Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case were land and water use permits allowing intensive mineral exploration on State land. Specifically, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had to give public notice before issuing the permits. Because the Alaska Constitution required public notice when interests in land were transferred, the answer to this question depended on whether the permits conveyed an interest in land. After a trial, the superior court held that notice was not required because the permits were nominally and functionally revocable and therefore did not transfer an interest in land. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the land use permits were not functionally revocable, conveyed an interest in land and consequently should have been preceded by public notice. As such, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Aulukestai v. Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

The State Commission for Human Rights brought an action on behalf of an employee who alleged that her employer’s racist and insensitive remarks created a hostile work environment. The Commission ultimately found that the employee did not suffer a hostile work environment, but it denied the employer’s request for attorney’s fees. The employer appealed on the issue the fees, arguing that it was entitled to fees as the prevailing party and because it raised affirmative defenses under the Alaska and United States Constitutions. After review of the specific facts entered on the Commission's record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Commission’s denial of fees. View "Ace Delivery & Moving, Inc. v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights" on Justia Law

The Alaska Board of Game promulgated regulations managing caribou hunting in Game Management Unit 13. A hunter challenged the regulations on constitutional and statutory grounds, arguing that they wrongfully interfered with his subsistence hunting rights, and also sought a judicially imposed public reprimand of an assistant attorney general representing the Board. The superior court dismissed the claim against the attorney, granted summary judgment upholding the regulations, and awarded partial attorney’s fees to the State and an intervenor defendant. The hunter appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal and summary judgment orders, but vacated the attorney’s fees awards and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manning v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Paige Vonder Haar purchased a vehicle from a seller in Oregon in 2007. The parties labeled the vehicle variously as an “electric car” or a “customized golf cart,” depending on their perspective. Paige’s husband David testified that it was one of a number of vehicles built by Dale Noland for Disneyland “to move passengers and their luggage from hotels and places in the park.” The Vonder Haars were not given any documents of title or registration at the time of purchase, but the bill of sale described it as a “1972 Noland car.” Paige sought to title and register it as a “low-speed vehicle,” a special category of vehicles deemed roadworthy under Alaska law. A cursory inspection failed to satisfy the Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV), that the vehicle met standards, and the DMV refused to title and register it as a low-speed vehicle. Following an evidentiary hearing, a hearing officer upheld that decision, which was affirmed again on appeal to the superior court. Paige appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to affirm the decision of the hearing officer: substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s finding that the vehicle had not been shown to be safe for roadway use and that the decision not to title or register it therefore had a reasonable basis. View "Vonder Haar v. Dept. of Administration" on Justia Law

A police officer’s employment was terminated for abuse of alcohol, sexually offensive remarks made to two female officers, and alleged dishonesty during the subsequent police investigation. An arbitrator concluded that terminating the officer’s employment was an excessive penalty and ordered the officer’s reinstatement. The superior court affirmed the arbitration decision and the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court based on the deference that must be given to an arbitration decision. However, the Alaska Police Standards Council revoked the officer’s police certificate after concluding that the officer was not of good moral character and was dishonest. The superior court reversed the decision to revoke, substituting its judgment for the Council’s. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court, holding that the Council’s decision, like that of the arbitrator, was entitled to deference. The Court therefore affirmed the Council’s decision to revoke the officer’s police certificate. View "Alaska Police Standards Council v. Parcell" on Justia Law

The Alaska Board of Game has established two different systems of subsistence hunting for moose and caribou in Alaska’s Copper Basin region: (1) community hunts for groups following a hunting pattern similar to the one traditionally practiced by members of the Ahtna Tene Nene’ community; and (2) individual hunts. A private outdoors group, the Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund, argued that this regulatory framework violated the equal access and equal protection clauses of the Alaska Constitution by establishing a preference for a certain user group. The Fund also argued that the regulations were not authorized by the governing statutes, that they conflicted with other regulations, and that notice of important regulatory changes was not properly given to the public. The Supreme Court concluded that the Board’s factual findings supported a constitutionally valid distinction between patterns of subsistence use, and because the Board’s regulations do not otherwise violate the law, the Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to the State, upholding the statute and the Board regulations against the Fund’s legal challenge. View "Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Paul Stavenjord, a Buddhist inmate, asked to receive a Kosher diet and to be permitted to purchase a prayer shawl. Prison officials at the Alaska Department of Corrections denied his requests. Stavenjord filed a complaint alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and various constitutional provisions. The superior court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Stavenjord had failed to demonstrate: (1) that a Kosher diet and prayer shawl were necessary for the practice of his religion; (2) that he was sincere in his requests for religious accommodation; and (3) that the Department's lack of accommodations substantially burdened the practice of his religion. Under Alaska's summary judgment standard, the initial burden falls on the moving party: the Department. Furthermore, religious necessity was not an element of RLUIPA. Because summary judgment was granted by placing the initial burden on the non-moving party and by focusing on Stavenjord's failure to make an evidentiary showing not required under RLUIPA, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stavenjord v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Robert Gillam and two of his business ventures filed suit, alleging that the Alaska Public Offices Commission should not have been allowed to investigate and decide whether Gillam and his businesses had committed certain campaign finance violations. Gillam alleged that both the Executive Director and the Chair of the Commission were biased and that further consideration by the Commission would violate his right to due process protected by the Alaska and federal constitutions and his Alaska constitutional right to a fair investigation. The superior court concluded that Gillam’s claims were not ripe and that Gillam has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Upon review, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed that there was an administrative recusal procedure for Gillam’s state law claims and that Gillam needed to exhaust that remedy before bringing his state law claims to court. The Court also agreed that Gillam’s federal due process claim was not ripe because the recusal procedure might resolve that claim. View "RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Kirk" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were the efforts of the Alaska Board of Game to control, by regulation, the movement of bison that stray outside the boundaries of two game ranches on Kodiak Island. The Board had statutory authority to determine when a domestic animal becomes "feral," and thus legally characterized as "game." Pursuant to this grant of authority, however, the Board's regulatory definition of a "feral" domestic animal must be reasonable and consistent with its authorizing statute. The Board amended the first regulation at issue to read: "Under this section, and in accordance with the definition of 'game' [provided in statute,] (which includes feral domestic animals) . . . musk oxen, bison, or reindeer that [are] lawfully owned . . . that [are] not confined or [are] not under positive control [are] feral unless the animal is a free-ranging animal on a state or federal grazing lease." The Board amended a second regulation to authorize the Alaska Department of Fish and Game to announce a public hunt of bison in Unit 8 (which included Kodiak) by emergency order. These amendments effectively confiscated lawfully owned domestic animals, unreasonably transforming them from "domestic" to "game" solely by reference to a property boundary line. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State and held the contested regulations invalid. The Court also vacated the court's award of attorney's fees to the State. View "Ellingston v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board fined an uninsured employers Titan Enterprises, LLC, Titan Topsoil, Inc. and CCO Enterprises (collectively, "Titan," all owned by Todd Christanson) a substantial amount because they had operated for a significant period of time without carrying statutorily required workers’ compensation insurance. On appeal, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed part of the Board’s decision, but it reversed the Board on the amount of the fine and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. The employer then asked the Commission for an award of attorney’s fees as a successful party on appeal. The State, Division of Workers’ Compensation, which had initiated the Board proceedings, opposed the award on the basis that it, too, had been successful on a significant issue. The Commission awarded the employer full fees of approximately $50,000. The Division petitioned for review of the fee award, and the Supreme Court granted review. Because the Commission failed to consider the Division’s partial success in the appeal, it reversed the Commission’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alaska Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law