Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Relevant to this appeal, set net and drift net commercial fishers both targeted sockeye salmon returning to the Kasilof and Kenai Rivers. The 2013 commercial fishing season in the Upper Cook Inlet saw strong sockeye salmon runs, but the Kenai River king salmon run was the weakest on record. The Alaska Department of Fish and Game (Department) regulated commercial and sport fishing. Attempting to achieve the minimum escapement goal for Kenai River kings while also keeping the strong sockeye run in check, and recognizing that set netters’ incidental harvest of those kings posed a greater risk to the king run than did drift netters’ substantially smaller incidental harvest, the Department’s Commissioner used her emergency order authority to limit time for and then close the set net fishery while also increasing the drift net fishery time. The set netters filed suit and sought an emergency preliminary injunction to re-open their fishery. The superior court declined to issue an injunction. The set netters amended their complaint to request a declaratory judgment recognizing the validity of the Board of Fisheries’ management plans and a permanent injunction directing the Department to follow those plans. They also sought damages, asserting constitutional claims and a claim for negligent or willful fisheries mismanagement. The superior court granted summary judgment in full to the Department and assessed an attorney’s fees award against the set netters, who appealed both orders. Because there were no genuine issues of material fact and the Department was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Furthermore, because the Court found no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s attorney’s fees award, it affirmed that award. View "Cook Inlet Fisherman's Fund v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization constructed a granite memorial on the Juneau waterfront and each spring conducted a ceremonial blessing of the fleet as the fishing boats passed by. The City and Borough of Juneau decided to build a large dock on the same stretch of waterfront. The City asked the State of Alaska to transfer the State-owned submerged lands necessary to complete the project, and the organization filed suit to enjoin construction of the dock before the land was transferred. The superior court denied the organization’s motions for injunctive and declaratory relief, denied motions to amend and for a continuance to conduct discovery, and granted the City’s motion to dismiss the organization’s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court was correct in ruling that the organization failed to allege an actual controversy and that the organization’s proposed amendment to its complaint was futile. View "Alaska Commercial Fishermen's Memorial in Juneau v. City & Borough Juneau" on Justia Law

A 21-year-old intoxicated Hooper Bay resident, Louis Bunyan, committed suicide while he was detained in a holding cell by the City of Hooper Bay. His mother filed a wrongful death action against the City, alleging that the City’s negligence led to her son’s death. She sought damages in her individual capacity and on behalf of her son’s estate and her son’s minor children. The case proceeded to a jury trial and the jury returned a million-dollar judgment against the City. The City appealed, raising a number of issues. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s rulings in many respects. But the Court vacated the jury’s damages award and remanded for further proceedings on the issue of allocation of fault between the City and the deceased under AS 09.17.080. View "City of Hooper Bay v. Bunyan" on Justia Law

Appellant Helen Wilson was an elderly woman residing at the Palmer Pioneer home with her husband. Helen previously lived in her own house but was unable to manage her medications and nutrition independently. Her son and grandson lived with her but were unable or unwilling to help. After Adult Protective Services received several reports of harm, a temporary emergency guardian was appointed for Helen; the guardian placed her in an assisted living facility and then in the Pioneer Home. Despite her limited financial means, Helen continued to support her son and grandson, who remained in her house. The master observed that Helen needed help managing personal care because she “was previously unable to maintain the level of necessary care prior to the petition being filed” and her family had previously “interfered with [personal care assistants].” And the master found that Helen needed assistance applying for benefits and managing her assets due to her “limited math abilities,” “age-related cognitive decline,” “tendency to give away more money than she can afford,” and “extremely tight budget,” which made “[h]er ability to receive benefits . . . a major factor in maintaining her current level of independence.” Accordingly the master gave the guardian authority to provide for Helen’s personal care, apply for insurance and government benefits, and“control [Helen’s] estate and income . . . to pay for the cost of services that the guardian is authorized to obtain on behalf of [Helen].” He recognized that Helen should be free to give away her discretionary income, but that she needed “a partial guardian [to] ensure that she only gives money away after her own necessities, including adequate nutrition, medication, and housing costs, have been met.” Before the superior court ruled on the master’s recommendations, the public guardian filed a motion for sale of Helen’s residence to help defray costs required to meet her daily needs. Helen appeals the appointment of a partial public guardian and full conservator, particularly for their role in making decisions on her behalf, and for selling her house. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wilson v. Alaska Dept. of Law" on Justia Law

