Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal concerned a dispute between three daughters regarding the administration of their deceased mother’s estate. The dispute centered around three documents: (1) a will executed in 1987; (2) a revised will the decedent allegedly executed in 2007 or 2008, which contained a clause revoking all prior wills; and (3) an exhibit that was allegedly an accurate (but unsigned) draft of the revised will. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that: (1) the decedent executed a valid will in 1987; (2) the decedent subsequently executed a revised will, but that will was lost; and (3) the revised will had revoked the 1987 will. Because an executed version of the revised will was never located, the superior court concluded it had been destroyed by the decedent, leaving her estate to be administered under Alaska’s statutory scheme for intestate succession. On appeal, one daughter challenged the superior court’s conclusion that the 1987 will was properly revoked. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the superior court to determine whether its finding that the revised will was properly executed is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The Court also remanded for the superior court to determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to overcome the presumption that the decedent destroyed her will. View "Dan v. Dan" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the division of property between a couple who had been in a relationship for 12 years but never married. The couple and their children resided in a home titled in the man's name. After they separated, pursuant to a domestic violence protective order, the man paid the mortgage while the woman lived in the home with the children. The man filed for custody of the children and the woman counterclaimed for custody and asserted that the parties' property should be divided by the court. The superior court found that the parties were in a domestic partnership and intended to acquire property as though married. It then proceeded to equally divide the property, but considered the post-separation mortgage payments a part of the domestic violence protective order and the equivalent of spousal support. Therefore it did not take them into account when dividing the property. The man appealed, arguing that the superior court erroneously concluded that the parties intended to be in a domestic partnership and that the superior court improperly failed to credit him for mortgage payments made after the separation. Because the superior court properly found that the parties intended to be in a domestic partnership and that the post-separation mortgage payments were made pursuant to a domestic violence protective order, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Reed v. Parrish" on Justia Law

A divorced couple with one child agreed in 2006 that the mother would cover all of the child's travel costs in lieu of paying child support. In 2010, the father filed a motion arguing that the 2006 agreement was invalid under Alaska Civil Rule 90.3, which had not been addressed in the superior court's original order. The father requested that child support from August 2006 through June 2010 be recalculated under Rule 90.3, with the mother paying arrearages. The superior court denied the father's motion for retrospective relief, but allowed prospective relief. The father appealed. Because the father did not file his motion challenging the original order within one year, as required under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(1), the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the father's motion insofar as it sought retrospective relief. Because the 2006 order violated Rule 90.3, the Court affirmed the grant of prospective relief. View "Aldrich v. Aldrich" on Justia Law

A couple had a turbulent relationship over the course of eight months, breaking up and reuniting several times. During the final break-up the woman sought a domestic violence protective order. The superior court granted the protective order based on a finding that the man "used coercion" when, in an effort to get her back, threatened to: (1) provide evidence to the woman’s ex-husband’s lawyers regarding a custody dispute, (2) report the woman’s mother’s alleged marijuana operation to the police, and (3) report the woman to the Office of Children’s Services for sexually abusing her children. The man appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding and that his conduct was constitutionally protected speech. Because there was sufficient evidence to show that the man committed a crime of domestic violence and because he waived his constitutional argument by failing to properly raise it, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "McGraw v. Cox" on Justia Law

