the merits of his due process claim: the 72-hour evaluation order and the statutory evaluation procedures did not violate due process, and the Court affirmed the evaluation order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Daniel G." on Justia Law

Hiland Mountain Correctional Center inmate, Doctor Suzette Welton filed three appeals over the dismissal of her administrative appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In all three cases, Welton appealed decisions in Department of Corrections (DOC) grievance proceedings. In order to qualify for the administrative appeal procedure, Welton had to show that: (1) she was alleging a violation of her constitutional rights; that (2) the proceeding was adjudicative in nature; and (3) she produced a record capable of appellate review. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior courts that the underlying DOC grievance proceedings were not adjudicative proceedings, and they did not produce a record capable of appellate review. View "Welton v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Nathawn Johnson was convicted of and sentenced for, among other crimes, two counts of sexual assault in the first degree relating to his rape of S.S. One count resulted from penetration of the victim's mouth without her consent; the other count resulted from penetration of the victim's vagina without her consent. Johnson never argued to the trial court that the two counts should have merged for double jeopardy grounds. After Johnson made the double-jeopardy argument for the first time on appeal, the appellate court held that Johnson had not preserved the issue and the trial court did not err by not merging the counts sua sponte. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Johnson argued the court of appeals erred by not reviewing his late-raised double jeopardy argument. The Supreme Court agreed with that, but finding that Johnson's separate convictions did not violate his rights against double jeopardy, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Johnson v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Byron Charles was convicted of a sex offense in the 1980s. In 1994 the Alaska Legislature enacted ASORA. The statute was expressly retroactive: ASORA accordingly required Charles to maintain sex offender registration. In 2006 Charles was charged with misdemeanor failure to register as a sex offender. At Charles’s failure-to-register trial, a Ketchikan police officer testified that he checked Charles’s 2005 registration and found that the listed address did not exist. Charles appealed, arguing only that the trial court’s finding of guilt was inconsistent with its finding Charles was credible, that the trial court erred in ruling on an evidentiary issue, and that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction. He did not argue that applying ASORA to him would be an ex post facto violation. The court of appeals affirmed Charles’s conviction in 2007. In 2008 the Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Doe I," holding that applying ASORA to Doe violated the Alaska Constitution’s ex post facto clause. The issue before the Court in this appeal was whether the 2008 holding in "Doe v. Alaska (Doe I)" applied to Charles. The Court concluded that it did. "In doing so, we adopt for cases on direct review the federal retroactivity standard announced in 'Griffith v. Kentucky.'" The Court also concluded that Charles’s prior failure to raise the ex post facto issue did not bar him from doing so later: manifest injustice would have resulted if he could not challenge on direct review his conviction for violating a criminal statute that, under the Alaska constitution, might not be applied to him. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals’s 2007 decision that affirmed Charles’s judgment and reversed his 2006 judgment of conviction. View "Charles v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A former inmate brought sued the Department of Corrections alleging that the Department negligently failed to protect him after he reported being threatened and that he was subsequently assaulted and seriously injured while in prison. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the inmate had not shown that a genuine issue of material fact existed on the question whether the Department breached its duty to protect him from reasonably foreseeable harm. Specifically, the superior court concluded that the communication of the threat was too general to put the Department on notice that the inmate was at risk for the attack he suffered. The inmate appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the inmate presented evidence that raised a genuine issue of fact as to the foreseeability of the attack he suffered. View "Mattox v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Responding to a domestic disturbance call, police officers entered a residence without a warrant and pepper sprayed and handcuffed a resident. The family sued for excessive force and unlawful entry. The superior court dismissed the claims on summary judgment, granting qualified immunity for the excessive force claims and holding that the family had not raised a cognizable unlawful entry claim. The superior court later denied the family’s Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(2) motion to set aside the rulings based on newly discovered evidence. The family appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment ruling and the denial of the Rule 60(b)(2) motion, but remanded the case for further proceedings on the family’s trespass and invasion of privacy claims. View "Lum v. Koles" on Justia Law

Jimmy Jack Korkow was convicted of first-degree murder for beating and stabbing his wife to death while the couple’s young children were present in the family home. The trial court sentenced Korkow to 99 years in prison with no possibility for parole until he served 50 years. The court of appeals reversed the 50-year parole restriction as mistaken; the Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review. Because the trial court correctly applied the statutory restriction on parole after making sufficient findings supported by the record, the Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the restriction was not excessive. View "Alaska v. Korkow" on Justia Law

An indigent prisoner appealed two prison disciplinary actions to the superior court. For each appeal the superior court calculated a reduced filing fee. The prisoner failed to pay any filing fees and his appeals were dismissed. On appeal, the prisoner contended that he had no means of paying even the reduced filing fees and argued that the fee statute unconstitutionally deprived him of access to the courts. The Supreme Court agreed with the prisoner: as applied, the applicable statute prevented him from exercising his right of access to the courts in violation of the Alaska Constitution's due process provision. The Court reinstated the prisoner's appeals. View "Barber v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

In May 2005, Petitioner Eugene Bottcher drove his vehicle off the road, hitting a boy and narrowly missing the boy's brother. Petitioner was intoxicated at the time; the boy who had been hit later died at the hospital from his injuries. After Petitioner hit the boy, he continued to drive, and when stopped by a passerby who had witnessed the accident, Petitioner tried to bribe him into not reporting the crime. Petitioner pled no contest to manslaughter, assault in the third degree, and failure to render assistance. The superior court sentenced him to a term of 23 years with 3 years suspended. The court also revoked Petitioner's driver's license for life. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's sentence and the lifetime revocation of his license. In his petition to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the lifetime revocation was excessive. Upon review, the Court held that the trial court was not clearly mistaken in finding that Petitioner's case was an extreme one in which a lifetime revocation of his driver's license was required to protect the public. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed the superior court's lifetime revocation of Petitioner's driver's license. View "Bottcher v. Alaska" on Justia Law

John Doe A and John Doe B were convicted of criminal offenses that required them to register and comply with Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA). After their convictions, the legislature amended ASORA, requiring certain offenders to comply with additional registration requirements. The John Does sued, claiming that retroactive application of ASORA’s amendments to them violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Alaska Constitution. The superior court agreed, and the State appealed. In 2008 the Supreme Court decided "Doe v. State" (Doe I), holding that ASORA’s amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and did not apply to persons who committed their crimes before the amendments became effective. Two years later the Court promulgated Alaska Appellate Rule 106, which provided that any issue decided by a two-to-one vote shall not have precedential effect. When the COurt promulgated Appellate Rule 106 it was silent on the question whether that rule might have retroactive effect. The Court held in this case that its two-to-one decision in Doe I was binding precedent that controlled the outcome of this case because Appellate Rule 106 did not have retroactive application. View "Alaska v. Doe" on Justia Law