Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The superior court ordered that divorced parents each claim one of their two children for the federal income tax dependency exemption. Both children resided primarily with the mother, and the court ordered her to sign and file a federal form waiving her exemption for one child. The mother appealed, arguing the superior court lacked authority to order her to sign the waiver form. The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the majority view that a custodial parent may be ordered to sign the waiver form, and affirmed the court’s order. View "Dodge v. Sturdevant" on Justia Law

Jamie and Anna They stopped using drugs when they realized Anna was pregnant with their son Ian, but after the birth they went back to abusing drugs and alcohol, with periods of sobriety. Although Ian lived with his parents during his early years, by the time he was four, he and his two non-party siblings were living with Ian’s grandmother in Oklahoma while his parents lived elsewhere. According to Jamie, Ian was exposed to domestic violence by Jamie’s brother during that time. Jamie, Anna, and Ian moved to Alaska in 2004. Once in Alaska, Jamie and Anna had three more children. The couple’s relationship was chaotic and physically abusive, and apparently they were separated at the time of trial. All four children have special needs.The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) sought termination of Jamie’s, but not Anna’s, parental rights to Ian. In closing argument, Jamie asserted that termination of his parental rights was not in Ian’s best interests because OCS had not identified any permanent placement. But the superior court did not specifically address this issue in its findings when it ordered the termination of Jamie’s parental rights. Jamie appealed, arguing that the termination should be vacated because the decision does not clearly state that termination of Jamie’s parental rights was for purposes of freeing Ian for adoption or other permanent placement. The Supreme Court concluded that given the facts and circumstances of this case, the superior court did not err when it found that termination was in Ian’s best interests. View "Jamie H. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Graham R. and Jane S. had one child. A 2006 court order granted Graham sole legal and primary physical custody. In 2012 Graham traveled to California for heart surgery and took the child with him, cutting off contact with Jane and causing her to miss a number of scheduled visits. When Graham returned to Alaska Jane moved for sole legal and primary physical custody, and the superior court granted her motion after an evidentiary hearing. Graham appealed that order, arguing that it was barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel; that the court erred in finding that his interference with Jane’s visitation rights was an act of domestic violence that constituted changed circumstances; and that the court erred in admitting evidence of his criminal convictions and of the child’s preferences. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order modifying custody, concluding that there was no error in its decision not to apply res judicata or collateral estoppel; that there were changed circumstances justifying a modification of custody; and that any evidentiary errors were harmless. View "Graham R. v. Jane S." on Justia Law

This case began in July 2008 when the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) assumed custody of four-month-old "Dawn" from her parents. Dawn was found to be a child in need of aid (CINA). Dawn's parents were Native Alaskans and thus the protections and requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied. Native Village of Tununak (the Tribe) intervened in Dawn's CINA case and submitted a list of potential placement options for Dawn, including Dawn's maternal grandmother, Elise, who lived in the village. Throughout much of the case, the parents and Tribe agreed there was good cause not to place Dawn with an ICWA preferred placement, and Dawn was eventually placed with the Smiths, non-Native foster parents who live in Anchorage. The superior court terminated Dawn's parents' parental rights at a September 2011 trial, making Dawn eligible for adoption. The Tribe asserted that, given the termination of parental rights, there was no longer good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and objected to Dawn's continued placement in Anchorage. In November the Smiths filed a petition to adopt Dawn. At no point in the case did Elise file an adoption petition in the superior court. The superior court conducted a placement hearing following the Tribe's objection to placement with the Smiths. Following testimony by a number of witnesses, including Elise, the court found that there was continued good cause to deviate from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences and again approved Dawn's placement with the Smiths. The court then granted the Smiths' adoption petition in March 2012. Dawn was almost four years old, and had lived with the Smiths for almost two and a half years. In separate appeals, the Tribe appealed both the superior court's order finding that there was good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and the adoption order. The Supreme Court then issued an order staying the adoption appeal while it considered the adoptive placement appeal. In 2013, the Court issued a decision in the first appeal that examined Dawn's adoptive placement with the Smiths. The Court reversed the superior court's finding of good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences. Four days after the Alaska Court issued its opinion in the adoptive placement appeal ("Tununak I"), the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl" (Baby Girl). There, the Supreme Court held that ICWA "section 1915(a)'s [placement] preferences are inapplicable in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child. This is because there simply is no 'preference' to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under section 1915(a) has come forward." The Alaska Court concluded that the decision in "Baby Girl" applied directly to the adoptive placement case on remand and to this adoption appeal. "We discern no material factual differences between the Baby Girl case and this case, so we are unable to distinguish the holding in Baby Girl. Because the Supreme Court's holding in Baby Girl is clear and not qualified in any material way, and because it is undisputed that Elise did not 'formally [seek] to adopt' Dawn in the superior court, we conclude that, as in Baby Girl, 'there simply is no 'preference' to apply[,] [as] no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward[,]' and therefore ICWA . . .preferences are inapplicable." The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's order granting the Smiths' petition to adopt Dawn and vacated its remand order in "Tununak I" requiring the superior court to conduct further adoptive placement proceedings. View "Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Upon dissolution of their marriage, father Gary Houston and mother Meredith Wolpert, agreed to give primary custody to the mother and "open and liberal visitation" to the father. The father moved for modification of custody, alleging the mother had unreasonably restricted his visitation. The superior court found the mother had been uncooperative, but concluded it was in the best interests of the child to remain in the mother's custody with a specific visitation schedule for the father. The father appealed that decision, arguing the superior court abused its discretion when it did not award him custody. He also appealed the superior court's denial of his motion for attorney's fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in the custody decision, but the Court remanded the issue of attorney's fees for further findings. View "Houston v. Wolpert" on Justia Law

