Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Ethel Kelly sued the Municipality of Anchorage (MOA) for negligence after she stepped into an uncovered valve box assembly pipe in a crosswalk and sustained injuries. MOA conceded that the valve box cover was missing, but denied it was responsible for this condition. MOA moved for summary judgment in superior court on grounds that it had no duty to Appellant since it neither caused nor had notice of the dangerous condition. Appellant filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to MOA. Appellant appeals. Because material issues of fact existed concerning whether MOA caused the defect and whether it had constructive notice of it, the Supreme Court vacated the superior court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kelly v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

Lawrence Trudell was injured when he fell while trying to descend a ladder from the roof of a structure on which he was working. At the time he was employed by Phillips Construction Co. (Phillips), a construction contracting company principally owned by Clayton Phillips and Trish Dorman. Phillips did not have workers' compensation insurance, even though it was licensed by the State. The structure Trudell was working on was owned by John Brent and Debra Hibbert. Trydell filed suit for workers' compensation benefits against Phillips and the Hibberts, alleging that the owners were "project owners" as defined in the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act and thus liable for securing workers' compensation. Phillips then filed for bankruptcy. The Hibberts denied liability on the basis that they were not "project owners." After a bench trial solely about whether the building owners were "project owners" or Trudell's employers, the superior court decided that they were neither and that they were not liable to pay worker's compensation, and awarded attorney’s fees against the Trudell. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded it was error to interpret "project owners" as excluding the building owners, and reversed the superior court's decision. View "Trudell v. Hibbert" on Justia Law

Appellant Jacob Ennen was seriously injured while he was a passenger in Gordon Shanigan's car. Shanigan's insurer, Integon Indemnity Corporation (Integon), paid $50,000 to cover Shanigan's possible liability to Appellant. Under Alaska insurance statutes, Appellant would also likely have been entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under Shanigan's policy. However, Integon's policy was inconsistent with these statutes, and Integon told Ennen that he was not entitled to any additional money. Six years later, some time after Integon learned that its underinsured motorist provision violated Alaska insurance statutes, Integon paid Appellant underinsured motorist benefits plus interest and fees. Appellant sued Integon for bad faith. Integon filed a third-party complaint against Appellant's attorney, Craig Allen. Before trial, the superior court dismissed Integon’s claims against Allen on the ground that allowing Integon to implead Appellant's attorney would violate public policy. The superior court held that because Appellant did not own the insurance policy, Integon did not owe him a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the superior court concluded that Appellant had no cause of action for bad faith. But, in the event this ruling were to be reversed on appeal, the superior court made an alternate finding that while Integon had committed the tort of bad faith, Appellant had suffered no damages as a result. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed on both counts. "The superior court was justifiably cautious about extending the bad faith cause of action to a new class of plaintiffs, but we conclude that Ennen, as an insured, is eligible under our existing case law to bring a cause of action for bad faith." The Court concluded that Appellant established facts that would entitle him to damages. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Integon's third-party claim against Allen on the alternative ground that Allen was not a proximate cause of Appellant's harm. View "Ennen v. Integon Indemnity Corp." on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff Helen Barton was injured while watching a high school football game in Barrow when a player ran out of bounds during a play and collided with her, breaking her leg. Plaintiff sued the North Slope Borough School District, alleging in part that the football field had not been designed or built with a proper "run-off" area along the sidelines and that spectators had improperly been allowed to stand in the run-off area during the game. Plaintiff retained expert landscape architect Juliet Vong who proposed to testify that she used a particular manual in designing sports fields "to help ensure the appropriate dimensions and design criteria are met for a given sport and level of play." The School District filed a motion in limine to exclude Vong's testimony because it did not provide an admissible expert opinion. The superior court agreed with the District and excluded Vong's report and testimony. At a jury trial in August 2010, the District was found not negligent. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the superior court should not have excluded Vong's testimony and that doing so was prejudicial to Plaintiff's case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that although it was error to exclude Vong’s testimony, the error was harmless. View "Barton v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law

