Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An Alaska state trooper was terminated in part due to dishonesty. The Public Safety Employees Association (PSEA) filed a grievance on behalf of the discharged trooper and then invoked arbitration. An arbitrator reinstated the trooper, ruling that the State did not have cause to terminate him. The superior court upheld the arbitrator's ruling. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the arbitrator committed gross error and that the reinstatement of the trooper was unenforceable. Upon review of the arbitrator's decision and subsequent superior court ruling, the Supreme Court held that the arbitrator's award in this case was not enforceable as a violation of public policy: "the State should be free to heighten its enforcement of ethical standards. . . We are [. . . ] troubled by the arbitrator's suggestion that the State's past lenience toward minor dishonesty requires it to be permanently lenient." Because the arbitrator's award was neither unenforceable nor grossly erroneous, the Court affirmed the superior court and the arbitration decision. View "Alaska v. Public Safety Employees Association" on Justia Law

In 2005 the Department of Revenue denied Permanent Fund Dividends (PDFs) to Appellants In and Peggy Harrod and their children. The Harrods appealed to the superior court where they argued that the Department lacked the authority to adopt residency requirements for the dividend program, that the denial of their applications violated the U.S. and State constitutions, and that their 2002 and 2003 dividend applications were wrongfully denied. The superior court affirmed the denial of the dividends. From 1997 to 2000, the Harrods resided outside of Alaska and did not apply for PDFs. In 2001 they unsuccessfully applied. Because they had been absent from Alaska for more than five years, a presumption arose that they did not intend to return and remain in state. The DOR applied the presumption and the Harrods did not rebut it. The presumption was applied in the Harrods' 2002 and 2003 applications, and the DOR found that despite returning in state on infrequent or short trips, the Harrods had not remained in-state for five years. Having reviewed the parties' arguments and the record on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Harrod v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2003, Officer Lee Virg-In used a taser twice on J.N., an 11-year-old girl. She had been driving an ATV in the streets of Kotzebue with another younger passenger. J.N. ran several stop signs and was otherwise driving dangerously. The Officer used his overhead lights and siren to signal J.N. to stop, but she refused, first trying to escape on the ATV and later on foot. According to J.N., she was never aggressive or threatening when the Officer eventually caught up with her. Sandra Russell, J.N.'s mother, filed a complaint against Officer Virg-In, alleging that his use of the taser constituted excessive force. Ms. Russell also sued the City of Kotzebue. The Officer defended the reasonableness of his actions and argued he was immune from suit. The superior court dismissed J.N.'s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it was error to grant the Officer qualified immunity "because if a police officer used a taser multiple times on an 11-year-old girl who was suspected of traffic violations, was compliant and was not posing a threat to the officer or others, that conduct would be so egregious that any reasonable officer would have known the conduct was an excessive use of force." The Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Russell v. Virg-In" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Price, Jr. posted "no trespassing" signs on his property in 1998 in an attempt to quell what he believed were an excessive number of snow machiners using a trail that crossed his land, damaging it, traveling at high speeds, and causing a great deal of noise. In 2003, the Supreme Court held that a group of snow machiners had established a public prescriptive easement over the trail but twice remanded the case to the superior court to define the scope of the easement. The superior court held additional hearings, and in 2007 issued a memorandum that defined the easement. Appellant appealed the court's definition. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant did not meet his burden of proving that the volume of snow machine traffic exceeded the scope of the easement. However, the Court reversed the superior court's decision that found the easement includes non-snow machine users. The Court remanded the case again for further clarification on the permissible scope of the snow machine easement, including seasonal limits, width and speed limit. View "Price v. Eastham" on Justia Law

The City of Juneau has an ordinance that prohibits smoking in certain places. In 2008, the City Assembly amended the ordinance to prohibit smoking in "private clubs" that offer food or alcoholic beverages for sale. The Fraternal Order of Eagles, Juneau-Douglas Aerie 4200 and three of its members challenged the ban on smoking on both its face and as applied to their Aerie facility. The Eagles argued that the prohibition violates both their First Amendment rights under the federal and state constitutions. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the ban on smoking in private clubs did not violate the Eagles' right to privacy under the federal or state constitutions, nor did it implicate the freedom of association under the federal First Amendment. The Court affirmed a lower court's order that granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Juneau. View "Fraternal Order of Eagles, Juneau-Douglas Aerie 4200 v. City & Borough of Juneau" on Justia Law

The Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOTPF) fired Appellee Paul Smith for misconduct. Smith, an equipment operator, shot and field-dressed a moose while on duty in 2005 and received a thirty-day suspension. In 2006, he took a fuel tank stand from his workstation, later claiming that he thought he received permission to do so. At about the same time, 100 gallons of fuel disappeared from the same station. DOTPF concluded that Appellee had stolen the fuel and terminated him. After unsuccessfully filing union grievances and complaints with the state Human Rights Commission and federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Appellee filed suit, alleging breach of contract, civil rights and tort law violations. The superior court granted summary judgment to the state on all counts. Appellee appealed the superior court's ruling on his civil rights and contract claims. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record and the arguments Appellee made on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decisions as to both of Appellee's claims. View "Smith v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The State provided prisoner Dewell Pearce extensive medical care during his incarceration. Around the time of his release from custody, Mr. Pearce won a medical malpractice judgment against the State. The State paid part of the judgment, but relying on a reimbursement statute, withheld the medical care costs associated with conditions unrelated to the malpractice claim. The State then sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to reimbursement from Mr. Pearce for treatment of the unrelated conditions. The superior court ruled that the statute in question did not authorize the State to seek reimbursement from former prisoners no longer in custody. The State appealed. Upon review of the superior court record and the applicable statute, the Supreme Court found that the superior court misinterpreted the law. The Court reversed the superior court's ruling and vacated the judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Alaska Dep't of Corrections v. Hendricks-Pearce" on Justia Law

In 1999, Appellant-Employee Kenneth Monzulla hurt his back at work. In 2001, he and his employer entered a partial compromise and release agreement to settle all issues stemming from the injury except for future medical care for his lumbar and thoracic spine. More recent disputes involved the extent of Appellant's medical care. A recurring issue between the parties pertained to venue for the proceedings. In 2008, Appellee Voorhees Concrete Cutting asked the Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission to review and stay a non-final order that denied its change of venue from Fairbanks. The Commission first issued a partial stay, which permitted the case to go forward in any venue other than Fairbanks. It later reviewed the merits of the Workers' Compensation Board's decision to deny the change of venue and reversed it. On appeal, Mr. Monzulla contended that the Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction over "motions for extraordinary review." He claimed that legislature only granted the Commission jurisdiction to hear appeals of final Board orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that jurisdiction to hear appeals is "necessarily incident to the Commission's express power" to hear appeals from final Board decisions. The Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Monzulla v. Voorhees Concrete Cutting" on Justia Law