Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The superior court adjudicated Candace as a child in need of aid because she had been sexually abused by her adoptive brother. The superior court nonetheless ordered that Candace be returned to her parents' home, holding that the Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children's Services (OCS), had failed to present "qualified expert testimony" as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to support a finding that she would likely suffer serious physical or emotional harm in her parents' custody. After review of the case, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the superior court's failure to accept OCS's proposed expert witnesses as qualified was error, and therefore vacated the order placing Candace with her parents. View "In the Matter of Candance A." on Justia Law

An elderly father was hospitalized for medical testing and treatment. The father had granted a durable power of attorney to his eldest adult daughter and had been residing with his youngest adult daughter and her family. One of the father's adult sons initiated guardianship and conservatorship proceedings over the father. The son's petition alleged that the father was incapacitated and unable to manage his affairs or his property, citing the hospital's psychiatric evaluation and the son's own observations. The petition also alleged that the eldest and youngest daughters were not looking after the father's best interests and wishes. The son later terminated the protective proceedings following a neuropsychological evaluation by the father's expert that concluded that the father did not need a guardian. The father and his eldest daughter filed motions for attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against the son's petition. The superior court denied both motions, concluding that Alaska Civil Rule 82 was entirely displaced by AS 13.26.131(d) and that the son's actions did not meet the standard for fee shifting required by that statute: that the petitioner initiated a proceeding that was "malicious, frivolous, or without just cause." The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's analysis and affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Protective Proceedings of Vernon H." on Justia Law

Anna Young and David Kelly were married, and fished together on David's boat during their marriage from 1982 to 1985. Eight years after the marriage was dissolved, the federal government established a program assigning individual fishing quotas (IFQs) to certain commercial fishers; David qualified for the program and was awarded quota shares. In 1995 he approached Anna and asked whether they could reach an agreement that would prevent litigation over her right to a marital share of the IFQs. Anna agreed to forgo suit; David began paying her money, sporadically and in varying amounts. After 13 years, David's payments stopped. Anna filed suit in 2011, alleging that David had breached their contract. She also filed a motion under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(6), seeking to reopen their 1985 property division and allocate the IFQs as a marital asset. The superior court granted summary judgment to David, deciding that any contract for something other than a marital share was too indefinite to be enforced, that the IFQs were not marital property, and that Anna therefore had no right of recovery. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Young v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Maxwell V. sued for custody of Terrance, the son he had with Stephanie W. The superior court granted him primary physical custody and joint legal custody. The Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed the first custody order in most respects, but remanded on two custody factors. On remand, the superior court again granted Maxwell primary physical custody. Stephanie appealed the second custody order. Two of her arguments, relating to discovery, were not preserved for appeal, were forfeited, and did not constitute plain error. The Supreme Court concluded Stephanie's third argument failed on the merits. She also challenged the superior court’s determination of two custody factors in light of the Supreme Court's remand instructions in first custody proceeding, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion by failing to consider Maxwell’s child support arrears in its stability determination, and that the superior court abused its discretion by holding against her, in the continuing-relationship determination, her allegations that Maxwell was manufacturing methamphetamine with Terrance present. The Supreme Court rejected Stephanie's additional arguments and affirmed the superior court's order in all respects. View "Stephanie W. v. Maxwell V." on Justia Law

Adam Sagers appealed a superior court's award of physical and legal custody of his minor son to the boy's mother, Colleen Sackinger. Adam contended: (1) that the superior court abused its discretion in denying a continuance of trial; (2) that it clearly erred in its factual findings; and, (3) that it abused its discretion in conditioning unsupervised visitation on Adam's completion of a psychological evaluation. Adam also contended that the trial judge was personally biased against him. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Sagers v. Sackinger" on Justia Law

In a custody modification proceeding, the superior court found that Todd Heber had a history of domestic violence and awarded Tamara Heber primary physical custody and sole legal custody of the parties’ son. Todd filed a motion arguing that this award was void because the assigned judge had received email communications from Tamara and subsequently disqualified himself. Todd also argued that Tamara engaged in fraud because their original dissolution petition stated that there was no domestic violence between them. But the record of the motion proceedings showed that Todd had adequate notice of this issue and that, regardless of the accuracy of the dissolution petition, Tamara’s motion to modify custody did not clearly involve fraud. Todd also argued that the second judge should have been disqualified because he had once reported that Todd’s lawyer had a disagreement with another staff member. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no risk of injustice that required a second judge to set aside the custody award, and that these circumstances did not suggest any disqualifying bias. View "Heber v. Heber" on Justia Law

The superior court granted a divorce to Shelley and Matthew Richter and equitably divided their marital property. Matthew appealed, challenging the court’s jurisdiction and its finding that a loan from Matthew’s mother was marital debt. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Richter v. Richter" on Justia Law

The Minto Tribal Court terminated the parental rights of Edward Parks and Bessie Stearman to their daughter S.P. At the termination hearing, the attorney for Parks and Stearman was not permitted to present oral argument to the tribal court. Parks did not file an appeal with the Minto Court of Appeals and instead brought suit against S.P.'s foster parents, the Simmondses, in the state superior court in an attempt to regain custody of S.P. The Simmondses moved to dismiss Parks's state lawsuit on the basis that the tribal court judgment terminating parental rights was entitled to full faith and credit under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that full faith and credit should not be afforded because the tribal court had denied Parks minimum due process by prohibiting his attorney from presenting oral argument on his objections to tribal court jurisdiction based on his status as a non-tribal member. Although the superior court recognized that oral argument is not a per se requirement of minimum due process, the superior court concluded that the denial of oral argument in this case deprived Parks of a meaningful opportunity to be heard because Parks did not receive sufficient notice that his attorney would not be allowed to present oral argument to the tribal court. The Simmondses appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court for further findings. On remand, the superior court reiterated its prior conclusion of a violation of minimum due process and further concluded that the due process error was not harmless because Parks's objections to the Minto Tribal Court's jurisdiction might have had merit. The Simmondses appealed again to the Supreme Court. Because Parks failed to exhaust his remedies in the Minto Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that his state court suit should have been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded for dismissal of Parks's suit. View "Simmonds v. Parks" on Justia Law

The superior court terminated a mother's parental rights based on evidence of her chronic delusions and the danger these delusions posed to her child. On appeal, the mother argued that several aspects of the court's decision were not adequately supported. Namely, she argues that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) should have required an assessment of her psychiatric condition and monitored the course of her psychological therapy. The Supreme Court's review of the record revealed that the mother did receive a psychiatric evaluation at OCS's direction and that it would likely have been harmful to disrupt the positive relationship she had with her counselor. Therefore, the Court concluded that the record supported the superior court's conclusion that OCS fulfilled its duty to make active efforts to provide this mother with services designed to prevent the breakup of her family. View "Grace L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

A court granted a default divorce to Amie Sey after her husband Willie Jackson, who was incarcerated at the time, failed to appear telephonically at a hearing. Jackson filed a motion for relief from judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b), arguing that Sey had made misrepresentations and withheld information about marital property. The court allowed Jackson to conduct discovery in support of the motion, but it later dismissed the motion for lack of prosecution. The court also determined that the time to appeal or to request Rule 60(b) relief was long past. Jackson appealed, making several challenges to the underlying divorce decree. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Jackson’s Rule 60(b) motion and remanded the case for consideration of its merits. View "Jackson v. Sey" on Justia Law