Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A state agency issued a request for proposals for legal services. A law firm delivered its proposal after the submission deadline, but the procurement officer accepted the proposal and forwarded it to the evaluation committee. After the agency issued a notice of intent to award that law firm the contract, a second law firm protested, alleging that the evaluation committee made scoring errors and that consideration of the late-filed proposal was barred by a relevant regulation and the request for proposals. The procurement officer sustained the protest, rescinded the original award, and awarded the second law firm the contract. The first law firm then protested, claiming: (1) the second law firm’s protest should not have been considered because it was filed after the protest deadline; (2) the first law firm’s proposal was properly accepted because the delay in submission was immaterial; and (3) the second law firm’s proposal was nonresponsive because that firm lacked a certificate of authority to transact business in Alaska. The procurement officer rejected that protest and the first law firm filed an administrative appeal. The administrative agency denied the appeal, and the first law firm appealed the agency decision to the superior court, which affirmed the administrative agency ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the administrative agency acted reasonably in accepting the second law firm’s late-filed protest and deeming that firm’s proposal responsive notwithstanding its lack of a certificate of authority. Furthermore, the Court concluded the agency’s interpretation that its regulation barred acceptance of the first firm’s late-filed proposal is reasonable and consistent with statute. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision upholding the final agency decision. View "Davis Wright Tremaine LLP v. Alaska, Dept. of Administration" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue before the Supreme Court concerned the attorney’s fees and costs awarded in the 2006 Trans-Alaska Pipeline System tax assessment case. The superior court decided that the Fairbanks North Star Borough, the City of Valdez, and the North Slope Borough were prevailing parties for purposes of attorney’s fees and costs because they had prevailed on the main issues of the case. The superior court also applied the enhancement factors to raise the presumptive award from 30 percent to 45 percent of the prevailing parties’ reasonable attorney’s fees. The owners of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System appealed, arguing the superior court should have applied Alaska Appellate Rule 508 instead of Civil Rules 79 and 82. In the alternative, they contended: (1) that the three municipalities did not prevail as against the owners; (2) that fees should have been allocated between separate appeals; (3) that none of the prevailing parties were entitled to enhanced attorney’s fees; and (4) that the Fairbanks North Star Borough’s award should have been reduced as recommended by a special master. The Fairbanks North Star Borough and the City of Valdez cross-appealed, arguing that the superior court should have viewed this case as one involving a money judgment for purposes of an attorney’s fees award under Rule 82(b)(1) and, in the alternative, that they were entitled to a greater enhancement of their fees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc. v. Alaska, Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Charles Kemp attempted suicide while in administrative segregation at the Anchorage Correctional Complex. He survived but suffered a serious brain injury. His mother, Marjorie Achman, sued the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging both a negligent failure to protect Kemp from self-harm and medical malpractice. The superior court granted summary judgment to DOC and awarded attorney’s fees to DOC as the prevailing party. Achman appealed that decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Achman v. Alaska" on Justia Law

An Alaska state trooper was discharged for having consensual sex with a domestic violence victim the morning after assisting in the arrest of the victim's husband. The Public Safety Employees Association (PSEA) filed a grievance under its collective bargaining agreement with the State. An arbitrator ordered that the trooper be reinstated with back pay after a three-day suspension, concluding that the State did not have just cause to discharge the trooper. The superior court upheld the arbitrator's order of back pay but decided that it could not enforce the ordered reinstatement because the Alaska Police Standards Council had by this point revoked the trooper's police certificate. The State appealed, arguing that the arbitrator committed gross error and that the order was unenforceable as a violation of public policy. The Supreme Court "generally will not disturb the results of a binding arbitration, even where [it] would reach a different conclusion were we to review the matter independently." The Court reasoned that because no statute, regulation, or written policy prohibited supervisors from engaging in progressive discipline of the trooper, in lieu of discharging him for his misconduct, the arbitrator's decision to impose discipline rather than uphold the termination did not violate any explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy. Because the arbitrator's award was neither unenforceable nor grossly erroneous, the Court affirmed the superior court's decision to uphold the arbitration award in part. View "Alaska v. Public Safety Employees Association" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska and the Municipality of Anchorage exempt from municipal property taxation $150,000 of the assessed value of the residence of an owner who is a senior citizen or disabled veteran. But the full value of the exemption is potentially unavailable if a person who is not the owner’s spouse also occupies the residence. Contending that the exemption program violated their rights to equal protection and equal opportunities, three Anchorage same-sex couples in committed, long-term, intimate relationships sued the State and the Municipality. The superior court ruled for all three couples. The State and Municipality appealed. As to two of the couples, the Supreme Court affirmed: same-sex couples, who may not marry or have their marriages recognized in Alaska, cannot benefit or become eligible to benefit from the exemption program to the same extent as heterosexual couples, who are married or may marry. The exemption program therefore potentially treats same-sex couples less favorably than it treats opposite-sex couples even though the two classes are similarly situated. The identified governmental interests do not satisfy even minimum scrutiny. The exemption program therefore violates the two couples’ equal protection rights as guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution. As to the third couple, the Court reversed the ruling in their favor because it concluded that the program did not exempt a residence from taxation unless the senior citizen or veteran had some ownership interest in it. If the senior citizen or veteran has no actual ownership interest, the program treats a same-sex couple the same as a heterosexual couple by denying the exemption to both couples, rendering marital status and the ability to marry irrelevant. Because the senior citizen member of the third couple had no ownership interest in the residence, that couple had no viable equal protection claim. View "Alaska v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

