Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a custody dispute between Susan M. and Paul H. involving: (1) Susan’s motion to sanction Paul for wrongfully denying her visitation; and (2) her motion to enjoin Paul from relocating to California with the children after the 2013-14 school year, a move the superior court previously approved. The superior court denied both motions, and Susan appealed. Though the Supreme Court affirmed, the Court warned that a parent’s unilateral suspension of the other parent’s visitation based on perceived violations of a custody agreement were improper in all but exceptional circumstances. "Even where such circumstances exist, the concerned parent should immediately inform the court of the problem." View "Susan M. v. Paul H." on Justia Law

Rowan B., Sr.(father) and Risa F. were the divorced parents of three children: Agnes, Rowan Jr. (Junior), and Saul. After Rowan and Risa divorced, Rowan received custody of their three children as well as custody of Risa’s two older daughters, Aeryn and Reagan. In 2012 Aeryn reported to the police and the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) that she and Reagan had been physically and sexually abused by Rowan over an extended time period. Aeryn also expressed her concern that Rowan was sexually abusing Agnes. OCS filed an emergency custody petition and removed the minor children (Agnes, Junior, and Saul) in June 2012. The children were adjudicated children in need of aid based on findings that the father had sexually and physically abused his daughters. In a criminal proceeding the father was convicted on 29 counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree and one count of incest. The father sought a delay of the termination proceedings pending appeal of his criminal convictions, but the superior court denied this request. Rowan appealed the ultimate outcome: termination of his parental rights to his three biological children. He argued that the superior court abused its discretion by denying a continued. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the children’s interest in permanency weighed heavily against delaying the termination proceedings for years while the father pursues his criminal appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rowan B. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

Tammy Wells and Primo Barile married in 1995 and divorced in 2004. They had a son, born in 1997. Tammy married Lance Wells after her divorce from Primo and had two children with Lance. Tammy and Primo shared physical custody of their son on a “50/50 basis” pursuant to an order entered in January 2009. Neither parent was required to pay child support to the other. The 2009 order required Tammy to apply for their son’s Permanent Fund Dividends (PFDs) but divided them equally with Primo. The order also required the parents to keep their son on their health insurance as long as it was available at reasonable cost through their employers, and to share the cost of any reasonable health care expenses not covered by insurance, up to a maximum of $5,000 annually. Tammy appealed a superior court’s grant of a motion to modify child custody filed by Primo. Tammy also challenged the court’s child support order, its order that she reimburse Primo for half their child’s Permanent Fund Dividends (PFDs), and a writ of assistance the court issued for the custody order’s enforcement. She also alleged that several of the superior court’s rulings showed judicial bias and a failure to give her the leniency appropriate to her status as a pro se litigant. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court abused its discretion when it ordered Tammy to reimburse Primo for the PFDs without taking into account, as an offset, the amounts that Primo may have owed Tammy for medical care. The Court reversed the judgment on this issue and remanded for further proceedings. On all other issues, the Court found no error and affirmed. View "Wells v. Barile" on Justia Law

A father filed for divorce and sought sole physical custody of the couple’s only child. Shortly before trial the father moved for a continuance. The court vacated the first scheduled trial day, used the second to take testimony from out-of-state witnesses, then continued taking evidence a few days later. In the middle of that day’s proceedings the court informed the parties it was their last opportunity to present evidence. The father objected, and in post-trial pleadings he presented the affidavit testimony of two other witnesses he had intended to call. The superior court denied his requests to present additional evidence. Because the lack of clarity in the proceedings led the father to reasonably believe he would have another opportunity to call witnesses, the Supreme Court held that the superior court abused its discretion when it failed to give him that opportunity. The case was remanded back to the superior court for a limited presentation of additional testimony. The Supreme Court rejected the father’s arguments that the superior court erred by denying a motion for recusal and in its weighing of the best interest factors relevant to the award of physical custody. View "Snider v. Snider" on Justia Law

Terri Lin Ruppe appealed a superior court order granting her divorce, determining custody, distributing marital property, and setting child support obligations for her former husband, Terry. She raised issues related to legal custody, the calculation of interim child support, the duration of permanent child support, the distribution of property, and the non-award of spousal support and attorney’s fees. After review of these arguments, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed most of the superior court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, but reversed its determination that payments Terry made during the pendency of the divorce could be credited against his post-divorce child support obligations. View "Ruppe v. Ruppe" on Justia Law

