Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Frank Griswold appealed a decision of the Homer, Alaska Advisory Planning Commission to the Homer Board of Adjustment. Griswold was a Homer resident who owned several lots within the Business District, one of which is approximately 3,280 feet from Terry and Jonnie Yager. The Yeagers applied for a conditional use permit to build a covered porch ten feet into a twenty-foot setback. Before the hearing, Griswold submitted two documents to the Commission, arguing that the setback exceptions required a variance rather than a conditional use permit and that provisions of the Homer City Code (HCC) allowing for setback exceptions by conditional use permits in the Business District conflicted with state law. After a public hearing the Commission approved the Yagers’ conditional use permit. Griswold appealed, arguing the Yeagers' permit would adversely affect the value of his Business District properties by increasing congestion in the area and that the permit would create a “pernicious precedent” for future setback exceptions in his neighborhood. Additionally Griswold said this would harm the use and enjoyment of his home. The Board rejected his appeal for lack of standing. Griswold appealed to the superior court, arguing that he had standing under the Homer City Code and alleging a number of due process violations. The superior court ruled that Griswold lacked standing as a matter of law and found any due process errors harmless. It also awarded the Board attorney’s fees on the appeal, reasoning that Griswold did not qualify for protection from attorney’s fees as a public interest litigant. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, finding that under applicable Home City Code section, a property owner need only produce some evidence supporting the owner’s claim that the city’s action could potentially adversely affect the owner’s use or enjoyment of the owner’s property. "The individual bringing the claim must still prevail on the merits by showing that a legal remedy against such harm is available." The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Griswold v Homer Board of Adjustment, et al." on Justia Law

Thomas Anderson, Sr. appealed the superior court’s dismissal of his claim that the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) failed to properly transfer a motorcycle endorsement from his California driver’s license to his new Alaska license in 1992. The court decided that the motorist’s claim, filed in 2017, was barred by the statute of limitations, the doctrines of laches and exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the governing DMV regulations. The court also awarded the DMV attorney’s fees calculated pursuant to the Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(2) schedule. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision primarily on laches grounds: Anderson filed his claim 25 years after the DMV’s alleged mistake, long past the time the DMV could reasonably be expected to have retained any evidence relevant to its defense. View "Anderson v. State of Alaska, Alaska Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the superior court’s decision adjudicating her child as a child in need of aid, contending the court relied in part on the record from her previous custody proceeding without giving her prior notice. The mother argued that by not giving her notice, the court violated her due process rights. Relying on cases involving judicial bias, she then claimed the superior court’s due process violation warranted automatic reversal of the court’s adjudication finding, or, alternatively, reversal on the basis that the error was not harmless. The Alaska Supreme Court determined, after review of this case, the mother failed to demonstrate that this alleged error was anything but harmless. View "Amy S. v. State of Alaska, DHSS, OCS" on Justia Law

The Alaska Department of Health and Social Services required most healthcare facilities to document the need for proposed services before the state approves construction of a new facility. The agency determined that an ambulatory surgical facility seeking to relocate from Anchorage to Wasilla did not need to submit such documentation because it was moving within the same community as defined by the relevant statute. Competing medical facilities in the Matanuska-Susitna Borough objected to the determination, arguing that Anchorage and Wasilla were not the “same community” and that the proposed relocation required the usual certification of need. Because Anchorage and Wasilla were not the same community as contemplated by the statute, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the determination that the facility was exempt from the required certification process. View "Alaska Spine Center, LLC v. Mat-Su Valley Medical Center, LLC" on Justia Law

The district court found that a woman, "Linda M.," charged with several misdemeanors was incompetent to stand trial and committed her to a state hospital. The hospital later brought petitions in the superior court for civil commitment and involuntary medication. Linda moved to dismiss or stay the proceedings, contending that the superior court was an improper forum because of the criminal case pending in the district court. The superior court denied the motion, asserted its jurisdiction to hear the case, and granted the hospital’s petition for authority to administer medication. Linda appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court held the superior court properly asserted its jurisdiction over the civil commitment and involuntary medication petitions and that the superior court did not err in finding that involuntary medication was in Linda's best interests. View "In Re Hospitalization of Linda M." on Justia Law

