Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case centered on a challenge to the Board of Game's 2010 amendments to regulations for subsistence caribou hunting in Game Management Unit 13, known as the Nelchina basin. The Alaska Board of Game promulgated regulations managing caribou hunting in Game Management Unit 13. The regulations allowed hunting under three types of permits: a community harvest subsistence permit, an individual subsistence permit, or a non-subsistence drawing permit. A hunter challenged the regulations on constitutional and statutory grounds, arguing that they wrongfully interfered with his subsistence hunting rights, and also sought a judicially imposed public reprimand of an assistant attorney general representing the Board. The superior court dismissed the claim against the attorney, granted summary judgment upholding the regulations, and awarded partial attorney's fees to the State and an intervenor defendant. The hunter appeals. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal and summary judgment orders, but vacated the attorney's fees awards and remand for further proceedings. View "Manning v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

"Dakota K." appealed a 30-day involuntary psychiatric commitment. The issue this case presented for the Alaska Supreme Court's review was whether the State or the respondent had the burden to prove the existence of prior involuntary commitments. The Court held that this burden rested with the respondent, who must make some evidentiary showing that the commitment was his first in order to raise the presumption of collateral consequences. " Involuntary commitment proceedings are necessarily expeditious. There is a limited amount of time for the respondent's attorney to meet the client, obtain legal and medical records, and marshal a defense to the underlying allegations of mental illness and risk of harm to self or others. It is therefore unrealistic to expect that the attorney would also present evidence during the commitment proceedings to establish collateral consequences for the purposes of a potential appeal. But after the trial court proceedings have concluded it would be entirely appropriate for the respondent to seek an evidentiary hearing in the superior court on the issue of collateral consequences. This evidentiary hearing would be for the limited purpose of obtaining findings from the court that the commitment was the first involuntary one or, if it were not the first, that there are other collateral consequences flowing from the commitment that would be avoided if it were reversed on appeal." In this case, Dakota never alleged, much less made an evidentiary showing suggesting, that his involuntary commitment at API was his first and therefore gave rise to a presumption of collateral consequences. Nor did he allege that the exception should apply because of any actual collateral consequences. Dakota's appeal of the superior court's order was deemed moot and the appeal dismissed. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Dakota K." on Justia Law

A bidder for mineral leases failed to submit a declaration he was a citizen older than 18 and thus qualified to bid. The Director of the Department of Natural Resources’ Division of Mining, Land & Water later allowed the bidder to remedy the omission, but on appeal the Department’s Commissioner determined that the bidder’s omission was not immaterial or due to excusable inadvertence, and reversed the Director. As a result, the bidder lost his leases. The bidder unsuccessfully appealed to the superior court and appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court found that because the Commissioner’s factual findings were based on substantial evidence in the record, his interpretations of regulations were not legally erroneous, and his application of law to facts was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion, and affirmed. View "Pacifica Marine, Inc. v. Solomon Gold, Inc." on Justia Law

A mother ("Theresa L.") appealed the termination of her parental rights to her two youngest children. The children, teenagers at the time of the termination hearing, testified that they did not want her rights to be terminated. The trial court decided that the children were in need of aid because of mental injury and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The mother argued on appeal that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) did not meet its burden of proving mental injury and that the trial court clearly erred in deciding that termination was in the children’s best interests because of their ages, their stated wishes, and their lack of a permanent placement. The Supreme Court issued an order reversing the trial court’s decision because OCS presented insufficient evidence that the children suffered a mental injury. This opinion explained the Court's reasoning. View "Theresa L., v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs." on Justia Law

M&M Constructors, owned by James McGlinchy, submitted a permit application to the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to mine a mineral deposit for use as construction rock. DNR denied M&M’s permit application because it concluded that the mineral deposit was common variety stone. Under the Common Varieties Act, “common varieties” of stone are not subject to “location,” meaning they could not be permitted through the mining law’s location process. M&M appealed to the superior court, arguing that DNR wrongly denied its permit application and also denied it procedural due process. After the superior court affirmed, M&M appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed because M&M sought to mine for common variety stone that was "well within the ambit" of the Common Varieties Act, and it received "ample" due process in the DNR proceeding. View "McGlinchy v. Alaska Dept. of Nat. Resources" on Justia Law