This case involved "Diana" and her daughters(all "Indian children"): Natalie was born in 2008; Selah was born in 2009; Ava was born in 2010; and Drew was born in 2011. The children's father previously relinquished his parental rights. Diana has shown a pattern of drinking alcohol while pregnant, abstaining once she learns she is pregnant, and then resuming drinking after the child is born. She admitted at trial that she drank during three of her previous pregnancies. OCS has been involved with this family since 2009 because of the parents' behavior when they drank. According to family, "there [were] no two better people on this earth who could take care of those kids" when they were sober. But when they were drinking, they were not good parents. Diana became confrontational and bossy, the children went hungry, and their home was unstable. Natalie became the caregiver of her siblings; when she was four years old she made her younger sisters' bottles, changed their diapers, and dressed them. This caused Natalie to be a "worry wart," and the stress caused her "tummy issues" and exacerbated her eczema. The other children also had issues: Selah has severe separation anxiety, Ava's speech was delayed, and Drew had "the shakes." The children were adjudicated children in need of aid in March 2013. Following a trial in the summer of 2014, the trial court terminated Diana's parental rights to the children after finding them subject to conduct or conditions described in AS 47.10.011(6), (9), and (10). Diana appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that OCS proved beyond a reasonable doubt that placing her children in her custody would likely put the children at risk of serious harm. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Diana P. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Srvcs" on Justia Law

Pro se appellant Ray DeVilbiss owned property within a road service area, but did not make use of the roads built and maintained with the road service taxes levied on that property. He argued Alaska law required that his property therefore be excluded from the service area, and that the tax was invalid absent a special benefit to his property. The superior court rejected these claims, and granted the borough that oversaw the service area summary judgment. Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court affirmed. Alaska law neither required boroughs and municipalities to exclude properties that do not make use of roads financed by road service taxes nor tied the validity of a tax to each taxpayer’s receipt of a special benefit. View "DeVilbiss v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough" on Justia Law

At the center of this an appeal was the superior court's de novo valuation of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) for tax assessment years 2007, 2008, and 2009. In February 2014 the Alaska Supreme Court issued a decision affirming the superior court's de novo valuation of TAPS for the 2006 assessment year.1 The parties introduced considerably more evidence during trial for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 years, but the operative facts remained substantially the same and the superior court applied similar standards and methods for valuation. Many of the issues raised on appeal were similar or identical to issues raised in the 2006 appeal and thus are partially or wholly resolved by the Court's prior opinion. Because the superior court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion with regard to any of its findings or its methodology, and because it committed no legal error in its conclusions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alaska Dept. of Revenue v. BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc." on Justia Law

This case centered on a challenge to the Board of Game's 2010 amendments to regulations for subsistence caribou hunting in Game Management Unit 13, known as the Nelchina basin. The Alaska Board of Game promulgated regulations managing caribou hunting in Game Management Unit 13. The regulations allowed hunting under three types of permits: a community harvest subsistence permit, an individual subsistence permit, or a non-subsistence drawing permit. A hunter challenged the regulations on constitutional and statutory grounds, arguing that they wrongfully interfered with his subsistence hunting rights, and also sought a judicially imposed public reprimand of an assistant attorney general representing the Board. The superior court dismissed the claim against the attorney, granted summary judgment upholding the regulations, and awarded partial attorney's fees to the State and an intervenor defendant. The hunter appeals. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal and summary judgment orders, but vacated the attorney's fees awards and remand for further proceedings. View "Manning v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

"Dakota K." appealed a 30-day involuntary psychiatric commitment. The issue this case presented for the Alaska Supreme Court's review was whether the State or the respondent had the burden to prove the existence of prior involuntary commitments. The Court held that this burden rested with the respondent, who must make some evidentiary showing that the commitment was his first in order to raise the presumption of collateral consequences. " Involuntary commitment proceedings are necessarily expeditious. There is a limited amount of time for the respondent's attorney to meet the client, obtain legal and medical records, and marshal a defense to the underlying allegations of mental illness and risk of harm to self or others. It is therefore unrealistic to expect that the attorney would also present evidence during the commitment proceedings to establish collateral consequences for the purposes of a potential appeal. But after the trial court proceedings have concluded it would be entirely appropriate for the respondent to seek an evidentiary hearing in the superior court on the issue of collateral consequences. This evidentiary hearing would be for the limited purpose of obtaining findings from the court that the commitment was the first involuntary one or, if it were not the first, that there are other collateral consequences flowing from the commitment that would be avoided if it were reversed on appeal." In this case, Dakota never alleged, much less made an evidentiary showing suggesting, that his involuntary commitment at API was his first and therefore gave rise to a presumption of collateral consequences. Nor did he allege that the exception should apply because of any actual collateral consequences. Dakota's appeal of the superior court's order was deemed moot and the appeal dismissed. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Dakota K." on Justia Law

A bidder for mineral leases failed to submit a declaration he was a citizen older than 18 and thus qualified to bid. The Director of the Department of Natural Resources’ Division of Mining, Land & Water later allowed the bidder to remedy the omission, but on appeal the Department’s Commissioner determined that the bidder’s omission was not immaterial or due to excusable inadvertence, and reversed the Director. As a result, the bidder lost his leases. The bidder unsuccessfully appealed to the superior court and appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court found that because the Commissioner’s factual findings were based on substantial evidence in the record, his interpretations of regulations were not legally erroneous, and his application of law to facts was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion, and affirmed. View "Pacifica Marine, Inc. v. Solomon Gold, Inc." on Justia Law