Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband appealed a superior court decision dividing the marital property. He raises two issues with regard to his wife’s retirement health insurance benefits: (1) that the superior court erred in determining the marital portion of those benefits; and (2) that the superior court erred in the rate it selected for valuing those benefits. In addition, Husband challenged the superior court’s award to the wife of a larger share of the marital property, which the court justified on grounds that the wife would have primary care of the couple’s child, and Husband was receiving two income-producing businesses created during the marriage. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error with regard to the health insurance benefits. However, the Court found it was an abuse of discretion to rely on the stated two justifications for an unequal division of the marital property, and remanded for the superior court’s further consideration of the equitable division. Lastly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s valuation of the husband’s 2010 income tax liability, because its finding was supported by the estimates given at trial and it was not required to revise the finding based on the husband’s later submission of his actual return. View "Engstrom v. Engstrom" on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took custody of two young girls because of their parents’ substance abuse and neglect. OCS took custody of the parents’ son shortly after his birth for the same reasons. The trial court terminated the parents’ rights to all three children, who were Indian children as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The parents appealed, arguing that the trial court violated due process when it entered an adjudication and disposition order on the basis of OCS’s offer of proof before the parents had received proper notice or been appointed counsel. They also argued that the trial court erred at the termination trial when it found that: (1) the children were in need of aid; (2) the parents failed to timely remedy the conduct or conditions that placed the children at risk of harm; (3) OCS’s expert witnesses qualified as experts for purposes of ICWA; (4) the parents’ continued custody of the children would likely result in serious emotional or physical harm to the children; and (5) termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the lack of proper notice at the adjudication and disposition stage did not affect the outcome of this proceeding (and therefore did not deprive the parents of due process) and that the trial court’s decision at the termination stage was supported by the evidence. View "Payton S. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

In this case, the superior court awarded the parents joint physical custody of their daughter, finding that although the father had committed domestic violence, it was “not of a degree or frequency” to trigger the presumption found in Alaska Statute 25.24.150(g) (a rebuttable presumption that a parent with a "history of perpetrating domestic violence" not be awarded sole or joint physical custody of a child). The Supreme Court, on review of this case, found that the trial court’s factual findings were ambiguous as to whether the father committed more than one act of domestic violence. The Court therefore remanded this case for further findings on this issue. View "Faye H. v. James B." on Justia Law

A married couple moved from Fairbanks to Mississippi to “start a new life” and work on their marriage. After living in Mississippi for a few months the husband filed for divorce, and a Mississippi court entered a temporary child custody order awarding the couple joint physical custody of their child. A few months later the mother fled to Alaska with the child and filed for divorce in Alaska Superior. The Alaska court dismissed the mother’s action, concluding that Mississippi had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The mother appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed: Mississippi had jurisdiction when it issued its temporary child custody order because (1) Alaska did not have home state or recent home state jurisdiction when the father filed his suit in Mississippi, and (2) the child had a significant connection to Mississippi and substantial evidence was available there. View "Norris v. Norris" on Justia Law

A husband and wife obtained a marriage dissolution that included a provision to split the “profits . . . after the cost of fuel and can[ne]ry dues” from their jointly owned commercial fishing boat. The parties disputed the meaning of the term “profits.” Each party contended that the other owed a large sum of money pursuant to the agreement. The superior court approved a standing master’s recommendation that interpreted “profits” to mean “payment from the cannery, less deductions for fuel, dues and other advancements.” Because the superior court’s findings regarding the parties’ reasonable expectations at the time of the dissolution agreement were not clearly erroneous, and because the superior court’s interpretation of the provision accurately reflects those expectations, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mahan v. Mahan" on Justia Law