The State Department of Revenue sought to hold the sole shareholder, director, and employee of a closely held Washington corporation personally liable for the corporation’s unpaid tax debts. The superior court pierced the corporation’s corporate veil, ruled that the shareholder’s successor corporation was liable for the tax debt, voided two contract transfers as fraudulent conveyances, and ruled that the shareholder had breached fiduciary duties to the corporation and the State as the corporation’s creditor. The shareholder and corporation appealed the superior court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil, arguing that the superior court erred by not barring the State’s suit under the principle of res judicata, by applying Alaska rather than Washington veil-piercing law, and by making clear factual errors. The shareholder and corporation also appealed the superior court’s finding that two contracts were fraudulently conveyed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that res judicata did not bar the State from seeking to pierce the corporation's corporate veil to collect tax debt established in an earlier case. Furthermore, the Court held that the corporation's veil was properly pierced under both Alaska and Washington state law. Though the superior court's fraudulent conveyance determination contained errors of fact, the Supreme Court concluded that those errors were harmless. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pister v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The State Department of Revenue sought to hold the sole shareholder, director, and employee of a closely held Washington corporation personally liable for the corporation’s unpaid tax debts. The superior court pierced the corporation’s corporate veil, ruled that the shareholder’s successor corporation was liable for the tax debt, voided two contract transfers as fraudulent conveyances, and ruled that the shareholder had breached fiduciary duties to the corporation and the State as the corporation’s creditor. The shareholder and corporation appealed the superior court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil, arguing that the superior court erred by not barring the State’s suit under the principle of res judicata, by applying Alaska rather than Washington veil-piercing law, and by making clear factual errors. The shareholder and corporation also appealed the superior court’s finding that two contracts were fraudulently conveyed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that res judicata did not bar the State from seeking to pierce the corporation's corporate veil to collect tax debt established in an earlier case. Furthermore, the Court held that the corporation's veil was properly pierced under both Alaska and Washington state law. Though the superior court's fraudulent conveyance determination contained errors of fact, the Supreme Court concluded that those errors were harmless. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pister v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

An oyster farmer closed his farm after dozens of people became sick from eating his oysters. He sued the state Department of Environmental Conservation, alleging that the agency negligently informed him that the site of his farm was suitable for shellfish farming. The superior court granted summary judgment for the agency, concluding that the farmer’s misrepresentation claim was barred by state sovereign immunity. The farmer argued on appeal that the agency’s sovereign immunity defense was inapplicable because his complaint alleged a claim of negligence, not negligent misrepresentation. After review, the Supreme Court found the allegations in the farmer’s complaint supported only a negligent misrepresentation claim. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to the agency. View "Miller v. Dept. of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

An oyster farmer closed his farm after dozens of people became sick from eating his oysters. He sued the state Department of Environmental Conservation, alleging that the agency negligently informed him that the site of his farm was suitable for shellfish farming. The superior court granted summary judgment for the agency, concluding that the farmer’s misrepresentation claim was barred by state sovereign immunity. The farmer argued on appeal that the agency’s sovereign immunity defense was inapplicable because his complaint alleged a claim of negligence, not negligent misrepresentation. After review, the Supreme Court found the allegations in the farmer’s complaint supported only a negligent misrepresentation claim. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to the agency. View "Miller v. Dept. of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on unsuccessful constitutional claimants’ invocation of a statutory protection against adverse awards of attorney’s fees and the responsive assertion that they had sufficient economic incentive to bring their claim regardless of its constitutional nature. In a related decision, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision on the merits of the constitutional claim and remanded for entry of declaratory judgment in the claimants’ favor. The constitutional claimants therefore became the prevailing parties, and the Court assumed that on remand they would seek an award of attorney’s fees and costs under AS 09.60.010. Because such an award was conditioned on the absence of sufficient economic incentive to bring the claim regardless of its constitutional nature, the Court also assumed that on remand the superior court would enter the same discovery orders regarding the petitioners’ financial information and third-party funding of the litigation. After review, the Supreme Court saw "no purpose in dismissing the original applications for relief and petition for review as moot in light of the change in prevailing party status, only to have them re-filed as a result of further attorney’s fees proceedings in the superior court." Thee therefore addressed the meaning of “sufficient economic incentive.” The Court first concluded that earlier public interest litigation case law provided that the guiding parameters for the meaning of “sufficient economic incentive.” Further, the Court concluded that in this case the claimants did not have “sufficient economic incentive” to bring the claim regardless of its constitutional nature. The Court vacated the superior court’s discovery order and remanded this for further proceedings. View "Alaska Conservation Foundation v. Pebble Limited Partnership" on Justia Law