Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jason Green and Courtney Parks had a dispute over custody of their infant daughter. The superior court awarded joint legal custody but gave Courtney primary physical custody and the “final say” if the parties could not agree on issues of their child’s welfare. Jason appealed the court’s award of custody, a condition that he not consume any alcohol before or during visitation, and the order that he pay all visitation-related travel expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the custody award and the allocation of visitation expenses, but remanded for reconsideration of whether the evidence supported the no-alcohol condition on Jason’s visitation. View "Green v. Parks" on Justia Law

J.W. was the son of Jeanette Myre, a member of the Asa’carsarmiut Tribe, and John Wheeler, a non-member. In 2007 Myre petitioned the Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Court to assume jurisdiction over the custody of J.W. After a hearing in which both parents participated. The tribal court awarded Myre primary physical custody and granted Wheeler limited visitation rights. In 2011 Wheeler kept J.W. at the end of a visitation period, then initiated custody proceedings in Alaska superior court. Myre moved to enforce the 2007 tribal court custody order; the superior court found it to be a lawful custody order and returned J.W. to Myre’s custody. In 2012 Myre was arrested for child endangerment, and the State of Alaska assumed protective custody of J.W. Wheeler moved for modification of the custody order in the superior court. The Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Council intervened in the superior court proceeding to argue that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to modify the tribal court custody order. The superior court concluded it had modification jurisdiction and determined there had been substantially changed circumstances such that modification was in J.W.’s best interests. The superior court awarded Wheeler primary physical custody. Neither Wheeler nor Myre appealed the superior court’s decision, but the tribal council appealed, arguing that the superior court lacked modification jurisdiction. The narrow question before the Alaska Supreme Court was whether the tribal council has standing to appeal the superior court’s modification decision in light of the parents’ election not to appeal that decision. Concluding that under this circumstance, the tribal council did not have standing, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Asa'carsarmiut Tribal Council v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Chloe W. appealed the termination of parental rights to her three-year-old son Timothy under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). She claimed the trial court erred by: (1) relying too heavily on a stipulation filed after the close of evidence, which Chloe argued was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) finding that Chloe had not remedied the conduct that placed Timothy at risk; (3) finding that OCS made active efforts to reunify the family; and (4) finding that terminating Chloe’s parental rights was in Timothy’s best interests. Because the trial court’s findings are amply supported by the record and its legal rulings are correct, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating Chloe’s parental rights to Timothy. View "Chloe W. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Richard and Olga Villars were married in Ukraine in 2004. Richard (a U.S. citizen), signed a Form I-864 affidavit of support in which he agreed to maintain Olga and her daughter, Linda, at 125% of the applicable federal poverty rate. Olga and Linda came to Alaska, and Richard and Olga later divorced. For several years Richard and Olga litigated Richard’s I-864 support obligation. After a previous appeal by Olga regarding Richard’s obligation for the first eleven months of 2010, the Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court to resolve Richard’s obligation for that period, which was no longer at issue. The parties have continued to dispute Richard’s I-864 obligations for 2009, December 2010, and all of 2011, 2012, and 2013. Following a series of hearings and orders in the superior court relating to these years, Richard filed this appeal, alleging a variety of errors by the superior court regarding its calculations of his obligations and potential offsets against those obligations. Because the superior court properly rejected Richard’s attempt to relitigate issues resolved in earlier proceedings, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s orders rejecting those claims. The case was remanded for further factual findings. View "Villars v. Villars" on Justia Law

A mother appealed a modified decree involving the custody of her three children. The superior court decided that the parents’ inability to communicate justified a modification of the existing joint-custody arrangement, and that the best interests of the children favored an award of sole legal custody to their father. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in making these decisions. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the allocation of the costs of the court-appointed guardian ad litem. The case was remanded for the superior court’s clarification of one issue: whether it meant to include, in its final modified decree, a change to the father’s weekend visitation schedule made by the attorney who drafted the decree. View "Riggs v. Coonradt" on Justia Law

The superior court ordered that divorced parents each claim one of their two children for the federal income tax dependency exemption. Both children resided primarily with the mother, and the court ordered her to sign and file a federal form waiving her exemption for one child. The mother appealed, arguing the superior court lacked authority to order her to sign the waiver form. The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the majority view that a custodial parent may be ordered to sign the waiver form, and affirmed the court’s order. View "Dodge v. Sturdevant" on Justia Law