A husband and wife divorced, and agreed that the wife would receive the marital home and a portion of the husband’s military retirement benefits. Additionally, the wife would remove the husband from the marital home mortgage. Two years later the wife sought a qualified retirement order to effectuate the property distribution. Following a dispute over the wife’s entitlement to the retirement and the wife’s failure to remove the husband’s name from the marital home mortgage, the superior court refused to issue a qualified order because the husband’s “retirement pay consist[ed] entirely of VA disability compensation and retirement [pay] for physical disability” and under federal law the disability compensation was not divisible marital property. The superior court also ordered the wife to remove the husband’s name from the mortgage within 60 days. When the wife did not comply the court forced the home’s sale. The superior court then awarded the husband prevailing party attorney’s fees. The wife appealed, challenging the superior court’s refusal to divide the military retirement and the court’s forced home sale. The Supreme Court affirmed those decisions, but reversed the refusal to reopen the marital property division. The superior court’s prevailing party determination and attorney’s fees award were vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Guerrero v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

t issue in this appeal are parents’ motions to modify their existing child custody arrangement. Without a hearing, the superior court denied the mother’s motion but granted the father’s motion for a temporary modification; later, with the parties’ agreement, the court made the temporary order permanent. The mother argues on appeal that she was entitled to evidentiary hearings. She also appeals the superior court’s denial of her request that income be imputed to the father for purposes of calculating his child support obligation. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reason to disturb the superior court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hope P. v. Flynn G." on Justia Law

This case involved "Diana" and her daughters(all "Indian children"): Natalie was born in 2008; Selah was born in 2009; Ava was born in 2010; and Drew was born in 2011. The children's father previously relinquished his parental rights. Diana has shown a pattern of drinking alcohol while pregnant, abstaining once she learns she is pregnant, and then resuming drinking after the child is born. She admitted at trial that she drank during three of her previous pregnancies. OCS has been involved with this family since 2009 because of the parents' behavior when they drank. According to family, "there [were] no two better people on this earth who could take care of those kids" when they were sober. But when they were drinking, they were not good parents. Diana became confrontational and bossy, the children went hungry, and their home was unstable. Natalie became the caregiver of her siblings; when she was four years old she made her younger sisters' bottles, changed their diapers, and dressed them. This caused Natalie to be a "worry wart," and the stress caused her "tummy issues" and exacerbated her eczema. The other children also had issues: Selah has severe separation anxiety, Ava's speech was delayed, and Drew had "the shakes." The children were adjudicated children in need of aid in March 2013. Following a trial in the summer of 2014, the trial court terminated Diana's parental rights to the children after finding them subject to conduct or conditions described in AS 47.10.011(6), (9), and (10). Diana appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that OCS proved beyond a reasonable doubt that placing her children in her custody would likely put the children at risk of serious harm. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Diana P. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Srvcs" on Justia Law

The superior court granted Caroline J. a long-term domestic violence protective order and awarded her interim sole physical and legal custody of her and Theodore J.'s three children. During the pendency of the divorce and custody trial, the superior court ordered reunification counseling for Theodore and the children, but Caroline continually failed to bring the children to the counseling sessions, and the court found she had engaged in parental alienation. After Theodore completed a domestic violence intervention program, the court awarded the parents shared physical and joint legal custody of the children. Caroline appealed. "Although we are mindful of the struggles faced by victims of domestic violence, in this case Caroline failed to make the necessary showing that domestic violence caused her to interfere with the children’s reunification counseling and to engage in parental alienation conduct. [. . .] Instead, in the superior court Caroline blamed the missed appointments on the children’s and her schedules and the children’s reluctance to go to counseling. She did not argue that she was afraid of Theodore or that her fear caused her to act the way she did. In fact, the court specifically found that she indicated a desire to have Theodore in the children’s lives." The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's custody order. View "Caroline J. v. Theodore J." on Justia Law

A husband and wife filed for divorce in 1986 and the court awarded the wife monthly child support. But the parties did not actually separate until 2007 (except for a period apart from 1997 to 2001). Their dissolution was a sham, structured to shield otherwise marital property from the husband's bankruptcy. After the parties actually separated in 2007, the wife contacted the Child Support Services Division to enforce past due child support dating back to 1986, which totaled nearly $118,000. The husband filed a motion for relief from the child support judgment. The superior court granted the motion after concluding that the parties' original dissolution had been obtained by a fraud on the court. The superior court used its discretion under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(6) to set aside the 1986 dissolution and order a division of property and child support as of 2007, when the parties actually separated. The wife appealed. Because the parties' 1986 dissolution used the court system as a tool to defraud creditors and thus undermined the court's integrity, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's conclusion that the dissolution was a fraud on the court under Rule 60(b)(6). View "Fernandez v. Fernandez" on Justia Law