Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Citizens sought a ballot initiative to eliminate the special regulations that govern real property transactions in a local economic development area. After the municipal clerk twice denied their petition for a ballot initiative, the sponsors sued for an order placing the initiative on the ballot. Finding the petition to be both contrary to existing law and misleading, the superior court upheld the municipal clerk's denial. The sponsors appealed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the petition is neither contrary to existing law nor misleading, it reversed. View "Sitkans for Responsible Government v. City & Borough of Sitka" on Justia Law

An adult woman diagnosed with a mental illness appealed her already completed 30-day involuntary commitment to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API), arguing the evidence did not support the superior court’s findings that: (1) she was likely to cause harm to herself or others due to her mental illness; and (2) API was the least restrictive alternative placement for her. Because Alaska's existing case law provides that an evidentiary-based "weight of the evidence" challenge to a completed involuntary commitment is moot absent accompanying legal issues appropriate for decision under the mootness doctrine's public interest exception, the Supreme Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on mootness. As a result, the Court addressed a question not directly raised in earlier cases: should the Court's application of the mootness doctrine in this context accommodate the importance of collateral consequences arising from an involuntary commitment? The Court answered that question "yes" and therefore reached the merits of this appeal. On the merits, the Court affirmed the superior court's involuntary commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Joan K." on Justia Law

In an October 2007 election, Kenai Peninsula Borough voters approved local initiatives establishing term limits for members of the Borough Assembly and the school board. But voters also reelected five incumbents who, by the terms of the initiatives, would be ineligible to serve an additional term. The Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers (ACT) filed a lawsuit against the Borough requesting a court declaration that the initiatives applied to candidates chosen in the October 2007 election and that the seats held by the five incumbents were vacant. The Borough argued that the initiatives were invalid. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to ACT and partial summary judgment to the Borough and, therefore, did not designate either as the prevailing party. ACT appealed the superior court's decision not to name a prevailing party and argued that ACT should have been named the prevailing party. After its review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that ACT and the Borough both prevailed on distinct issues central to the case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision not to name a prevailing party or award attorney's fees and costs to either party. View "Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kenai Peninsula Borough" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the validity of two 2005 Kenai Peninsula Borough (Borough) ordinances: one enacted by the Borough Assembly and the second enacted by voter initiative. The Borough Assembly enacted an ordinance in June 2005 that increased the sales tax rate from two percent to three percent. In an October 2005 election, Borough voters passed an initiative that required prior voter approval for all Borough capital projects with a total cost of more than one million dollars. The Alliance for Concerned Taxpayers (ACT) challenged the sales tax increase and sought to enforce the capital projects voter approval requirement. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Borough on both matters: on the sales tax issue, reasoning that a 1964 voter action allowed the increase and the 2006 referendum defeat ratified it; and on the capital projects voter approval issue, reasoning that Proposition 4 was an unconstitutional use of the initiative power to appropriate a public asset. ACT appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment on the sales tax issue and the capital project voter approval issue, concluding the 1964 voter authorization of a three-percent sales tax preserved the Borough's right to raise the rate to three percent, and that the 2006 defeat of the referendum to repeal the rate increase constituted a ratification of the increase. On the voter approval issue, the Court concluded that allowing voters to veto any capital improvement projects of over $1 million had the effect of diluting the Borough Assembly's exclusive control over the budget and was therefore an impermissible appropriation. View "Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kenai Peninsula Borough" on Justia Law

Appellant Ethel Kelly sued the Municipality of Anchorage (MOA) for negligence after she stepped into an uncovered valve box assembly pipe in a crosswalk and sustained injuries. MOA conceded that the valve box cover was missing, but denied it was responsible for this condition. MOA moved for summary judgment in superior court on grounds that it had no duty to Appellant since it neither caused nor had notice of the dangerous condition. Appellant filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to MOA. Appellant appeals. Because material issues of fact existed concerning whether MOA caused the defect and whether it had constructive notice of it, the Supreme Court vacated the superior court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kelly v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

The parents of a developmentally disabled adult woman appealed a superior court's decision to appoint a public guardian, rather than the parents, as the woman's legal guardian. The superior court found that the parents failed to take advantage of resources available for the daughter's development and did not support the daughter's contact with extended family. On appeal, the parents argued that they should have been appointed as guardians and that the appointment of a public guardian, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the parents were unfit to serve as guardians, violated their constitutional right to parent their child. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the public guardian, and because the superior court's action did not violate the parents' substantive due process rights under the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court in all respects. View "In the Matter of the Protective Proceedings of Tammy J." on Justia Law

