Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following their separation, two parents initially shared physical custody of their daughter. But after a domestic violence incident, the superior court awarded the mother sole legal and primary physical custody, while allowing the father telephone calls and supervised visitation. The father subsequently filed a motion to modify custody, seeking a return to equal physical custody. The superior court denied this request, concluding that the daughter's emotional needs and the father's unwillingness to foster a strong relationship between the mother and daughter supported the continuation of supervised visitation. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in considering the child's best interests, and because it articulated a plan through which the father could achieve unsupervised visitation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matthew P. v. Gail S." on Justia Law

Jennifer and Adam were the parents of three minor children: a daughter, Andrea, and two younger boys. The children were Indian children as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The State's Office of Children's Services (OCS) took three minor children into emergency custody, then sought a court order granting OCS temporary custody, asserting there was probable cause to find the children in need of aid. A standing master determined that no probable cause existed and recommended that the three children be returned to their mother's custody. The State objected to the master's recommendation, and the superior court reviewed and rejected it, finding that there was probable cause. The mother filed this appeal, asking the Supreme Court to hold that masters have the authority to return children to their homes without judicial review. Before the State filed its brief, the superior court dismissed the underlying case, making this appeal moot. After its review, the Supreme Court applied the "public interest" exception to the mootness doctrine and affirmed the superior court's ruling. View "Jennifer L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

A father appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter. He claimed the trial court violated his due process rights when it allowed the termination trial to conclude in his absence without first asking him directly if he wished to testify. Kendra G. was born in 2012, and considered an Indian child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Both parents had a history of alcohol abuse, and father-appellant Remy M. had a history of domestic violence. The Office of Children's Services (OCS) initially became involved in this case after receiving reports alleging that mother Vera was abusing and neglecting her children. Although Remy has been able to maintain sobriety in a highly controlled environment, such as a correctional facility, he has repeatedly relapsed, including a few months before the termination trial. At the time of trial, Remy had not completed the recommended long-term substance abuse treatment or addressed the behavioral health issues that cause him to relapse. OCS presented numerous exhibits and the testimony of 16 witnesses to support its claim that termination of Remy's parental rights was necessary because of Remy's substance abuse, domestic violence, criminal behavior leading to incarceration, and parenting deficiencies. Remy attended most of the trial. On the third day of trial, Remy's attorney asked the court if Remy could be absent from trial on the following day to attend an integrated mental health and substance abuse assessment. The trial court responded that Remy did not have to be present because the case was civil, not criminal. The trial court ultimately found "beyond a reasonable doubt," that Kendra was in need of aid, and that even though Remy wanted to be a good father, he had been unable to follow through with any changes in his life to become an adequate parent for her in the near future. Remy did not appeal the substance of the trial court's decision. Instead he argued that the trial court violated his right to due process because it failed to advise him that he had a right to testify and because it permitted his attorney to waive that right in his absence. Remy argued in the alternative that even if he was not denied due process, "[the Supreme Court] should remand the case for development of the record in support of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Remy M. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs." on Justia Law

Mark Horne and Belinda Touhakis were romantically involved for several years in the mid 2000s, though they never married and produced no biological children together. During their relationship, Touhakis adopted a daughter. When Horne and Touhakis ended their relationship, Horne requested custody and visitation rights as a psychological parent. He also offered to provide child support. Under the terms of the settlement, the parties agreed that Horne had established a psychological parent relationship with Touhakis's daughter and would have six-day-long visitation rights every 21 days. Horne was then a self-employed entrepreneur, and several of his projects and investments began losing money shortly after the settlement. In late 2012 he asked the superior court to modify his child support obligation. During an evidentiary hearing, the Horne conceded that it would be fair to base his child support obligation on imputed income, and he estimated that he could earn a gross annual income of about $40,000 if he sought and obtained full-time employment. The superior court concluded that Horne underestimated his earning potential, and the court imputed income to Horne at twice his income estimate. Because the court's findings were insufficient to allow the Supreme Court to review its imputed income determination, it vacated the trial court's decision setting Horne's new monthly child support obligation, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Horne v. Touhakis" on Justia Law

Andrea C. appealed a superior court’s decision to award Marcus K. primary physical and sole legal custody of their two children. Andrea argued the superior court made inadequate findings regarding Marcus’s history of domestic violence, and she also challenged the superior court’s application of the best interest factors. "This significant shift in custody" appeared to the Supreme Court as having been the result of two factors: (1) Marcus rebutted the domestic violence presumption, making it possible for the superior court to award him physical and legal custody; and (2) the superior court had increasing concerns regarding Andrea’s parenting. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Andrea C., v. Marcus K." on Justia Law