A prisoner recovered a medical malpractice judgment against the State of Alaska Department of Corrections. But when DOC paid the judgment, it deducted the expenses it had incurred for unrelated medical care provided to the prisoner by outside providers. The DOC then brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that DOC had the statutory right to reimbursement from the prisoner for medical expenses incurred on his behalf. In this appeal, the prisoner’s estate argued that only prisoners with access to the specified funding sources listed in the statute were liable for the cost of outside medical care. But the Supreme Court concluded that the statute entitled the DOC to reimbursement from a prisoner regardless of whether the medical care is provided inside the prison or made available through an outside provider. The Court also concluded that the common fund doctrine did not require the DOC to share the cost of the prisoner’s attorney’s fees for the medical malpractice action. View "Hendricks-Pearce v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

A group of citizens sued two borough assembly members, alleging various violations of borough and state conflict of interest laws and the common law conflict of interest doctrine. After the borough took official action facilitating the assembly members’ defense, the citizens moved to enjoin the assembly members from using their official positions to defend the lawsuit or pursue personal financial gain. The superior court granted a preliminary injunction under the balance of hardships standard, concluding that the citizens faced the possibility of irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted and that the assembly members were adequately protected by the injunction. The assembly members filed a petition for review, which the Supreme Court granted. They argued that the superior court applied the wrong preliminary injunction standard and that the injunction violates their free speech rights. The Court agreed: the trial court should have applied the probable success on the merits standard because the injunction did not adequately protect the assembly members, and the injunction imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The Supreme Court vacated the injunction in full. View "Alsworth v. Seybert" on Justia Law

A former inmate brought sued the Department of Corrections alleging that the Department negligently failed to protect him after he reported being threatened and that he was subsequently assaulted and seriously injured while in prison. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the inmate had not shown that a genuine issue of material fact existed on the question whether the Department breached its duty to protect him from reasonably foreseeable harm. Specifically, the superior court concluded that the communication of the threat was too general to put the Department on notice that the inmate was at risk for the attack he suffered. The inmate appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the inmate presented evidence that raised a genuine issue of fact as to the foreseeability of the attack he suffered. View "Mattox v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) became involved with Emma D. and her newborn son, Joey, following reports from Covenant House expressing concern about Emma’s homelessness, inability to care for an infant, and feelings of depression and aggression toward Joey. Emma D. has a history of mental health issues, particularly bipolar disorder, dating back to her early childhood. OCS took the then-six-month-old Joey into emergency custody during Joey’s hospitalization for respiratory syncytial virus and dehydration, during which he was also diagnosed with supraventricular tachycardia, a heart disorder that required regular attention and treatment. OCS staff subsequently made attempts to assist Emma in obtaining regular mental health treatment in order to reunite her with Joey. OCS staff had difficulty communicating and meeting with Emma; she failed to engage in regular treatment, maintain consistent visitation with Joey, or attend her appointments with case workers and service providers. The superior court terminated Emma’s parental rights 14 months after OCS assumed emergency custody. Emma argued on appeal that OCS failed to consider adequately her mental health issues and therefore its efforts were not reasonable. She also appealed the superior court’s finding that she had failed to remedy her conduct in a reasonable time. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no reversible error in the superior court’s decision terminating Emma’s parental rights. View "Emma D. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A fire broke out at a mobile home owned by Leo Regner near North Pole. The North Star Volunteer Fire Department, the North Pole Fire Department, and the Fort Wainwright Fire Department responded to the fire but were unable to prevent damage to the mobile home. Regner sued the fire departments and several of their employees, alleging negligence. Regner voluntarily dismissed his claim against the Fort Wainwright Fire Department and its employee, and the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that they were immune from suit. The superior court granted complete summary judgment. Regner appealed only the superior court’s decision that he failed to make a sufficient showing of negligence to defeat summary judgment. Because the defendants did not move for summary judgment on the merits of Regner’s negligence claims and the merits of those claims were not otherwise addressed in the summary judgment proceedings, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Regner v. North Star Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc." on Justia Law