Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Garold Charles was in an accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle belonging to Tara and Anthony Stout. He brought negligence claims against the Stouts and Credit Union 1, the lienholder of the Stouts’ vehicle. Credit Union 1 moved for summary judgment. Charles opposed the motion, relying on testimony from Tara’s deposition and contending in part that he was a third-party beneficiary of an alleged contract between Credit Union 1 and the Stouts by which the credit union agreed to provide liability insurance. The superior court struck Tara’s testimony and granted summary judgment to Credit Union 1. Charles appealed. Finding no error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Charles v. Stout" on Justia Law

Appellant Hugo Rosales suffered an injury working on a fish-processing vessel. He filed both a workers' compensation claim and a maritime lawsuit. Appellant and the employer ultimately entered into a global settlement of both cases. The state Workers' Compensation Board initially rejected the settlement. Appellant later tried to withdraw from the settlement but changed his mind. At a hearing, he testified that the though the settlement was in his best interests. The Board approved the settlement after the hearing. Several months later, appellant moved to have the agreement set aside. The Board denied this request. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision. Finding no error in the Commission's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rosales. v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc." on Justia Law

Fifteen-year-old Kevin Michaud fired a single shot from a revolver belonging to his parents, killing one friend and seriously wounding another. The parents of the two victims sued Kevin, his parents, and their insurance company, United Services Automobile Association (USAA). The Michauds' liability policy provided a $300,000 limit for "Each Occurrence" of "Personal Liability." The superior court ruled that the policy afforded $900,000 of coverage because there had been a single occurrence and Kevin and his parents were each entitled to a separate per-occurrence policy limit. USAA appealed, arguing that the policy affords a single per-occurrence policy limit of $300,000 regardless of the number of insureds. The victims' parents also appealed, arguing that not only were there three individual coverage limits, one each for Kevin and his parents, but there were also multiple occurrences. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that USAA's position was most in accord with the express language of the policy, the reasonable expectations of an insured, and case law, and therefore reversed the superior court's decision. View "United Services Automobile Association v. Neary" on Justia Law

In 2001, Alaska State Troopers went to Bret Maness's home to take him into custody for psychological evaluation, pursuant to an involuntary commitment order that had been issued by the superior court. When the troopers arrived at his home, Maness threatened to kill the troopers then fled, first in his RV, and later on foot. During the pursuit, Maness was shot by an Anchorage Police Department officer and then arrested. Maness filed a civil action against many of the participants in the events leading to his shooting and arrest. In 2008 the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment with respect to all of Maness's claims except those based on excessive force. Maness then amended his complaint, adding numerous state tort claims to his excessive force claims. The superior court again granted summary judgment to the defendants, with the exception of the Anchorage police officer who actually shot Maness. Maness's excessive force claim against the police officer who shot him went to trial, where the jury delivered a verdict for the police officer. Maness then appealed the grant of summary judgment with respect to his claims against two of the Alaska State Troopers who attempted to execute the civil commitment order. He also appealed the superior court's award of attorney's fees to the defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the Superior Court properly granted the troopers summary judgment on the excessive force claims; and (2) the Superior Court properly granted summary judgment on the state tort claims. The Court vacated the fee award and remanded the case for further proceedings on attorney's fees. View "Maness v. Daily" on Justia Law

Jack Morrell was a patron of appellee Jason, Inc.'s Chilkoot Charlie's bar where he had been drinking. He had a confrontation with Eric Kalenka shortly after he left. Morrell brandished a knife and used it to fatally stab Kalenka. Kalenka's estate sued Chilkoot Charlie's alleging the bar had continued to serve Morrell as a "drunken person" in violation of Alaska law, and therefore was liable in part for Kalenka's death. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether the Kalenka estate raised a genuine issue of fact of whether Morrell was a "drunken person" within the meaning of the statute. The Court concluded that the estate presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment. Therefore, the Court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment to Chilkoot Charlie's, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc." on Justia Law

A driver caused injury to the passenger of another car in a two-car accident. The passenger brought suit for damages, including her insurer's subrogated claim for medical expenses. The driver made an early offer of judgment, which the passenger did not accept. The driver's insurer then made a direct payment to the subrogated insurer, thereby removing that amount from the passenger's potential recovery. The driver then made a second offer of judgment, which the passenger did not accept. After trial both parties claimed prevailing party status; the driver sought attorney's fees. The superior court ruled that the first offer of judgment did not entitle the driver to fees, but the second offer did. Both parties appealed, arguing the superior court improperly considered the subrogation claim payment in its rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the subrogation claim payment had to be taken into account when evaluating the first offer of judgment and affirmed the decision that the driver was not the prevailing party based on the first offer of judgment. But because the nature of the payment on the subrogation claim was not clear, the Court vacated the decision that the second offer of judgment entitled the driver to attorney fees and remanded the case for further proceedings on this issue. View "Dearlove v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Following a car accident with an uninsured motorist, Lori McDonnell filed suit against her insurer State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company on behalf of herself and her minor son, Luke. McDonnell sought a declaratory judgment that: (1) she was entitled to have her personal injury claims settled by appraisal under the mandatory appraisal statute; and (2) a provision in her State Farm insurance policies requiring her to file suit against the insurance company within two years of the accident was void as against public policy. The superior court ruled that the mandatory appraisal statute did not apply to personal injury claims. The court further ruled that the contractual two-year limitations provision was enforceable, but only if State Farm could show that it was prejudiced by an insured's delay in bringing suit, and that the appropriate accrual date for the limitations period was the date State Farm denied an insured’s claim, rather than the date of the accident. McDonnell and State Farm both appealed that decision. Finding no error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "McDonnell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The question before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether a defendant who pled no contest to disorderly conduct in a criminal action could be collaterally estopped from relitigating the elements of that crime in a related civil declaratory judgment action regarding insurance coverage, thereby precluding coverage. Kent Bearden pled no contest to disorderly conduct for punching Paul Rasmussen. Rasmussen subsequently filed a civil complaint against Bearden, and Bearden tendered the lawsuit to State Farm Insurance Company to defend and indemnify him under his homeowners insurance policy. State Farm sought declaratory relief and moved for summary judgment on the ground that Bearden's conduct could not be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the insurance policy because his no-contest plea collaterally estopped him from relitigating the issues of mens rea and self-defense. The superior court granted the motion. Finding no error with the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bearden v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Appellee Tamarack Air, Ltd. negligently damaged Appellant James Madonna's airplane while it was on Tamarack's airfield after it had been in Tamarack's shop for maintenance. Tamarack offered to fix the plane, but Madonna refused the offer. Instead, he elected to ship the plane to Wyoming and had the plane repaired at the original factory. Tamarack argued that Madonna had failed to mitigate his damages and refused to compensate Madonna for the full cost of these repairs. A jury awarded Madonna most, but not all, of the cost of having the plane repaired out of state. On appeal, Madonna argued that the trial court erred by refusing to let him present several other claims for damages related to the accident. But finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "Madonna v. Tamarack Air, Ltd." on Justia Law

Dixie Dixon was injured in an automobile accident when a car driven by Joshua Paul Blackwell ran a red light. She sued and received a verdict that was lower than Blackwell's Alaska Civil Rule 68 offer of judgment. On appeal she challenged the adequacy of the verdict and the efficacy of the offer of judgment. Because the jury's verdict was not inadequate, the offer Blackwell made was a valid Rule 68 offer, and the judgment finally rendered by the court was at least five percent less favorable to Dixon than the offer, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Dixon v. Blackwell" on Justia Law