The father appealed the court’s determination of his child support obligations, its factual findings regarding child custody and visitation, its valuation and division of the marital estate, its denial of attorney’s fees, and its denial of a continuance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed on all issues. View "Limeres v. Limeres" on Justia Law

In January 2011, the Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of three children. The children had been in the care of their maternal grandparents, but before their removal had returned to their parents. OCS, under the impression that the children were being cared for by the parents at the time of removal, placed the children with the maternal grandparents. The day the trial to terminate the mother’s parental rights was to begin, the mother moved to have the grandmother joined in the proceeding as the children’s Indian custodian. The court denied both the mother’s motion to join the grandmother and the grandmother’s motion to intervene, finding that shortly after the removal the parents revoked the grandmother’s Indian custodian status by asking OCS not to place the children with her. The grandmother moved for reconsideration and argued that her due process rights were violated at the time of the removal. She argued that OCS did not provide her with notice of the right she was entitled to as the children’s Indian custodian, including notice of her right to intervene in the proceeding and of her right to be represented by counsel. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that although OCS breached its duty to provide the grandmother with notice required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because of the short time between the children’s removal and the parents’ revocation of the grandmother’s status as the children’s Indian custodian the grandmother had suffered no significant detriment to her rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and held that any error OCS may have made regarding the notice provisions of ICWA was harmless. View "Molly O. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Sherry R. appealed the termination of her parental rights to her son Jake. She argued in appeal that the superior court’s erred in finding: (1) she failed to remedy the conduct that made Jake a child in need of aid (CINA); (2) the State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify her with Jake; and (3) termination of her parental rights was in Jake’s best interests. Finding that the record amply supported the superior court’s decision to terminate Sherry’s parental rights, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sherry R. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Two parents shared joint custody of their child during the pendency of their divorce, but the father's plans to move out of state led both parents to seek primary physical custody of the child. The superior court granted primary physical custody to the mother, concluding that all of the statutory factors but one were neutral between the parents but that the mother was more likely than the father to facilitate a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child. The father then appealed, arguing that the superior court erred: (1) by failing to find that the father had superior capability to meet the child's needs; and (2) by prompting the father to discuss his concerns about the mother's parenting and then holding those concerns against the father in the continuing-relationship determination. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's determinations in all respects. View "James R. v. Kylie R." on Justia Law

Simone H. appealed the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her son, Irving. Simone challenged the trial court's denial of her request to have Irving's therapy records released to her for use during the termination trial and the trial court's finding that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to provide services designed to enable Irving's safe return to her custody. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Simone's request for access to Irving's therapy records and that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that OCS made reasonable efforts to reunify Simone with Irving.View "Simone H. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law