A mother ("Theresa L.") appealed the termination of her parental rights to her two youngest children. The children, teenagers at the time of the termination hearing, testified that they did not want her rights to be terminated. The trial court decided that the children were in need of aid because of mental injury and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The mother argued on appeal that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) did not meet its burden of proving mental injury and that the trial court clearly erred in deciding that termination was in the children’s best interests because of their ages, their stated wishes, and their lack of a permanent placement. The Supreme Court issued an order reversing the trial court’s decision because OCS presented insufficient evidence that the children suffered a mental injury. This opinion explained the Court's reasoning. View "Theresa L., v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs." on Justia Law

A grandparent petitioned for restriction-free visitation with his grandchildren after they moved out of state. The parents conceded that visitation with the grandparent was in the children’s best interests, but opposed court-ordered visitation, stating that they had never denied reasonable visitation and would continue to allow visitation with some restrictions. Without finding any of the parents’ visitation restrictions unreasonable or any history of denying reasonable visitation, the superior court entered an order requiring “reasonable” visitation. The parents appealed, arguing that the order violated their constitutional rights to the care, custody, and control of their children. Immediately after oral argument the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s visitation order. The Court explained the basis for that order. Because the superior court’s findings precluded the possibility that a constitutional visitation order could be entered based on the record in this case, the Court also dismissed the grandfather’s visitation petition in its entirety. View "Ross v. Bauman" on Justia Law

A grandparent petitioned for restriction-free visitation with his grandchildren after they moved out of state. The parents conceded that visitation with the grandparent was in the children’s best interests, but opposed court-ordered visitation, stating that they had never denied reasonable visitation and would continue to allow visitation with some restrictions. Without finding any of the parents’ visitation restrictions unreasonable or any history of denying reasonable visitation, the superior court entered an order requiring “reasonable” visitation. The parents appealed, arguing that the order violated their constitutional rights to the care, custody, and control of their children. Immediately after oral argument the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s visitation order. The Court explained the basis for that order. Because the superior court’s findings precluded the possibility that a constitutional visitation order could be entered based on the record in this case, the Court also dismissed the grandfather’s visitation petition in its entirety. View "Ross v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Sarah D. and John D. separated shortly after their daughter turned three. Each claimed that the other was abusive, and obtained a short-term domestic violence protective order after they separated. The parties later stipulated to a mutual no-contact order but violated it by continuing a sporadic romantic relationship. Sarah requested interim attorney’s fees. After the superior court denied her request, Sarah consented to her lawyer’s withdrawal. Sarah and John then agreed to a property settlement. Before litigating custody Sarah again requested interim attorney’s fees and twice filed continuance motions requesting time to obtain counsel. Her motions were denied, and she appeared pro se throughout a four-day custody trial. John’s parents helped pay for his lawyer, and he was represented at all times. Over Sarah’s objections, John’s father was allowed to intervene as a party for visitation purposes. The trial court awarded shared physical and sole legal custody to John and gave John’s father unspecified visitation during John’s custodial time. Sarah appealed the court’s denials of her requests for an interim fee award, trial continuances, and to compel a witness's attendance at trial. She also appealed the court’s orders granting the grandfather intervention and visitation and the court’s domestic violence finding and custody decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the order granting the grandfather visitation and otherwise affirmed all but the custody decision, remanding for more detailed findings and conclusions on domestic violence issues. View "Sarah D. v. John D." on Justia Law

When Brandy and Jeremy Moore divorced in 2014, the superior court granted sole legal and primary physical custody of their ten-year-old daughter to Brandy, and awarded Jeremy unrestricted visitation, including visitation to foreign countries. Jeremy proposed taking the child to Micronesia during his visitation period because he became involved with a Micronesian woman he met while he was stationed there with the Army. Brandy asked the superior court to limit Jeremy’s international visitation to countries that have ratified the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The superior court denied Brandy’s motion, and she appealed, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion by allowing unrestricted international visitation. She worried that if Jeremy absconded with the child to a non-signatory country, the child will then be beyond the jurisdiction of the Alaska court to enforce the custody order. But because the superior court made an express finding that Jeremy’s conduct raised no concerns about the safety and return of the child, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moore v. Moore" on Justia Law