Two parents disputed the legal custody and visitation rights for their daughter; the mother resided in Alaska and the father resided on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana. The superior court awarded sole legal custody to the mother because it concluded that the parties could not communicate effectively to co-parent their daughter. The court ordered unsupervised visitation between the father and the daughter in Alaska, but prohibited visitation on the reservation until the daughter turned eight. The father appealed. Although the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it decided legal custody, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court failed to fully justify its decision when creating its restrictive visitation schedule and allocating visitation expenses. Consequently the Supreme Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Red Elk v. McBride" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to three of her children. She argued that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that the children were children in need of aid because of the mother’s mental illness, a statutory basis for termination not alleged in the petition; (2) finding that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made the necessary efforts towards reunification; and (3) allowing two witnesses to testify as experts. In affirming the trial court’s order, the Alaska Supreme Court held: (1) the trial court’s finding that the children were children in need of aid was supported by alternative grounds that are not challenged on appeal; (2) its finding that OCS made the required efforts to reunify the family was supported by the evidence; and (3) its acceptance of the challenged expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion. View "Sylvia L. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Shirley M. was the mother of Abigail, born in April 2010. For many years violence, prostitution, reported substance abuse, and other crimes consumed Shirley’s life. Abigail was Shirley’s fifth child: Haily was born in 2002, Daisy was born in 2003, Penny was born in 2005, and Andrew was born in 2008. In March 2004 OCS received a high priority report that the father of Shirley’s older children was abusing Haily. OCS removed the children but later returned them with in-home services and custody supervision. OCS made a referral for in-home services, including parenting training for both parents. Although the family participated in the services, OCS continued to have concerns. In June 2005 OCS considered removing the children from the home again after receiving another report that the father was abusing Haily. Shortly after Penny was born OCS petitioned to place the three children under supervision. Not long after that, Penny died due to asphyxiation. It was suspected that Shirley rolled over onto Penny when the family was sleeping in a tent in the yard at Rae’s residence. According to the social worker who saw Haily and Daisy the day they were removed from Shirley’s care, the children had low muscle tone and few speech skills. The social worker also reported that the children were generally unruly, screaming and trying to break things, and hitting and pinching each other. Shirley ultimately lost her parental rights as to her remaining children, and she appealed termination of those right, in this case, as to Abigail, on the grounds that the trial court erred in finding that: (1) Shirley failed to remedy the conduct that put Abigail at risk of harm; (2) the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to provide services to reunify the family; (3) termination was in Abigail’s best interests; and (4) OCS did not abuse its discretion in placing Abigail with her foster parents and not her great-grandmother, Rae. Finding no reason to disturb the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shirley M. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

Sometime in early 2007, "Connie" approached Holly and William Ebert, a married couple she knew from church, about adopting her child. Connie wanted the Eberts to adopt her child because she thought they would be loving parents and because they shared her religious values. The Eberts agreed to the adoption. "Bruce" and Connie began a relationship in August 2006. At some point, Connie told Bruce that she was pregnant and was considering giving up the child for adoption. Bruce objected to the adoption. After a final attempt to repair their relationship, Bruce and Connie separated permanently in January 2007 and that was when Connie contacted the Eberts about her child. Before the child was born, the Eberts met with Bruce "to discuss a consent to adopt." In late December 2007, Bruce filed a complaint for custody of the child, "Timothy." In July 2008 the Eberts filed an adoption petition and intervened in Bruce's custody case. The superior court ordered paternity testing, and Bruce obtained a positive result. The court appointed counsel for Bruce and consolidated the adoption and custody cases. The superior court ordered an interim custody arrangement after a hearing in December 2008. The court granted physical custody to the Eberts and semiweekly visitation to Bruce. The court also ordered Bruce to pay $50 per month in child support, retroactive to 2007; over the next four months, Bruce paid a total of $200 in support. It was undisputed that Bruce paid no child support before being ordered to do so at a December 2008 hearing. He later testified that he did not realize he had a child support obligation and that the Eberts never applied to the Child Support Services Division for child support. Bruce claimed he was under the impression that the Eberts were wealthy and did not need his financial assistance. In May 2009 the superior court held a trial on the adoption petition and the custody dispute. In post-trial briefing, Bruce argued that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) compelled the court to grant Bruce custody of Timothy and prevented the Eberts from adopting Timothy without Bruce's consent. The Eberts argued that Bruce could not invoke ICWA to prevent the adoption because he was not a "parent" for purposes of the statute until he established paternity in late 2008. They also argued that ICWA section 1912(d)'s "active efforts" provision did not apply in a private adoption, particularly when the parent seeking to invoke ICWA had no meaningful connection to any tribe. And they maintained that, even if ICWA applied, the supervised visitation provided to Bruce was adequate to fulfill the active efforts requirement. Finally, they argued that Bruce's consent to the adoption was not required under state law because Bruce could not show that his failure to communicate with or support Timothy during the child's first year of life was justifiable. Connie, who continued to support the adoption, made arguments similar to the Eberts'. The Eberts and Connie appealed the superior court's denial of the adoption, claiming that Bruce's consent to the adoption was unnecessary. The Supreme Court found that under AS 25.23.050(a)(2)(B), the consent of a noncustodial parent was not required for adoption if that parent unjustifiably fails to support the child. But the superior court did not clearly err by concluding that Bruce had justifiable cause for his failure to support the child. View "Ebert v. Bruce L." on Justia Law

"Robert" appealed a superior court decision that his consent was not required for his biological daughter’s adoption. The superior court accepted the superior court standing master’s recommendation that Robert’s consent was not required under AS 25.23.050 because he had abandoned his daughter for a period of over six months, failed to provide for her care and support for over one year, and failed to meaningfully communicate with her for over one year. Because the abandonment finding was well-supported by the record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In Re Adoption of S.F." on Justia Law