Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A husband and wife divorced, and agreed that the wife would receive the marital home and a portion of the husband’s military retirement benefits. Additionally, the wife would remove the husband from the marital home mortgage. Two years later the wife sought a qualified retirement order to effectuate the property distribution. Following a dispute over the wife’s entitlement to the retirement and the wife’s failure to remove the husband’s name from the marital home mortgage, the superior court refused to issue a qualified order because the husband’s “retirement pay consist[ed] entirely of VA disability compensation and retirement [pay] for physical disability” and under federal law the disability compensation was not divisible marital property. The superior court also ordered the wife to remove the husband’s name from the mortgage within 60 days. When the wife did not comply the court forced the home’s sale. The superior court then awarded the husband prevailing party attorney’s fees. The wife appealed, challenging the superior court’s refusal to divide the military retirement and the court’s forced home sale. The Supreme Court affirmed those decisions, but reversed the refusal to reopen the marital property division. The superior court’s prevailing party determination and attorney’s fees award were vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Guerrero v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

t issue in this appeal are parents’ motions to modify their existing child custody arrangement. Without a hearing, the superior court denied the mother’s motion but granted the father’s motion for a temporary modification; later, with the parties’ agreement, the court made the temporary order permanent. The mother argues on appeal that she was entitled to evidentiary hearings. She also appeals the superior court’s denial of her request that income be imputed to the father for purposes of calculating his child support obligation. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reason to disturb the superior court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hope P. v. Flynn G." on Justia Law

This case involved "Diana" and her daughters(all "Indian children"): Natalie was born in 2008; Selah was born in 2009; Ava was born in 2010; and Drew was born in 2011. The children's father previously relinquished his parental rights. Diana has shown a pattern of drinking alcohol while pregnant, abstaining once she learns she is pregnant, and then resuming drinking after the child is born. She admitted at trial that she drank during three of her previous pregnancies. OCS has been involved with this family since 2009 because of the parents' behavior when they drank. According to family, "there [were] no two better people on this earth who could take care of those kids" when they were sober. But when they were drinking, they were not good parents. Diana became confrontational and bossy, the children went hungry, and their home was unstable. Natalie became the caregiver of her siblings; when she was four years old she made her younger sisters' bottles, changed their diapers, and dressed them. This caused Natalie to be a "worry wart," and the stress caused her "tummy issues" and exacerbated her eczema. The other children also had issues: Selah has severe separation anxiety, Ava's speech was delayed, and Drew had "the shakes." The children were adjudicated children in need of aid in March 2013. Following a trial in the summer of 2014, the trial court terminated Diana's parental rights to the children after finding them subject to conduct or conditions described in AS 47.10.011(6), (9), and (10). Diana appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that OCS proved beyond a reasonable doubt that placing her children in her custody would likely put the children at risk of serious harm. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Diana P. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Srvcs" on Justia Law

The superior court granted Caroline J. a long-term domestic violence protective order and awarded her interim sole physical and legal custody of her and Theodore J.'s three children. During the pendency of the divorce and custody trial, the superior court ordered reunification counseling for Theodore and the children, but Caroline continually failed to bring the children to the counseling sessions, and the court found she had engaged in parental alienation. After Theodore completed a domestic violence intervention program, the court awarded the parents shared physical and joint legal custody of the children. Caroline appealed. "Although we are mindful of the struggles faced by victims of domestic violence, in this case Caroline failed to make the necessary showing that domestic violence caused her to interfere with the children’s reunification counseling and to engage in parental alienation conduct. [. . .] Instead, in the superior court Caroline blamed the missed appointments on the children’s and her schedules and the children’s reluctance to go to counseling. She did not argue that she was afraid of Theodore or that her fear caused her to act the way she did. In fact, the court specifically found that she indicated a desire to have Theodore in the children’s lives." The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's custody order. View "Caroline J. v. Theodore J." on Justia Law

A husband and wife filed for divorce in 1986 and the court awarded the wife monthly child support. But the parties did not actually separate until 2007 (except for a period apart from 1997 to 2001). Their dissolution was a sham, structured to shield otherwise marital property from the husband's bankruptcy. After the parties actually separated in 2007, the wife contacted the Child Support Services Division to enforce past due child support dating back to 1986, which totaled nearly $118,000. The husband filed a motion for relief from the child support judgment. The superior court granted the motion after concluding that the parties' original dissolution had been obtained by a fraud on the court. The superior court used its discretion under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(6) to set aside the 1986 dissolution and order a division of property and child support as of 2007, when the parties actually separated. The wife appealed. Because the parties' 1986 dissolution used the court system as a tool to defraud creditors and thus undermined the court's integrity, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's conclusion that the dissolution was a fraud on the court under Rule 60(b)(6). View "Fernandez v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