Connor J. was living at a shelter for homeless youth, when his psychiatric condition allegedly began to deteriorate. A social worker filed a petition in superior court seeking authority to hospitalize Connor for evaluation. The petition noted Connor had a history of suicidal thoughts; that he had been diagnosed at various times with depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder; and that he had been treated for mental illness in the past at a hospital and several counseling centers. Connor was transported to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) for an evaluation. A few days later API filed a petition for 30-day commitment and a proceedings were initiated that lead to his commitment. The superior court issued a 30-day involuntary commitment order after finding that Connor was "gravely disabled" and there were no less restrictive alternatives to hospitalization. The respondent appealed, arguing that it was plain error to find he waived his statutory right to be present at the commitment hearing, that it was clear error to find there were no less restrictive alternatives, and that the commitment order should be amended to omit a finding that he posed a danger to others, a finding the superior court meant to reject. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded it was not plain error to find that the respondent waived his presence at the hearing. We further conclude that it was not clear error to find that there were no less restrictive alternatives to a 30-day hospital commitment. However, because there was no dispute that the “danger to others” finding should not have been included in the commitment order, the case was remanded for issuance of a corrected order. View "In Re Hospitalization of Connor J." on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took custody of a three-month-old child after he was found outside alone on a cold winter day. The child’s mother had an alcohol abuse problem and had failed repeated attempts at treatment. The father also had problems with alcohol abuse, never completing treatment, and spending much of the relevant time period in jail or on probation. The mother and father had a second child while OCS’s case was pending, and the agency took custody of that child as too. OCS then petitioned to terminate parental rights to both children. The superior court granted OCS’s petition following trial. The parents appealed: the father argued the superior court erred when it found OCS’s proposed expert witness, an experienced attorney and guardian ad litem, qualified to testify about whether the children would likely suffer emotional or physical harm if returned to their parents’ care. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed the record did not support a conclusion that the witness met the heightened standard for expert testimony under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA); for that reason the Court reversed the termination order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Eva H. v. Alaska, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

A former employee of the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS), Terri Reynolds-Rogers, brought a wrongful discharge suit against the State. At the time of her termination she had four union grievances pending against DHSS, and her union filed another based on the termination. The union settled all five grievances in exchange for a payment to the employee. She later sued DHSS for wrongful termination, alleging both breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and several torts, including retaliatory discharge and failure to accommodate her disabilities. The superior court granted DHSS’s motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment against the employee. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court was correct in deciding that the employee’s claims were resolved by the settlement of her grievances, were barred by the statute of limitations, or were legally insufficient in light of the undisputed facts. View "Reynolds-Rogers v. Alaska, Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

The superior court terminated a mother’s and father’s parental rights, finding their two children were in need of aid based on abandonment, incarceration, risk of domestic violence, and substance abuse. The court also determined that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) had satisfied its duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parents and children. The mother and father separately appealed the court’s reasonable-efforts determinations; the mother also appealed the court’s findings that the children were in need of aid based on abandonment and domestic violence. Consolidating the cases, the Alaska Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the superior court’s decision to terminate the mother’s and father’s parental rights. View "Violet C. v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Electrical utilities entered into agreements for the purchase and transmission of energy from a hydroelectric project to utilities in distant service areas. Legislation exempted the agreements from the review or approval of the Regulatory Commission of Alaska (RCA); any disputes were to be resolved instead by a contractually established committee. A substation leased by Homer Electric Association (HEA) to Chugach Electric Association (Chugach) and used by Chugach for the transmission of the distant utilities’ electricity was along the transmission pathway. When the lease expired, HEA filed tariff applications with the RCA, seeking approval of rates for its own transmission of the other utilities’ energy. The other utilities objected to the RCA’s jurisdiction, citing their agreements and the legislation exempting the agreements from regulatory review. The RCA determined that it had the authority to consider the tariff applications. The affected utilities appealed to the superior court, which held that the RCA did not have that authority. HEA and the RCA petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for review, challenging both the superior court’s appellate jurisdiction and the merits of its decision regarding the RCA’s authority. The Supreme Court rejected the challenges to the superior court’s jurisdiction, and concluded that the intent of the original agreements and of the governing statute was to exclude disputes like this one from the RCA’s jurisdiction. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the superior court reversing the RCA’s order. View "Regulatory Commission of Alaska v. Matanuska Electric Association, Inc." on Justia Law