Appellant James Grace suffered permanent brain injuries when his helmet failed after he braked to avoid hitting a dog and was thrown over the handlebars of his motorcycle. Appellant and his wife, Kathleen, filed personal injury and loss of consortium claims against the helmet retailer and manufacturer. The Graces received disbursements from the receiver of one of the manufacturer's second-tier insurance providers that had filed for bankruptcy and gone into liquidation, and entered a settlement agreement with the third-tier insurance carrier. Appellant and his wife separated at some point after the accident, divorced for a month, and remarried. Except for a partial disbursement of funds that occurred while their final divorce hearing was pending, the Graces were unable to agree upon how the remaining settlement and insurance proceeds should be divided. The Graces' lawyer filed an action for interpleader asking the superior court to determine how to divide the remaining funds. After a one-day trial, the superior court concluded that: (1) based on the "analytic" approach in "Bandow v. Bandow," the portion of the recovery from the receiver for the manufacturer's second-tier insurance carrier that was allocated for past economic loss, past medical loss, and rehabilitation services was marital property and should have been divided equally; and (2) the recovery from the third-tier insurance carrier was the result of a jointly-assigned bad faith insurance claim and belonged to both parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's division of the proceeds from the second-tier insurance carrier, but reversed its division of the proceeds from the third-tier insurance carrier. View "Grace v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Appellant Ryan Nelson agreed to perform an errand for his employer, a subcontractor, on the Appellant's day off. While on in the errand, the Appellant was injured at the job site. His employer filed a "notice of controversion" on the basis that Appellant was intoxicated at the time of the injury and his injuries were proximately caused by his intoxication. Appellant sued the general contractor and the Municipality of Anchorage (the owner of the job site) for negligence. The defendants asked the superior court to dismiss the action under the exclusive remedy provision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act. The superior court granted summary judgment to the general contractor and the Municipality. Appellant appeals, arguing that lack of a workers' compensation remedy permits him to bring a common law negligence action or, alternatively, that the exclusivity provision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act denied him due process. He also argued as a matter of statutory construction, that the Municipality could not be a project owner. Because the worker has not shown that the employer’s controversion of benefits left him to his common law remedies, the Supreme Court determined Appellant's statutory construction and constitutional claims were not ripe. The Court also held that the Municipality could be a project owner. View "Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

In 2002 Plaintiff Kevin O'Connell was awarded damages against Defendants Anthony and Paulette Will for Defendants' failure to pay a promissory note. Under the attorney's fee provision in the note, Plaintiff was also awarded full attorney's fees and costs. After Plaintiff's attorney engaged in post-judgment collection efforts, Anthony Will paid the judgment. In 2009 Anthony Will filed a request for an order that the judgment in the case had been satisfied, and the superior court granted the motion. Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a further award of fees, arguing that he incurred additional fees in collecting the original judgment and that under the terms of the promissory note he is entitled to an additional award for those fees. The superior court denied his motion and Plaintiff appealed. He also argued that the superior court should not have considered Anthony Will's motion for entry of a satisfaction of judgment because Anthony failed to serve Paulette Will, Anthony's ex-wife, with the motion. Because the promissory note's terms did entitle Plaintiff to post-judgment fees, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's order denying Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees. The superior court did not err in considering Anthony Will's motion, but because Plaintiff was entitled to post-judgment attorney’s fees, the Court vacated the superior court’s entry of an order that the judgment was satisfied. View "O'Connell v. Will" on Justia Law

After a minor collision between two vehicles in the drive-through line of a Taco Bell, Jack Morrell, the driver of one vehicle, stabbed and killed Eric Kalenka, the driver of the other vehicle. Morrell was uninsured and Kalenka’s policy provided coverage for liabilities arising out of the “ownership, maintenance, or use” of an uninsured motor vehicle. Kalenka’s automobile insurer filed an action in superior court, seeking a declaration that Kalenka’s policy did not provide coverage for Kalenka’s death. The superior court concluded that there was no general liability coverage under the policy. Appellant Uwe Kalenka, the personal representative of Eric Kalenka’s estate, appealed the denial of liability coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s determination that Kalenka’s policy did not provide liability coverage. View "Kalenka v. Infinity Insurance Companies" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were coverage limits associated with underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance and whether coverage provided under disputed insurance policies complies with the requirements of Alaska insurance statutes. The Respondent families hold UIM policies. They alleged they suffered emotional distress and loss of consortium as a result of a collision that killed one family’s child and severely injured the other family’s child. The insurer accepted that the policyholders incurred damages. However, it contended that the families exhausted the coverage limits available to them under the UIM policies because the family members seeking damages were not “in” the fatal collision. The superior court concluded that the families had not exhausted their UIM coverage under Alaska insurance statutes and reformed the insurance policies to allow the emotional distress claims to proceed to arbitration. The superior court dismissed the families’ loss of consortium claims as outside the coverage of the policies. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the families exhausted the coverage limits available under their policies and that these policies were consistent with statutory requirements, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision to reform the policies. Because coverage limits are exhausted, the Court declined to consider whether loss of consortium was covered under the policies. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Houle" on Justia Law

Appellant Zebuleon Whitney collided with a bicyclist in his pick-up truck, seriously injuring the bicyclist. The bicyclist sought a settlement agreement in excess of the maximum coverage of the driver’s insurance policy. Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) responded with an offer to tender policy limits, which the bicyclist refused. After a series of court proceedings in both state and federal court, Appellant sued his insurance company, complaining in part that his insurance company had breached its duty to settle. State Farm moved for partial summary judgment on a portion of the duty to settle claims. The superior court granted the motion. The parties then entered a stipulation by which Appellant dismissed all remaining claims, preserving his right to appeal, and final judgment was entered in the insurance company’s favor. Because State Farm’s rejection of the bicyclist’s settlement demand and its responsive tender of a policy limits offer was not a breach of the duty to settle, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to that extent. But because the superior court’s order exceeded the scope of the insurance company’s motion for partial summary judgment, The Court reversed the superior court’s order to the extent it exceeded the narrow issue upon which summary judgment was appropriate. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings concerning the surviving duty to settle claims. View "Whitney v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law