Following their separation, two parents initially shared physical custody of their daughter. But after a domestic violence incident, the superior court awarded the mother sole legal and primary physical custody, while allowing the father telephone calls and supervised visitation. The father subsequently filed a motion to modify custody, seeking a return to equal physical custody. The superior court denied this request, concluding that the daughter's emotional needs and the father's unwillingness to foster a strong relationship between the mother and daughter supported the continuation of supervised visitation. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in considering the child's best interests, and because it articulated a plan through which the father could achieve unsupervised visitation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matthew P. v. Gail S." on Justia Law

Jennifer and Adam were the parents of three minor children: a daughter, Andrea, and two younger boys. The children were Indian children as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The State's Office of Children's Services (OCS) took three minor children into emergency custody, then sought a court order granting OCS temporary custody, asserting there was probable cause to find the children in need of aid. A standing master determined that no probable cause existed and recommended that the three children be returned to their mother's custody. The State objected to the master's recommendation, and the superior court reviewed and rejected it, finding that there was probable cause. The mother filed this appeal, asking the Supreme Court to hold that masters have the authority to return children to their homes without judicial review. Before the State filed its brief, the superior court dismissed the underlying case, making this appeal moot. After its review, the Supreme Court applied the "public interest" exception to the mootness doctrine and affirmed the superior court's ruling. View "Jennifer L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

A father appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter. He claimed the trial court violated his due process rights when it allowed the termination trial to conclude in his absence without first asking him directly if he wished to testify. Kendra G. was born in 2012, and considered an Indian child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Both parents had a history of alcohol abuse, and father-appellant Remy M. had a history of domestic violence. The Office of Children's Services (OCS) initially became involved in this case after receiving reports alleging that mother Vera was abusing and neglecting her children. Although Remy has been able to maintain sobriety in a highly controlled environment, such as a correctional facility, he has repeatedly relapsed, including a few months before the termination trial. At the time of trial, Remy had not completed the recommended long-term substance abuse treatment or addressed the behavioral health issues that cause him to relapse. OCS presented numerous exhibits and the testimony of 16 witnesses to support its claim that termination of Remy's parental rights was necessary because of Remy's substance abuse, domestic violence, criminal behavior leading to incarceration, and parenting deficiencies. Remy attended most of the trial. On the third day of trial, Remy's attorney asked the court if Remy could be absent from trial on the following day to attend an integrated mental health and substance abuse assessment. The trial court responded that Remy did not have to be present because the case was civil, not criminal. The trial court ultimately found "beyond a reasonable doubt," that Kendra was in need of aid, and that even though Remy wanted to be a good father, he had been unable to follow through with any changes in his life to become an adequate parent for her in the near future. Remy did not appeal the substance of the trial court's decision. Instead he argued that the trial court violated his right to due process because it failed to advise him that he had a right to testify and because it permitted his attorney to waive that right in his absence. Remy argued in the alternative that even if he was not denied due process, "[the Supreme Court] should remand the case for development of the record in support of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Remy M. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs." on Justia Law

Mark Horne and Belinda Touhakis were romantically involved for several years in the mid 2000s, though they never married and produced no biological children together. During their relationship, Touhakis adopted a daughter. When Horne and Touhakis ended their relationship, Horne requested custody and visitation rights as a psychological parent. He also offered to provide child support. Under the terms of the settlement, the parties agreed that Horne had established a psychological parent relationship with Touhakis's daughter and would have six-day-long visitation rights every 21 days. Horne was then a self-employed entrepreneur, and several of his projects and investments began losing money shortly after the settlement. In late 2012 he asked the superior court to modify his child support obligation. During an evidentiary hearing, the Horne conceded that it would be fair to base his child support obligation on imputed income, and he estimated that he could earn a gross annual income of about $40,000 if he sought and obtained full-time employment. The superior court concluded that Horne underestimated his earning potential, and the court imputed income to Horne at twice his income estimate. Because the court's findings were insufficient to allow the Supreme Court to review its imputed income determination, it vacated the trial court's decision setting Horne's new monthly child support obligation, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Horne v. Touhakis" on Justia Law

Andrea C. appealed a superior court’s decision to award Marcus K. primary physical and sole legal custody of their two children. Andrea argued the superior court made inadequate findings regarding Marcus’s history of domestic violence, and she also challenged the superior court’s application of the best interest factors. "This significant shift in custody" appeared to the Supreme Court as having been the result of two factors: (1) Marcus rebutted the domestic violence presumption, making it possible for the superior court to award him physical and legal custody; and (2) the superior court had increasing concerns regarding Andrea’s parenting. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Andrea C., v. Marcus K." on Justia Law