Jamie and Anna They stopped using drugs when they realized Anna was pregnant with their son Ian, but after the birth they went back to abusing drugs and alcohol, with periods of sobriety. Although Ian lived with his parents during his early years, by the time he was four, he and his two non-party siblings were living with Ian’s grandmother in Oklahoma while his parents lived elsewhere. According to Jamie, Ian was exposed to domestic violence by Jamie’s brother during that time. Jamie, Anna, and Ian moved to Alaska in 2004. Once in Alaska, Jamie and Anna had three more children. The couple’s relationship was chaotic and physically abusive, and apparently they were separated at the time of trial. All four children have special needs.The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) sought termination of Jamie’s, but not Anna’s, parental rights to Ian. In closing argument, Jamie asserted that termination of his parental rights was not in Ian’s best interests because OCS had not identified any permanent placement. But the superior court did not specifically address this issue in its findings when it ordered the termination of Jamie’s parental rights. Jamie appealed, arguing that the termination should be vacated because the decision does not clearly state that termination of Jamie’s parental rights was for purposes of freeing Ian for adoption or other permanent placement. The Supreme Court concluded that given the facts and circumstances of this case, the superior court did not err when it found that termination was in Ian’s best interests. View "Jamie H. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Graham R. and Jane S. had one child. A 2006 court order granted Graham sole legal and primary physical custody. In 2012 Graham traveled to California for heart surgery and took the child with him, cutting off contact with Jane and causing her to miss a number of scheduled visits. When Graham returned to Alaska Jane moved for sole legal and primary physical custody, and the superior court granted her motion after an evidentiary hearing. Graham appealed that order, arguing that it was barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel; that the court erred in finding that his interference with Jane’s visitation rights was an act of domestic violence that constituted changed circumstances; and that the court erred in admitting evidence of his criminal convictions and of the child’s preferences. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order modifying custody, concluding that there was no error in its decision not to apply res judicata or collateral estoppel; that there were changed circumstances justifying a modification of custody; and that any evidentiary errors were harmless. View "Graham R. v. Jane S." on Justia Law

This case began in July 2008 when the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) assumed custody of four-month-old "Dawn" from her parents. Dawn was found to be a child in need of aid (CINA). Dawn's parents were Native Alaskans and thus the protections and requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied. Native Village of Tununak (the Tribe) intervened in Dawn's CINA case and submitted a list of potential placement options for Dawn, including Dawn's maternal grandmother, Elise, who lived in the village. Throughout much of the case, the parents and Tribe agreed there was good cause not to place Dawn with an ICWA preferred placement, and Dawn was eventually placed with the Smiths, non-Native foster parents who live in Anchorage. The superior court terminated Dawn's parents' parental rights at a September 2011 trial, making Dawn eligible for adoption. The Tribe asserted that, given the termination of parental rights, there was no longer good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and objected to Dawn's continued placement in Anchorage. In November the Smiths filed a petition to adopt Dawn. At no point in the case did Elise file an adoption petition in the superior court. The superior court conducted a placement hearing following the Tribe's objection to placement with the Smiths. Following testimony by a number of witnesses, including Elise, the court found that there was continued good cause to deviate from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences and again approved Dawn's placement with the Smiths. The court then granted the Smiths' adoption petition in March 2012. Dawn was almost four years old, and had lived with the Smiths for almost two and a half years. In separate appeals, the Tribe appealed both the superior court's order finding that there was good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and the adoption order. The Supreme Court then issued an order staying the adoption appeal while it considered the adoptive placement appeal. In 2013, the Court issued a decision in the first appeal that examined Dawn's adoptive placement with the Smiths. The Court reversed the superior court's finding of good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences. Four days after the Alaska Court issued its opinion in the adoptive placement appeal ("Tununak I"), the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl" (Baby Girl). There, the Supreme Court held that ICWA "section 1915(a)'s [placement] preferences are inapplicable in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child. This is because there simply is no 'preference' to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under section 1915(a) has come forward." The Alaska Court concluded that the decision in "Baby Girl" applied directly to the adoptive placement case on remand and to this adoption appeal. "We discern no material factual differences between the Baby Girl case and this case, so we are unable to distinguish the holding in Baby Girl. Because the Supreme Court's holding in Baby Girl is clear and not qualified in any material way, and because it is undisputed that Elise did not 'formally [seek] to adopt' Dawn in the superior court, we conclude that, as in Baby Girl, 'there simply is no 'preference' to apply[,] [as] no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward[,]' and therefore ICWA . . .preferences are inapplicable." The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's order granting the Smiths' petition to adopt Dawn and vacated its remand order in "Tununak I" requiring the superior court to conduct further adoptive placement proceedings. View "Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Upon dissolution of their marriage, father Gary Houston and mother Meredith Wolpert, agreed to give primary custody to the mother and "open and liberal visitation" to the father. The father moved for modification of custody, alleging the mother had unreasonably restricted his visitation. The superior court found the mother had been uncooperative, but concluded it was in the best interests of the child to remain in the mother's custody with a specific visitation schedule for the father. The father appealed that decision, arguing the superior court abused its discretion when it did not award him custody. He also appealed the superior court's denial of his motion for attorney's fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in the custody decision, but the Court remanded the issue of attorney's fees for further findings. View "Houston v. Wolpert" on Justia Law