Two correctional officers allegedly injured inmate Respondent Paul Heisey within the jail. Respondent filed a complaint asserting several tort claims against the State and the two officers. Pursuant to a statute allowing the State to substitute as defendant for any State employee that is certified as acting within the scope of employment, the Attorney General certified the officers as acting within the scope of their employment and substituted the State as the Defendant. The State then filed a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. While the motion was pending, Respondent moved to amend his complaint to substitute state constitutional claims for the tort claims. The superior court granted the motion to amend, ruling that Respondent may have a damages claim for violation of his state constitutional rights under the circumstances of the case. In the same order, the superior court partially granted and partially denied the motion to dismiss. The State petitioned for review of the superior court's legal conclusions. The Supreme Court accepted the petition and requested briefing on three issues: (1) whether the Attorney General's certification was subject to judicial review; (2) whether the inmate's claims arose out of an assault or battery for which the State is immune; and (3) whether a state constitutional claim for damages exists under the circumstances of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Attorney General's certification was subject to judicial review, that some of the inmate's claims arose out of an assault or battery for which the State is immune, and that a damages claim under the state constitution does not exist under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court vacated the superior court's order on the motion to amend and motion to dismiss, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Alaska v. Heisey" on Justia Law

Appellant Chana Boyko was a teacher who resigned in lieu of termination from the Anchorage School District after violating a "last chance agreement." She alleged the School District breached a resignation agreement in which it promised not to release negative information about her to prospective employers. Appellant sued, claiming that she was terminated as a result of disability discrimination and that the School District's comments made in violation of the resignation agreement breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and interfered with her prospective contractual relations. The superior court granted the School District summary judgment on all claims, concluding that the District had nondiscriminatory reasons for termination and that its comments were protected by statutory immunity. Appellant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the claims of statutory immunity, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and interference with prospective contractual relations, because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding these claims. The Court affirmed summary judgment on the discrimination claim. View "Boyko v. Anchorage School District" on Justia Law

Appellant Tom Oels was a sergeant with the Anchorage Police Department (APD) since 2002. In 2005, he stated his intent to retire and be rehired while retaining the rank of sergeant. Appellant was told that under AMC 03.30.068(A)(4) he could retire, but could only be rehired as an entry-level patrol officer, not as a sergeant. Appellant filed a complaint with the Employee Relations Board (the Board) alleging: (1) that MOA and the Anchorage Police Department Employees Association (APDEA) had violated AMC 03.30.068(A)(4) by requiring that sergeants be rehired as patrol officers, and (2) that APDEA had breached its duty of fair representation. The Board heard the matter and decided against Appellant on both counts. Appellant appealed the ruling to the superior court which, sitting as an intermediate appellate court, affirmed the Board’s decision. The superior court held that although the plain meaning of the ordinance was ambiguous, the underlying legislative history demonstrated that the provision was intended to allow for flexibility to rehire sergeants as patrol officers. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s analysis that the municipal code defined "rehire" as returning to the same position or class of positions, but the Court ultimately reached a different result. The Court found that the ordinance was not ambiguous; by its terms, it did not require sergeants to be rehired as entry-level patrol officers. The Court therefore reversed the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Oels v. Anchorage Police Dept. Employees Association" on Justia Law

Petitioner Eleanor Oakes owned a 7/8 undivided interest in a 20-acre parcel of land in Council, while Respondents David and Sine Holly owned a 1/8 undivided interest in the property. The parties went to court to partition the property, and each agreed to submit up to three partition proposals for the court’s selection after it heard evidence about the choices. The superior court selected one of Petitioner's proposals, and she hired a surveyor to implement the division of the property. The survey revealed a significant error in the map presented to the superior court of the selected proposal. The error resulted in the Hollys acquiring more river frontage than Petitioner had intended in her proposal which was selected by the superior court. Petitioner moved to amend the proposal, but the Hollys urged that the selected proposal be implemented as surveyed. The superior court concluded that under the doctrine of mutual mistake, Petitioner bore the risk of the drafting mistake in her proposals, and it enforced the proposal with the drafting error. But because the error in the property description did not occur in the formation of contract, the Supreme Court in its review concluded that the doctrine of mutual mistake was inapplicable. "Instead, the error occurred during the evidentiary hearing and formed a mistaken factual premise for the trial court's decision." The Court therefore remanded the case back to the superior court to determine whether it was appropriate to grant relief for mistake, and if so, to repartition the property in compliance with state law. View "Oates v. Holly" on Justia Law