When Chad and Jessica Lewis divorced, they participated in a settlement conference to divide their property. Following the settlement conference, the superior court recited a proposed settlement agreement on the record, and both parties agreed to it. Jessica then filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law incorporating terms which differed from the agreement as recited by the court. The superior court accepted Jessica's proposed findings and decree over Chad's objection. Chad appealed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that there was no evidence that the parties agreed to the terms set out in Jessica's proposal and because the terms recited on the record are unenforceable, the Court vacated the superior court’s written findings of fact and conclusions of law and remanded the case for a new property division. View "Lewis v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In this appeal the issue before the Supreme Court was the superior court's valuation and distribution of marital property in the divorce of Carolyn Vieve Day and Charlie T. Williams. Day appealed on three grounds: (1) she contended that the superior court erred when it found her to be employable; (2) that the facts and equities of this case did not support a 50-50 property division; and (3) that the superior court should not have included in the marital estate funds that had already been spent by the date of trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded for additional findings on the superior court's 50-50 property division because the court did not make sufficient findings to explain why an equal distribution was justified in the presence of facts that appear to favor a greater distribution to Day. Furthermore, the Court concluded that it was error for the superior court to include in the marital estate funds that had already been spent by the time of trial. With regard to Williams, he cross-appealed on three grounds: (1) that the superior court erred when it revalued the parties' duplex after divorce; (2) that the court should not have applied the active appreciation theory when valuing the land on which the parties' paint business was situated; and (3) that the court should not have awarded attorney's fees to Day. The Supreme Court agreed with Williams that revaluing the duplex would have been improper, but because it was not clear whether the superior court actually revalued the duplex, the Court vacated the order to sell the duplex and remanded for reconsideration and clarification. Furthermore, the Court held that it was error for the superior court to award Day the duplex without considering whether she would be able to afford to keep or sell the property. As to Williams's remaining two claims, the Court affirmed the superior court's decisions. View "Day v. Williams" on Justia Law

A couple divorced in 2008, and the mother was granted sole legal custody and primary physical custody of their three children. At the time of the divorce, the superior court stated that if the father met certain conditions he could return to the court to seek modification of the child custody order. In 2009, he filed a motion to modify custody, seeking joint legal custody and increased visitation. The superior court, largely adopting a master's report and recommendations, left sole legal custody and primary physical custody with the mother, but expanded the father's visitation. The father appealed the superior court's 2010 custody modification order. Because the superior court neither committed clear error nor abused its discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the majority of the superior court's order. But because the superior court's order failed to explain why it did not order any changes to the father's visitation during the children's summer vacation, the case was remanded for further explanation regarding summer visitation. View "Jack C. v. Tally C." on Justia Law

A father and a mother share joint legal and equal physical custody over their daughter. The father sought to obtain a passport for the daughter, but federal law requires the consent of both parents if the child is under the age of 16. After the mother refused consent, the father brought a motion in the superior court requesting that the mother be ordered to execute a notarized statement of consent for the passport. The superior court denied this motion and the father appealed. Because the superior court abused its discretion in denying the father's motion, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Patrawke v. Liebes" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Gorton and Stephanie Mann are the parents of a young son. When they divorced, the superior court awarded them a shared physical custody schedule and to calculated child support. This appeal arose from that calculation and from the amount the superior court allowed Jeffrey to deduct from his income for child support payments he was already making for his two children from a prior marriage. The superior court allowed Jeffrey to deduct from his adjusted gross income the actual amount of child support he paid to the mother of his two older children from the prior marriage. But Jeffrey claimed that he should receive a deduction for a hypothetical 27% of his income that caring for the older children would cost him if they lived with him full time and he did not have shared custody of those children. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision that Jeffrey was only entitled to deduct from his adjusted income the amount of child support actually paid for the children from his prior marriage under Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(a)(1)(C). View "Gorton v. Mann" on Justia Law

Appellants Richard and Durena Tracy appeal the superior court’s dismissal of their state law negligence and federal constitutional claims against the State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS). This case arose from Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceedings to protect their granddaughter, Annie. The Tracys also appealed the superior court’s denial of summary judgment in their favor and its award of attorney’s fees against them. The Tracys are the biological grandparents of "Annie" and now her adoptive parents. When Annie was five, a kindergarten teacher erroneously suspected Annie had been victim to sexual abuse by Richard. OCS investigated the allegation, all the while Richard was not permitted contact with Annie until the investigation was complete. When the allegations were deemed groundless by an OCS expert, Richard and Durena sued OCS for damages stemming from the fees and expenses they incurred defending themselves from the OCS investigation. Ultimately the Tracys lost that battle, and the district court granted OCS's request for attorney fees. Affirming the superior court's dismissal of the Tracys' claims, the Supreme Court vacated the award of attorneys' fees against the Tracys. The Court found that because there was no bad faith nor asserted with improper motive, the superior court should not have given OCS an award of fees. View "Tracy v. Alaska" on Justia Law